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On Forgetting to Read Solzhenitsyn
It was in 1974 that I first picked up a copy of The Gulag Archipelago. I didn’t 
finish reading it until this century. It is a very long book—seven books to 
be precise, published in three volumes that together run to roughly two 
thousand pages in English translation. But it shouldn’t take forty years to 
read a book, even a very long one. Why it took me four decades to finish 
reading Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s crowning achievement requires a little 
backstory and can serve as an entry point into the present book.
Solzhenitsyn’s epic work documents one of the great crimes of the 
modern era, the Gulag—the network of prison camps in the former 
Soviet Union, which more than any other institution came to symbolize 
Stalinism—the authoritarian political system derived from the name of 
the Soviet Union’s long-time ruler, Joseph Stalin. Gulag is an abbreviated 
form of “Glavnoe upravlenie ispravitel’no-trudovykh lagerei,” or the “Chief 
Administration for Corrective Labour Camps.” But the term has come to 
signify much more than this. It refers, as Anne Applebaum notes, to an 
entire array of “labor camps, punishment camps, criminal and political 
camps, women’s camps, children’s camps, transit camps.”1 It was not just a 
prison system, but a system of forced labour.
An archipelago is, of course, a chain of islands. In Solzhenitsyn’s view, 
the series of prison camps extending across the Soviet Union formed “that 
amazing country of Gulag which, though scattered in an Archipelago 
geographically, was, in the psychological sense, fused into a continent—
an almost invisible, almost imperceptible country inhabited by the zek 
people”2— zek being camp slang for “prisoners.”3 This archipelago, Solzhe-




which it was located, like a giant patchwork, cutting into its cities, hov-
ering over its streets. Yet there were many who did not even guess at its 
presence.”4 The Arctic city of Vorkuta was a principal site in the Gulag 
archipelago. Michael Allen traces Vorkuta’s origins to the summer of 1932, 
when a secret-police supervised “geological survey group, primarily made 
up of prisoners” arrived in the area. The city that grew from these small 
beginnings was constructed entirely by forced labourers.5 According to 
Alan Barenberg, the two labour camps associated with the city, “Vor-
kutinskii lager’ (‘Vorkuta camp,’ better known as Vorkutlag) and its twin, 
Rechnoi lager’ (‘river camp,’ better known as Rechlag) saw approximately 
half a million prisoners pass through their gates by the middle of the 
1950s.”6
Barenberg suggests that, in employing the archipelago metaphor, Sol-
zhenitsyn was exaggerating the extent to which the Gulag was an “almost 
invisible, almost imperceptible”7 world of its own—that, in fact, the bor-
ders between the Gulag and the rest of the Soviet Union were more porous 
than Solzhenitsyn implies. Pointing to the constant churn of prisoners 
entering and leaving the system, at a rate far more rapid than was pre-
viously recognized, he joins historian Lynne Viola in insisting that our 
understanding of the Gulag system must be extended to include what 
Viola calls “the other archipelago”—the massive resettlement of former 
“kulaks”8 (a controversial term about which much will be said in the fol-
lowing pages). This approach brings the Gulag system into focus not as 
one of exception but rather as an extreme point on a continuum of unfree 
labour and “follows the conclusions of historians Sheila Fitzpatrick and 
Donald Filtzer, who separately argued that ‘free’ labor could hardly have 
existed under Stalin, particularly from 1940 until 1953”9—that is, from 
the 26 June 1940 introduction of a law making it a criminal offense for 
a worker to leave their job without the employer’s permission, to the 5 
March 1953 death of Stalin.
One aspect of this approach is both necessary and important, bring-
ing into focus the massive, forced resettlement of millions of peasants. 
The resulting exile colonies need very much to be understood as part of 
the Gulag.10 However another aspect—the notion of placing the Gulag 
experience on a continuum of “unfree” labour—while compelling on an 




and terrible experiences of those condemned to the Gulag prison camps 
per se. Besides the appalling death rates, there were the hidden injuries of 
broken relationships and damaged lives.
Suzanne Rosenberg was one of the hundreds of thousands who were 
labelled “enemies of the people” and unjustly incarcerated in the forced 
labour camps of the Gulag. She did survive and was eventually released, 
but she returned home to a cold reception—including from her own young 
daughter, who at one point “tore to shreds a photograph” of her mother. 
“Longing to disassociate themselves from their arrested parents,” writes 
Rosenberg, “such children all the more eagerly proclaimed their loyalty 
to the socialist regime.”11 Over several years, Rosenberg repaired relations 
with her daughter, but her story helps bring into sharp relief the different 
life experiences of those within and those without the Gulag prison camps. 
Even if the category of “free” labourer did not exist in Stalinist Russia, 
Solzhenitsyn and others are absolutely right to emphasize the extreme 
circumstances faced by “residents” of the Gulag prison camps. The experi-
ences of those confined within these prisons merit separate treatment 
from the experiences of those who managed to remain in regular society.
Estimating the total number of people who, at some point in their 
lives, experienced the forced labour regime of this archipelago is not a 
straightforward exercise. Applebaum, in the appendix (“How Many?”) 
to her monumental Gulag: A History, calculates that between 1929 and 
1953, some eighteen million Soviet citizens were incarcerated in the camps 
of the Gulag. If we add to this figure the four million (mostly German) 
prisoners of war interned during World War II; the approximately seven 
hundred thousand former Russian prisoners of war who, once released 
from German camps, were sent to the Gulag; and the six million “special 
exiles” (including “kulaks deported during collectivization, Poles, Balts 
and others deported after 1939, and Caucasians, Tartars, Volga Germans, 
and others deported during the war”), then “the total number of forced 
laborers in the USSR comes to 28.7 million.”12 We don’t know how many 
died. A very conservative estimate is close to three million.13 Many of the 
millions who were sent to the Gulag were political prisoners. According 
to Solzhenitsyn, of these political prisoners “on whom the thunderbolt of 
arrest at one time or another fell . . . I doubt whether a fifth, I should like 




Pages of The Gulag Archipelago. Photograph by Adam Jones, 25 July 2017, 
Wikimedia Commons.
The Gulag Archipelago was, in the words of Solzhenitsyn, an “experi-
ment in literary investigation.” It was an experiment conducted in the 
laboratory of the author’s own bitter experiences. A captain in the Red 
Army taking part in the war with Germany in 1945, Solzhenitsyn was 
arrested, as he puts it, “because of my correspondence with a school 
friend,” in which the two “indulged in fairly outspoken expressions of 
our political outrage and in derogatory comments about the Wisest of the 
Wise,” i.e., Stalin.15 This correspondence was, according to Solzhenitsyn, 
an example of “childish stupidity.”16 According to the authorities, it was 




eight years in the camp system before being released into exile just in time 
to learn, from the radio, of the death of Stalin. It was “the moment for 
which every zek in Gulag (except the orthodox Communists) had prayed! 
He’s dead . . . ! The villain has curled up and died!”17
It was an experiment conducted in almost impossible circumstances. 
“I had to conceal the project itself,” he explains, “my letters, my materials, 
to disperse them, to do everything in the deepest secrecy. I even had to 
camouflage the time I spent working on the book with what looked like 
work on other things.” He hid various portions of the book in different 
apartments and offices of friends and supporters, so that “never once did 
this whole book, in all its parts, lie on the same desk at the same time!”18
Despite these constraints, Solzhenitsyn accumulated the “reports, 
memoirs, and letters” of 227 individuals who had experienced the horror 
of the camps.19 Their names were to have been listed when the book was 
published, but because of the repressive conditions in the Soviet Union 
in the 1960s and 1970s, they had to remain anonymous. Solzhenitsyn 
persevered in overcoming all these obstacles and produced a work that 
will no doubt continue to be read for generations to come.
In 1974, when the paperback version of the English translation of the 
first volume became available, I was a teenager from small-town Ontario, 
Canada—newly arrived in Toronto. Before my move to the big city, an 
interest in Russian literature and history had taken me to Tolstoy’s War 
and Peace. During my first summer in Toronto, I added Leon Trotsky’s 
History of the Russian Revolution to my reading list, among other long and 
compelling literary products of Russian culture. So, when the paperback 
edition of Gulag Archipelago, volume 1, appeared, it was quite natural to 
add it to the reading list. In October 1974, I bought a copy for $1.95 and 
began reading and carefully underlining portions that I, an impressionable 
small-town teenager just discovering politics and history, found relevant.
October 1974 marked not only my introduction to Solzhenitsyn, but also 
my introduction to student and Left politics in Toronto. At the end of 
one student council meeting, a Leading Member of the Toronto Left sug-




Russia, the Cold War, and other things political. That I had read Tolstoy 
did not impress. That I was studying Russian impressed a bit. That I was 
reading Trotsky—along with Lenin, the most well-known figure from 
1917 and, in the years since, the most well-known of Stalin’s opponents—
impressed greatly. But when the subject of Solzhenitsyn came up, the 
Leading Member frowned.
“Gulag is not a good book. Solzhenitsyn is not reliable. His views of 
events are distorted.”
I felt myself blushing with shame. The Leading Member was an import-
ant person. Everyone knew him. I didn’t want to be reading a bad book. I 
asked the Leading Member what exactly made it a bad book.
“Well,” he said, “Solzhenitsyn is very colourful and impassioned about 
the Gulag. And it was a horrible thing, the Gulag. But he’s made himself a 
member of a Cold War chorus which insists that the Gulag is not just about 
Stalin. They say it’s about Lenin as well. Solzhenitsyn says the Gulag begins 
with Lenin. He says that Lenin led to Stalin. He’s an anti-communist.”
I was mortified. The book I was annotating, the book that had me 
hooked, was a bad book. It had a bad line on Lenin. It was anti-communist. 
I felt terrible. The early 1970s were profoundly shaped by the long Cold 
War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those on the Left 
who were opposed to the crimes of the United States in, for instance, 
Indochina experienced tremendous pressure to be suspicious about any 
criticism of the Soviet Union, since such criticism might open the door to 
anti-communism. Solzhenitsyn’s book went on the shelf and stayed there 
for almost four decades.
Flash forward to 2013. In addition to returning to the study of the 
Russian language, I was picking up threads of old research and acquir-
ing material on the Mezhraionka, the Inter-District Committee, a 
four-thousand-strong organization of radical, mostly young workers that 
in July 1917, along with Trotsky, joined Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshe-
viks—the left-wing party that, along with its counterpart and rival the 
Mensheviks, originated as a faction in the Russian Social Democratic 
Labour Party (Rossiiskaia sotsial-demokraticheskaia rabochaia partiia, or 
RSDRP).20 I was also writing conference papers on three generations of 
class struggle in the Arctic coal-mining town of Vorkuta (pronounced 




this book. Vorkuta, a town surrounded by multiple prison camps, was one 
of the principal “islands” comprising the Gulag Archipelago. From 1936 to 
1938, Vorkuta’s prison camps were the site of the last stand of anti-Stalinist 
socialists, many of them Trotskyists (followers of Trotsky), who waged a 
heroic hunger strike and, against all odds, won their demands, only to be 
taken into the Arctic tundra and massacred en masse. In the period from 
1947 to 1953, Vorkuta became one of the principal sites of the strike wave 
that sounded the death knell for the Stalinist forced labour system. And, 
in the years from 1989 to 1991, coal miners in Vorkuta—many of them 
descendants of the former camp inmates, including the murdered Trot-
skyists—stood up, organized independent trade unions, and struck again 
and again and again, until Stalinism was swept into the dustbin of history. 
I wanted to know everything I could about this town called Vorkuta.
I knew that Solzhenitsyn had mentioned something about the first 
generation of resistance—the 1936–37 hunger strike (and subsequent mas-
sacre) of the Russian Trotskyists. I also encountered in his work references 
to the second generation of resistance, the 1953 camp rebellions. But the 
bits I managed to gather together weren’t systematic; they were more a 
series of elliptical remarks in one of his most famous novels, The First 
Circle.21 Furthermore, Solzhenitsyn was a novelist, not a historian. It didn’t 
occur to me to look at The Gulag Archipelago. Truth be told, I had almost 
forgotten that it existed. I had also forgotten that it wasn’t a novel but a 
historical document of the first order.
However, in the course of my research, The Gulag Archipelago kept 
appearing in this or that footnote. When I tried to follow up on the refer-
ences, I realized something else I had forgotten—that it was a three-volume 
work. All I had was the first volume. So, I went out and bought used 
copies of the two missing volumes. Especially valuable for my research 
was volume 3, in the 1978 English translation. What I encountered in those 
pages was one of the twentieth century’s greatest chronicles of heroic mass 
workers’ resistance.
And let’s be clear, this is a workers’ story. Many years ago, the great W. 
E. B. Du Bois persuasively argued that chattel slaves toiling on the plan-
tations of pre–Civil War United States—their exclusion from the wage 
system notwithstanding—absolutely had to be included in the category 




in the category of “class struggle.”22 The analysis developed in these pages 
accepts this framework. The twenty-eight million forced labourers who 
were chewed up in the Gulag system constituted a forced labour prole-
tariat, grinding out under compulsion the goods and services deemed 
necessary by the Stalinist ruling class to creating a modern, industrialized 
society. The Stalinist ruling class was wrong. The industrialization created 
through this coerced labour proved to be a mirage, melting away into irrel-
evance upon the disintegration of the Stalinist system in 1991. The Lada 
could not compete with the Corolla. The Zenit B could not compete with 
the Nikomat. Like the Confederate slave-holding rulers before them, the 
Stalinist rulers demonstrated at some cost (to others) that coerced labour 
does not work well as a method by which to modernize.
But coerced or not, the zeks were workers. Any book that tells the life 
stories of these workers, and even more, any book that documents their 
struggles and forms of organization, is a chronicle of the movement of 
workers and the oppressed seeking liberation. Anyone who is a partisan 
of the workers’ movement needs to take such a chronicle seriously.
The second wave of rebellion, culminating in the year 1953, saw a series 
of strikes sweep through the Gulag. I had learned something of these 
strikes through memoirs and accounts that came out in print in the years 
that followed, particularly the key strikes that occurred at Vorkuta.23 But 
I had yet to read Solzhenitsyn’s account. When I finally had in my hands 
the third volume of his Gulag, I knew from the chapter headings that I 
was holding something exceptional—“The First Whiff of a Revolution,” 
“Chains, Chains . . . ,” “Poetry Under a Tombstone, Truth Under a Stone,” 
“Tearing at the Chains,” and “Behind the Wire the Ground Is Burning.” 
These chapters form the bulk of part 5 of The Gulag Archipelago, which 
comprises most of the first three hundred pages of the third volume. What 
Solzhenitsyn has written here is a beautiful, moving chronicle of workers’ 
resistance against exploitation, resistance in horrendous conditions and 
against impossible odds. Here is a sample.
In early August 1953, “eleven truckloads of soldiers drove up” to Vor-
kuta’s struck pit No. 29.24 “The prisoners were called out onto the parade 
ground, toward the gate. On the other side of the gate was a serried mass 
of soldiers. ‘Report for work, or we shall take harsh measures!’” At the sight 




there were others, who forced a path through the ranks—to stand in the 
front row, link arms, and form a barrier against the strikebreakers.” Bullets 
ended the stand-off. “There were three volleys—with machine-gun fire in 
between. Sixty-six men were killed.” Not all the soldiers could stomach 
the murdering of unarmed striking workers in cold blood. “A number of 
thin wood patches appeared on the roofs of huts at pit No. 29, covering the 
bullet holes made by soldiers firing over the heads of the crowd. Unknown 
soldiers who refused to become murderers.”25
The Vorkuta prisoners would not have known it, but one week earlier, 
eerily similar events had taken place in far away Noril’sk. A clandestine 
“self-help group” in which Danylo Shumuk was a key activist helped organ-
ize a strike that for several weeks stopped production in the Noril’sk-area 
mines. But 4 August 1953, the strike—like the one at Vorkuta—was vio-
lently broken. Massed soldiers appeared at the camp gates. In response, 
hundreds of unarmed prisoners “took up their positions, empty-handed, 
opposite the companies.” When after a brief stand-off, the soldiers opened 
fire, 79 prisoners were killed and 280 were injured.26
At Solzhenitsyn’s own camp, located at Ekibastuz, in the Karaganda 
region of Kazakhstan, resistance had already taken the form of a three-day 
hunger strike in January 1952:
None of those who took part will ever forget those three days in our 
lives. We could not see our comrades in other huts, nor the corpses 
lying there unburied. Nonetheless, the bonds which united us, at 
opposite ends of the deserted camp, were of steel. . . .
This was a hunger strike called by men schooled for decades in 
the law of the jungle: “You die first and I’ll die later.” Now they were 
reborn, they struggled out of their stinking swamp, they consented 
to die today, all of them together, rather than to go on living in the 
same way tomorrow.27
In the near term, many of these individual strike actions failed, drowned in 
bloody repression. Yet, in the longer term, the strike movement as a whole 
was victorious. The strikes were crucial in forging a new class conscious-
ness, a commitment to solidarity that, as it grew, made the forced labour 
system more and more untenable. The mass resistance by the united zeks 




camp system, ending the practice of forced labour, at least on a systematic 
mass scale.
Some “mainstream” historians are uninterested in the deep stories of 
the workers’ movements, fixated instead on developments “at the top” of 
society. When workers struck en masse against the communist state, the 
official communist historiographers adopted a mainstream attitude: they 
wanted nothing to do with it. “Like all embarrassing events in our history 
. . . these mutinies have been neatly cut out, and the gap hidden with an 
invisible join,” writes Solzhenitsyn. “Those who took part in them have 
been destroyed, and even remote witnesses frightened into silence; the 
reports of those who suppressed them have been burned or hidden in 
safes within safes within safes—so that the risings have already become a 
myth.”28 We need to rise above both mainstream indifference and Stalinist 
opprobrium and read Solzhenitsyn’s master work.
There is much to learn from Solznehnitsyn’s three volumes. There is 
also much with which to disagree. If the third volume of The Gulag Archi-
pelago reveals a hidden story of workers’ resistance, the second displays 
a deeply problematic, latent, and not-so-hidden antisemitism. One of 
the most powerful memoirs to emerge from the Gulag, that of Mikhail 
Baitalsky, critiques Solzhenitsyn’s second volume on precisely this point.29 
Solzhenitsyn clearly documents the sexual violence against women that 
existed in the camps. To illustrate his point, however, Solzhenitsyn focuses 
in on and names just one perpetrator: “the fat, dirty old stock clerk, Isaak 
Bershader . . . nauseating in appearance.”30 Baitalsky challenges Solzhe-
nitsyn’s choice:
This is the only rapist named in the entire chapter. There is not 
another hint as to the nationality of the men who bought women’s 
bodies. Meanwhile, Solzhenitsyn knows as well as I do . . . that the 
entire practice of buying women originated with the camp crimin-
als; that it was the camp criminals who played cards for women; and 
that in the criminal world there were very few Jews. . . .
He named Isaac; he named a Jew. It does not matter that for 
every Isaac there were many thousands of non-Isaacs. He was 




Solzhenitsyn’s approach is reprehensible. However, this does not mean we 
should leave his book on the shelf unread. Baitalsky himself, his biting 
critique notwithstanding, takes Solzhenitsyn seriously as an indispensable 
source for our understanding of the Gulag.
I doubt that the Leading Member whom I encountered more than 
forty years ago intended to adopt the restricted horizons of Stalinist and 
mainstream historians. However, discouraging a young enthusiast from 
reading a magnificent chronicle of workers’ resistance simply because one 
disagrees with one aspect of the story—linking the Gulag not only to Stalin 
but also to Lenin—was, at the very least, bad mentoring. Solzhenitsyn’s 
The Gulag Archipelago—in particular, its third volume—helps bring to 
light a hidden story of workers’ resistance. It is a book that should be an 
acknowledged part of the literature for all who study the great story of 
the collective resistance of workers and the oppressed, the resistance that 
is at the core of all human progress.
In the years following my encounter with the Leading Member, my pol-
itical activism and that of my friends followed a trajectory that will be 
familiar to some others of my generation. We took our inspiration from 
the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. We saw at the heart of those revo-
lutions—both the “dress rehearsal” of 1905 and the monumental events 
of 1917—the great hope of freedom for the workers in the form of soviets 
(workers’ councils) and for the peasants in the form of access to land. We 
saw the great hope of life for the planet in the end of the slaughter of the 
so-called Great War. We saw as central to the story of the Russian revo-
lutions the singular individual figure of Vladimir Lenin and the singular 
collective figure of the Bolshevik Party.
We were also anti-Stalinist. We detested Leonid Brezhnev, head of the 
Russian state from 1964 to 1982. We breathed the hope created by Poland’s 
magnificent Solidarność union. We shed no tears when the Berlin Wall fell. 
During the Tiananmen Square protests, we were with the young man and 
against the tanks he faced. And we insisted, with Trotsky, that there was 
“between Bolshevism and Stalinism not simply a bloody line but a whole 




But what of Solzhenitsyn’s insistent question: Where did it begin? This 
book will not pretend to answer this question. It will ask something more 
modest: What can we learn? For me, this learning has happened over many 
years and in at least three phases. The first phase, which dates back to the 
years following the encounter with the Leading Member, was organized 
around a simple epistemology that denied any connection between the 
Lenin moment of revolution and the Stalin moment of counter-revolution. 
Some of us were even uncomfortable with the thoughtful position of 
Victor Serge.
It is often said that “the germ of all Stalinism was in Bolshevism 
at its beginning.” Well, I have no objection. Only, Bolshevism also 
contained many other germs, a mass of other germs and those who 
lived through the enthusiasm of the first years of the first victorious 
socialist revolution ought not to forget it. To judge the living man by 
the death germs which the autopsy reveals in a corpse—and which 
he may have carried in him since his birth—is that very sensible?33
The second phase evolved in the context of the new radicalizations of 
this century, which emerged in opposition to the effects of globalization, to 
imperialist war, and to the stubborn persistence of settler colonialism. As 
in any such moment of radicalization, a new generation of young people 
was looking to examples from the past for inspiration—and some were 
drawn to the figure of Lenin in the context of the Russian Revolution. But, 
problematically, some of the material from which they were learning their 
Lenin was rehabilitating not only Lenin but also Stalin.34
In a 2009 article, “Leninism: It’s Not What You Think,” I tried to draw 
out the democratic and self-emancipatory side of the Leninist moment. 
Following Marcel Liebman in Leninism Under Lenin, I pointed out how 
democratic centralism did not emerge as a concept in Lenin’s 1903 argu-
ment for greater centralism, but rather in his 1906 argument for greater 
democracy. Following Liebman again, I insisted on seeing the overly cen-
tralist and sometimes sectarian aspects of Lenin’s theory and practice 
as determined by the repressive and authoritarian conditions of tsarist 
Russia (“tsarist” being derived from the name for the ruling monarch 
of the Russian empire, “tsar”). I argued that when this veil of repression 




for instance—Lenin strove to overcome that sectarianism and authoritar-
ianism. In the same article, I reminded readers of one of Lenin’s last public 
appearances in November 1922, his closing remarks to the Fourth Con-
gress of the Communist International (Comintern). Lenin referenced a 
resolution, adopted at the previous congress, regarding “the organisational 
structure of Communist Parties” and “the methods and content of their 
activities”—a resolution he described as “almost entirely Russian,” in that it 
reflected the conditions prevailing in Russia. While praising the resolution 
itself, Lenin warned the gathered delegates, “we have not learnt how to 
present our Russian experience to foreigners.” He went on to argue that
our most important task today is to study and to study hard. Our 
foreign comrades, too, must study. . . . Among other things they 
must learn to understand what we have written about the organi-
sational structure of the Communist Parties, and what the foreign 
comrades have signed without reading and understanding. This 
must be their first task. . . . The resolution is too Russian, it reflects 
Russian experience. That is why it is quite unintelligible to foreign-
ers, and they cannot be content with hanging it in a corner like an 
icon and praying to it. Nothing will be achieved that way.35
In other words, one cannot simply cut and paste Leninist methods into 
the context of the very different conditions prevailing in, for instance, 
western Europe.
The book you are reading represents the third phase in this evolving 
epistemology—and could very well have been titled “Leninism: It’s Not 
What I Thought.” The theme of self-emancipation versus substitutionism 
runs like a thread throughout the chapters in the book. The concept of 
self-emancipation has at its core the idea that liberation from oppres-
sion can be achieved only by the self-activity of the oppressed, who must 
become the agents of their own emancipation. By contrast, substitution-
ism refers to attempts to substitute the actions of others for the agency 
of the oppressed. A serious, unfiltered study of the Russian Revolution 
reveals that, while there was a profound self-emancipatory current at its 
heart, that current can only sometimes be located within the section of the 
Left that we retrospectively call Leninist. Certain aspects of the Leninist 




completely substitutionist, run completely counter to an emancipatory 
politics, and must be rejected.
To get at this concept of self-activity, this book is framed by an intro-
ductory chapter sketching both the hope and the horror associated 
with the Russian Revolution and its aftermath and a conclusion linking 
self-emancipation and substitutionism to ethics and the relationship 
between ends and means. The intervening chapters relate a narrative div-
ided into three parts.
Part 1, “Vorkuta: Anvil of the Twentieth Century,” provides a 
three-chapter historical pivot for the book, telling the story of the three 
generations of class struggle mentioned above—three moments of mass 
resistance to Stalinism centred in the Arctic settlement of Vorkuta, con-
cluding with the 1989–91 wave of strikes “that heralded the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.”36 “The vengeance of history,” said Leon Trotsky in his last 
book, “is far more terrible than the vengeance of the most powerful Gen-
eral Secretary.”37 The story of Vorkuta certainly makes real these prescient 
words. It also provides an indispensable foundation for our understanding 
of the arc of history from 1917 until today. No theory in the social sci-
ences can be more than an approximation of the lessons of experience. All 
such theories require a concrete grounding in knowledge of the collective 
resistance of workers and the oppressed. In these chapters, I attempt to 
create that grounding by sketching three remarkable moments of workers’ 
struggle and self-organization.
Part 2, “Self-Emancipation Versus Substitutionism,” provides a 
four-chapter conceptual pivot for the book. Chapter 4 centres on the for-
gotten insights of Iulii Martov and Raphael Abramovitch, both of whom 
theorized the central importance to the Russian Revolution of the mass 
actions of a temporary new class: peasants-in-uniform. The role of this 
temporary new class, and in particular the way in which the Bolsheviks 
leaned on these peasants-in-uniform, represented substitutionism—
peasant-soldiers for workers—on a truly grand scale. Chapter 5 provides 
some clarity on the political economy of the agrarian question—the com-
plex political and economic problem of the relationship of the peasants to 
the land on which they worked and to control over the products of their 
labour. Such clarity is indispensable to evaluating the competing claims as 




conceptual confusion in the use of the category “petit-bourgeois,” a confu-
sion in theory that was to have tragic consequences in practice. Chapters 6 
and 7 outline case studies in substitutionism—the former focussing on the 
1920 invasion of Poland and the 1921 invasion of Georgia, the latter on the 
1921 German “March Action” and the 1919 Hungarian “revolution”—and 
the politics surrounding each that dominated the early congresses of the 
Communist International.38 The German and Hungarian events bring to 
light the forgotten insights of another key political theorist, Rosa Luxem-
burg’s close ally Paul Levi.
Part 3, “The Rear-View Mirror,” is comprised of four chapters organized 
around two twenty-first-century contributions to our understanding of 
the Russian Revolution and its legacy. Marshall McLuhan made famous 
a tragic and pessimistic view of how we use historical knowledge. “The 
past went that-a-way,” he wrote. “When faced with a totally new situation, 
we tend always to attach ourselves to the objects, to the flavour of the 
most recent past. We look at the present through a rearview mirror. We 
march backwards into the future.”39 A similarly tragic, but somewhat more 
optimistic approach comes from Greek mythology, where knowledge and 
understanding are symbolized by the owl of Minerva, famously referenced 
by the German philosopher Hegel: “The owl of Minerva takes its flight 
only when the shades of night are gathering”40—tragic because, as with the 
rear-view mirror analogy, it asserts that knowledge and understanding are 
always clearest retrospectively; optimistic because at least understanding 
is possible, even if only in hindsight. Looking into the rear-view mirror, 
chapters 8 and 9 develop themes broached in Leon Trotsky’s path-breaking 
political biography of Joseph Stalin, written in 1940 but only published 
in full in 2016. Chapters 10 and 11 examine themes introduced by Tamás 
Krausz in his ambitious political biography of Lenin, published in 2015, 
but based on forty years of research.
The conclusion explores ends and means, a binary as stark as the “hope 
and horror” duality that begins this book. Many readers will recognize 
the issues raised in this text as real and problematic. Some will nonethe-
less ask: Didn’t it turn out all right in the end? Didn’t the ends justify the 
means? Any serious confrontation with Vorkuta—and the reactionary 
reality of which it was a fragment—can lead to only one conclusion: it 




The conclusion takes its last subheading from a phrase famously coined 
by Rosa Luxemburg in her 1918 pamphlet “The Russian Revolution”: 
“Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differ-
ently.”41 Here again, we are drawn back to Martov. He and his co-thinkers 
were among those who dared to “think differently.” Their much maligned, 
ethically based, and creative class analyses of the events of 1917 need to be 
pulled out from under a century of opprobrium and taken very seriously. 
The conclusion does not try to answer the tired question: Did Lenin lead to 
Stalin? The utility of such a question in the twenty-first century is not clear. 
There was a revolution. Lenin’s party played a key role in that revolution. 
What can we learn from that experience? There was a counter-revolution. 
Stalin’s party played a decisive role in that counter-revolution. What can 
we learn from that experience? That learning will only happen with our 
eyes wide open. Not forgetting to read Solzhenitsyn (and Martov, and 
Abramovitch, and Levi) are steps in that learning process.
Let us return to the Trotskyists at Vorkuta in the terrible years of 1937 and 
1938—the years of the Great Terror. Even when denied books, paper, and 
pens, they fought, to the end, with their minds. One anonymous “thin 
man,” who was one of the only survivors of the infamous Vorkuta-area 
prison known as the Brickworks (described in more detail in chapter 
1), recounts how—in the face of death at what was to be the site of mass 
executions—the prisoners found ways to resist even under appalling con-
ditions:
We had a verbal newspaper, Truth Behind Bars, we had little 
groups—circles, there were a lot of clever, knowledgeable people. 
Sometimes we issued a satirical leaflet, The Underdog. Vilka, our 
barrack representative, was editor and the illustrations were formed 
by people against a wall background. Quite a lot of laughing, too, 
mostly young ones there. When everything suddenly came to an 





The word for “truth” in Russian is pravda—the iconic name associated 
with newspapers of the Soviet regime. So, the name of their newspaper, 
Pravda za reshetkoi, or Truth Behind Bars, had a bitter, ironic meaning for 
the anti-Stalinist socialists imprisoned in the Gulag. It seems appropriate, 
as a tribute to those defenders of truth from behind bars, to borrow their 
newspaper’s title for this book.
Incarceration was a weapon frequently deployed against opponents of 
tyranny in the era of the Great War and the Russian Revolution. A minor-
ity of those imprisoned were women: in 1942, in the Gulag, for instance, 
women accounted for just 13 percent of those interned.43 Minority or 
not, women prisoners experienced extreme suffering. Those classified 
as “political” lived with the constant threat of sexual violence from, in 
particular, male prisoners classified as “criminal.” Edward Buca provides 
graphic detail of the fate of one woman political prisoner, a university 
student, who successfully fought off the advances of one predator only to 
be brutally gang-raped by him and his friends.44 Some members of that 
gendered, oppressed minority put pen to paper, among them Aleksandra 
Chumakova, Brigitte Gerland, Maria Joffe, Nadezhda Joffe, Elinor Lipper, 
and Suzanne Rosenberg, all from the camps of the Gulag, as well as Rosa 
Luxemburg, writing from a German prison cell. They provided analyses 
and memoirs indispensable to our understanding of this era. It is not 
coincidental that many of these were Jewish women. The Jewish com-
munity experienced extreme oppression under kaiserism, tsarism, and 
Stalinism, the opposition to which led thousands toward political activism.
Most readers will recognize the name Rosa Luxemburg. While the 
events of 1917 were unfolding, she was in prison because of her antiwar 
agitation, and by January 1919, she was dead, brutally murdered by military 
thugs acting with the complicity of the social democratic government of 
the day. Her insights into the dynamics of the Russian experience were 
necessarily preliminary, given her brutal murder when that revolution 
was not yet two years old. Preliminary or not, her analysis—on which 
this book relies heavily—remains central to any attempt at evaluating 
those fateful years.
Some readers will recognize the surname Joffe. The 1927 suicide note 
that Adolph Joffe penned to his close friend and comrade, Leon Trotsky, is 




epoch.45 Few people today know the name of Joffe’s second wife, Maria. 
Her memoir documenting her time in the Vorkuta camps, captured in 
the riveting One Long Night, has been central to my understanding of the 
essence of incarceration and the forced labour experience.
It seems appropriate, as a tribute to all those who spoke truth from 







Some important preliminary research for this book was carried out in 
2011 using the collection at Joseph S. Stauffer Library, while on annual 
research leave and visiting my alma mater, Queen’s University in Kingston, 
Ontario. The bulk of the research was completed while I was on sabbatical 
from Athabasca University in 2016. An appointment as associate pro-
fessor (status only) with the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education 
(OISE) allowed me access to the unparalleled resources at the University 
of Toronto. Much of the writing was done in the quiet setting of the United 
Jewish Peoples’ Order’s Camp Naivelt, on the banks of Ontario’s Credit 
River. It was at one of the camp’s regular summer Sunday bagel brunches 
where I was first introduced to the writings of Isaac Babel, writings that 
helped clarify key issues about the Soviet Union in the 1920s. My interest 
in things Russian goes back to the 1970s. The Russian language profes-
sors at York University then and my instructors at Hansa Canada and 
the University of Toronto in recent years were and have been helpful and 
patient. The anonymous manuscript reviewers made insightful and helpful 
comments, many of which I incorporated. The diligent Russian–English 
translation work of Mariya Melentyeva and Russian language copy editing 
of Elizabeth Adams from World Communications were indispensable in 
helping me navigate Russian-language source material. As always, Angela 
Pietrobon has been indispensable in making a “final pass” over the manu-
script. The index was expertly prepared by Michel Pharand. Thanks to 
Abbie Bakan, who pointed out to me in 2016 that my research into the 
Russian Revolution was, in fact, the preparation of a book manuscript. As 
always, every idea in this book emerged in long discussions with Abbie, 
with whom I have travelled a parallel political and intellectual journey for 




Adam, Rachel, and Michael are members of a younger generation that 
provides the motivation for all meaningful intellectual labour. And as I 
was going over initial copy editing in July 2019, Gabriel—the youngest of 
the next generation—was born. Welcome.
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A Note on Translations and 
Transliterations
For the most part, I have chosen to quote from and cite standard Eng-
lish translations of sources originally in Russian, as these translations are 
readily available to English-speaking readers. For writings by Lenin, those 
are found primarily in the English translation of the fourth edition of his 
Collected Works (Lenin: Collected Works, or LCW). Where no such trans-
lations exist, or where the published translations seemed in some way 
deficient, I have provided my own translations—for Lenin, translating 
primarily from the Russian fifth edition of his Collected Works (Polnoe 
sobranie sochinenii, or PSS). The excerpts from World Bolshevism were 
translated jointly by myself and Mariya Melentyeva. Otherwise, all trans-
lations are my responsibility alone.
Several systems exist for the transliteration of the Cyrillic alphabet. 
To facilitate library searches for the sources cited, I have opted to follow 
the system used by the American Library Association (ALA) and the 
Library of Congress (LC), although without recourse to diacritics. There 
are some exceptions. When a name has acquired a standard English 
spelling (such as Gorky, Lunacharsky, Preobrazhensky, and Trotsky), I 
have adopted that. For some, we have competing standards. The last 
name of the author of The Soviet Revolution: 1917-1939 has been trans-
literated in two ways—Abramovich and Ambrovitch. I have opted for 
the latter, as it was the transliteration that he himself approved when The 
Soviet Revolution was published in English in 1962. For the first name of 
his mentor and co-thinker Martov, we similarly have two standards—
Julius and Iulii. I have opted for the latter as it more accurately reflects 
the Russian pronunciation. For the same reason, I would have preferred 
to spell the surname “Joffe” as “Ioffe,” but I have retained “Joffe” for all 
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three Joffes, Adolph, Maria, and Nadezhda, in accord with what has 
become standard practice.
Translation of Russian language titles has respected the practice in 
that language of using minimal capitalization. As a result, normally, just 
the first word of the translated title has been capitalized, or the first word 
following a colon. However, there are no articles in the Russian language, 
and thus where the first word of a translated title in English is preceded 
by an article (or the first word following a colon), I have capitalized both 
the article and the noun that it modifies. The German language texts used 
have the opposite issue—in German, all nouns are capitalized, and my 
translations of German-language titles respect that practice.
Access to the works of different authors is affected by geopolitics and 
history. For the majority of the authors quoted, we have, for the most 
part, “traditional” sources—published books and journal articles. For indi-
viduals such as Martov—who became persona non grata in the decades 
following the revolution—there is a dearth of these even in Russian let 
alone in English translation, despite the fact that he was a prolific author. 
For Lenin, by contrast, we have access to far more. Massive quantities of 
his writings have been carefully, almost reverentially, preserved for poster-
ity. Some were originally published as books, journal articles, or pamphlets 
(that is, essays, often quite lengthy, issued as independent publications). 
Some were letters to individuals that were never intended for publication. 
Some were unpublished drafts. Some were consciously withheld from 
publication. A great many were short, often polemical, newspaper articles 
commenting on issues of the day.
Why does this matter? The type of publication in which an argument 
appears has a strong impact on the manner in which that argument is 
developed. Articles written for a book or journal are composed over 
months and years with the anticipation of acquiring an audience. Neces-
sarily, they involve considerable reflection and editing. Articles written 
in haste for a daily or weekly newspaper tend to use sharper and more 
extreme formulations and to be pitched in a higher emotional register 
than what would typically be found in a 300-page book or a 15,000-word 
journal article. Knowing the kind of publication, then, can be helpful in 
assessing the merits of a particular piece of writing. Consequently, as I was 
conducting my research, I found it useful to be very specific, identifying 
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exactly what “type” of publication I had before me when I cited Lenin in 
particular, and I think this might, where appropriate, be similarly useful 
for readers of the book. For many authors in this book—particularly the 
“scholar activists” (Abramovitch, Lenin, Luxemburg, Martov, Marx, Serge, 
and others)—it is helpful to know when a work was written, and this is 
not always evident from the bibliographic entry (such as when it is part of 
a collected works project, a compilation, or a reprint). So, on many occa-
sions, I have found it helpful to indicate (within square brackets) in the 
bibliography, as well as at the first use of each of the appropriate sources, 
the year in which such works were first published (or first written, in the 
case of works that remained unpublished for some time).
All works directly cited are listed in the bibliography. A complete ref-
erence for works by Lenin that are taken from LCW or PSS can be found 
in the first reference. For items not taken from LCW or PSS, publication 
information is listed in the bibliography.
Finally, a text that plays a central role in part 3 of this book—Leon 
Trotsky’s last (and unfinished) manuscript, his biography of Joseph 
Stalin—exists in English translation in two versions, both titled Stalin: 
An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence. One is an abridged edition, 
translated by Charles Malamuth and published in 1941, and the other 
is a complete edition, prepared by Alan Woods, that was published in 
2016. The earlier translation has been charged, on occasion, with being 
misleading, a charge with which I do not agree. However, to address any 
concerns on this issue, whenever I quote from a passage that appears in 








This book represents one attempt to reflect on and rethink the arc of the 
Russian Revolution of 1917 and its aftermath. It confronts both the great 
hope unleashed at its birth and the despair that ensued with its Stalinist 
denouement. It attempts to precisely identify class agency in this process, 
by rediscovering the key role of peasant-soldiers in the revolution that 
took place in the cities and by considering the forced labourers in the 
Gulag as part of a new proletariat in the making. Woven through the 
book is an interrogation of the contradiction between self-emancipation 
and substitutionism. The essence of self-emancipation was captured by 
Karl Marx in October 1864, in his draft of the inaugural rules for the 
International Working Men’s Association (often referred to as the First 
International). Its very first line was unequivocal: “the emancipation of the 
working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves.”1 
The essence of substitutionism was captured forty years later by the young 
Leon Trotsky, when—in a devastating critique of Lenin and the Bolshe-
viks—he contrasted “two opposing methods of work. . . .  In the one case 
we have a party which thinks for the proletariat, which substitutes itself 
politically for it, and in the other we have a party which politically educates 
and mobilises the proletariat to exercise rational pressure on the will of all 
political groups and parties.”2 His thesis—that there can be no substitute 
for the workers’ own mass activity as a pathway to emancipation—is a 
core premise of this book.
That there was a revolution in Russia in 1917 is undeniable. A mag-




on Women’s Day—today known as International Women’s Day.3 Orlando 
Figes captures the mood perfectly:
Towards noon huge crowds of women began to march towards the 
city centre to protest for equal rights. . . .  Photographs show the 
women were in good humour as they marched along the Nevsky 
Prospekt. 
But in the afternoon the mood began to change. Women textile 
workers from the Vyborg district had come out on strike that 
morning in protest against the shortages of bread. Joined by their 
menfolk from the neighbouring metal works, they had marched 
towards the city centre, drawing in workers from other factories on 
the way, and in some cases forcing them out, with shouts of “Bread!” 
and “Down with the Tsar!” By the end of the afternoon, some 
100,000 workers had come out on strike.4
The movement mushroomed over the next two days, and the tsar’s future 
rested on the loyalty of the armed forces, in particular the cavalry known 
as the Cossacks, who had a deserved reputation for brutality and violence. 
The afternoon of 25 February (10 March) proved decisive.
Part of the crowd was brought to a halt by a squadron of Cossacks 
blocking their way near the Kazan Cathedral. . . .  A young girl 
appeared from the ranks of the demonstrators and walked slowly 
toward the Cossacks. Everyone watched her in nervous silence: 
surely the Cossacks would not fire at her? From under her cloak the 
girl brought out a bouquet of red roses and held it out towards the 
officer. There was a pause. The bouquet was a symbol of both peace 
and revolution. And then, leaning down from his horse, the officer 
smiled and took the flowers. With as much relief as jubilation, the 
crowd burst into a thunderous “Oorah!” From this moment the 
people started to speak of the “comrade Cossacks.”5
A working-class-centred movement, now growing into a general 
strike and increasingly operating in sync with the peasant-based armed 
forces, was a movement before which none could stand. There would still 
be violent clashes and many casualties. Figes says that from the urban 




‘theirs’—hated agents of the regime. The people called them ‘pharaohs’ 
(much as some today might call the police ‘pigs’) and they had no doubts 
that the police would fight to the end.”6 But despite vicious police violence 
against the movement, the workers and peasant soldiers swept away the 
oppressive tsar and re-established the extraordinary 1905 institution of 
workers’ councils (soviets), which, for the next few months, would coexist 
uneasily alongside a provisional government hastily improvised through 
negotiations among the political parties.
Demonstration of Putilov factory workers on the first day of the February 
Revolution of 1917. Wikimedia Commons.
October Song
In his evocative poem “October Song,” Dan Georgakas described the way 
in which the October Revolution inspired millions: “The lights went on 
all over Europe. / Nothing / can ever be the same.”7 The revolution pulled 
into public political life millions who were striving to find a way out of the 
morass of war, famine, and despair to which they had been condemned 
by the old regime. It was a revolution underpinned by enormous mass 




Funeral on the Marsovo Pole (the Field of Mars), in Petrograd, where close 
to two hundred of those who died fighting in the February Revolution 
were buried on 23 March 1917. Photographer unknown, Russian State 




spontaneous.8 These movements provided the immediate background 
to the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in November, an event that has 
gone down in history as the October Revolution (based on the Julian 
calendar). 
Isaac Steinberg, who had for a few months served as the People’s Com-
missar of Justice in the post-October regime, by 1919 would find himself 
in Moscow’s Butyrka prison, following his arrest by his former Bolshevik 
allies. He was to become one of the harshest and most eloquent critics 
of the regime. Nonetheless, in a book published in 1953, only a few years 
before his death, he clearly identified the emancipatory feel of the momen-
tous events of 1917:
The October Revolution brought tremendous exaltation to vast 
sections of the Russian people. After eight months of frustrated 
expectations, there was now a profound sense of relief. . . .  The 
deepest sensation which October aroused in the people was joy. In 
city, village and Army people rejoiced in the fullness of their liber-
ation, in the limitless freedom that now summoned their creative 
efforts.9
Iulii Martov (born Iulii Osipovich Tsederbaum), another harsh critic of 
the regime, according to P. Iu. Savel’ev and S. V. Tiutiukin, believed that 
“Russia after 25 October 1917 was in many ways reminiscent of France 
under the Jacobin dictatorship, with Lenin playing the role of Robespierre 
and with its red terror and bold experiments in social leveling.”10 Martov 
was a principal leader of the Mensheviks and vociferously opposed many 
Bolshevik policies, including the resort to executions and mass terror, 
suppression of elections in the soviets, and deployment of armed soldiers 
to the countryside to forcibly seize grain from the peasants. However, this 
“did not detract from his high opinion of the imperishable democratic 
gains of October: the liberation of the country from the Entente’s [the war-
time alliance of Great Britain, France, and Russia] imperialist influence, 
the overthrow of the propertied classes, and the radical elimination of all 
remnants of serfdom. . . . These, in Martov’s eyes, were the progressive 
features of the Russian events of October 1917, their historical justification, 




Significantly, however, Martov and his co-thinkers did not call the 
events of October a revolution. According to Leopold Haimson, they 
“insisted on calling October an ‘overturn’ (perevorot).”12 This word has an 
ambiguous (and evolving) meaning. In 1917, it was often used interchange-
ably with revolution (revoliutsiia) and uprising (vosstanie) to describe 
both the events of February/March and October/November. However, 
by the mid-1920s, the term revoliutsiia (revolution) had become, in effect, 
the officially sanctioned term for what would later in English become 
some version of “The Great October Revolution.” But for Martov and the 
Mensheviks, the October/November events were never a revolution, but 
rather a perevorot—an overturn. In modern usage, the term perevorot 
can in fact, be translated as “coup” or “putsch,” words with much sharper, 
more negative connotations.13 But Haimson’s stress on translating it as 
“overturn” does accurately coincide with Martov’s political analysis of the 
October events, an analysis developed in detail through many publications 
in the years that followed. Martov’s use of the term began in the very heat 
of the long, chaotic 1917 night when the Second Congress of the Soviets 
was in session. As the Bolshevik-directed military operation unfolded, 
Martov read out a joint declaration from his Menshevik-Internationalists 
and the Jewish Socialist Labour Party (Paole-Tsion), which read: “The 
overturn which gave power in Petrograd into the hands of the Military 
Revolutionary Committee the day before the opening of the Congress, was 
perpetrated by the Bolshevik Party alone by means of a purely military 
conspiracy.”14 “Overturn” (perevorot) was used by Martov again in his 1919 
book World Bolshevism, a book to which we will return on many occasions 
throughout this text.15
Where did the October Revolution (or overturn) come from? Just 
before the outbreak of war in 1914, Russia had a population of more than 
170 million.16 It was a multinational and overwhelmingly peasant-based 
empire, with the minority of wage-earning workers and the educated 
middle class largely concentrated in a small number of cities—most 
notably, Petrograd (known before 1914 as St. Petersburg) and Moscow. 
The rural population was caught in a hellish netherworld, formally freed 
from feudalism and serfdom in the 1860s, but in fact trapped in extreme 
poverty, “producing food crops primarily for its own consumption and for 




Chained by debt to local usurers and village strong men, peasants were 
condemned to exist within the illiterate, patriarchal, and oppressive struc-
ture of the so-called commune, or mir. In that small world, petty power 
was in the hands of the male heads of households, whose ruling weapon of 
choice was the cudgel, wielded equally against “their” women and “their” 
children.18 In 1922, Maxim Gorky wrote that “women are nowhere beaten 
as mercilessly and terribly as in the Russian village” and that “children, 
too, are assiduously beaten.” These beatings were justified through folklore. 
“Probably in no other country do proverbs offer such advice. ‘Hit your 
wife with the butt of the axe, get down and see whether she is breathing. 
If she is and shamming, she wants more.’” According to Gorky, “hundreds 
of such aphorisms, embodying the people’s wisdom accumulated over 
centuries, circulate in the countryside.”19 Figes tells the story set in 1908 of 
Grigorii Maliutin, a male peasant who had for years been the chief elder 
of his village. He “was a heavy-built and heavy drinking septuagenarian. 
. . . Vain and jealous of his power, he was a strict disciplinarian, a village 
despot of the old school, who still beat his elderly wife and, as the elder 
of the village, flogged any peasant found guilty of a crime. Most of the 
villagers lived in fear of him.”20
In 1914, this patriarchal violence of the village was joined by the mass 
violence of the trenches. With the outbreak of World War I, a huge number 
of peasant boys were removed from the fields and placed into uniform. Of 
the sixteen million mobilized in total, at least twelve million were peasant 
males.21 Roger Pethybridge estimates that “by 1916, 36 per cent of the male 
population of working age was under arms.”22 For peasant males, that 
percentage was certainly higher: fully 66 percent of the roughly eighteen 
million peasant males between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine were 
called up.23 An extraordinary proportion of the able-bodied young peasant 
men (and many of the not so able-bodied older men) were pulled into the 
trenches and subjected to unimaginable suffering. By 1917, writes Boris 
Souvarine, “the dead already numbered two million and a half; there were 
three million wounded and prisoners. Hospitals and ambulance stations 
were overflowing with the sick.”24
The repercussions from this mass mobilization and mass slaughter 
were enormous. The creation of a mass army of peasant male soldiers cre-




of prisoners of war and refugees from the combat zone only partly alleviat-
ed.”25 As a result, the number of acres of land sown with wheat fell steadily, 
from 270 million acres in 1913, the year before the war, to just 138 million 
in 1916, two years into the conflict.26 In the country, says Richard Pipes, 
“landlords, for lack of farm labor, were unable to fulfill their traditional 
role as suppliers of food to the cities.”27 Furthermore, the sixteen million 
young men pulled into the army were not merely lost as labourers but 
were added to the rolls of consumers dependent on surplus grain from 
the countryside. The main thread connecting the countryside to the urban 
areas had always been the trade in grain, on which the cities relied to 
feed their growing populations. That thread was now broken. By 1917, the 
cities were haunted by hunger. It was no accident that the Women’s Day 
demonstration in Petrograd, which sparked the revolution, was a plea 
by women for bread. As Marcel Liebman describes it: “Procession after 
procession passed through the street to cries of ‘Bread,’ ‘Our children are 
starving,’ ‘We have nothing to eat!’”28
The uprising in the cities, sparked by hunger and fatigue with the war, 
was like an electric shock in the already seething trenches. Soldiers were 
restive even before the revolution: in January 1917, the inspector general 
of artillery estimated that “one million or more soldiers had shed their 
uniforms and returned home.”29 The new provisional government, which 
assumed power in the vacuum created by the abdication of the tsar on 2 
March (15 March) 1917, promised an elected Constituent Assembly where 
the agrarian question would be discussed and settled. For the peasant sol-
diers at the front, settling the agrarian question meant one thing—seizing 
and redistributing land that was outside the control of the commune. In 
part, this meant land controlled by the rich landowners, but it also meant 
the land of family farmers, a class newly created through a package of 
radical policy changes introduced in late 1906, often called the “Stolypin 
reform” after their chief architect, Petr Stolypin, the minister of the Inter-
ior, appointed prime minister by the tsar in July 1906. Stolypin’s reforms 
aimed to increase agricultural productivity by enabling peasants to choose 
to leave the mir and set up on their own piece of land as independent 
family farmers. By 1915, as a consequence of these reforms, approximately 




established family-run farms.30 The land of this new class of family farmers 
was coveted by those peasants still engaged in communal farming.
The provisional government—an unstable coalition of liberal democrats 
and non-Bolshevik socialists in which the latter soon became domin-
ant—could not navigate these waters. Over the roughly eight months of 
its existence, it tried to bridge the demands of the workers and peasants 
for bread, peace, and land and the demands of the business class and the 
general staff of the army, whose shared agenda was military victory and 
a free rein for a liberal, capitalist society along West European lines and 
who feared and distrusted the peasants and workers. It was a bridge too far.
We can add Isaac Steinberg to the list outlined in the preface of writ-
ers who produced truth from behind bars. Imprisoned in 1919 as part of 
the suppression of all left-wing challenges to the Bolsheviks, he wrote 
what is perhaps the best survey of the immense forces that led from the 
February Revolution, through the stalemated months of the provisional 
government, to the October Revolution—a survey where one key chapter 
was written “on tiny scraps of paper, which were smuggled out to his wife 
from the Butyrka prison in Moscow,”31 and on which the narrative that 
follows relies heavily.
The provisional government, while opposed to the old tsarist regime, 
nonetheless refused to pull Russia out of the tsar’s murderous war. On 18 
June (1 July) 1917, Alexander Kerensky, associated with the peasant-based 
Social-Revolutionary Party then serving as the provisional government’s 
minister of war (and soon to become its official leader), pushed the 
peasant-soldier mass into one last futile offensive—an offensive that ended 
in defeat, death, destruction, and a chaotic retreat. The very launch of the 
offensive was the tipping point, resulting in what Steinberg describes as 
“deep moral and psychological disturbances within the Army. Soldiers 
considered themselves betrayed by their democratic and socialist lead-
ers.”32 This sense of betrayal led directly to what has come to be known 
as the “July days.”
In the first week of July, Steinberg writes, “tens of thousands of workers, 
Petrograd soldiers and Kronstadt sailors poured into the streets to demand 
a radical change. The Bolshevik Party, still weak at that time . . . attached 
itself to this mass movement and furnished it with a slogan: ‘All Power 




violence, had only just ended when “military catastrophe at the front 
broke. The mass retreat of the Russian Army began. . . . Nothing was left 
of the offensive.”34 Kerensky and the other government socialists lost their 
legitimacy and, unable to rely on popular support, increasingly turned to 
the general staff of the army as their only ally. This alliance with reaction-
ary militarism saw them sanction what had once been unthinkable—“the 
death penalty was reintroduced at the front for soldiers who refused to 
enter battle. . . . In restoring the death penalty, the revolution tumbled 
from its moral height and delivered to the military clique a weapon that 
would later be used against the revolution itself.”35
For a few weeks, military reaction carried the day. The government 
socialists and the army general staff were able, for a while, to pin the 
blame on the far Left for the defeat on the battlefield, accusing them of 
having “sabotaged” the armed forces. These charges were, in particular, 
levelled against the Bolsheviks and the Left Social-Revolutionaries—the 
radical wing of the peasant-based Social-Revolutionaries (SRs) that, as the 
revolution unfolded, emerged as an independent party. “Together with 
the Bolsheviks Trotsky and Lunacharsky, the Left Social-Revolutionaries 
Proshyan and Ustinov were arrested,” Steinberg notes, and their organiz-
ations were pushed underground.36
Again, it was developments at the front that transformed the situation. 
On 21 August (3 September), the German armies broke through and began 
moving toward Petrograd. This time, the situation could not be blamed on 
the now underground far Left. As Steinberg tells it, people began to ask 
whether this military debacle resulted from “some evil plan on the part 
of the military reactionaries.” These sentiments crystallized on 26 August 
(8 September), when “General Kornilov and his headquarters began an 
open rebellion against the Government.” But his attempted coup quickly 
disintegrated: “The counter-revolution had miscalculated.”
The entire country—from the capital to the last forgotten village—
rose as one. . . . As on a signal, workers, soldiers, railway men, postal 
officials armed themselves, occupied all danger points, cut off the 
military headquarters from the rest of the country and forced them 
to complete capitulation. Tremendous strength was thus uncovered 
in the soviets when Kerensky, in despair, turned to them for help. 




the political issues involved, were not out to save Kerensky’s Gov-
ernment, but their own independence which, they now realized, 
dwelled in the power of the Soviets. The road to the October Revolu-
tion, from that moment, lay open.37
Travelling on that road to revolution were millions of deserting sol-
diers. Roger Pethybridge notes that, on 25 October 1917, more than 9.3 
million men in total were stationed at the front and the rear, but, by spring 
1918, “most of them had literally melted away.”38 Throughout 1917 and 
into 1918, millions of young peasant men and boys, arms in hand, turned 
toward home. “Fearing a division of land in their absence,” Souvarine 
reports, they “returned en masse to the villages without permission” and 
“began to pillage the great estates, and to seize cattle.”39 But their pillage 
was not restricted to the great estates. According to Richard Pipes, “the 
communal peasants, at first cautiously and then with increasing boldness, 
raided landed property, first and foremost that belonging to fellow peas-
ants who had withdrawn from the commune and taken title to private 
land.”40 This was, indeed, a revolution, but with ominous contours. For 
peasants to take land from the great estates was both just and progressive, 
but for the patriarchal commune to assert ownership over small family 
farms was neither. In economic terms, it was a serious retreat, since the 
two areas that had traditionally been able to produce a grain surplus—
the large estates and the family farms—were now swallowed up by the 
unproductive commune, whose members were always just on the edge 
of subsistence production, unable to develop the productivity of labour 
necessary for bringing large surpluses to market. Finding a solution to the 
agrarian question had begun, but it was by no means finished.
These mass movements of peasant-soldiers, urban women, and factory 
workers—movements that took the form of mutiny and desertion in the 
army, the forcible appropriation of land by peasants in the countryside, 
and bread riots, strikes, and the formation of soviets in the cities—were 
the background to the November 1917 seizure of power by the Bolshevik 
Party. It was a seizure of power done in the name of the soviets under the 
slogans “Bread, peace, and land!” and “All power to the Soviets!” and with 




The End of an Era
How did the hopes of 1917 metamorphose into the horrors of Stalin-
ism? Leon Trotsky and Boris Souvarine—whose pathbreaking studies 
of Stalinism will anchor chapters 8 and 9 of this book—differ in their 
interpretations of what has come to be known as the October Revolution. 
Neither would have entertained Martov’s much more nuanced approach 
in seeing the October events as an “overturn”—the imposition of a new 
governmental authority (vlast) through the armed actions of a minority, 
within a still-intact, but damaged, revolutionary process. For Trotsky, it 
was a proletarian uprising, calling into existence the first workers’ state 
since the Paris Commune of 1871, a workers’ state representing, in the 
minds of many in his generation, a higher form of democracy than a 
parliamentary state. For Souvarine, October 1917 was a coup d’état by the 
Bolshevik Party in alliance with radicalized soldiers and sailors, a largely 
military undertaking with the urban workers per se playing a very small 
role. The resulting state was only nominally proletarian, the real power 
resting in the hands of the Bolshevik Party machine—that machine resting 
not on the self-active urban workers organized in workers’ councils, but 
rather on the mobilized masses of pro-Bolshevik peasant-soldiers and 
sailors. Trotsky saw the January 1918 dispersal of the Constituent Assembly 
to be inevitable and just, since a higher form of democracy now existed 
through the soviets. Souvarine regarded soviet democracy as being more 
formal than real and saw the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly as a 
tragedy, making inevitable a civil war between the Bolsheviks in the cities 
and the peasant masses in the countryside.41
Differences aside, Trotsky and Souvarine agree on many of the key 
contours of the counter-revolution that followed. Both understood the 
underpinnings of the counter-revolution to be the harsh conditions in 
which the original revolution unfolded—world war, civil wars, foreign 
intervention, famine, social dislocation, mass unemployment, and popula-
tion dispersal. The pressures from these conditions came to a head in early 
1921, with strike waves sweeping the major cities and peasant rebellions 
sweeping the countryside in reaction to the period of what has come to 
be known as “war communism,” from 1918 to 1921, during which Lenin’s 
Bolshevik government dispatched urban squads to seize grain from the 




culminated in the Kronstadt rebellion, an uprising against Bolshevik 
rule carried out by the sailors who had, just a few years before, been the 
military bulwark of the regime. In 1921, the Bolsheviks, at the cost of 
thousands of lives, crushed the Kronstadt rebellion, and in the immediate 
aftermath, the revenge of the security forces was fierce. Isaac Steinberg 
describes the terrible consequences of Kronstadt: “Every night groups of 
imprisoned sailors were taken from the Petrograd jails and shot. Great 
numbers were sent to the prisons and concentration camps of Archangel 
and Turkestan.”42 The former, Archangel, was the extreme northerly dis-
trict in which, in the summer of 1923, the notorious Solovki camp was 
established, the first post-revolutionary hard labour concentration camp. 
Socialist prisoners interred there encountered those survivors of Kron-
stadt, who had been promised an amnesty in 1922. Tragically, however 
“a good half ” of these Kronstadt sailors “(and their number was in the 
four figures) did not live long enough to enjoy the amnesty.”43 Steinberg 
concludes that “Kronstadt marked the end of an era. After Kronstadt the 
Russian people no longer had the strength to stand up in such a manner 
for their rights and honor.”44
Lenin and the Bolsheviks did, however, accede to the Kronstadt sailors’ 
principal economic demand—the end of war communism and a return to 
distribution of grain through the market. As a result, the regime was able 
to achieve some degree of stabilization. But many of the most politically 
active workers, on whom all hopes rested for a workers’ revolution, had 
been killed in the civil wars, dispersed to the countryside, or pulled into 
the burgeoning state and party apparatus that controlled both political 
and economic life in what became in 1922 the Soviet Union. Although an 
important and politicized workforce still existed in the cities, it operated 
under conditions of surveillance, repression, and fear. Souvarine calls 
the resulting years of political backsliding a “counter-revolution.” Trotsky 
stops short of this, preferring the term “Thermidorian reaction.”
Thermidor was the month in the French revolutionary calendar of 1794 
when Maximilien Robespierre was overthrown and executed by others 
in the French revolutionary elite. Trotsky used the term consciously, sug-
gesting an internal fight within an “intact” revolutionary process, but he 
stretched the definition beyond politics. In the Russian case, he writes, 




in character. It stood for the crystallization of a new privileged stratum, 
the creation of a new substratum for the economically dominant class.”45 
He thus pushes the notion of a Thermidorian reaction very close to the 
broader notion of a “counter-revolution.” This is not surprising. Trotsky, 
as we will see in chapter 8, was immersed in a milieu that found it difficult 
to stick with the restrictive category of Thermidor and then apply the 
adjective “progressive” to a regime associated with artificially induced 
famines, forced labour camps, purges, and mass executions—actions that 
destroyed the lives of millions.
Catastrophe in the Countryside
Whether labelled “Thermidorian reaction” or “counter-revolution,” the 
consolidation of Stalin’s rule brought catastrophe to the countryside. In 
1928, the Stalinist regime declared its intention to “liquidate the kulaks as 
a class.”46 This was, in fact, a declaration of war against the entire peas-
antry. According to Lynne Viola, “During the collectivization of Soviet 
agriculture, almost anyone could be labeled a kulak.” Although, in theory, 
the term was applied to “rich” peasants—rural capitalists, symbolic of the 
emergence of class stratification in village settings—Viola observes that “as 
the state entered into what would be a protracted war with the peasantry, 
the kulak came to serve as a political metaphor and pejorative for the 
entire peasantry.”47 As Donald Treadgold suggests, in deciding whether 
to label someone a kulak, the Soviets probably most often used a criterion 
“openly voiced by Tito in 1949, namely, that the test of being a kulak was 
not the size of a man’s holding, but whether he was for ‘socialism’ or against 
it”—a criterion by which, Treadgold comments, “the number of kulaks in 
Russia must be reckoned as very large indeed.”48 
The essence of the war on the kulaks was the forced move of mil-
lions of peasants onto “collective farms” (kolkhozy), which might better 
be described as agricultural forced labour camps. Peasant resistance was 
intense, and even before the forced collectivization drive was over, mil-
lions died. The worst moment was the winter of 1932–33, when millions 
starved to death in what Souvarine rightly calls an “artificially organized” 
famine.49 Souvarine cites a correspondent for the Socialist Courier who 
reported in May 1934 that the 1932–33 famine had claimed five million 




an American socialist, Harry Lang. According to Souvarine, Lang had 
returned “utterly dismayed” from a stay in the Soviet Union, where he 
had learned from a senior government official that “at least six million 
starving people perished in the Ukraine at that period”—information 
that Lang subsequently published in the New York paper the Forward. 
Lang further reported that “40 per cent of the population disappeared in 
certain districts of the Ukraine and White Russia.”50
While readers today may not be familiar with either the Socialist 
Courier or the Forward, in the 1930s they were essential reading for any 
concerned with developments in the Soviet Union. The Forward was a 
Yiddish-language daily newspaper, founded in 1897, that by the early 1930s 
had a daily circulation in excess of 275,000.51 The Socialist Courier (Sot-
sialisticheskii vestnik) was a Russian-language periodical launched in 1921 
by the Menshevik Delegation Abroad, at the time consisting of just three 
members—Raphael Abramovitch, Iulii Martov, and Eva Broido.52 Pro-
duced by the Mensheviks in exile, it was smuggled into Russia and eagerly 
read by thousands. The editorial offices of the Socialist Courier followed 
the Mensheviks as they went from place of exile to place of exile—in Abra-
movitch’s case, from the Soviet Union to Berlin in the 1920s, to Paris in 
1933 after Hitler came to power, and finally to New York in 1940 after the 
Nazi invasion of France. More than seven hundred issues of the journal 
appeared, until, with the passing of the last of the veterans of 1917, it ceased 
publication in the early 1960s. Sidney Hook was not alone in his opinion 
that the Socialist Courier was “the most knowledgeable journal on Soviet 
affairs published anywhere.”53
These eye-witness accounts notwithstanding, the existence of the 
famine—particularly as it concerned the Holodomor (murder by hunger) 
centred in Ukraine—was disputed by many on the Left then, as it often is 
to this day. Late in March 1933, at the height of the famine, the New York 
Evening Post reported that “official quarters” in the Soviet Union “declared 
flatly that actual famine did not exist” and “vigorously denied . . . reports 
published abroad that the nation is suffering from famine. A statement 
that thousands were dying of starvation was branded as ‘nonsensical.’”54 
This version of events was repeated by supporters of the Soviet Union in 
the West, including the editors of Weekly People, one of North America’s 




“Every now and again scare stories originate to the effect that the Rus-
sian mass is seething in counter-revolt or is starving by the millions.”55 
Writings such as these echoed the words and relied on the research of 
award-winning journalist Walter Duranty, accurately labelled a “bour-
geois admirer” of Stalin by Jay Lovestone.56 At the end of March, Duranty 
spoke derisively of “a big scare story in the American press about famine 
in the Soviet Union with ‘thousands already dead and millions menaced 
by death from starvation.’”57 The evidence of catastrophe was so strong, 
however, that even Duranty had to make some concessions. “There is 
no actual starvation or deaths from starvation,” he wrote, just “a serious 
food shortage throughout the country” and “widespread mortality from 
diseases due to malnutrition.”58
Victims of hunger, Kharkiv district, Ukraine, 1933. Photograph by Alexander 
Wienerberger, Wikimedia Commons.
Those dying from lack of food would have been uninterested in the 
subtle distinction between “mortality from diseases due to malnutrition” 
and “starvation.” Duranty’s sophistry was an attempt to challenge the 
path-breaking journalism of Gareth Jones, “Foreign Affairs secretary to 




first foreigner to visit the Russian countryside since the Moscow author-
ities forbade foreign correspondents to leave the city.”59 As Jones recounted 
to an American journalist,
I walked along through villages and twelve collective farms. Every-
where was the cry, “There is no bread. We are dying.” This cry came 
from every part of Russia, from the Volga, Siberia, White Russia, the 
North Caucasus, Central Asia. I tramped through the black earth 
region because that was once the richest farm land in Russia and 
because the correspondents have been forbidden to go there to see 
for themselves what is happening.60
During his walking tour in 1933, Jones had managed to evade govern-
ment officials and enter the hunger-stricken areas, where he interviewed 
hundreds of peasants.
I stayed overnight in a village where there used to be 200 oxen and 
where there now are six. The peasants were eating the cattle fodder 
and had only a month’s supply left. . . . “We are waiting for death” 
was my welcome, but “See, we still have our cattle fodder. Go farther 
south. There they have nothing. Many houses are empty of people 
already dead,” they cried.61
Malcolm Muggeridge, another eyewitness, described his visit to the North 
Caucasus and the Ukraine:
I saw something of the battle that is going on between the Govern-
ment and the peasants. The battlefield was as desolate as in any war, 
and stretches wider; stretches over a large part of Russia. On the 
one side, millions of peasants, starving, often their bodies swollen 
with lack of food; on the other, soldiers. . . . They had gone over the 
country like a swarm of locusts and taken away everything edible; 
they had shot and exiled thousands of peasants, sometimes whole 
villages; they had reduced some of the most fertile land in the world 





So overwhelming was the suffering experienced in 1932 and 1933 that today 
the fact of a mass famine cannot be denied. However, the goal posts have 
been moved. The denial of famine has been replaced by emotional denials 
of this famine having resulted from a genocidal plan directed by Stalin 
against the people of Ukraine. A Canadian author, Douglas Tottle, played 
a role in perpetuating this denial with his Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The 
Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard, which one critic dis-
missed as “an unabashed, book-length argumentum ad hominem.”63 More 
scholarly is the work of Mark Tauger, who argues that the “low harvest” in 
1932 was “the result of a failure of economic policy, of the ‘revolution from 
above,’ rather than of a ‘successful’ nationality policy against Ukrainians 
or other ethnic groups.”64
But is the central task really to discern Stalin’s genocidal intentions? 
First, in the absence of evidence, how will we ever know? Second, it deflects 
attention from what we do know. The famine was clearly rooted in the cat-
astrophic policy of forced collectivization. “We peasants are all hungry,” a 
Russian peasant told journalist Gareth Jones, after eating Jones’s discarded 
orange peel. “The Communists took away our grain. They robbed us of our 
land. They came to our village and left only a few potatoes for us to live 
through the winter. There’s bread in the big cities, but there is no bread in 
the villages in the homes of the people who grow the wheat.”65 Third, is it 
legitimate to blame the peasants’ starvation on nature? When Jones asked 
the peasants “Why is there famine?” they replied:
“It is not the fault of nature. It is the fault of the Communists.
“They took away our land. Why should we work if we have not 
our own land?
“They took away our cows. . . .
“They took away our wheat. . . . 
“The Communists have turned us into slaves and we shall not 
be happy until we have our own land, our own cows and our own 
wheat again.”66
Jones had no doubt that the crisis was man-made. “The famine now kill-
ing hundreds in the Soviet Union cannot be attributed to the weather,” 




exception of drought in some areas in 1931—blessed the Soviet Govern-
ment.” He went on to blame the disaster on the “Soviet policy of abolishing 
the private farm and replacing it by large collective farms, where the land 
and cattle were owned in common. . . . When the Government attempted 
force to make them [the peasants] yield their cows they retaliated by mas-
sacring their cattle and eating them.”67
Contemporary research firmly backs up these 1933-era accounts. 
According to R. J. Rummel, “The weight of evidence suggests that the 
attempt to collectivize the peasant, even the nomad, and liquidate the 
kulak as a class, massively disrupted the agricultural system and brought 
about the famine.”68 N. M. Dronin and E. G. Bellinger blame the govern-
ment’s “race to achieve the unrealistic plan figures for grain delivery” for 
the famine in 1931. They go on to explain why the crisis deepened, despite 
the weather being conducive to farming:
In the next years, 1932 and 1933, which were years of good weather, 
the excessive procurement of grain from devastated collective farms 
was the single cause of mass famine in the Ukraine and other pro-
ductive regions. The authorities seemed to do everything possible 
to aggravate the situation. They prevented starving peasants from 
leaving the affected regions, even though such migration had saved 
millions of lives in previous bad years. 
Dronin and Bellinger point out that despite an extremely severe drought in 
1936, “the recurrence of mass famine was avoided due to a few elementary 
measures such as the radical reduction of the grain procurement plan (by 
60 percent) and the halting of grain exports.”69
This contemporary research is compelling. But in fact, impeccable 
research demonstrating these truths has been sitting on our bookshelves 
for decades. One of the classics of 1970s scholarly writing on the Russian 
Revolution is Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, Stephen Cohen’s 
study of Nikolai Bukharin, a leading figure in the Russian movement. 
Cohen’s scholarship provides overwhelming evidence regarding not only 
the reality of the devastating famine of 1932–33 but also the roots of this 
famine in the forced collectivization policies of the Stalin regime.
In 1928, after a few years of relatively “normal” economic urban–rural 




the countryside to the cities. Under Stalin’s initiative, the regime reverted 
to the methods of war communism, sending thousands of party activists, 
backed by the armed force of the state, to seize grain “surpluses” from 
the peasants, seizures that shifted the burden of hunger from the cities to 
the countryside. The policy proved catastrophic. Cohen, quoting Bukha-
rin, notes that “as a result of Stalin’s ‘extraordinary measures,’ . . . peasant 
agriculture was ‘regressing’ because ‘the basic peasant masses have lost 
any stimulus to produce.’”70 A “new wave of peasant unrest” swept the 
country in the summer and autumn of 1929 as “state agents—their meth-
ods increasingly coercive—swarmed the countryside procuring grain.”71 
This was the prelude to the catastrophic “great assault that was to come in 
December,” an assault whose aim was to shift twenty-five million peasant 
families off their individual plots and into collective farms.72 It was, in 
effect, the launch of a one-sided civil war—the armed forces of the state 
against the pitchforks and bodies of the peasants.
We can pick up the story from another classic author, Alec Nove, 
whose books have also been available for decades. The forced collectiv-
ization of peasants began in the dead of winter, in late December 1929. 
Nove indicates that “it was announced by 20 February 1930 . . . that 
50 per cent of the peasants had joined collective farms.” The usually 
detached Nove resorts to the use of an exclamation mark, to emphasize 
that this represented “half of the peasant population in seven weeks!”73 
Tens of millions had been ripped from their small plots and deposited 
in their new collective farms. The resulting chaos was intensified at the 
beginning of March 1930, when Stalin called a temporary halt to the 
process in his “dizzy with success” article.74 “Within weeks,” Nove writes, 
“the proportion of the peasantry collectivized fell from 55 per cent (1 
March) to 23 per cent (1 June).”75 In other words, there was, once again, 
a mass movement of tens of millions, this time reversing the flow, with 
peasants leaving the collective farms and returning to their old small 
plots—all in the middle of winter. It is impossible to convey “the fantastic 
ups-and-downs in the lives of the large majority of the population of the 
Soviet Union within a few short months.”76
Those ups and downs were about to intensify. Among the immediate 
consequences of this war of the Soviet state against most of its popu-




much of the productive capacity of the countryside. Cohen provides some 
stark statistics: “Figures published in 1934 revealed that more than half 
of the country’s 33 million horses, 70 million cattle, 26 million pigs, and 
two-thirds of its 146 million sheep and goats had perished,” most during 
the catastrophic months of January and February, 1930. “Twenty-five years 
later, livestock herds were still smaller than in 1928.”77
From within the Soviet Union, this appalling destruction of livestock 
was blamed on the kulaks. From 10 February until 22 March 1934, the 
Bolsheviks, since 1918 officially called the Russian Communist Party 
(Bolsheviks) or RCP(B), gathered at their 17th Party Congress. Central 
Committee member Ianis Rudzutak, delivering a CC report to that con-
gress, said: “Of course a lot of damage has been done to agriculture by 
the kulaks who campaigned to wipe out the herd.”78 This explanation has 
no credibility. The very scale of slaughter would have entailed a level of 
organization and coordination far beyond the resources of any in the 
countryside.
The livestock and the farmers died for the same reason—the seizure 
of their grain by the Soviet state. The whole point of forcing peasants off 
their land and onto collective farms was to make systematic the seizure 
of their grain. In the first year of collectivization, the scale of the pending 
catastrophe was not yet apparent. As Nove puts it: “The heavens chose 
to smile. The weather was excellent, somehow most of the sowing did 
get done, and the 1930 harvest was better than that of 1929,” increasing 
by about 15 percent.79 But if the heavens chose to smile, the authorities 
did not. An increase in grain production simply meant intensified state 
pressure to procure even more grain. And just to be clear, procurement 
meant the violent seizure of grain from the peasants by armed agents 
of the state. In 1931, Nove writes, these seizures “left many peasants and 
their animals with too little to eat. Ukraine and North Caucasus suffered 
particularly severely.”80 By 1932, “all forces were directed to procurements,” 
which included the use of the death penalty for any who “refused to deliver 
grain for procurements.”81
As was inevitable in these circumstances, millions of animals and 
humans died. All relied on grain—feed grain for the livestock, grain to 
make the bread for the peasantry. When party policy led to extremes such 




Kaganovich, “all grain without exception was removed, including seed and 
fodder,”82 the animals had to be slaughtered immediately: not only could 
they not be fed but their meat provided an emergency (but temporary) 
food source for the starving peasants. The seizure of grain “surpluses,” 
especially when grain production was declining, forced the peasants to 
abandon bread and turn to meat, slaughtering their animals to stave off 
hunger. But that solution could happen only once. By the winter of 1932–
33, grain was still being forcibly seized, but the animals were gone. The 
result was a famine of catastrophic proportions. Nove has no doubt that 
these policies were the direct cause of the famine, which he describes as 
“part and consequence of the struggles described above.”83
The events of these disastrous years, sometimes called a “revolution 
from above,” but in reality, more resembling a counter-revolution, did 
lead to industrialization. The cities received both bread and the labouring 
bodies of ex-peasants, who were starving, homeless, and desperate for 
work. But the price for this industrialization was paid with the lives of 
millions of small farmers and by “those inseparable partners of peasant 
destiny, their livestock.”84
The latter quotation is taken from Stanisław Swianiewicz in his path-
breaking exploration of the economics of forced labour in the Soviet 
Union. Swianiewicz draws a direct parallel between the experience in 
the Soviet Union and that of Great Britain some centuries before, where 
“the policy of enclosures provided a cheap labour force for industry by 
squeezing the peasant out of the countryside.”85 In both cases, the rural 
population suffered displacement and impoverishment. But the compres-
sion of the time frame meant that this suffering was felt far more acutely in 
the Soviet Union. “For three centuries,” Swianiewicz writes, the enclosures 
“provided English industry with a cheap labour force by compelling the 
peasants to move to the towns. The Communist Government carried out 
the same task in a few years.”86 Forced collectivization—like Great Britain’s 
enclosure movements—could be accomplished only by depriving peas-
ants of the means of subsistence. Both policies in effect expropriated land 
formerly worked in common and created a mass proletariat available for 





The story of forced collectivization is an appalling one. Horrendous 
suffering swept whole areas of the Soviet Union, suffering that resulted 
directly from the war on the peasantry launched by Stalin in the context 
of what was grotesquely labelled a five-year plan. Yet, there had been gen-
erations of goal posts being moved—first, denying that the famine existed, 
and then, when the reality of that famine was too obvious to deny, arguing, 
without reflection, that the issue in dispute was whether policy was motiv-
ated by anti-Ukrainian chauvinism, all the while leaving hanging the main 
issue: the destruction of agricultural productivity caused by the imposition 
of so-called collectivization. In reality, it was a return to policies of the era 
of war communism, doing the work of the British enclosure movement, 
but in a matter of years, not a matter of generations.
In 2003, without conceding that what happened was genocide, the 
Russian Federation added its signature to a UN resolution that said, in 
part: “The Great Famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor), which 
took 7 to 10 millions of innocent lives, became a national tragedy for the 
Ukrainian people. . . . We also commemorate the memory of millions of 
Russians, Kazaks and representatives of other nationalities who died of 
starvation . . . as a result of civil war and forced collectivization.”87 This 
retroactively confirms the research of Cohen in the 1970s, of Nove in the 
1960s, and of Souvarine in the 1930s, as well as the eyewitness accounts of 
Gareth Jones and Malcolm Muggeridge, both of whom managed to evade 
government authorities and actually visit the devastated areas in 1933.88
Catastrophe in the Cities
Whether labelled a “Thermidorian reaction” or “counter-revolution,” the 
consolidation of Stalin’s rule brought devastation to the countryside. It 
also brought catastrophe to the urban areas. Solomon Schwarz has meticu-
lously documented the steady decline in workers’ living standards during 
the first five-year plan (1928–33). “Nominal wages . . . greatly exceeded 
Plan estimates,” he notes, “but a much greater inflationary rise in living 
costs considerably depressed the level of real wages.”89 There was some 
improvement up to the summer of 1938, but then “the trend reversed 
itself, with nominal earnings lagging far behind the price level. By 1941, 




entry into the war they cannot have been much higher, by and large, than 
at the end of the First Five-Year Plan period.”90
Decline in real wages was only one aspect of the misery for urban 
workers. Sergei Kirov, one of the regime’s most popular figures, and a 
formidable potential rival to Stalin, was assassinated in confusing cir-
cumstances in December 1934. After his death, purges swept through the 
cities. Roy Medvedev writes that “every oblast [province], Leningrad espe-
cially, was swept by the first wave of mass arrests, which was later called 
the ‘Kirov flood’ in the camps.”91 Ante Ciliga says the Kirov flood sent 
30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants of Leningrad into exile in Siberia.92 Boris 
Souvarine writes that “some 100,000 innocent inhabitants of Leningrad” 
were deported.93 And Solzhenitsyn states that “one-quarter of Leningrad 
was purged—cleaned out—in 1934–1935. Let this estimate be disproved 
by those who have the exact statistics and are willing to publish them.”94
This was just a taste of what was to come. In 1937 and 1938, the 
counter-revolution reached a chilling climax in what would come to be 
called the Great Terror. These years are well-known as the years of the 
“trials” of Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and other leading figures of 
the party. With painstaking devotion to detail, Medvedev’s classic account 
of these horrendous years tells the story and lists the names of seven hun-
dred individual victims, “the best-known officials, military commanders, 
writers, artists and scholars.”95 These individuals were among thousands 
falsely accused and arrested from every key sector of politics and civil 
society, including: 
• the central organs of the ruling Communist Party
• the party committees in the regions
• the trade unions
• the upper echelons of the Red Army
• the very security apparatus that was conducting the purges
• leading members of non-Russian communist parties living in exile 
in the Soviet Union




• writers and cultural workers, including “every kind of creative 
person and organization . . . painters, actors, musicians, architects 
and film people.”96
While we have Medvedev’s seven hundred names, most who suffered 
in the Great Terror were anonymous. “Numerically” he says, “the chief 
victims were hundreds of thousands of rank-and-file Party members.”97 
There were also thousands of non-party victims and those whom Suzanne 
Rosenberg calls “small fry.” These latter, according to Rosenberg, “by the 
thousands and hundreds of thousands were also being caught in the net. 
. . . When you arrived at your job you never knew who would be missing 
next.”98 Souvarine writes that “mass arrests and wholesale executions 
made the population live again through the darkest hours of the Civil 
War. Groups of several dozen ‘citizens’ were shot each week, then each 
day, without formality, without the least guarantee of justice, or after secret 
trials, tantamount to pseudo-legal assassination.”99 Medvedev says that 
“there were days when up to a thousand people were shot in Moscow 
alone.”100 Nadezhda Joffe amplifies this, saying that in 1937–38, “about 
28,000 people a month were annihilated.”101
Medvedev’s estimate for the total number of victims summarily shot, 
based on information available in the 1970s, was “at least four to five hun-
dred thousand.”102 Contemporary research on those two terrible years, 1937 
and 1938, puts the figure at 681,692.103 In addition, the victims of famine, 
forced exile, and imprisonment in the Gulag numbered in the millions. 
Souvarine cites evidence from the suppressed census of 1937, which Stalin 
anticipated would show a population of 171 million, up from 147 million 
in 1926. The actual total, according to Souvarine, was just 145 million, 
meaning that more than 20 million people were “missing.”104 Nove makes 
the same point, but with different arithmetic, saying: “well over 10 million 
people had ‘demographically’ disappeared” between the two censuses.105 
Contemporary figures put the 1937 census figure at 162 million against 
an expectation of 170 million, a gap of “only” 8 million.106 Whether we 
rely on Souvarine’s 1930s figures, Nove’s 1960s figures, or figures from 
contemporary research, it is clear that from the late 1920s to the mid- to 




the suppression of the census and the demand by Stalin for a revised one 
in 1939. Whatever the actual figures, this really is the arithmetic of horror.
Whether focusing on the countryside or the city, the move from hope 
to horror must be the starting point for any assessment of the Russian 
Revolution. To focus only on the horror and blur the experience of hope 
in the revolution’s early months is to deny the efficacy of mass action by 
the oppressed. To focus only on the hope and blur the experience of horror 




PA R T  1
Vorkuta: anvil of the 
Working Class
Anvil—A heavy block on which metal can be hammered and 
shaped, typically of iron or (now) steel, having a flat top, concave 
sides, and (typically) a pointed or tapering projection at one end . . . 
in figurative contexts, esp. with reference to the use of an anvil as 
a block on which something is forged or shaped. (Oxford English 
Dictionary)
The Arctic settlement of Vorkuta was in every respect an anvil, a block on 
which was forged the emergent postrevolutionary working class. Letting 
fall into the background for a moment the received wisdom and theories 
about communism and the Russian Revolution and instead bringing to 
the fore issues of class formation and class struggle can assist mightily in 
understanding revolution and counter-revolution in the territories of the 
former Russian empire. In the chapters of part 1, I develop this class for-
mation through an examination of three pivotal moments of class struggle 
in and around Vorkuta.
Chapter 1 examines Vorkuta in the 1930s, when the town was fast 
becoming one of the Soviet Union’s most important sources of coal. In 
the years from 1936 to 1938, Vorkuta also became the final resting place 
of Stalin’s political opponents—the same radicalized workers who had 
raised the Bolsheviks to power in 1917. Before their extermination, the 
political prisoners at Vorkuta—many being followers of Leon Trotsky, 




Party—organized a mass hunger strike, which became the stuff of whis-
pered legend in the following decades.
In chapter 2, we move to the 1950s, by which point, as was indicated 
earlier, the forced labour camps at Vorkuta had seen “approximately half a 
million prisoners pass through their gates.” Vorkuta had grown to become 
a major mining centre and the principal supplier of coal to Leningrad, 
a city of well over three million people. In 1953, in the period following 
Stalin’s death, thousands of Vorkuta’s forced labourers organized a massive 
strike in protest against the Gulag labour system, demanding improve-
ments to their living and working conditions. The strike, which ended in 
violent repression, nonetheless played a pivotal role in ending the forced 
labour system in the Soviet Union.
Chapter 3 focuses on the late 1980s and an even more massive strike. 
By then, the mines of Vorkuta were employing “free” wage labourers, 
some of them the grandchildren of those imprisoned at Vorkuta during 
the 1930s. In July 1989, the thousands labouring in Vorkuta’s coal pits were 
central to the wave of strikes that were instrumental in the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. From its origins as a graveyard for revolutionaries, then, 
Vorkuta gave birth to the gravediggers, first, of the forced labour system 
and, eventually, of the Stalinist state system itself.
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Above the Arctic Circle, in a lost corner of the world,
The earth is shrouded by coal-black eternal night.
The wind howls like a wolf and will not let us sleep.
Oh, for just a glimmer of dawn in this oppressive gloom!
A sinister presence floats in the shadows.
We are alone with our anguish and our sense of doom.
Above the Arctic Circle, there is no joy my friend.
A furious blizzard erases all our tracks.
Don’t come for us, don’t be tormented by us, save yourself.
But maybe, if you find a moment . . . remember me, my friend.1
An anonymous historian identifies the author of these haunting lines as 
Lyova Dranovsky, an old communist and prisoner in the Gulag who, some 
time prior to 1938, “began to write some very fine and moving poetry 
. . . sitting by the stove in the tent, by the bank of the Vorkuta River.”2 
Truth be told, we cannot be sure of the exact name of the poet. From 
another account by Hryhory Kostiuk, one of the very few eyewitnesses 
who survived the events to be described here, we learn of another poet 
with a slightly different name—Comrade Granovsky. Kostiuk remembers 
prisoners reading, and even singing, Granovsky’s poems.3 Comparing that 
with our first eyewitness, who says that Dranovsky’s “poems became the 
common property of the whole Vorkuta camp and were set to music, to 
sad and mournful tunes,”4 it is likely that Lyova Dranovsky and Comrade 
Granovsky were the same person. Even if they were two different people, 
1  One Long Night, 1936–38
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however, they met the same fate. Granovsky was “doomed to die in Stalin’s 
camps.”5 Dranovsky “was shot at Syr-Yaga in 1938.”6
Our knowledge of Comrade Granovsky comes from a standard 
peer-reviewed, scholarly source. Our knowledge of Lyova Dranovsky has 
a quite different pedigree. It derives from a remarkable memoir, circulated 
as part of the underground anti-Stalinist literature known as samizdat. 
The memoir was “written over a period of years and completed in the 
late sixties” and “became known to the world in 1970.” Its anonymous 
author was one of the only survivors of the 1936–38 massacres visited upon 
anti-Stalinist socialists.7 The Granovsky/Dranovsky poem was written on 
the banks of the Vorkuta River. Near the source of that river, two hun-
dred kilometres from where it drains into the Pechora and more than one 
hundred kilometres north of the Arctic Circle, lies the town of Vorkuta, 
epicentre of the 1936–38 Great Terror.
The Arc of Repression
Located at the extreme northern tip of what is today the Komi Repub-
lic, roughly two hundred kilometres south of Baydaratskaya Bay on the 
Kara Sea, Vorkuta is further north than Great Bear Lake, Repulse Bay, 
or Bathurst Inlet in Canada.8 As a settled area in the far reaches of the 
Arctic, Inuvik, on the Mackenzie River delta, might be offered as a point of 
comparison. But Inuvik remains an administrative centre, the population 
of which has rarely exceeded 3,500. In contrast, by 1993, Vorkuta had a 
population of 217,000, with most of its workers employed in the 13 coal 
mines that surrounded the city.9 By 2013, the population of the town had 
plummeted to just 96,000, but this was still far greater than any compar-
able Arctic settlement in Canada.10
Vorkuta is a forbidding place. Some of its inhabitants in 1993 described 
the climate as “twelve months of winter, followed by summer.” In the words 
of one resident, “after ten years here you stop being human because of the 
cold, depression, polar nights, tough work.”11 Joseph Scholmer—a German 
communist arrested in 1949 and sent to Vorkuta—recalled the “old hands” 
telling him: “You mustn’t stay here too long. It’s a murderous climate. 
Anyone who stays here too long gets the guts knocked out of him.”12 So 
grim are the environs that, when advisors to Tsar Nicholas I proposed that 




a colony for exiles, he sent for a report on conditions there and decided 
that it was ‘too much to demand of any man that he should live there.’”13
Vorkuta first entered the pages of history as prison ground and mas-
sacre site for thousands of socialists who opposed the rise to power of 
Stalin and his bureaucracy. The introductory chapter laid out the horren-
dous statistics of repression for 1937 and 1938—681,692 “documentable” 
executions carried out by the Stalinist state in those terrible years.14 Vor-
kuta was a principal site of that state-organized terror. In impossible 
conditions, anti-Stalinist socialists—many of them followers of Leon 
Trotsky—fought to uphold the ideals of the Russian Revolution. They 
fought with their bodies, launching a series of mass hunger strikes, some 
of which they actually won—at least in the near term.
In fact, their victories were the very definition of pyrrhic. Almost to a 
person, these anti-Stalinist socialists were executed, most in what came 
to be known as the “Kashketin executions,” so called because they were 
overseen by Efim Iosifovich Kashketin, a senior staff member with the 
NKVD, or People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs.15 Robert Conquest 
tells us that only children aged twelve and under escaped execution.16 This 
is confirmed by the account of an extraordinary eyewitness to these awful 
events, Ivan Mitrofanovich Khoroshev, writing under one of his several 
pseudonyms “M.B.” The real identity of M.B. was only discovered after 
Khoroshev’s death in early 1991.17 Born in 1904, he had been sentenced 
in 1936 to six years in the Gulag on charges of “counter-revolutionary 
Trotskyist activities.” In October 1991, just months after his death, he was 
officially rehabilitated. Khoroshev writes: “At the time of execution of a 
male prisoner, his imprisoned wife was automatically liable to capital 
punishment; and when it was a question of well-known members of the 
Opposition, this applied equally to any of his children over the age of 
twelve.”18 Once Kashketin’s work was done, he was in turn imprisoned 
and executed, a fate that befell many of those who were instruments of 
the terror. Mikhail Baitalsky captures the terrible irony, saying that several 
months after overseeing the slaughter in Vorkuta, Kashketin was heard 
shouting from a prison in the area: “Tell the people that I am Kashketin! 
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The victims of this slaughter were part of a whole layer of Russian 
socialists who opposed the Stalin regime. Arriving at estimates for the 
size of this opposition is difficult, but the numbers clearly ran into the 
thousands. In October 1923, the “Declaration of the 46,” one of the first 
opposition documents, was supported by half the party cells in Moscow, 
one-third of the cells in the army, and a majority of the students in the 
communist cells of Moscow’s institutions of higher learning.20 The years 
1924 and 1925 were years of stalemate, when Trotsky’s advice was “do noth-
ing, don’t reveal ourselves at all, maintain our connections, protect our 
cadres from 1923, let Zinoviev wear himself out.”21 According to Pierre 
Broué, during those years, the Trotskyist opposition in Leningrad might 
have numbered “just a few dozen,” but “it was something else altogether” 
in Moscow, where the opposition claimed some “five hundred members, 
very well organized. There, the Bolshevik-Leninists [Trotskyists] knew 
that they had an absolute majority in the factory and army cells.”22 Roland 
Gaucher estimates that from 1926 to 1928, the United Opposition—now 
including Kamenev and Zinoviev, who had been pushed into opposition 
to Stalin—had some seven to eight thousand activists across the whole 
Soviet Union, much the same as the number of activists who formed 
the core of the Stalin-Bukharin bloc, which had replaced the earlier 
Zinoviev-Kamenev-Stalin troika.23 There was, of course, one important 
difference: the Stalinist activists had the resources of the state and the 
party at their disposal, while the anti-Stalinist activists had only their 
own wits and initiative. In 1927, in the teeth of intensifying repression, 
the United Opposition platform received some four to five thousand sig-
natures. At the beginning of 1929, the anti-Stalinist opposition estimated 
that “between 2,000 and 3,000 of its members were in captivity, but this 
approximate figure was later raised to 5,000.”24 Gus Fagan, in 1980, put 
the figure at between 6,000 and 8,000.25
This socialist, anti-Stalinist opposition found, from time to time, a 
hearing inside the mass of the working class. Michal Reiman argues that 
although many underestimate the importance of this opposition, “one 
can hardly agree with such views: they seem paradoxical indeed in light 
of the mountain of ammunition expended on the opposition by the party 
leadership in those years.”26 He goes on to argue that in 1926, “opposition 




The opposition organized mass meetings of industrial workers in 
Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Leningrad and Moscow; at a chemical plant in 
Moscow shouts were heard, “Down with Stalin’s dictatorship, down 
with the Politburo!”
There were rumours of underground strike committees, in which 
the opposition were said to be participating, in the Urals, the Don-
bass, the Moscow textile region and Moscow proper—and of funds 
being raised for striking workers.27
Sergei Ivlev, a Left Oppositionist imprisoned with Khoroshev in the 
1930s, told of an electric United Opposition meeting he helped organize 
in Moscow in the autumn of 1927. A former student of Moscow Higher 
Technical School, he obtained a key to the largest auditorium at the school, 
saying that he needed it for a geography club meeting.
At seven o’clock in the evening, as soon as I opened the auditorium, 
crowds of students and worker-oppositionists began arriving from 
all over Moscow, having been notified in advance through their 
organisers. There were more than three thousand of them. The audi-
torium and the adjoining corridor were filled to capacity. Trotsky, 
Kamenev and Zinoviev attended the meeting. Unusual enthusiasm 
and unanimity prevailed at this meeting. The opposition leaders' 
fiery words landed on fertile soil.
When the authorities cut off the electricity, plunging the auditorium into 
darkness, the meeting organizers were prepared, handing out sterno can-
dles collected in advance. “And when L. B. Kamenev, the chairman of the 
meeting, solemnly proclaimed: ‘Let us dispel the Stalinist gloom with Len-
inist light!’—dozens of candles were lit in different parts of the audience to 
enthusiastic applause.” The authorities escalated and rounded up “reliable 
men” to help them break up the meeting. But when the several thousand 
“ostensible Stalinist supporters” arrived, they stood around passively, “and 
some of them even joined the oppositionists. After finishing the meeting, 
the oppositionists left the auditorium singing, and lined up in two dense 
columns in the corridor and courtyard. Under their protection Trotsky, 
Kamenev and Zinoviev marched unhindered to their cars.”28
Even in the early 1930s, when Stalinist repression was gathering steam 
and the bulk of Trotsky’s Left Opposition had been driven into exile or sent 
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to the Gulag, a workers’ opposition continued, looking to the traditions 
of Lenin and Trotsky as a counter to Stalinist oppression. Aleksandra 
Chumakova provided an eyewitness account of one such episode. As a 
party worker in the Moscow Committee, she “was not in the Opposition,” 
but “her husband was, and her fate was linked to his and to that of other 
Oppositionists close to them.”29 In 1932, she was sent to the Glukhovka 
textile mill, the oldest textile mill in Russia, to investigate complaints about 
working and living conditions. This was not an insignificant mill. It was 
in the Ivanovo district, not far from Moscow, and had a long tradition of 
working-class militancy, having played a critical role in the 1917 revolution. 
As Chumakova reports:
When I arrived at the factory I was immediately struck by the hor-
rifying unrelieved poverty of the workers. Gaunt from hunger, they 
were barely able to get to work and stand up at their machines for 
the allotted eight hours. Through the streets of the factory settlement 
wandered the starving, emaciated children of the workers. They 
gathered around the garbage cans of the factory dining hall and 
waited for something edible to be thrown out. The textile workers 
would call their children into the dining halls and share with them 
the one bowl of soup allowed each worker per day. . . .
The Glukhovka workers had no respect for Stalin. During the 
1932 May Day demonstration they had carried portraits of Lenin and 
Trotsky through the streets of the settlement and had shouted angry 
phrases against Stalin.30
This bitterness and anger moved from demonstrations to strikes, which 
were fiercely repressed.31
Precisely because the arguments of the Trotskyists had a hearing inside 
the working class, the repression against them was fierce. It was, in Maria 
Joffe’s words, “one long night.”32 The darkest pit of that night was in the 
Gulag, in which were deposited millions of peasants who had defended 
their land and hundreds of thousands of communists who fought the rise 
of Stalin.
By 1936, the great majority of former Oppositionists had “capitulated,” 
many of them in words only in order to preserve their lives and jobs. 




in the early 1930s and who were, temporarily, allowed to live and work in 
relative freedom:
There was something wild about them in those days. At their famous 
parties, vodka flowed and an old gypsy song was sung with the 
refrain: “We’ll booze away the lot, but we’ll keep the concertina, and 
we’ll make the bitches dance to our tune!” The concertina was their 
inner freedom, their integrity, their secret ideological “core.” It was 
the justification of their hymns to Stalin, of their denial of the spirit 
of October, which they knew they were helping the “bitches” to bury. 
It was recklessly ignored that every tenth guest at the party was an 
agent who would be reporting what they said.33
Capitulation, however, would provide only a temporary reprieve. All would 
ultimately share the fate of the irreconcilables, the “hard core of uncompro-
mising Trotskyists, most of them in prisons and camps.”34 According to 
Pierre Broué, Genrikh Yagoda, director of the NKVD, “proposed to Stalin 
the arrest of all the Trotskyists in exile and deporting them to the most 
distant camps of the Gulag, Vorkuta and Kolyma-Magadan.”35 Berger adds 
a third camp to the list, saying of the Trotskyists that in mid-1936, “they 
and their families had all been rounded up . . . and concentrated in three 
large camps—Kolyma, Vorkuta and Noril’sk.”36
These three places of exile were grim indeed. Kolyma, the vast Siberian 
district in the far northeast of the Russian landmass, had a reputation for 
being home to the deadliest of the camps in the Gulag.37 Travel some three 
thousand kilometres west from Kolyma, and you would encounter the 
camps centred around Noril’sk, roughly three hundred kilometres inside 
the Arctic Circle. Travel another eleven hundred kilometres west, and 
you would finally reach the camps at Vorkuta. A line connecting the three 
extermination centres would describe a vast arc stretching across some of 
the most forbidding land in the world—a vast arc of repression. Vorkuta 
was probably the most important of these three as a killing ground for the 
socialist, anti-Stalinist opposition, and it is the one from which the most 
eyewitness testimonies have emerged, allowing us to piece together a pic-
ture of what occurred. The most detailed report—that of Khoroshev—did 
not reach the West until 1961. “In the mid- and late 1930s,” writes Khoro-
shev, “the Trotskyists in Vorkuta were a very patchwork group; some of 
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them still called themselves Bolshevik-Leninists.”38 Khoroshev estimates 
that the “genuine Trotskyists” numbered “almost 500 at the mine, close 
to 1,000 at the camp of Ukhta-Pechora, and certainly several thousands 
altogether around the Pechora district.”39 Added to these, “there were in 
the camps of Vorkuta and elsewhere more than 100,000 prisoners who, 
members of the party and the youth, had adhered to the Trotskyist Oppos-
ition and then at different times and for diverse reasons . . . were forced to 
‘recant their errors’ and withdraw from the Opposition.”40
While “the Trotskyists formed the only group of political prisoners who 
openly criticized the Stalinist ‘general line’ and offered organized resistance 
to the jailers,” Khoroshev tells us that organizing such resistance was diffi-
cult in the extreme.41 The labour of the inmates at the time—in contrast to 
later years, when the Vorkuta area was transformed into a massive mining 
complex—had little economic importance to the regime. As the terror 
began to bite in late 1936, the Trotskyists at Vorkuta launched a hunger 
strike—the last resort in any collective struggle. While the tactic had been 
used by other prisoners, the 1936 strike was the largest we know of in the 
camp system. According to Khoroshev, its leaders were Sokrat Gevorkian, 
an Armenian researcher formerly affiliated with what Khoroshev calls “the 
Institute of Human Sciences”; the student Karl Petrovich Mel'nais, who had 
led a Left Opposition group at the University of Moscow before his arrest in 
1927; Vladimir Ivanov, an Old Bolshevik and former member of the Cen-
tral Committee who had supported an oppositional faction known as the 
Group of Democratic Centralism; V. V. Kossior, who had occupied a senior 
managerial post in the petroleum industry; and Igor’ Poznanskii, for-
merly one of Trotsky’s secretaries. The strike was launched on 27 October 
1936 to protest the second frame-up trials being staged in Moscow (with 
Kamenev and Zinoviev as the star prisoners) and was to involve a thousand 
prisoners over an agonizing four months.42 “Even the children persisted,” 
writes Berger, “although the strike leaders begged the mothers to stop them 
because the sight was intolerable to the men.”43
According to Solzhenitsyn, the strikers demanded, among other things, 
“separation of the politicals from the criminals; an eight-hour workday; 
the restoration of the special ration for politicals and the issuing of rations 
independently of work performance.”44 In his own account, Khoroshev’s 




rations. According to Khoroshev, the hunger strikers insisted only that 
“the food quota of the prisoners should not depend on their norm of 
output. A cash bonus, not the food ration, should be used as a productive 
incentive.”45 After 132 agonizing days, the strikers received a “radiogram 
from the headquarters of the NKVD, drawn up in these words: ‘Inform 
the hunger strikers held in the Vorkuta mines that all their demands will 
be satisfied.’”46
This can only be considered a remarkable victory. Even more remark-
ably, it was not the first such victory. Solzhenitsyn reports that, before 
the Vorkuta strike, there was “a hundred-day strike somewhere in the 
Kolyma . . . : they demanded a free settlement instead of camps, and they 
won.”47 An anonymous survivor of Vorkuta mentions a 1934 hunger strike 
in the prison where he was before arriving at Vorkuta in which the strik-
ers also won their principal demands.48 Yet both of these victories were, 
again, pyrrhic. The strikers at Kolyma, writes Solzhenitsyn, were “scattered 
among various camps, where they were gradually annihilated.”49 Elinor 
Lipper, a German socialist who was a prisoner in the Kolyma system, has 
documented massacres of communists at this time in Kolyma. According 
to Lipper, in 1937 and 1938, “all who were still capable of independent 
thinking and independent decisions, all those who still knew what the 
word socialism meant, who still had some idealism, all those whose vision 
of freedom was not yet distorted, were to be robbed of their influence and 
liquidated.”50
Lipper recalls that, in 1938, Stepan Nikolaivich Garanin visited the 
camps, “examining the list of counterrevolutionaries” and noting especially 
“those who were convicted of KRTD (counterrevolutionary Trotskyist 
activity).” Garanin had assumed control of the Kolyma camps in 1937 and 
presided over his own reign of terror. At night, he would have the prison-
ers “driven in a herd out of the gate” where they would be “shot en masse 
under his personal supervision.” Many thousands of others, who escaped 
immediate execution, would be taken by truck to Serpantinka, which 
Lipper calls “one of the most ghastly institutions in the Soviet Union.”51 
Its terrors were such that, even years later, survivors of this prison “were 
so gripped by the horror of it that they did not dare to tell their fellow 
prisoners of the inhumanity they had seen and experienced.” According to 
40 
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992459.01
“Truth Behind Bars” 
Lipper, “it was estimated that Garanin had the deaths of some twenty-six 
thousand persons on his conscience.”52
At Vorkuta, the task of annihilating the Trotskyists fell to Kashketin. 
“He had been granted extraordinary powers,” writes Vadim Rogovin, and 
he carried with him “order No. 00409. The significance of the order can 
be judged by the two zeroes, which were used only in cases when the 
order was undertaken on Stalin’s personal initiative.”53 A special prison 
camp was established at an abandoned brickworks, about twenty kilo-
metres south of Vorkuta. In the dead of winter, the surviving hunger 
strikers and all other hardline Trotskyists in the surrounding prison 
camp system were settled there in appalling conditions. Solzhenitsyn 
provides a chilling description:
In the middle of the six-by-twenty-yard tent . . . stood one gasoline 
drum in place of a stove, for which one pail of coal per day was 
allotted, and in addition the zeks would throw their lice in to add 
a little to the heat. A thick layer of hoarfrost covered the inside of 
the canvas wall. There were not enough places on the bunks and 
the zeks took turns lying down and walking. They were given ten 
and a half ounces of bread a day and one bowl of gruel. Sometimes, 
though not every day, they were given a codfish. There was no water 
and they were given pieces of ice as part of the ration. It goes with-
out saying, of course, that they were never able to wash themselves 
and that there was no bath. Patches of scurvy appeared on their 
bodies.54
These are the conditions in which the verbal newspaper Truth Behind Bars, 
described in the introductory chapter, was “published.”
The intellectual life of the imprisoned Trotskyists is one of the most 
impressive aspects of their doomed struggle against Stalinism. Ante Ciliga 
was a leading Yugoslav communist who, with Victor Serge, was one of the 
last Oppositionists to escape from the Gulag just before the mass execu-
tions began. In 1933, he was imprisoned in the Verkhne-Uralsk isolator. 
“Isolator” was the shorthand for special political prisons, used from 1921 
until 1937 as detention centres for political prisoners. Jacques Rossi says 
they were used for all the Bolsheviks’ “former allies in the revolutionary 




like, followed by the members of their very own party.”55 The isolator at 
Verkne-Uralsk was one of the most notorious. In an account written in 
Paris in 1936 and 1937, Ciliga recalled encountering two prisoner-produced 
journals at Verkhne-Uralsk, each reflecting different political currents.56
What a diversity of opinion there was, what freedom in every arti-
cle! What passion and what candour, not only in the approach to 
theoretical and abstract questions, but even in matters of the greatest 
actuality. Was it still possible to reform the system by peaceful 
means, or was an armed rising, a new revolution required? Was 
Stalin a conscious or merely an unconscious traitor? Did his policy 
amount to reaction or to counter-revolution? Could he be elimin-
ated by merely removing the directing personnel, or was a proper 
revolution necessary?57
The French-language version of Ciliga’s book says these journals were 
titled La verité en prison and Le Bolchevik militant —rendered respectively 
in the English translation as Pravda in Prison (Truth in Prison) and The 
Militant Bolshevik. New issues were published every month or two, with 
each of the ten to twenty articles printed separately in booklet form. The 
booklets were then combined into a “packet,” which “circulated from ward 
to ward.” Ciliga recalls that “the papers appeared in three copies, one copy 
for each prison wing.”58
Until very recently, it was believed that all trace of these underground 
prison publications had disappeared. However, in early 2018, while cell no. 
312 was undergoing repairs at Verkne Uralsk, beneath the floorboards, a 
hidden cache was discovered, with 27 separate documents dating back to 
1932 and 1933. They were in different states of preservation, some almost 
illegible.59 One document—“The Fascist Coup in Germany” from The 
Bolshevik-Leninist No. 2 (12)—written in 1933 after Hitler’s seizure of 
power in Germany, has been deciphered and republished—the unexpected 
return of a silenced voice from the distant past.60
Ciliga published a Russian-language article on a portion of his time at 
Verkne-Uralsk in the 1938 issue of Sovremennyia zapiski (Modern notes), 
a journal published by exiled Social-Revolutionaries living in Paris. In that 
article, we read that the name in Russian of La verité en prison (“truth in 
prison”) was Pravda za reshetkoi (lit., “truth behind bars”).61 Some of the 
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prisoners at the Brickworks were undoubtedly familiar with the printed 
Pravda za reshetkoi and adopted the same name for their oral “publica-
tion,” Truth Behind Bars.
Although resistance was possible in the 1930s—including this kind of 
“literary resistance”—victories could only be temporary and, again, ultim-
ately pyrrhic. For the vast majority of the imprisoned Trotskyists, their 
“convictions” were in fact death sentences. Under Kashketin’s direction, 
the Vorkuta camps became the centre of extermination for the core of 
the Trotskyist opposition. At the end of March 1938, the first twenty-five 
prisoners were called up for transit. This “transit” was to the tundra, where 
they were shot and buried. According to Mikhail Baitalsky, “the first to 
be sentenced to death were all those who had taken part in the hunger 
strike.”62 Khoroshev gives a heart-rending description of “the executions 
in the tundra,” both in his early 1960s article and in a longer, more detailed 
1978 account. Every day or two, a few dozen prisoners were taken away, 
but “on one occasion about a hundred people were called out of their 
tents . . . Twenty-six people were taken from our tent alone.” He goes on:
Several people from our tent and other tents refused to come out. 
When the guards entered the tents and began to remove the desper-
ately resisting people, outside, where the “convoy” was gathering, 
you could hear voices, at first scattered and discordant, but then 
increasingly stronger and stronger. They were singing the “Inter-
nationale”. A minute later, almost simultaneously, the voices of our 
neighbouring tents joined in the chorus, and then, as if on com-
mand, our people joined in one mighty stream of menacing sounds. 
Huddled in the passage and standing on the upper bunks, they 
strained their voices as if their salvation depended upon it, singing 
furiously, menacingly and soulfully.63
The Brickworks’s guards, Khoroshev says, were rewarded with six months 
of leave at full pay. “They were promised money and holiday documents 
in Ust-Usa. However, when they arrived in groups in Ust-Usa they were 
arrested and shot.”64
“For thirty years now,” writes Baitalsky in his brilliant memoir, “the 
memory of the Vorkuta executions has been like an open wound inside 




many there were on the list of victims remains a secret even now, buried in 
the archives. It was approximately 900—maybe more.” This was Vorkuta’s 
part in the complete destruction of the core of the Left from the Russian 
Revolution, and according to Baitalsky, the executions there “pale before 
those at Kolyma.”65 According to Berger, “the same system was followed in 
all three camps”—Vorkuta, Noril’sk, and Kolyma. Lipper’s evidence from 
Kolyma, cited above, provides confirmation of that, at least for Kolyma. 
“By the end of 1937,” writes Berger, “hardly a member of the Trotskyist 
cadres was left in the three camps.”66 Broué’s account for Kolyma-Magadan 
is the most detailed for that camp. On 12 July, the Oppositionists in the 
camp launched a hunger strike that faced even more obstacles than the one 
in Vorkuta. Broué recounts that on 26 and 27 October and 4 November, a 
total of “87 hunger strikers . . . were condemned to death and executed.” 
Broué says that this was not all—that there were, in fact, “many other 
executions.”67
Shtrafnoi izoliator [penalty isolator or punishment cell] at the camp in 
Vorkuta, 1945. Russian Federation State Archive, Wikimedia Commons.
This extermination of the Trotskyists was the tip of the iceberg. By the 
end of the Great Terror in 1938, all the different sections of the party—from 
followers of Trotsky, to followers of Bukharin, to former loyal Stalinists—
had been decimated by mass executions. According to Roy Medvedev, “the 
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NKVD arrested and killed, within two years, more Communists than had 
been lost in all the years of the underground struggle, the three revolu-
tions, and the Civil War.”68
Importantly, this was not the first round in the annihilation of the Left 
from 1917. I have already mentioned (and will document further below), 
the mass arrests and killings following the Kronstadt uprising of 1921, 
after which it was anathema to be considered an “anarchist.” Through the 
course of the 1920s, thousands of members of the party with historically 
the most support in the countryside, the Social-Revolutionaries, were 
driven underground, into exile and forced labour, and the party itself 
was ultimately destroyed. In the same decade, thousands of members of 
the party with historically the most support among urban workers, the 
RSDRP-Menshevik, suffered the same fate.69 Accompanying the destruc-
tion of the SRs was a disgraceful show trial in 1922, where to their shame, 
the Bolsheviks presided over staged mass demonstrations, demanding 
“death” for those on trial. Fortunately, one aspect of the 1930s show trials 
was not used. The accused were not tortured.70 Nine years later, the four-
teen defendants at the so-called “Menshevik Trial” were not so fortunate. 
One of these, Mikhail Iakubovich from the Commissariat of Domestic 
Commerce, survived into the 1970s. In 1969 and 1970, he published in 
the Samizdat underground his recollections of the trial and the methods 
used by the secret police to extract confessions. Vera Broido’s summary of 
his report on the treatment of the defendants makes for difficult reading.
They [the defendants] were beaten about the head and face and on 
the genitals, kicked to the ground and stamped upon with heavy 
boots; they were throttled. Or else they were kept standing, without 
sleep, for many days and nights, while they were interrogated by 
shifts of chekists (the so-called “conveyor belt”); they were put, half 
naked and barefoot, into icy punishment cells; they were threatened 
with execution.71
In spite of this horrendous treatment, only one actual Menshevik ended 
up among the fourteen defendants. The rest of the arrested Mensheviks—
including Vera Broido’s imprisoned mother, Eva Broido, then a woman in 
her early fifties—never appeared in the dock. In the words of Vera Broido: 




The full story of the 1920s repression of the non-Bolshevik Left requires 
its own full treatment at a later date. But in this book, the reality of what 
happened to the anarchists, the SRs, and the Mensheviks needs to be 
visible, at least to the extent of these few paragraphs.
“Who Will Prevail?”
Stalin’s rise was opposed by many socialist workers and intellectuals, who 
found themselves grouped into various opposition categories, including 
followers of Leon Trotsky. The last acts of this opposition were the desperate 
hunger strikes in the far reaches of the Russian Arctic. The consolidation 
of Stalin’s power involved the physical elimination of the core of his own 
party, including those who called themselves Old Bolsheviks—followers of 
Lenin from before 1917. Those who called themselves Trotskyists, or seen 
to be followers of Leon Trotsky, were killed almost to a person, many of 
them meeting their fate in the Brickworks at Vorkuta. In The Time of Stalin, 
Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko (whose father was a leading Bolshevik and a 
primary figure in the storming of the Winter Palace in 1917), describes the 
1930s as a “historical epoch during which the vilest and bloodiest kind of 
evildoing flourished upon the earth.”73 Antonov-Ovseenko’s The Time of 
Stalin uses a method similar to Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag, organizing the story 
around oral testimony—a “wealth of personal testimonies . . . and oral 
accounts, by people who survived the Stalin era.” However, unlike Sol-
zhenitsyn’s, Antonov-Ovseenko’s circle included some very senior figures 
from that era.74 One of these was Anastas Mikoyan—one of the few Old 
Bolsheviks to survive in Communist Party leadership from the revolu-
tionary era into the postwar era, and the only member of the Politburo 
to support Khruschev at the Party’s historic Twentieth Congress in 1956, 
when Khruschev began the process of exposing Stalin’s crimes.75 Drawing 
on oral accounts provided by Mikoyan, Antonov-Ovseyenko graphically 
illustrates the character of this counter-revolution. “The cells of the smaller 
prison at the Lubyanka were full to overflowing,” he writes, going on to 
recount a dialogue among the prisoners lying on the floor. One of them, 
an Italian woman, described what was happening in Russia as a “fascist 
coup.” She was executed in 1936.
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That was the year the end came for Zinoviev and Kamenev too. 
Stalin was apparently afraid the death penalty might not actually 
be carried out against his two former allies. He sent Voroshilov to 
observe. This is what Voroshilov reported.
“They stood up in front of Stalin’s executioner.
Zinoviev (shouting): This is a fascist coup!
Kamenev: Stop it, Grisha. Be quiet. Let’s die with dignity.
Zinoviev: No. This is exactly what Mussolini did. He killed all his 
Socialist Party comrades when he seized power in Italy. Before my 
Death I must plainly state that what has happened in our country is 
a fascist coup!”76
If the events of 1917 to 1921 represented a partially successful attempt to 
install the rule of the working class, those of 1936 to 1938 represented the 
entirely successful attempt to consolidate the rule of the state bureaucrats 
grouped around Stalin. Trotsky struggled with the relationship between 
revolution and counter-revolution until his assassination by a Stalinist 
agent in 1940. To his death, he maintained that some remnants of workers’ 
power remained in Russia. He argued that, although distorted by Stalin-
ism, the Soviet Union remained a workers’ state (if a degenerated one) 
because it remained in the control of the Communist Party. “If the party 
were excluded from the Soviet system, then the whole system would soon 
collapse,” he wrote in 1930. “Freed from the control of the party, the trusts 
would immediately be converted into first, state capitalist, then, private 
capitalist enterprises.”77
However, inside this party on which all depended, he said, “there are 
dispersed the elements of two parties.”
From the official party there is emerging a party of the 
counter-revolution, whose elements exist at various stages of 
maturity. A symmetrical process is taking place at the opposite, at 
the proletarian pole of the party, above all, in the form of the Left 
Opposition. . . . The main question is: who will prevail? It will be 
immediately decided, not by the economic statistics of the socialist 
and capitalist economic tendencies, but by the relation of forces 





The events at Vorkuta, replicated in the even more remote camps of 
Noril’sk and Kolyma, made it absolutely clear who would prevail. The 
party of counter-revolution physically eliminated the Left Opposition—
and every other organized leftist group then current in the Soviet Union. 
Following Trotsky’s own logic, these hard facts would signify the final act 
in the destruction of any remnants of the attempt to construct a workers’ 
state. Trotsky did not, and could not, know the scale of the destruction of 
the old Marxist cadres in the Soviet Union. Since most eyewitness reports 
of the extermination camps only reached the West in the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s, an earlier generation, left with a paucity of information, had some 
illusions about what was transpiring in the Soviet Union. But we now 
know the extent of the destruction of the socialist, anti-Stalinist oppos-
ition. With this knowledge, it seems abundantly clear that the events of 




Scholars differ in their views of the origins of the Gulag system, of which 
Vorkuta was a part. According to one school of thought, the Gulag was 
a response to “the political imperatives of the Soviet regime’s attempts to 
eliminate its perceived enemies . . . and not a response to the economic 
needs of industrialization.”1 Clearly, the elimination of the Trotskyists 
at Vorkuta fits this understanding. But can the Gulag’s vast system of 
forced labour really be divorced from economics? The detailed research 
of Stanisław Swianiewicz tells a different story. This remarkable Polish 
author takes us into the complex geopolitics of the period between the 
two world wars of the twentieth century.
Swianiewicz, imprisoned by the Red Army after its invasion of Poland 
in 1939, was among the handful of Polish officers to survive what became 
known as the Katyn massacre of 1940. In September 1939, Stalin’s armies 
invaded and occupied eastern Poland, the prize for their August signing 
of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany—usually referred 
to as the Hitler–Stalin Pact. In the process, the occupying Russian forces 
captured some 250,000 Polish soldiers, including 15,000 officers (army 
and police). The officers were interned in three “special camps”—Kozelsk 
(the camp in which Swianiewicz was held), Ostashkov, and Starobelsk.2 
On 5 March 1940, Stalin signed an order condemning to death more than 
20,000 Polish prisoners, including all of the officer corps.3 Among these 
thousands were “20 university professors; 300 physicians; several hundred 
lawyers, engineers, and teachers; and more than 100 writers and journal-
ists.”4 Swianiewicz was one of just a few hundred to escaped execution and 
burial in a mass grave, the most notorious of which is in the Katyn forest.5 
By the end of the war, of the more than 20,000 put onto prison transports 
2 Striking Against the Gulag, 1947–53
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and taken to secret execution locations, he was one of the only, if not the 
only one, to survive.6
The Katyn massacre is intimately linked to the Polish–Soviet war of 
1920 (to be examined in greater detail in chapter 6). As a young univer-
sity student, Swianiewicz was part of a generation that volunteered for 
the armed forces to defend Polish independence in the post–World War 
I period. Many of the volunteers became noncommissioned officers—
above the rank of private but below the established officer corps. These 
NCO-level patriotic intellectuals were an important counterbalance to 
the senior Polish officers, who Swianiewicz describes as having “come 
mostly from Imperial Austrian and Tsarist Russian Armies that had 
occupied Poland for more than 100 years.” Although these senior officers 
were trained military professionals, their training was in the context of 
defending empire, not the Polish state. But when war with Russia broke out 
in 1920, it evolved into not a war for empire, but a war for Polish national 
survival. Unlike the senior officers, the mostly youthful NCO-level cadre 
were “imbued with the drive to build and defend an independent Polish 
state.” As Swianiewicz observes, the success of the Polish army in halting 
the advance of the Red Army at the very gates of Warsaw was due “in a 
great degree to the psychological attitude that this ‘corporal-academic’ 
represented.”7
Thousands of these “corporal-academics,” patriotic volunteers who 
played a central role in successfully stopping Russian occupation of their 
country in 1920, were mobilized in 1939 as the war threat loomed. Many of 
them were among the thousands taken prisoner along with Swianiewicz. 
“In the forest of Katyn and in some other unknown place of torment,” 
he writes, “there was the settling of scores by the Soviet Union with this 
‘corporal-academic.’”
The Soviet sledovatyels [investigators] were very well informed about 
the fact that all the older first and second lieutenants of the reserve, 
who came to Kozelsk and Starobelsk, were the previous volunteers 
of 1920. I pondered over the fact that the high percentage of these 




Striking Against the Gulag
Swianiewicz was an accomplished scholar of economics. He was the 
author of several books including two in the Polish language published in 
the 1930s—Lenin jako ekonomista (Lenin as an economist) and Polityka 
gospodarcza Niemiec hitlerowskich (The economic policy of Hitler’s Ger-
many). In exile from 1942 on, he was appointed professor of economics 
at Saint Mary’s University in Halifax in 1963, retiring ten years later as 
professor emeritus. In his view, however, his expertise in economics was 
not the main reason for the NKVD’s interest in him. His life was spared 
because of his visits to Germany in 1936 and 1937: “Apparently, some high 
level echelons of the NKVD surmised that I possessed secrets of some of 
the behind the scenes political machinations.”9 After a year of interroga-
tion, Swianiewicz was sentenced in 1940 to eight years of hard labour in 
the Gulag, and was released in August 1941, after Hitler’s invasion of the 
Soviet Union, Stalin’s move into an alliance with the Western powers, 
and the signing of a military pact with the Polish government in exile. 
After the war, he combined his expertise in economics with his first-hand 
experience with the Gulag to situate the Gulag system in the context of 
the economics of forced labour and the needs of industrialization, a path-
breaking analysis on which this book relies heavily.
The Economics of Forced Labour
The key instrument directing political repression inside the Gulag system 
was the state security service, known by various names over the decades, 
among them the Cheka, OGPU, NKVD, and KGB.10 According to Swianie-
wicz, “during the 1930’s the NKVD became not only a security police with 
its own army . . . but also a huge industrial and constructional concern 
which organized production under its own administration.” In addition, 
it played the role of a “contractor supplying labour force to enterprises.” 
Central to these roles was the constant “search for new sources of man-
power. The reign of terror which was a characteristic of the Stalinist period 
was to a certain extent a result of the atmosphere created by this extension 
of the NKVD’s economic sector.”11
The profits from the camps covered a considerable amount of 
expenses connected with the increasing national expenditures, 
but most certainly, they covered almost completely the cost of 
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maintaining the huge NKVD apparatus, which in Stalin’s time 
expanded to one of the largest, and one could even risk stating 
“the” largest enterprise in the world. It conducted huge construc-
tion projects, mostly in the far regions of the Soviet Union; it built 
railroads, roads, and canals; it exploited forests on the huge stretches 
between the Finnish border and the Pacific Ocean; it owned coal 
mines and farms, and it possessed its own research institutes in the 
same manner as great monopolistic industrial concerns. The aggre-
gate amount of the work force, free and enslaved, employed in the 
NKVD enterprises during the period when I was there as a slave had 
to extend to more than 7 million people.12
This gigantic enterprise—centred in what Solzhenitsyn called his 
country’s “sewage disposal system”—had an unending appetite for new 
labourers, the supply of which took the form of successive waves of mass 
repression and arrests. Solzhenitsyn identifies three such waves.13 The first 
began as a small wave in the 1920s, but grew enormously in the years 
from 1928 to 1932 with the implementation of the first five-year plan—a 
wave that has been variously labelled as “liquidating the kulaks as a class,” 
“dekulakization,” the “great turning point,” or, probably most accurately, 
the “war on the peasantry,” the tragic consequences of which were touched 
on in the Introduction and to which we will return in chapter 5.14 Solzhe-
nitsyn reminds us that this first wave drove some fifteen million peasants 
“out into the taiga and the tundra,” and that this massive displacement 
remained, for many decades, largely forgotten, not least because “peasants 
are a silent people, without a literary voice, nor do they write complaints 
or memoirs.”15 The second wave, the Great Terror of 1937–38, is somewhat 
better known, given that it “swept up and carried off to the Archipel-
ago people of position,” educated people, around whom were others who 
escaped incarceration and who, in Solzhenitsyn’s time, were still “writing, 
speaking, remembering.”16 Then came the third wave, from 1944 to 1946, 
during which the Soviet regime “dumped whole nations down the sewer 
pipes,” along with millions of individuals who had fought for Russia and 
become prisoners of war in Germany. This was the wave in which Sol-
zhenitsyn was caught—a soldier who dared to make remarks critical of 
Stalin in letters to a friend.17
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The harsh compulsion of economic necessity characterized the Russian 
Revolution from its inception. From 1921 to 1923, a horrific famine took 
place, centred on areas of what is today Ukraine. Roman Serbyn tells 
us that starvation and related epidemics claimed 1.5 million to 2 million 
lives.18 Some food aid, in the form of grain shipments, arrived from the 
West to assist in feeding the starving millions. Nonetheless, in 1922, amidst 
much controversy, the Soviet government announced that it was resuming 
the export of grain to the West. While food was unloaded in the port of 
Odessa, coming in as aid to hungry Ukrainians, grain grown by Ukrainian 
peasants was simultaneously loaded to be shipped to Germany. Some rail 
workers who were ordered to transport grain out of the country went on 
strike. But the export went ahead, despite acts of sabotage against trains 
and elevators containing grain for export.19 Roman Serbyn argues that 
this policy had economic roots. The five-year-old regime was seeking to 
industrialize, which required foreign exchange with which to purchase 
the technology and other inputs needed in modern industry. But because 
Western banks would not extend loans to the Soviet government, the only 
source of foreign exchange was trade, and one of the only commodities 
Russia could sell abroad for cash was wheat.20
In the 1930s, the decade in which the Gulag exploded in size, the catas-
trophe of forced collectivization so seriously damaged the agricultural 
sector that grain was no longer a candidate to be a commodity from which 
serious amounts of foreign currency could be acquired through external 
trade. Serbyn says that “timber was to a very great extent made to take the 
place of grain” and that to this end, “extensive exploitation of the forests 
became necessary in order to maintain a foreign balance. The forestry 
reserves were, however, mostly in the remote northern regions where 
there was no adequate supply of manpower.” The first five-year plan pro-
jected a need for 900,000 workers in the forestry industry, but only about 
50,000 became available through contracts with collective farms. Into the 
labour supply breach stepped the security services, leading to hundreds 
of thousands of prisoners engaged in forced labour in the “great timber 
industry run by what was then called the NKVD in the extreme north of 
European Russia.”21
Another commodity was central to the Gulag: gold, the most precious 
commodity of all. Gold dug out of the ground at one of the most brutal 
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camps, Kolyma, was “sold directly to the West, exchanged for desperately 
needed technology and machinery.”22 But it was a third commodity that 
dominated the lives of the prisoners in Vorkuta, an indispensable energy 
input for Soviet industrialization. The story of Vorkuta is the story of coal.
The Transition to Coal
The drive to industrialization accelerated in the 1930s, and with that accel-
eration came even greater compulsion. Industrialization depended on 
coal, which was extracted in large part from the forced labour camps in 
and around Vorkuta and which required thousands and thousands of coal 
miners—some forced and some “free.” During World War II, after the loss 
of Ukraine and its vast coal supplies to the German invaders, the drive to 
extract coal from the mines in and around Vorkuta accelerated again.23 
By the early 1950s, the forced labour system, whether used for producing 
coal or some other product, with its millions of prison labourers, had 
become central to the Soviet economy. As Joseph Scholmer noted at that 
time: “Prisoners, who had been employed in the industrial ministries 
before their arrest, estimated that half of the entire coal production of 
the Soviet Union and eighty per cent of the wood supply is provided by 
forced labour.”24
That this industrialization was based on forced labour was not atypical 
in the history of the world economy. As we saw in the introduction, Swian-
iewicz drew a direct parallel between forced collectivization in the Soviet 
Union and the enclosure movement in Great Britain. The Soviet forced 
labour system had similar historical parallels. Compulsion and unfree 
labour have often accompanied the early years of the development of a 
capitalist economy, particularly during the period of what Marx referred 
to as ursprüngliche Akkumulation—typically translated as “primitive 
accumulation” but which we should more accurately, and less offensively, 
translate as “primary” accumulation.25 Robert Miles suggests that primary 
accumulation is “synonymous with the creation of a labour market and the 
commodification of labour power.”26 “Force or compulsion” writes Abigail 
Bakan, in a comment on Miles’s analysis, “are employed as a precondition 
of moving from one mode of production to another, as it involves the 
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Evgeny Preobrazhensky—a Soviet economist and Trotskyist who, 
in 1937, became a victim of Stalin’s terror—tried to apply this notion of 
primary accumulation to the transition not only to capitalism but also 
to socialism. In 1926, he picked up a term originally coined by V.M. 
Smirnov—“primitive socialist accumulation” (or, as Preobrazhensky also 
called it, “preliminary socialist accumulation”).28 Preobrazhensky suggested 
that the concept should be understood as a necessary accompaniment to 
the development of a socialist economy. However, while related to cap-
italist primary accumulation, preliminary socialist accumulation could, in 
important ways, be distinguished from it, principally because the former 
is intimately connected with colonization. Preobrazhensky claimed that, 
with regard to “colonial plundering, a socialist state, carrying out a policy 
of equality between nationalities and voluntary entry by them into one 
kind or another of union of nations, repudiates on principle all the forcible 
methods of capital in this sphere. This source of primitive accumulation 
is closed to it from the very start and for ever.”29
This claim rings hollow. In chapter 6, we will examine Russia’s postrevo-
lutionary approach to both Poland and Georgia, which is different in form 
but not in substance from the approach of capitalist great powers to states 
they wish to subordinate as part of their sphere of influence. Furthermore, 
if the economic essence of colonial primary accumulation was unequal 
exchange—the metropole extracting more surplus from its colonies than 
it returns to them—this is precisely the relationship that Preobrazhensky 
advocated in the relationship of what he called the “socialist” sector of the 
economy to the “petty,” or presocialist, economy of the small peasants. In 
a nonindustrialized country such as Russia, “socialist accumulation” will 
“be obliged to rely on alienating part of the surplus product of pre-socialist 
forms of economy”—that is, from the peasantry.30 From 1926 until early 
1929, this idea was vociferously opposed by both Bukharin and Stalin. 
Suddenly, though, in the summer of 1929, Stalin did an about-face and 
adopted Preobrazhensky’s approach almost without amendment.
Like Preobrazhensky, Stalin made the appropriate statement oppos-
ing colonialism. “In the capitalist countries industrialisation was usually 
effected, in the main, by robbing other countries, by robbing colonies or 
defeated countries,” he argued, insisting that the Soviet Union “cannot 
and must not engage in colonial robbery, or the plundering of other 
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countries.”31 What was the alternative to external colonialism? It was some-
thing that can only be called internal colonialism—the superexploitation 
of the Russian countryside by its cities. At first, this was to be enforced 
solely through a consciously distorted price and tax structure, to create 
what Preobrazhensky labelled “non-equivalent exchange” between the 
country and the city.32 Stalin initially put this in bland economic terms: 
the peasantry, he said, “not only pays the state the usual taxes, direct and 
indirect; it also overpays in the relatively high prices for manufactured 
goods . . . and it is more or less underpaid in the prices for agricultural pro-
duce.” In less bland terms, however, he characterized this as “in the nature 
of a ‘tribute’”—and as we will outline in chapter 5, the extraction of this 
tribute went far beyond taxes and prices.33 Stalin quickly moved to forcible 
seizure of grain stockpiles, pushing millions of peasants, at gunpoint, off 
their land and into collective farms. As with European colonialism, the 
extraction of a “tribute” cost the lives of millions. While in this “war on 
the kulaks,” according to Alec Nove, “Stalin levied a tribute on the peas-
ants on a scale greater than Preobrazhensky had ever conceived,” it was 
in essence a policy completely consistent with Preobrahensky’s theory.34 
And in fact Preobrazhensky, while upset at the pace of Stalin’s forced col-
lectivization, as were all in the Trotskyist opposition, did see such a link. 
Preobrazhensky’s concept of “primitive socialist accumulation had been 
ruthlessly imposed by collectivization,” writes Nove, and “industrialization 
was being made possible ‘by exploiting the peasants, by concentrating the 
resources of the peasant economy in the hands of the state.’”35
It’s all a bit esoteric. Without too much effort, we can demonstrate that 
the experience of Russia in the 1930s belongs in the category of industrial-
ization and forced labour. But how can such horrific methods—which, as 
we have seen, cost millions of lives—result in something called socialism? 
Let’s put aside the political rhetoric about “socialism” and examine the 
economics of forced labour in a bit more detail. There are two conditions 
in which many industrializing economies have resorted to compulsion 
and forced labour: when labour power is cheap and in plentiful supply, and 
when economically critical and labour-intensive tasks cannot be accom-
plished without coercion. Capitalism in the Americas, for instance, had an 
economically critical set of labour-intensive tasks to perform in its early 
years—the tasks involved in operating plantations to supply English textile 
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mills with cotton and European dining room tables with sugar and coffee. 
However, the work on those plantations could not be performed by free 
labour, since, given a choice, the free labourers would, to a person, rather 
homestead on their own land (which was also in plentiful supply) than 
break their backs in the interests of international capital. But with a huge 
pool of cheap and available labour in Africa, that problem could be solved 
through a centuries-long forced labour system that was even more brutal, 
more exploitive, and longer-lasting than the forced labour system in Stalin’s 
Gulag. In Russia, similar conditions laid the material foundations for the 
“high Stalinism” of the postwar period.36 There was labour-intensive, eco-
nomically necessary work throughout all of the Arctic, its treasure house 
of natural resources eagerly awaited by industry in the south. And there 
was a massive pool of millions of displaced peasants. Left to themselves, 
very few would have migrated to the far north to work and die in the coal 
and gold mines. But they were not left to themselves. Whole towns, whole 
nations, were interned in the vast camp system and forced to use their 
labour to accumulate wealth for Stalinist industrialization.
Vorkuta, in particular, became one of the most important areas to 
Soviet industrial development in the entire forced labour system. Joseph 
Scholmer described the situation in the early 1950s: “The coal from Vor-
kuta [that] supplies the whole of Leningrad and Leningrad is the heart of 
Soviet industry, with its factories making precision instruments, electrical 
equipment, optical lenses and engine parts.”37 In 1950, three of the coal 
mines in the Vorkuta complex won “first prize for coal production for the 
entire industry in the USSR,” notes Edward Buca.38
The story of coal in Vorkuta—with forced labour as a unifying thread—
links the area’s first identity, as a place for the extermination of anti-Stalinist 
socialists, to its second, as one of Russia’s largest coal producers. Barenberg 
narrates how the first seams of coal in the Vorkuta area were discovered 
by a young geologist, Georgii Aleksandrovich Chernov, during an exped-
ition in the summer of 1930. A year later, Chernov returned with what 
he described as a group of thirty-nine “mining engineers of Ukhta,” who 
began work on the first permanent settlement in the region. Chernov 
related this story in his memoirs, but, as Barenberg points out, he “failed to 
acknowledge the most important detail of the discovery of coal in Vorkuta. 
. . . The thirty-nine ‘mining engineers of Ukhta’ who arrived in Vorkuta 
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were in fact prisoners.”39 Once coal was discovered in the area, it was 
not long before the first mine began operating in 1934, although output 
remained limited until 1937, when electric power arrived.40
The centrality of forced labour to Vorkuta and coal is discernible even 
in usually dispassionate reports from academic congresses. Turn to the 
findings of the seventeenth session of the International Geological Con-
gress, published in 1937. This dull, dry professional text, prepared under 
the direction of Mikhail Prigorovksy, carries the usual Stalinist verbiage 
about vast increases in production, breaking the limits imposed by the 
old tsarist system, and so on. It speaks of “the enormous growth of the 
socialist construction and exploitation of new regions,” going on to list 
“the Tungus Basin, Lena field, Pechora and Bureya basins” as “prospective 
coal areas.”41 But the most significant sentence in the report is this: “Newly 
obtained data confirm the presence there of enormous . . . distributed 
coal reserves.”42
This mention of “newly obtained data” was published in 1937, the year 
the mass killings of the Oppositionists began. Of the twenty-two specific 
locales on which the Prigorovsky volume reports, pride of place is given 
to the Pechora coal-bearing region in which Vorkuta is located, soon to 
become the killing ground of the Left Opposition. The Pechora district 
report is the first in the book, in spite of the fact that it is the district for 
which the authors have the least information, as its author (T. Ponomarev) 
admits: “The estimates of the reserves of the Pechora coals given in this 
article are but preliminary and most approximate ones, since most recent 
data concerning this question have not been received . . . in time for being 
included in the manuscripts prepared for print. For the same reason no 
figures of the actual and probable reserves of the region are given by us 
in this paper.”43
Ponomarev’s comment raises the question of where this “most recent 
data”—so recent that it could not be included—might have come from. As 
he notes, the presence of coal in the Pechora district was first “established 
by geological explorations carried on there in 1924–1930 by the Geological 
Service of the USSR. Nearly all the industrially important coal areas of 
the basin presently known to us have been detected in the result of these 
works.”44 This information clearly dovetails with Barenberg’s account of 
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Chernov’s discovery (with, however, no mention of the role of forced 
labour in this process). But again, 1930 does not qualify as “recent.” 
Ponomarev’s report might seem like the end of the road—were it not 
for Maria Joffe’s gripping account of her twenty-nine years in the Gulag. 
Central to her memoirs are the camps in the Vorkuta area, and the Brick-
works several kilometres from Vorkuta where the mass executions took 
place. Joffe describes one of her fellow prisoners, a young geologist named 
Gleb Elizavetsky. Like Joffe, he was imprisoned for “Counter-revolutionary 
Trotskyist Activity” (KRTD). Elizavetsky was, in Joffe’s words, a “non-party 
man.”45 But, like so many others, however, once painted with the KRTD 
brush, he had no hope of reprieve, and he would meet the same fate as 
if he had been an active member of the Left Opposition. Early in 1937, 
Elizavetsky announced to Joffe and others that “he had got a permit to 
go outside the zone to do geological research, outside working hours.”46 
Describing his findings, he said: “There might be Devonian oil in one of 
the areas, but research would have to be carried out as to whether it’s suf-
ficient for industrial development. At the site of the precipice—there are 
slight traces of pelitsipods and this might mean coal.” In a footnote, Joffe 
explains that pelitsipods (which should really be “pelecypods” in English 
translation) are “a kind of fossilised cockle-shell sometimes preceding 
coal seams.”47
A doctor found Elizavetsky’s report on coal lying in the camp warden’s 
office. In an effort to save Elizavetsky’s life, writes Joffe, “the doctor got 
the paper registered, packed up, sealed and speedily despatched with the 
rest of the mail.” Joffe says that the “doctor had every confidence in the 
life-saving qualities of those ‘pelitsipods.’ Moscow was urging haste in 
the search for oil and coal.” The discovery did not save Elizavetsky’s life. 
In spite of his important findings, he was sent off to the death camps.48
If the coal of Vorkuta did not prove life-saving for Elizavetsky, it did 
prove to be life-sustaining for the people and factories of Petrograd. His 
early 1937 report on his findings could well be the “most recent data” to 
which Ponomarev refers, however we might never know with certainty. 
Perhaps buried somewhere in the old NKVD records are documents to 
prove that this “Trotskyist” geologist was in fact the person who discov-
ered evidence of important new coal deposits in the Pechora coal basin, 
a basin that includes Vorkuta. Whatever the truth, Elizavetsky’s story is 
60 
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992459.01
“Truth Behind Bars” 
emblematic of the overlap between Vorkuta’s main role in the 1930s, as a 
death camp for Stalin’s enemies, and its emergent role as a forced labour 
camp in the subsequent decades, a production centre of coal to feed Rus-
sian industrialization.
The Transition from Forced Labour
Industrialization in the USSR was conducted in the context of incredible 
repression against the Left, against the labour force inside industry, and 
against national minorities inside the Russian empire. All three of these 
“constituencies” found ways to organize against their jailers. That organiz-
ation transformed into mass resistance when the various divisions inside 
the camps were bridged. And once again, this mass resistance, culminating 
in the great mineworkers’ strike of 1953, made Vorkuta the focal point of a 
wave of anti-Stalinism, the second such wave since the triumph of Stalin 
in the 1920s.
Monument to the Estonians who died in Vorkuta in 1953, erected by former 
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The least studied of these three components of the anti-Stalinist resist-
ance is the Left inside Russia itself. The contradiction between the words 
of the regime’s rulers and the realities of life in a Stalinist society provided 
ideological conditions that nourished the re-creation of oppositional cur-
rents almost as soon as the old Opposition had been liquidated. German 
journalist Brigitte Gerland was arrested in Dresden in 1946 for reporting 
on conditions under Soviet occupation; after fifteen months in a German 
prison, she was transferred to Vorkuta.49 Upon her release in 1953, she 
described a “program of resistance” developed by “small secret circles, 
meeting at night behind locked doors” inside the Soviet labour camps. 
One such movement “is said to have started from a discussion between 
five Moscow students on the long-banned poetry of Boris Pasternak.” 
These students envisaged “a way of making room for spiritual freedom 
in a collectivist society by decentralization of state power, until the state 
could finally be replaced altogether by the workers and peasants ‘syndi-
cates.’” According to Gerland, this initial core of five “recruited hundreds 
of followers” until the group was infiltrated by police spies, arrested en 
masse in 1950, and sent to the labour camps.50
Elsewhere, Gerland tells a similar story with a more explicitly political 
focus. In 1948, a manifesto written by a dozen students began circulating 
in Moscow.51 The students called their group Istinny trud Lenina (Lenin’s 
True Work), and such a name needs to be taken with a grain of salt. It is 
certainly not a coincidence that its initials—ITL—are identical to those 
for Corrective Labour Camp (in Russian, Ispravitel’no-trudovoi lager’), the 
Stalinist euphemism for the forced labour camps that comprised the core of 
the Gulag. P.M. Tashtemkhanova is not alone in believing that in choosing 
precisely this name for their clandestine organization, “it was the Correct-
ive Labour Camps (ITL) which were being referred to allegorically and 
sarcastically by the young interlocutors of B. Gerland.”52 It is probable that 
Gerland, in describing these students as “Leninist,” is leaning too much on 
the literal meaning of ITL and paying too little heed to the deep sarcasm 
the choice of name expressed. Nonetheless, following Gerland, we can see 
a considerable amount in the analysis of the ITL that is reminiscent of the 
old Left Opposition—in spite of that Opposition’s physical liquidation. The 
ITL argued that a political revolution was necessary against a bureaucracy 
that was strangling the original ideals of the 1917 revolution and that the 
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foundation of a rebirth of real socialism would be a regeneration of work-
ers’ councils (soviets).53 In this sense, they could be seen as reviving the 
classic framework developed by Leon Trotsky. Other oppositionists had 
revived the framework of the Group of Democratic Centralism, or Decists, 
who, in the 1920s, had called the USSR a “system of ‘state capitalism’” that 
had “destroyed workers’ democracy.”54 Echoing this analysis, some of the 
young members of the ITL referred to Russia as “state capitalist,” argu-
ing that no vestiges of the old revolution remained. Their manifesto was 
circulated underground, allowing the group to grow to an organization 
of several hundred, with links to universities in Leningrad, Kyiv (Kiev in 
Russian), and Odessa.55
In 1949, the group was broken by the Russian authorities. Accord-
ing to Gerland, “in a single night, entirely unexpectedly, hundreds of its 
members were arrested and condemned to twenty-five-year terms at hard 
labor.”56 Scattered throughout the Gulag, these ITL students reconstituted 
an opposition, along with anarchist students and other oppositional cur-
rents they encountered in the camps. Gerland was impressed by these 
student oppositionists: “Outstanding among them were the children of 
the generation of ’37; their parents, once leading figures in party, army and 
government, had fallen victims to Stalin’s great purge.”57 It was these ITL 
students, she says, who saw that the key to resistance lay in the collective 
action of workers:
The idea of a mass strike of forced laborers was popularized in the 
camp by the Leninist students. . . . The Leninists knew that only a 
strike which embraced at least an entire forced-labor area that was 
important economically, such as Vorkuta, stood any chance of suc-
cess. And so they undertook, systematically and patiently, to forge 
contacts between all the camps in the city of Vorkuta as well as in 
the Vorkuta district itself.58
For a strike to succeed, the divisions between the prisoners, which had 
been cultivated by the authorities, had to be overcome. There were two 
types of divisions that were the most intense—first, among the “criminal” 
population, between collaborators (suki) and irreconcilables (blatnoy), 
and second, among the entire prison population, between the Russians 
and the non-Russians.59 Before the oppositional students arrived in the 
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camps, however, the first remarkable steps at overcoming these divisions 
had already taken place.
Forty kilometres east of Vorkuta, four small prison camps, with about 
five thousand prisoners in total, contained the toughest of the “criminal” 
elements among the prison population. Added to these was a group of 
former Red Army officers, including three named Mikhtyiev, Nasarov, 
and Malmyga. In 1947, these three were at the centre of a conspiracy that 
resembled nothing if not the great Spartacus slave revolt in 71 BC inside the 
Roman Empire. They determined to kill their guards, seize their weapons, 
form an army from the prisoners in their camps, and march on the main 
camp system in Vorkuta proper. Once Vorkuta was conquered, “with an 
army of hundreds of thousands of prisoners, with food and weapons from 
the camp stores, they planned to march down the railway to the west. 
Their goal was nothing less than raising an army of the oppressed—pris-
oners, workers, peasants—to overthrow the system and the great leader 
[Stalin] himself.”60 Faced with the possibility of resistance, the suki stopped 
collaborating with the prison authorities and threw in their lot with the 
blatnoy. This was “the first time the suki and the blatnoy stopped fighting 
each other and allied themselves against the guards.”61
The plan, of course, failed, but not before the rebels had killed all the 
guards in the four camps, formed an army of several thousand, and begun 
a march across the tundra to Vorkuta itself. There, the odds were stacked 
against them. Warned in advance, the Vorkuta authorities had airplanes 
and machine guns with which to greet the zek army, and they massacred 
these latter-day Spartacans by the hundreds. Few survived, but their 
example was to be key to the next round of struggle.
The surviving rebel blatnoy were imprisoned in one of the worst of 
Vorkuta’s forced labour camps. There, one by one, they were ordered to 
perform tasks that would violate their code of solidarity. They each stead-
fastly refused, and, one by one, they were shot. Imprisoned in the same 
camp were a group of other “irreconcilables,” who were there as punish-
ment for being uncooperative and who bore witness to these events. One 
of them was Edward Buca, who later described the rebel blatnoy and their 
impact:
Their solidarity was total. All to a man obeyed the blatnoy code, 
and refused to do anything connected with the oppression of other 
64 
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992459.01
“Truth Behind Bars” 
prisoners. Their behaviour was an example to the rest of us. Natur-
ally, only a few of us knew the details of what had taken place in the 
little zone [the four small prison camps east of Vorkuta], but most 
of us had an inkling—and this was enough. The seeds of revolt had 
been sown. More and more suki in the camp stopped persecuting 
the other prisoners, and eventually the blatnoy called a halt to their 
struggle against the suki.62
Six years later, Buca would be a key leader in the strikes that brought the 
forced labour system to its knees.
This was not the first such Spartacus-like rebellion, but it is the best 
documented. In his memoir The Notebooks of Sologdin, Dimitri Panin—on 
whom Solzhenitsyn based the character Sologdin in his epic novel about 
the camps, The First Circle—relates his eyewitness account of a similar 
revolt in 1942. A small camp in the Pechora district, south and west of 
Vorkuta and near Ust-Usa, was headed by a disgruntled “commandant” 
whose staff responsible for the work details were all former prisoners 
sentenced under Article 58. The commandant and these former Article 
58 prisoners lured the camp’s armed security guards into the bathhouse, 
stole their clothes and weapons, freed and armed the rest of the prisoners, 
and began marching on the central headquarters for the Pechora district, 
located in Ust-Usa. They liberated several camps on the way and amassed 
a small army. After weeks of fighting, the Soviet authorities finally sup-
pressed this uprising. The insurgents were killed virtually to the last man. 
The handful of survivors committed suicide.63
In 1948, a group of war veterans (some perhaps belonging to or inspired 
by the underground veterans’ organization, Democratic Movement of the 
North of Russia) seized their guards’ weapons and tried to take a town 
in the Noril’sk labour-camp region, east of the Urals. “The effort failed,” 
writes George Saunders, “and they fled toward the mountains—reportedly 
over 2,000 strong—but were annihilated by the Kremlin’s airpower. A sim-
ilar revolt apparently occurred in the eastern Siberian region of Kolyma.”64
Through these uprisings—even though most ended in failure and 
death—the evidence was accumulating “that it was possible to wage an 
open struggle against the tyranny practiced in Stalin’s camps.”65 The 1947 
uprising, in particular, showed that the divisions between suki and blatnoy 
could be overcome if resistance against their common enemy, the prison 
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authorities, was seen as possible. It also showed that the blatnoy were 
more than just hardened criminals—they could constitute themselves as 
a fighting force.
Significantly, resistance methods soon began to shift from the tactics 
of Spartacus to the tactics of the modern workers’ movement. In 1949, the 
ITL students, in alliance with the blatnoy, attempted to organize a strike 
in one of Vorkuta’s most important coal pits, but their efforts met little 
response from the miners.66 In 1951, in the hard labour camp near Ekibas-
tuz in the southwest of the USSR, a five-day work stoppage and hunger 
strike of three thousand prisoners ended in a victory.67 These were the first 
rumblings of a storm that was to explode two years later.
Although collective rebellion could demonstrate the possibility of unity 
between blatnoy and suki (and the politicals), another equally profound 
division confronted these activists in the preparation of strike activity: the 
national divisions between Russians and non-Russians inside the camp. 
Edward Buca describes the situation well:
One result of our desperate condition was increased hatred and 
strife between the different nationalities, with each group trying 
to blame another for our plight. The basic conflict was between 
Russians and Ukrainians. The Russians regarded the Ukrainian 
nationalists and separatists as the real guilty men. . . . enemies of the 
Soviet fatherland, aliens who didn’t deserve to be fed; they should be 
worked until they dropped dead, and left to rot in the tundra. The 
Russian prisoners had picked up these ideas from the NKVD officers 
and guards. When the NKVD noticed this, they gladly encouraged it 
in order to keep the prisoners divided among themselves.68
These divisions resulted in a highly complex and conflictual situation. On 
the one hand was Russian chauvinism, a hatred of the Russian prisoners for 
the non-Russians, cultivated by the NKVD and captured perfectly by Buca. 
On the other was bitter anti-communism, particularly of the Ukrainian 
prisoners, whose experience of national oppression at the hands of the 
Stalinists made them hate all things Russian and all things communist, 
and who looked to the Western democracies for salvation. Among many 
of the non-Russians, this faith in the West made them distrustful of any 
camp conspiracies. Waiting on Stalin’s death, which they were convinced 
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would lead to war with the West and liberation from Stalinism, their main 
objective was to stay alive and stay out of trouble.
Activists within the largely Russian Left and among the non-Russian 
national minorities worked hard to break down these divisions. For the 
Left, it meant including demands for “national minority rights” in their 
political slogans. As Gerland reported, the ITL students “categorically con-
demned the Stalinist policy of nationalistic expansion” as well as “all the 
annexations by the Soviet Union perpetrated after the war, because these 
annexations run counter to the principle of national self-determination 
so passionately defended by Lenin.”69
More concretely, activists organizing among the national minorities 
ensured that representatives from all of “the nations of Vorkuta” were 
on their underground committees. When the young Pole Edward Buca 
asked an old Ukrainian prisoner for advice on how to organize, he was 
told: “Before you act, you must do everything possible to organize all 
nationalities.” Accordingly, in the initial work of pulling together clan-
destine groups, Buca recalled, “it was arranged that each national group 
would have its own leader; these latter would together select the supreme 
commanders.”70
But it took outside events to force the pace and make mass resistance 
a possibility. The catalyst was the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953, 
which had four important impacts. First, it raised expectations massively. 
“I’ll always remember that morning,” recalled Buca, a Polish national. 
“We were on our way to the mine when the announcement came over 
the loudspeaker. . . . We stopped in our tracks . . . Some prisoners were 
weeping, everyone was moved. This was like a great earthquake which 
could affect even our lives. It was certain that one era in history was over 
and who could know what the next would be like?”71 Joseph Scholmer also 
remembered that moment:
When the actual announcement of his death came, bearded moujiks 
[peasants] with tears in their eyes went down on their knees and 
prayed. “I’ve been in this camp nineteen years now,” said one of the 
Georgians. “But this is the best news I’ve ever heard.” “God has saved 
the Jews,” a Polish Zionist whispered to me. . . . “If he hadn’t died, 
there would have been pogroms again as bad as anything at the time 
of the Black Hundred, or Petljura, or Hitler.”72
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Second, the death of Stalin temporarily paralyzed the camp author-
ities, who were unsure which faction in the Kremlin would gain control. 
This became even more pronounced after the fall of Lavrenti Beria, the 
long-time head of the Soviet secret police and, until overthrown in a palace 
coup in June 1953 and eventually executed, the presumed heir to Stalin’s 
power.73 An authoritarian regime needs iron discipline from top to bottom. 
When a split opens up at the top, when it is unclear who the final authority 
is, the entire system can become temporarily paralyzed. In the context of 
such paralysis and confusion, mass action that seemed unthinkable just 
days before can suddenly be on the agenda.
Third, among the non-Russian national minorities, Stalin’s death set in 
motion a chain of events that led to massive disillusionment with the West-
ern democracies. Scholmer recalled that “Churchill’s statement that the 
new men in the Kremlin had to be given a chance to show their good-will 
and work out their policy in peace . . . caused the most profound dismay 
in the camps.”74 The national minorities had been reluctant to support 
resistance activities, banking everything on Western intervention. With 
the West having indicated its willingness to coexist with a post-Stalin 
Russia, thousands who had remained aloof from all talk of conspiracy 
and strike were now ready for action.
Fourth, and most importantly, the post-Stalin paralysis in the Soviet 
bureaucracy made possible the rise of a new workers’ movement in Eastern 
Europe, culminating in the massive East Berlin workers’ uprising, whose 
example electrified the millions of forced labourers in Russia’s Arctic. 
Anne Applebaum describes the discontent building in the last years of 
Stalin’s life, discontent that was not confined to East Germany. “The Soviet 
ambassador to Prague had written of ‘near-total chaos’ in Czech indus-
try in December 1952,” notes Applebaum. This chaos existed throughout 
Eastern Europe and expressed itself as mass marches in Czechoslovakia, 
strikes by tobacco workers in Bulgaria, and, perhaps most significantly, 
a huge population movement from East to West Germany. “More than 
160,000 people had moved from East to West Germany in 1952, and a 
further 120,000 had left in the first four months of 1953.”75 Beria him-
self had a clear eye as to the reasons for this chaos, citing, among other 
causes, “the unwillingness of individual groups of peasants to join the 
agricultural production cooperatives” and “the severe difficulties that the 
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GDR [German Democratic Republic, official name of East Germany] is 
experiencing with the supply of food products and consumer goods.”76 
This crisis situation came to a head on 16 June 1953, when East Berlin 
“witnessed its first major mass strikes since the war,” and the next day, 
when thousands of construction workers marched through the city carry-
ing banners saying “Berliners, join us! We don’t want to be slaves to our 
work!”77 The movement became massive and, before it was put down by 
the brute force of Russian tanks, spread throughout the country. Apple-
baum describes the size of the uprising: “Demonstrations took place in all 
of the major cities and industrial centres . . . especially those with a strong 
communist or social democratic tradition: Rostock, Cottbus, Magdeburg, 
Dresden, Leipzig, Erfurt, and Halle. In total, about 500,000 people in 373 
towns and cities went on strike in about 600 enterprises. Between a mil-
lion and 1.5 million people took part in demonstrations of some kind.”78
This magnificent upsurge in resistance to Stalinism galvanized the 
forced labourers in Vorkuta. As Scholmer recalled: “Although official news 
of the rising in Berlin and the Eastern Zone on June 17 only appeared late 
and in a garbled form in the camps, it wasn’t difficult to form an objective 
picture of what had happened. . . . Even the ordinary prisoner felt instinct-
ively that what had happened in Berlin and the Eastern Zone was a revolt 
against the police system which had arrested, sentenced and enslaved 
himself.”79 Strike committees soon formed in various sections of the camp. 
According to Gerland, even members of the non-Russian minorities, who 
had until then sought to avoid activism, began to join these committees.80 
She goes on to report that, on 21 July 1953, six thousand forced labour-
ers at mine Pits no. 1 and no. 7, where ITL students and anarchists were 
particularly influential on the strike committees, refused to go to work. 
Feverishly working to spread the strike, prisoners “requisitioned all the 
available stocks of paper” and produced thousands of leaflets, which read:
Fellow prisoners, you have nothing to lose but your chains!
Don’t expect to gain your freedom through anyone’s efforts but 
your own. No one will help you; no one will save you; only you 
yourselves can change your lot.
Down tools! The strike is our only weapon!81
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Scholmer, imprisoned in Camp 6, which he describes as “one of the 
relatively quiet camps,” estimates that more than ten thousand workers 
eventually took part in the strike—although, even according to an official 
estimate, this figure is too low by half.82 Gerland, whose information comes 
from Pits 1 and 7, where the key organizing took place, says that, by 23 July, 
some thirty thousand labourers were on strike, halting operations at ten 
of the mines. The strike continued to spread, and “within ten days, twenty 
big pits inside the city and its environs were shut down tight.”83
Whatever the exact numbers, given the conditions, what the strike 
committees accomplished was remarkable. Even though the authorities 
had surrounded the striking sections of the camp with troops, thus effect-
ively isolating them from one another, news spread like wildfire. “This was 
accomplished in the main,” Gerland writes, “thanks to the aid of soldiers 
who sympathized with the strikers and therefore incurred the risk of main-
taining the contacts which had been broken by the work stoppage.”84 As 
well as keeping lines of communication open, the strike committees had to 
ensure the day-to-day survival of the strikers. To this end, the committees 
assumed control over entire sections of the camps, putting the strikers in 
charge of routine operations. It was, in effect, a kind of workers’ control.
Edward Buca, who was at one of the more isolated camps, oversaw 
a strike committee that arranged for maintaining the abandoned mine 
shafts so that gas would not build up and explode.85 The strikers also 
provided staff for the bakery, “which made bread for both guards and 
prisoners,” maintained a functioning hospital for the many sick and dis-
abled camp inmates, and even ran a laundry, again for both the inmates 
and the guards.86 Not only did this self-organization build the confidence 
of the strikers themselves, it also helped them gain the sympathy of the 
soldiers who surrounded the camp. Buca reports that, when the first batch 
of guards’ laundry had been washed, “it was hung out in the sun to dry, 
and the guards, most of them simple peasant boys, were impressed. ‘We’ll 
never fire on you,’ several of them said.”87
But the strikers were vulnerable, especially if the prison authorities 
could find loyal troops.88 By the end of July, such troops were in place, and 
the striking sections of the camp were surrounded. The relatively isolated 
camp, under the control of Edward Buca’s multinational strike committee, 
was chosen to serve as an example to the rest. That example would take 
70 
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992459.01
“Truth Behind Bars” 
place “the first day of August, 1953,” when the striking prisoners were 
given an ultimatum: surrender within the next forty minutes or face the 
consequences.89 Buca describes what happened next:
I asked those around me what they wanted to do. These were my 
closest collaborators, and their decision was unanimous: they would 
not leave the camp, even if it meant death.
Then I went from group to group, asking for their decisions. It 
was the same everywhere: death rather than surrender.90
The prisoners massed at the camp gates, linking arms, to confront the 
troops. They were first attacked by a fire engine, “but before the hoses 
could be unwound,” a wall of prisoners advanced, “turning the vehicle 
out of the gate as if it had been a toy.”91 Then the massacre began. Roman 
Rudenko, chief prosecutor of the Soviet Union, who had arrived to oversee 
negotiations with the strikers, pulled out a pistol and shot Ihnatowicz, one 
of the key strike leaders. “It must have been a signal,” writes Buca:
There was a salvo of shots from the guards, straight into the mass of 
prisoners. But we were standing with our arms linked, and at first no 
one fell, though many were dead and wounded.
Only Ihnatowicz, a little in front of the line, was standing alone. 
He seemed to stand for a moment in astonishment, then turned 
round to face us. His lips moved, but no words came out. He 
stretched out an arm, then fell.
As he fell, there came a second salvo, then a third, and a fourth. 
Then the heavy machine-guns opened fire. . . . Then the firing 
stopped. There was silence. After waiting a few moments, I gave 
orders to stand up. Hundreds lay dead. I gave orders to take the 
wounded to hospital as quickly as possible. Some refused to go and 
turned back with some notion of trying to stop the guards from 
entering the camp. Some tore off their ragged shirts and yelled at the 
guards, “Shoot, you red devils! Shoot!”
But there were no more shots.92
We will never know how many died. Buca’s friend Greczanik, who had 
been on the front line, said it was “hard to tell,” but he thought there must 
have been “at least four hundred killed.”93 Scholmer quotes the surgeon 
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Blagodatov, who, after the massacre, was ordered to the camp and found 
about two hundred seriously wounded prisoners, “most of them hit in the 
chest and stomach. . . . Sixty-four prisoners had been killed on the spot.” 
Many of the wounded died. “We operated for a whole week,” said the 
surgeon. “We did what we could, but they were dying from their wounds 
all the time.”94
This did not signal an immediate end to the strike. Even though news 
of the massacre at Buca’s camp spread throughout the Vorkuta complex, 
other strikers held out for a while longer. Moscow made some concessions: 
allowing letters to be written home twice a month instead of twice a year, 
allowing yearly visits from family members, eliminating the hated iden-
tification numbers, and removing the iron bars from barracks windows. 
The strikers rejected these concessions out of hand as inadequate. Moscow 
responded with promises of better food, higher pay, and shorter work 
shifts. Still, the strikers held firm. General Derev’ianko, who had been 
one of those responsible for the massacre at Buca’s camp, then “resorted 
to a ruse” in Gerland’s words: “Members of the strike committee and of 
the central strike leadership were politely invited to an interview at the 
headquarters, an invitation they naturally accepted. They were cordially 
met at the camp gate by orderlies, who accompanied them to the city; but 
not a single one of them returned from this talk.”95
Finally, strikers at Camp 7 were presented with an ultimatum to “march 
out and form up in the tundra or else the camp would be taken by storm.”96 
The strike leaders decided to march into the tundra as ordered to avoid 
a massacre. Once there, the authorities arrested strikers who were in any 
way suspected of being among the leaders of the strike, four to five hun-
dred in total. “This action in fact eliminated the entire strike committee 
though they were not known individually,” writes Scholmer. “All the active 
elements in the camp were now missing. The masses were leaderless. The 
morale of the strikers had been broken. Work began in the pit again next 
day.”97 Some pits held out to November, for more than three months, but, 
as Gerland tells us, “they finally returned to work only because the supply 
of food and, what is even more vital in polar regions, the supplies of coal 
gave out.”98
While it is the one for which we have the best eyewitness accounts, the 
strike in Vorkuta was not the only one that year—some of them preceding 
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the dramatic events in East Berlin. Danylo Shumuk was a prison-labourer 
in the Noril’sk area camps, sent there along with thousands of others to 
exploit the copper and other non-ferrous metals in the surrounding hills. 
The conditions were brutal. In the summer of 1947 during a clandestine 
meeting of prisoners, in the first stages of organizing the “self-help group” 
referred to in the Preface, he reported to those assembled that “close to 
fourteen thousand prisoners sentenced to hard labour were brought to 
this camp. After only three years approximately eight thousand remain, 
many of whom have been partly or completely crippled; the other six 
thousand, broken by the cold, hunger, harsh work and constant brutality, 
are no longer with us.”99 In 1953, out of these appalling conditions, a strike 
movement broke out, parallel to that in the Vorkuta camps. According to 
Shumuk, “by the second half of May close to twenty thousand political 
prisoners were on strike in the Noril’sk area.”100
At the core of Shumuk’s account of the strike at his camp—the last to 
be engulfed by the strike wave—is a story of self-organization that paral-
lels Buca’s. The clandestine “self-help” group formed in 1947, by the end 
of 1949, had grown to include approximately “fifty of the most capable 
Ukrainians in the camp.”101 It saw its role as building the morale of the 
prisoners, and finding ways to push back against violence and excesses 
from the camp administration. It won considerable influence throughout 
the camp as a result.
The strike in Shumuk’s camp began on 4 June 1953. Three days earlier, 
twenty political prisoners had been transferred to the camp, including Ivan 
Vorobev, “who had gained a legendary reputation because of his many 
escapes from the camps.”102 On 4 June, when it became clear that these new 
prisoners, Vorobev included, were being beaten mercilessly, a rebellion to 
save their lives began among the rest of the inmates. “The fourth of June 
1953 was a memorable day” says Shumuk. “All the prisoners had left the 
barracks and were now in the street, waiting to see what would happen 
next.”103 What did happen was a remarkable two-month long strike. 
Robert Conquest says that the prisoners “struck for comparatively mild 
demands—contact with their families, letters and parcels, regularisation 
of the ration system and so on.”104 While formally true, there was actually 
much more involved. Like the events in Vorkuta, it was an uprising of the 
very oppressed against absolutely appalling conditions. As in Vorkuta, the 
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events ended with a massacre. “Many attempts were made to trick” the 
strikers, writes Conquest, “but the strike was eventually put down by force, 
with over 1,000 dead. Executions of ‘ringleaders’ followed on a mass scale. 
The rebellion’s rank and file were sent for special punishment to Kolyma.” 
About a month later, these prisoners “were sent on to the notorious mines 
of Kholodnaya. An old inmate describes them marching to their trucks, 
shouting boasts and sneering at the meeker prisoners who had preceded 
them and some of them even singing Ukrainian nationalist songs.”105
We can draw several conclusions from these remarkable events in 1953. 
By using the strike—the classic tactic of the international workers’ move-
ment—the Vorkuta workers indicated that they were a new force to be 
reckoned with. In the 1930s, the Vorkuta inmates had only moral power 
on their side. The heroic hunger strikes of the anti-Stalinist socialists had 
no hope of winning. They were a magnificent statement of a dying gener-
ation. By the 1950s, however, the forced labour inmates of Vorkuta had, in 
additional to moral power, economic power. Two students who had been 
in Leningrad during the Vorkuta strikes ended up in the Vorkuta pits two 
months after the strikes ended. “We soon got to know you were on strike,” 
they told Scholmer and other labourers in the camp. “The drop in coal was 
noticeable at once. We don’t have any reserves.”106 The moral power of the 
1930s had been reinforced with economic power in the 1950s.
Without question, this flexing of newfound economic muscle hast-
ened the demise of the forced labour system in the Soviet Union. “New 
strikes kept breaking out through 1954 and 1955,” writes George Saunders, 
“until finally a general amnesty of political prisoners was granted and 
the camp system partly dismantled.”107 That the strikes could have such 
great impact was possible because of the changes that had taken place in 
the Russian economy over a generation. By the 1950s, the conditions that 
made forced labour economically “rational” for the Russian economy were 
disappearing. Once the mines had been opened, the canals dug, the dams 
built, and the roads cut through the tundra, a transition away from forced 
labour and toward waged labour was clearly on the agenda. Forced labour 
was less suited to the next stage of industrial development than it had been 
to the stage of “primary accumulation.”108 A higher technical level required 
higher skill levels on the part of the working masses and hence greater 
use of labour by consent rather than by coercion. Importantly, the pool of 
74 
https://doi.org/10.15215/aupress/9781771992459.01
“Truth Behind Bars” 
cheap labour represented by the millions of peasants displaced by war and 
civil wars was, by and large, used up—millions having been driven off the 
land either to the cities in search of work or to the Gulag. As such rural 
reserves disappear, the conditions for systems of formal coerced labour 
become more constrained.
Certainly, this is a long and difficult process. And certainly, “free wage 
labour” has elements—sometimes profound elements—of coercion. How-
ever, it matters a great deal whether labour is formally coerced (as in the 
Gulag system) or informally coerced (through wage levels, benefits, and 
levels of unionization). In the former situation, organizing is difficult in 
the extreme. In the latter, the difficulties are real but of an entirely different 
order. The next chapter, in examining the struggles of the emergent “free” 
wage labouring class in Vorkuta and elsewhere, will reveal this clearly.
So, the events of 1953 represented an economic transformation. Most 
importantly, however, those events represented the transformation of the 
mass of forced labourers into a collectivity of proletarians. The proletar-
iat is, in part, formed objectively by capitalism. But it emerges as a class 
when it subjectively begins defining itself as a class that can act in its own 
interests. That began to happen in Vorkuta in 1953.
In Scholmer’s words, “the most important thing about the strike was 
that it ever took place at all.”109 Buca later reflected on his feelings at the 
end of the fourth day of the strike:
I sat outside one of the huts—out of sight of the guards—and talked 
and joked with the prisoners, and thought about the changes that 
had taken place inside the camp during those four days: we had 
become human beings again.
Anyone who saw those prisoners, from those in the hospital who 
had no hope of surviving to those who were exhausted from their 
brutal work, could never doubt that the attempt we had made had 
been worth while [sic], however it might turn out. I didn’t know 
what was going to happen, but, despite my fears, I was happy.110
Shumuk documents the remarkable self-activity that was the foun-
dation on which this kind of new confidence was built. Critical to the 
conduct of the two-month-long strike in his camp were the regular general 
meetings pulling together hundreds of striking prisoners.
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The general meetings were held in the club, which could accommo-
date approximately 700 people. Whenever we had to persuade the 
[strike] committee to follow our lead, our “invisible” self-help organ-
ization summoned its supporters to the club where they occupied, 
according to a prearranged plan, all the available places. As the 
meeting went through the agenda, and especially when controversial 
matters were being discussed, our supporters in the audience would 
speak. There were usually five to seven such speeches, and after each 
one, all those present would clap and shout their approval.111
The self-organization and resulting solidaristic consciousness so clearly 
visible in the Vorkuta and Noril’sk strikes of 1953 marked the end of one 
era and the beginning of the next. They marked the end of the era when 
industrialization could be, and was, conducted on the backs of millions of 
zeks. They marked the beginning of an era when industrialization would 
increasingly have to rely on wage labour, as it did in the West. And the 
strikes also served notice that these wage labourers would make an effort 
to put their imprint on the future of this vast industrial economy. It is to 
this era that we now turn in order to examine the third and last wave of 
anti-Stalinist struggle, in which Vorkuta once again played a central role. 
The making of a new working class, begun by hunger strikes of the Trot-
skyists in the 1930s, continued with the prison camp strikes of the zeks 
in the 1950s. Although participants in both movements paid a huge price 
in the short term—mass executions in the 1930s, systematic slaughter of 
frontline militants in the 1950s—both movements formed indispensable 





If the events of 1953 were precipitated by a paralysis at the top of society 
that set in after the death of Stalin, the events of 1989 were precipitated by 
a deeper and more thoroughgoing paralysis—a political crisis, signalled 
by the state’s embrace of policies of glasnost and perestroika, rooted in a 
profound and prolonged economic crisis. The latter had first manifested 
itself in a period of sluggish economic growth during the 1970s, followed 
by half a decade of stagnation, from 1980 to 1985, and then by outright eco-
nomic decline. Glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) were 
the responses to the economic crisis from the Soviet government of Mikh-
ail Gorbachev. But thousands within the very conservative nomenklatura, 
or bureaucracy, were very resistant to the changes that implementing these 
policies would have demanded. As in 1953, the resulting paralysis at the top 
created political openings at the bottom, and the mid to late 1980s were 
marked by unprecedented political ferment inside the Soviet Union. In 
this atmosphere, what David Mandel has rightly called the “rebirth of the 
labour movement” took place between 10 and 24 July 1989—a coal miners’ 
strike involving almost half a million workers.1 Some seven decades after 
the creation of what some called a “workers’ state” (a term to which we 
will turn in Part 3 of this book) that state’s own workers would undermine 
its foundations, making real Leon Trotsky’s warning, cited in the preface: 
“The vengeance of history is far more terrible than the vengeance of the 
most powerful General Secretary.”2
The depth of the economic crisis gripping the USSR in the 1980s is now 
well known. The magnitude of this crisis, which will become clear below, 
created the conditions for a vast proliferation of economic grievances from 
the working class. The regime’s response, under Gorbachev’s leadership, 
was to reintegrate the Soviet economy with that of the West, even if this 




meant allowing noncompetitive firms to go under. This restructuring was 
known as perestroika. But, in the context of declining living standards, 
restructuring—described at the time by Michael Burawoy as “a potentially 
explosive combination of openness for intellectuals and discipline for 
workers”—was likely to produce social unrest.3 It is in this sense that pere-
stroika and glasnost went hand in hand. The intention of the bureaucracy 
was, through glasnost, to legitimize its economic strategy, to open up the 
political process just enough to allow a greater feeling of participation on 
the part of the masses, but without conceding anything in terms of control 
and power. The problem with such schemes is that they can easily get out 
of control. Millions of people took Gorbachev at his word, and perestroika 
from above became redefined as what Theodore Friedgut and Lewis Sie-
gelbaum termed “perestroika from below.”4
Perestroika from Below
Small groups of perestroika enthusiasts began organizing in the mid-1980s. 
As Friedgut and Siegelbaum note: “In each small group, a start had to be 
made in introducing democratic change and civic activism. Perestroika 
had to reach up from below to meet the efforts initiated from above.”5 In 
particular, the workers’ movement began pressing its economic demands 
through initiatives outside the control of both the state and a Stalinist 
union movement that was completely bound to that state. In the words 
of worker-activist Aleksandr Utkin: “It was obvious to everyone that the 
old unions were not defending us. When we sat down for negotiations 
with the government, the official trade-unions sat with the government 
opposite us.”6
In the first half of 1989, these factors resulted in two million worker 
days lost to strikes, with “an average of 15,000 workers on strike each day.”7 
These strikes raised the possibility, for the first time in seventy years, of 
working-class organizations independent of the state. But so long had 
the traditions of independent working-class struggle been buried that, at 
first, the numbers who looked to independent labour organization were 
relatively small.
The strike of 400,000 coal miners in July changed that dramatically. 
As Michael Haynes summarizes: 
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This strike began in July 1989 in the Kuzbass in Western Siberia, the 
source of one fifth of Soviet coal, and spread to the Donbass where 
another third was produced. Some 400,000 of the million or so 
miners of the USSR were involved in the first genuine mass working 
class action since the revolution.8
David Remnick says that this unfolding movement involved “mines all 
across the country, from Ukraine to Vorkuta to Sakhalin Island,”9 a truly 
gigantic workers’ action that would have profound political consequences. 
“The initial demands were economic: more soap, detergent, toothpaste, 
sausage, shoes and underwear, more sugar, tea, and bread.”10 Workers 
complained of overcrowded dormitories and buses, a shortage of day-
care spaces and schools, miserable life expectancy (for miners, less than 
fifty years), poor work conditions, industrial pollution, runaway inflation, 
poor scheduling of holidays, and the arbitrary power and corruption of 
the local officials.11 On 10 July, after negotiations had broken down, these 
grievances exploded in strike action in Mezhdurechensk (three thousand 
kilometres east of Moscow and less than four hundred kilometres from 
the border with Mongolia). By 15 July, the strike involved 158 mines and 
177,000 workers. On that date, the workers in the Donbass, in Ukraine, 
more than three thousand kilometres east of the original strikes, began 
to go out on strike.12 In all, “100 mines struck in the Donbass with up to 
90,000 miners out on a single day. . . . On 20 July the strike spread to the 
other mining centres of the Ukraine.”13 As the strikes were reaching their 
peak there, the Pechora district, twenty-five hundred kilometres north 
and east of the Donbass, exploded, with thousands going on strike from 
19 to 24 July.
Remnick sums up the political consequences of this mass rebellion: 
“After July 1989, the Kremlin could never again have any confidence at all 
that it was the master of events. After July 1989, the illusion of a gradual, 
Gorbachev-directed ‘revolution from above’ was over.”14 A new force in 
Russian society was discovering its power. “Everywhere the picture was 
the same,” says David Mandel.
The miners occupied the central squares in permanent meeting. 
Worker detachments maintained order. In Donetsk [in the Don-




. . . In Kemerovo [near Mezhdurechensk], crime declined by 52% 
during the strike. The strike committees stopped the sale of alcohol, 
sealed liquor stores and set up drug inspection points on the main 
roads. In Donetsk two miners were dismissed for appearing drunk 
on the central square.15
The strikes were relatively short-lived and ended, in each case, with 
partial but real victories. Vorkuta played a key role, its miners having 
considerable economic power. Its largest coal pit, Vorgashorskaya, could 
at the time produce 18,000 tons of coal a day.16 In Vorkuta, “the miners 
won concessions from the Government that included an increase in sup-
plies of soap, fresh meat, refrigerators and leather shoes. In addition, the 
miners were promised pay increases for certain work shifts and some 
sort of profit sharing.”17 But more important than these concessions was 
the increase in confidence and level of organization. These were the first 
sustained, widespread incidences of working-class collective action since 
the 1953 prison camp strikes. In contrast to the 1953 strikes, however, the 
workers’ organizations, once formed, did not have their leaders dispersed 
into the prisons of the Gulag. As Mandel notes, “with the end of the strike, 
the strike committees did not disband but transformed themselves into 
workers’ committees, whose main task was to monitor the execution of the 
agreements.”18 For the first time in seventy years, organizations based in 
the working class, independent of the state and powerful enough to avoid 
instant repression from the regime, were operating in the Soviet Union. 
A silence more than three generations old was ending.
“There had been strikes before in the Soviet Union,” Remnick writes, 
including “bus drivers in the city of Chekhov, airline pilots who refused 
to fly until safety standards were improved.”
But the symbolism of the miners’ strike was extraordinary. The 
miners embodied the vanguard of the proletariat, a bastion of 
Bolshevism in the old days. To look out at the great crowd of them 
in Lenin Square was to see a kind of poster for what had once been 
called “the masses.” And now the masses were walking off the job 




The Vengeance of History
Eighteen months later, the coal miners would again lead a nationwide 
coal strike against the regime. Between these two actions, smaller but none-
theless significant strikes in the coal fields put the working-class struggle 
front and centre in the unfolding drama of glasnost and perestroika. In 
response to the explosive events of July 1989, Gorbachev attempted to all 
but outlaw strike activity. Vorkuta workers responded with illegal wildcat 
strikes. On 25 October 1989, Fein writes, a strike by “16,000 of the 24,000 
miners in the northern Vorkuta region forced the closing of four of the 
area’s 13 mines.”20 The strike lasted just twenty-four hours. According to 
Washington Post correspondent Michael Dobbs, the workers decided to 
return after “the local mine association had threatened legal proceedings 
against 90 to 100 leaders of the strike, accusing them of breaking the new 
law on resolving labor disputes.” However, a return to work did not mean 
an end to the struggle. A spokesman for the miners said that they “would 
resume the protest if their demands were not met by year’s end.”21
The strike of Vorkuta workers was part of a wider series of actions 
by miners in other parts of the Soviet Union. On 1 November, a mas-
sive two-hour “warning” strike occurred in the Donbass, the largest 
coal-producing area of the USSR. The striking miners, who numbered 
almost one hundred thousand, demanded political change: “In addition 
to routine economic demands, the strikers in Donetsk in the Ukraine 
called for abolition of the leading role of the Communist Party and direct 
election of the Soviet President. Similar political demands have been made 
by miners in the northern city of Vorkuta.”22 In July 1990, roughly one 
hundred thousand mineworkers went out on strike again, this time in 
Ukraine, Siberia, and Vorkuta, with expressly political demands. The Chi-
cago Tribune carried the story:
The strike coordinating committee in the Donetsk basin of the 
Ukraine issued an appeal that expressed total lack of faith in the 
government.
“We are of the view that [Soviet prime minister Nikolai] Ryzh-
kov’s government in the year since it was set up has failed to come 
up with an effective concept of getting the country out of its present 




“We cannot sit and wait any longer until our government and the 
party apparatus dictates its will . . . and leaves us with nothing but 
hunger, poverty and devastation.”
In addition to demanding the resignation of Ryzhkov and his 
ministers, the miners called for the nationalization of all Communist 
Party property and the elimination of all party political cells in the 
government, the army and the KGB.23
In the mid-1980s, the activists seeking to rebuild independent 
working-class organizations after three generations of Stalinism could be 
numbered in the dozens. Now these activists had an audience of hundreds 
of thousands. In October 1989, long-time political dissident Boris Kagarlit-
sky expressed excitement at the possibility that activists could go from 
the margins to the mainstream. “There are a lot of small groups trying 
to organise independent trade unions,” Kagarlitsky wrote, “but the only 
serious possibilities lie with Sotsprof ”—the Federation of Independent 
Socialist Trade Unions, launched that summer—“and the strike commit-
tees themselves.” He went on to note that “there are about 5,000 members 
of the initiative groups for Sotsprof, and the aim now is to develop it in 
provincial working class areas.”24
Sotsprof was just one of many attempts at forming independent 
working-class organizations. In the coal fields, for instance, a more 
important role was probably played by the Independent Miners’ Union, 
which in 1991, according to Mandel, had “approximately 55,000 members, 
though its real influence among the miners was much broader.”25 Given 
the more than seventy-year absence of independent working-class politics, 
this re-emergence of independent trade unions, however small in scale 
relative to the tens of millions who comprised the working class in the 
Soviet Union, was nonetheless significant.
For all of these independent unions, 1991 was to be a turning point in 
their history. But for all, it was also to represent, for the moment, the peak 
of their ability to influence Russian politics. In retrospect, this should have 
caught no one by surprise. Kagarlitsky had, in 1989, warned enthusiasts 
in the West: “You mustn’t exaggerate the level of class consciousness of 
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The Legacy of the Past
It is impossible to calculate the extent to which working-class conscious-
ness was destroyed by the long years of authoritarianism and Stalinism. 
Unable to organize independently, punished at the slightest sign of 
independent activity, unable to put forward independent political parties, 
and provided with no forums in which to discuss, debate, and hammer 
out ideological viewpoints, the political consciousness of the working 
class throughout the Soviet Union was driven to an extremely low level. 
The 1989 awakening of the class could not help but be marked by this 
legacy. The negative aspects of this legacy manifested in different ways. 
With respect to the miners, while extremely militant and politicized, they 
remained isolated from much of the rest of the working class. In addition, 
the vacuum of ideas created by decades of political repression left the 
miners open to illusions about Boris Yeltsin and his market-friendly pro-
gram of reforms. Isolation and Yeltsinism together meant that this initial 
attempt at forming independent organizations was to prove incapable, 
in the short term, of creating stable, mass working-class organizations.
On 4 March 1991, at the ironically named Bolshevik Mine in Novo-
kuznetsk, a city in the Kuzbass not far from Mezhdurechensk, what was 
to have been a one-day walkout in solidarity with striking Ukrainian 
miners set off another wave of strikes. The strikes quickly spread to at 
least one-third of the country’s 580 mines, including those in Vorkuta, and 
then settled into a massive, generalized challenge to the regime.27 Not only 
were these strikes larger and more sustained than the 1989 strikes, they 
were also more expressly political. “In 1989, it was only the coal miners 
of Vorkuta, in the Russian Polar region, who combined radical political 
principles with their economic demands,” Remnick reported at the time. 
“But now, as Gorbachev’s economic policies continue to flounder, almost 
all of the strikers have proclaimed radical change in political leadership 
as central to their position.”28
Increasingly, however, this political opposition to the Soviet state 
transformed itself into political support for Boris Yeltsin, then chair of 
the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR—the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist 
Republic. At the start of May, as the second month of the strike drew to 
a close, Yeltsin travelled to Novokuznetsk, where, the New York Times 




of them eager to see Gorbachev resign.29 As one member of the strike com-
mittee, Aleksandr Kolesnikov, commented: “So far it’s been all hurrah. At 
the first rally yesterday the miners formally endorsed Yeltsin.”30 The con-
ditions creating this move toward Yeltsin intensified. By 1991, continued 
economic decline was making life grim for the miners and rendering 
hollow the “liberals’ promises of a bright future from market reform.”31 
The decline in their living standards dragged many workers into apathy, 
which opened the door for Yeltsin and his promises of market reform in 
a way that was much more pronounced than in 1989.
The miners’ enthusiasm for Yeltsin was tempered by the fact that, 
only the previous week, he had been one of the ten signatories of an 
agreement reached between Gorbachev and the leaders of nine of the 
constituent republics of the Soviet Union. Signed on 23 April, the Accord 
of Ten, as reported by David Mandel, “called on the miners and all other 
strikers to return to work and to make up the losses, declaring that it 
was ‘unacceptable to try to achieve political goals by inciting to civil dis-
obedience, strikes and appeals to overthrow the political authorities.’”32 
Yeltsin, speaking at a miners’ rally, praised their strike to the heavens. 
“The miners have turned out to be the initiators of the destruction of 
the old command-administrative system and creators of a new system of 
economic management,” he told the miners. However, Pavel Vashonov, a 
key member of the Yeltsin camp, expressed a quite different view: “‘This 
wave of strikes cannot give birth to any normal political system,’” he said, 
going on to argue that the motivation of the workers came from “their 
instinctive reaction to having been ‘robbed and deceived.’”33
In the confusion, the strike movement, whose activists had increasingly 
looked to Yeltsin as an alternative to Gorbachev, came to a halt in city after 
city, pit after pit. Mandel described “the initial reaction among many of 
the miners’ leaders” as “shock and betrayal,” quoting strike leader Alek-
sandr Kriger as saying, “I think that Yeltsin betrayed us.”34 Whether the 
miners had been betrayed or not, Yeltsin seemed like a better choice than 
Gorbachev to many in the movement. In Vorkuta, the strike ended when 
an agreement was reached to transfer the control of the mines from the 
USSR and Gorbachev to the Russian Republic and Yeltsin.35 The workers, 
in other words, even if disillusioned by the Yeltsin–Gorbachev rapproche-
ment, were looking to Yeltsin and his program of market reforms to solve 
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their deep economic and social grievances. This was expressed in August 
when hundreds of thousands of working people took to the streets to 
defend Yeltsin against the reimposition of bureaucratic control in the coup 
attempted by hard-core Stalinist loyalists that month.
Yeltsin did, of course, prove to be a false saviour. According to Richard 
Greeman, writing in the early 1990s, Yeltsin’s “‘low intensity’ attack on 
rights and living standards of working people is demoralizing enough. 
Planned massive price rises have reduced everyone but the privileged to 
desperation. Salaries are next to worthless. Pensions are simply not paid 
on the grounds of a manufactured ‘shortage’ of money, while ‘before our 
eyes, our systems of free medical care and free universal education are 
being dismantled without our permission, with no legal basis.’”36
The workers’ movement, starting from a very low point, proved capable 
of only momentarily breaking out of its isolation in the mining centres. 
Except for an explosion in Minsk, wrote Mandel, “the movement failed 
to embrace the largest Soviet cities, and the miners’ attempts to expand 
the movement in their own regions met with very limited success.”37 In 
the vacuum of ideas that was the legacy of long decades of Stalinism, 
and in opposition to Gorbachev, the workers turned to Yeltsin and his 
pro-market alternative. By 1993, in the wake of the privation and poverty 
that this “alternative” had led to, the independent union movements of 1991 
had retreated from the stage. In the words of Richard Greeman: “For the 
moment, we have stasis—which the Greeks understood as a violent and 
degenerative paralysis of a polity in the middle of an unfinished class war.”38
“They Are Their Sons and Daughters”
In the years following 1993, the situation was not, in fact, one of stasis. If 
economic decline was the background to perestroika and glasnost, what 
ensued in the transition to neoliberalism was economic catastrophe.
It is extremely difficult to measure the state of the economy in the 
Soviet Union in the 1980s. Government statistics were notoriously unreli-
able. Working with the statistics we do have and with the most basic 
measure of the health of an economy—output per capita adjusted for 
inflation—we find that the economy in the USSR declined 1.27 percent in 
1988, 1.47 percent in 1989, 0.76 percent in 1990, and a precipitous 14.6 per-




economic decline in that year was similar to that experienced by Greece 
in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008. However, the years following 
were even worse. Figure 1 takes the same criterion—output per capita 
adjusted for inflation—and tracks the performance of the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation from 1991 to 2015. The 
United States and the United Kingdom experienced economic weakness 
in 1991 and 1992, in the context of the recession that opened up the decade. 
A sharp decline in 2008 and 2009, during the Great Recession, is also 
clearly evident. But otherwise, the economies of those two countries grew. 
By 2007, just before the Great Recession, inflation-adjusted output per 
capita in the United Kingdom was 43 percent greater than in 1990; in the 
United States, the figure was 39 percent. By 2015, after recovery from the 
Great Recession, the output per capita for both countries was 44 percent 
greater than in 1990.
Figure 1. Output per capita in Russia, the U.S., and the U.K. from 1991–2015 
(1990=100). Derived from data available in United Nations, “Population” and 
United Nations, “GDP, at Constant 2005 Prices – National Currency.”
But the story in the Russian Federation through the 1990s was catas-
trophic. As figure 1 shows, inflation-adjusted output per capita dropped 
so precipitously that, by 1998, it stood at just 58 percent of the 1990 figure. 
An economic decline of 42 percent is reminiscent of the Great Depression 







































































The Vengeance of History
only in 2006 did output per capita return to 1990 levels. By 2014, it was up 
22 percent from 1990, but it fell back to 17 percent the next year.
Perhaps even more dramatic as an indicator of economic weakness is 
the trade balance of the Soviet Union and countries of the former Soviet 
Union in that most basic of commodities: wheat. “Bread, peace, and land!” 
was the organizing slogan of the 1917 revolution, but, by the late twentieth 
century, the first of these could not be produced in sufficient quantity to 
feed the people of the Soviet Union. As Ernest Mandel explained, “the most 
dramatic expression” of slowing rates of growth in the 1980s in the Soviet 
Union was “the quasi-stagnation in cereal production, particularly animal 
feed, which for years has made the USSR dependent on massive imports 
of agricultural products from capitalist countries (Argentina, Canada, 
USA, France and Australia).”40 As figure 2 shows, from the mid-1970s 
on, the Soviet Union imported more wheat than it exported. By 1984, the 
trade deficit in wheat stood at a staggering twenty-five million tonnes. The 
terrible inefficiencies of the system bequeathed by Stalinism are exposed 
as clearly in this one chart as in any lengthy treatise.
The difficult realities of the early 1990s are also apparent in figure 2. 
In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the trade deficit 
worsened, with 1993 surpassing the twenty-five million tonne mark of 
1984. Just as with the earlier figures on output per capita, by the twenty-first 
century, recovery is visible. But we can also see the sharp economic decline 
in the first years of neoliberalism. As is often the case in periods of deep 
and prolonged economic crisis, in the 1990s, the entire energy of the poor 
and the oppressed turned to survival. Class struggle receded into the back-
ground, and the promising beginnings of 1989 to 1991, in terms of the 
independent organization of workers, became a distant memory.
Again, as in the two periods looked at previously, throughout 1989 to 
1991, it was the miners in Vorkuta who were the quickest to press political 
demands and the most ready to take direct action and who were in the 
forefront of establishing independent union organizations. According to 
David Mandel, during the July 1989 awakening of the Russian workers’ 
movement, Vorkuta, of all the coal-mining regions, had the highest “level 
of politicization.” Not only did the miners there demand “the removal 
of the coal minister and of the chairman of the Union of Workers of 




committee, himself a party member for over ten years,” called for the 
rescinding of the article in the constitution that allotted the Communist 
Party a monopoly of power in the state.41
Figure 2. Net exports of wheat in countries of former USSR, 1961–2013. 
Derived from data available in FAOSTAT, “Crops and Livestock Products, 
Wheat, Import Quantity, Export Quantity.”
In a November 1989 interview, Kagarlitsky was asked why it was the 
Vorkuta miners who were the most militant and the most politicized.
“It’s important to know that these miners are the sons and grand-
sons of Stalin’s victims. No one other than those in the labour 
camps ever worked in the mines.” Kagarlitsky said today’s miners 
were aware of the Trotskyists who were forced to work in the Vor-
kuta labour camps during Stalin’s purges. “They are their sons and 
daughters. No one ever moves there, so these are the second and 
third generation.”42
















































































The Vengeance of History
From the Standpoint of the Working Class
A core part of the methodology, for those of us who are historical material-
ists, is to listen to the voices of workers in struggle. One of the aspirations 
of this book is to discern the trajectory of the Russian Revolution of 1917. 
If we listen to the voices of workers in struggle, that trajectory is revealed 
with absolute clarity.
Upon invoking a desire to see things from the standpoint of the 
working class, however, we are immediately confronted with concep-
tual difficulties. The term class, more often than not, is used to capture 
an objectively measurable category. We think of it as a statement about 
differential relations to wealth and power, to status, or to the means of 
production. These objective measures all have their place. Income levels 
tell us a considerable amount. Status in a hierarchical economy is very 
real, and often very offensive. And the question of relation to the means 
of production is frequently decisive. It is not uncommon for scholars to 
suggest that for Karl Marx, these objective measures correspond to one 
half of his class analysis, the half that can fit under the heading of “class 
in itself ”—the objective or structural counterpart to the subjective or 
struggle-based notion of “class for itself.”
Edward Andrew, in 1983, provided a list of those who accept this “class 
in itself ” reading of Marx, a list that includes T. Dos Santos, Nicos Pou-
lantzas, Irving M. Zetlin, and Robert Tucker. However, Andrew went on 
to make the interesting point that, in fact, nowhere did Marx use the term 
“class in itself.”43 Here is what Marx, as a young man in 1847, actually did 
argue, in The Poverty of Philosophy:
Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of 
the country into workers. The domination of capital has created for 
this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus 
already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the strug-
gle . . . this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for 
itself. The interests it defends become class interests. But the struggle 
of class against class is a political struggle.44
There are objective, structural pressures pushing in the direction of 
class formation. Capital in the cycle of capital accumulation continually 




like the structuralist formation implied by the term “class in itself.” Struc-
turalist Marxists who emphasize a “class in itself ” versus “class for itself ” 
binary risk falling into the same trap identified by Marx, a trap that viti-
ates all materialisms precedent to historical materialism. The young Karl 
Marx said, in his famous “Theses on Feuerbach”: “The chief defect of all 
previous materialism . . . is that things [Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness 
are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not 
as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively.”45 Classes are not 
structures. Classes are collections of human beings with hopes, dreams, 
ideas, and passions. Marx’s interest was not with an inert mass of workers 
created and recreated by capitalism, but with the dynamic and living mass 
of workers who, in political struggle, begin to unite and to become a “class 
for itself.” His is a subjective approach with an objective dimension rather 
than an objective approach with a subjectivist add-on.
More than half a century has passed since the publication of E. P. 
Thompson’s The Making of the English Working Class (1963). Thompson 
is in the company of C. L. R. James, Rosa Luxemburg, and others who 
remind us in their writings of the human, “class for itself ” dimension of 
serious historical materialist analysis. The emergence of a class “for itself ” 
is not automatically determined. It is a product of struggle.
Thompson chose to use “making” in his title because his book is “a 
study in an active process, which owes as much to agency as to condi-
tioning. The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. 
It was present at its own making.” As he goes on to explain, “I do not see 
class as a ‘structure,’ nor even as a ‘category,’ but as something which in fact 
happens (and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships.”46 
Writing about class in the context of ancient Greece, G. E. M. de Ste. Croix 
put it this way: “I am not going to pretend that class is an entity existing 
objectively in its own right like a Platonic ‘Form.’” Similarly, Thompson 
understood class as “essentially a relationship”—as an expression of the 
social relations through which human beings enter into the process of 
production.47
The three chapters that constitute part 1 of this book suggest that a 
Thompsonian approach to class can help us understand class formation 
in the territories of the Soviet Union in the Stalin and post-Stalin eras. 
What is sometimes lost in debates about, for example, the “class nature” 
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of the Soviet Union in these eras is the lived experience of the poor, the 
oppressed, and the exploited. An examination of their struggles—their 
hopes, dreams, forms of organization, ideas—can shed some light on the 
working class that did emerge “for itself ” on several occasions in the twen-
tieth century and can perhaps give us some insight into the class to emerge 
for itself at some point in the twenty-first century. The first stage in that 
process was the heroic hunger strike of the Trotskyist forced labourers—
their doomed last stand telling those willing to listen that a new Russian 
working class “in the making” existed in the Gulag. The second stage was 
the wave of camp strikes centred on 1953, which led to the dismantling of 
the forced labour system. The third stage involved the strikes that took 
place between 1989 to 1991, which sounded the death knell of the Stalin-
ist system. The re-emergence of the working class as a “class for itself ” 
in 1989 to 1991 was a tremendous achievement. The August 1991 coup 
attempt, when hardline Stalinists attempted to re-establish “communist” 
rule, was stopped in large part by striking workers throughout the USSR, 
including, as journalist John Gray notes, “striking miners in most of the 
Soviet coal fields.”48
The depression of the neoliberal 1990s drowned the 1989–91 wave in a 
tsunami of misery. But the story doesn’t end there. The economic crisis has 
eased. Slowly, tentatively, as the figures in this chapter show, the economies 
throughout much of the former Soviet Union have returned to growth, 
including returning to being net exporters of wheat. Given that the Black 
Earth Region that lies in Russia and Ukraine contains some of the most 
fertile land in the world, it is astonishing that there was ever a moment 
when these countries had to import wheat on a massive scale. Although 
the working class in the countries of the former Soviet Union has many 
obstacles to overcome, it is a class that has covered a tremendous amount 
of ground in very few years. While it took the Western labouring masses 
almost two thousand years to progress from the slave rebellions in 71 
BC to the struggle for democracy in 1848 AD, in modern Russia, a mere 
forty to fifty years separated the Spartacus-style revolts of the 1940s and 
the working-class struggle for democracy in the late 1980s. This strug-
gle for glasnost and democracy quickly generated ideas about and the 
initial attempts at independent working-class organization, which points 




much greater rapidity than was the case for the European working-class 
movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We cannot 




PA R T  2
Self-Emancipation 
Versus Substitutionism
The next chapter and the three that follow are organized around the con-
trast between the two concepts around which this book is organized: 
self-emancipation and substitutionism. Their focus falls especially on 
specific instances of substitutionism and their consequences, both at the 
time of the 1917 revolution and in the early years of Bolshevik rule.
Chapter 4 examines a kind of substitutionism sui generis, in which the 
mass activity of a temporary new class—the peasants-in-uniform, a tem-
porary class forged by the First World War—substituted for the self-activity 
of urban workers. This long-ignored analysis has been developed most 
clearly by Iulii Martov and Raphael Abramovitch, two leading members of 
the antiwar Menshevik-Internationalists. Both, as well as being Menshevik 
leaders, had deep roots in the General Jewish Labour Bund in Lithuania, 
Poland, and Russia—Martov providing intellectual inspiration to the Bund 
in its infancy, Abramovitch providing years of organizational leadership. 
In the heat of revolution and civil war, both Martov and Abramovitch 
pointed to the influence of soldiers and the military army environment 
on the revolution in Russia. 
In chapter 5, I attempt to get at the root of the misunderstanding of the 
peasants-in-uniform by investigating misunderstandings of the peasantry 
per se. I argue that the largely urban intellectual Left—including, but not 
limited to, Lenin and the Bolsheviks—had a very formulaic understand-
ing of dynamics in the countryside, on the basis of which they developed 




overwhelming tendency to see the Russian peasantry as “petit bourgeois” 
did not mesh with what can only be called the “patriarchal” reality of the 
dominant institution in the countryside—the mir.
Chapters 6 and 7 engage with the early congresses of the Communist 
International (Comintern)—in particular the recently published pro-
ceedings of the Third and Fourth Congresses of the Comintern. Their 
publication completes the record of the first four congresses of the Comin-
tern, congresses identified by Leon Trotsky as unsurpassed in the manner 
with which they approached the key political issues of their time. Specif-
ically, these chapters focus on four moments of extreme substitutionism: 
the Russian invasions of Poland in 1920 and Georgia in 1921 (chapter 6), 
and the German March Action of 1921 in which a large role was played by 
leaders of the failed Hungarian revolution of 1919 (chapter 7). Together, 
these chapters provide a critique of what was known at the time as the 
“theory of the offensive.” The transcripts of the early congresses reveal an 
incredible tension between substitutionism— acting in a “revolutionary” 
manner even in the absence of any real prospect of mass support and 
self-emancipation— and relying on the self-activity of the masses of the 
working class and the oppressed. Sometimes, it was the leadership of the 
Comintern who articulated the latter. Often it was not.
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Grappling with the problems of substitutionism and searching for a 
self-emancipationist approach have deep roots in the Russian Left of the 
era. According to Leopold Haimson, “samoupravlenie, samostoiatel’nost’ 
samodeiatel’nost’ [lit. self-government, autonomy, self-activity] were terms 
used by the Mensheviks to express the need for the ‘active involvement’ of 
workers in public affairs” and “were developed by the Menshevik editors 
of Iskra following their 1903 split with Lenin.”1 Menshevik leader Pavel 
Axelrod, in an influential article, of which the first part was published in 
late 1903 and the second in early 1904, outlined these ideas at some length, 
arguing that “the development of class self-awareness [class-consciousness] 
and the self-activity of the proletariat is a process of self-development and 
self-education of the working class,” the indispensable foundation for the 
“process of social-democratic self-development and self-education.”2
Leon Trotsky’s first major work, Our Political Tasks, appeared a 
few months after Axelrod’s article, and was dedicated, by the then 
twenty-four-year-old Trotsky, to his “dear teacher Pavel Borisovich Axel-
rod.”3 Trotsky argues that the publication of Axelrod’s article marks “the 
beginning of a new era [epoch] in our movement.”4 I quoted earlier, from 
this first book of Trotsky’s, his scathing deconstruction of what he saw as 
Lenin’s substitutionist methods. The book also offers a positive alternative 
to substitutionism (zamestitel’stvo), deploying all the terms outlined by 
Haimson and adding a fourth, self-determination (samopredeleniia). A 
term normally deployed in discussions of movements of oppressed nations 
against imperialism, Trotsky deploys it here to discuss the emergence of 
an independent working-class movement. Tactically, he suggests that par-
ticipating in elections can be a “starting point for the self-determination 
of the proletariat”5—this in a book that is framed by the idea that the key 




task facing the Russian movement was to prepare an insurrection against 
tsarism! He also puts this concept at the centre of his strategic orienta-
tion. He takes it as a given that the Russian movement “will triumph as a 
workers’ movement or it will not triumph at all.” However, he argues, “this 
exhausts only one side of the question. The other can be formulated as 
follows: the Russian revolutionary movement must, when it has triumphed 
as a workers’ movement, be transformed without delay into a process of 
political self-determination of the proletariat,” a process that he summar-
izes as involving “putting the workers forward as the main revolutionary 
force and making the revolution their political schooling.”6 The unifying 
concept in all this is the idea of the self-activity of the proletarian masses. 
Coming out of the devastating split between the Bolsheviks and Menshe-
viks at the 1903 congress, “the basic task,” Trotsky argues, “may in general 
be formulated as consisting of the development of the self-activity of the 
proletariat.”
It took the Second Congress, an infinitude of palace revolutions 
in the Party organisation, and a whole series of bitter frictions in 
all fields—before the cry (the howl almost) “Towards the masses! 
Into the masses!” burst out from the Party, and the watchword 
“self-activity of the proletariat” became a living and, let us hope, 
life-giving slogan.
The questions of social democratic tactics based totally on 
politically conscious and active masses, are today placed on the 
agenda by the whole of the previous development of our Party, a 
development which. . . . has created all the necessary material and 
ideological conditions; and one can be assured that now, all publish-
ing or practical work concerned to develop the political self-activity 
of the working class, will not be without issue and will not be 
crushed.7
The concepts of self-activity and substitutionism can help us navigate 
the complicated contours of the Russian Revolution. The introduction to 
this book presented the binary of hope and horror—the hope that exploded 
in the revolution of 1917, and the horror that has variously been called 
Stalinism, Thermidorian reaction, and counter-revolution. There is a com-




as a mass emotion on 8 March, with the demonstration-turned-strike on 
Women’s Day in 1917. Here, self-activity took centre stage. Horror crystal-
lized as a mass emotion exactly four years later, when Women’s Day in 1921 
was marked by the opening of the Red Army attack on the rebel sailors 
of Kronstadt. Here, substitutionism was on full, grotesque—and tragic—
display. Isaac Steinberg recounts the details of this initial failed attack, 
quoting a “Bolshevik historian of that period, N. Pukhoff,” who recalled 
that a blizzard was raging on the night of the attack and “described the 
Red Armists dressed in long white overalls (like shrouds) to camouflage 
them in the snow”:
“At the very beginning of the operation,” Pukhoff reported, “the 
Second Battalion refused to go into action. Only with great dif-
ficulties, and the help of the Communist Commissars, were they 
persuaded to step on to the ice. But they no sooner reached the first 
southern battery of Kronstadt, than an entire company of that bat-
talion surrendered to the enemy, and only the officers returned. . . . 
Soon it was learned that another military unit, the Third Battalion, 
had done the same. . . . All, except the Commissar and three or four 
soldiers, surrendered.”8
The Bolsheviks turned to drastic measures. They mobilized hun-
dreds of communists from the Tenth Party Congress, then convening in 
Moscow, to act as agitators. “And to intimidate the rest of the soldiers,” 
writes Steinberg, “the ‘revolutionary’ tribunals were set working at full 
speed.”9 The drastic measures worked, and Kronstadt fell to the Bolsheviks. 
The fortunate rebels escaped, while “the others fell into the hands of the 
Cheka and military tribunals.”10
Let us reflect for a minute on the revenge taken by the Cheka on the 
defeated rebels. “Every night groups of imprisoned sailors were taken from 
the Petrograd jails and shot,” Steinberg tells us.11 This kind of extrajudicial 
use of terror and violence had become routine. Victor Serge, who rallied 
to the Bolshevik cause during the years of civil war, and who makes it very 
clear that the terror of the counter-revolution was far worse than that of 
the Bolsheviks, nonetheless maintains that “the formation of the Chekas 
was one of the gravest and most impermissible errors that the Bolshevik 




them lose their heads.” Serge uses the plural, Chekas, because, in reality, 
throughout the vast expanse of Russia there were many local Chekas, 
and “these gradually came to select their personnel by virtue of their 
psychological inclinations.” The recruits were “characterized by suspi-
cion, embitterment, harshness, and sadism.” As Serge recalls: “In every 
prison there were quarters reserved for Chekists, judges, police of all sorts, 
informers, and executioners. The executioners, who used Nagan revolv-
ers, generally ended by being executed themselves. They would begin to 
drink, to wander around and fire unexpectedly at anybody.” As well as 
being morally degenerate, the Chekas were also (or therefore) a complete 
failure as a tool with which to build a new society. “All evidence indi-
cates that revolutionary tribunals, functioning in the light of day (without 
excluding secret sessions in particular cases) and admitting the right of 
defense, would have attained the same efficiency with far less abuse and 
depravity,” Serge argues. “Was it so necessary to revert to the procedures 
of the Inquisition?”12
In any case, these “procedures of the Inquisition” were used to complete 
the work of defeating the Kronstadt rebellion, marking the elimination 
of the last hopes of emancipation emanating from 1917. A state had been 
consolidated. Tsarism and the old regime were gone, but the new state, 
from March 1921 on, had nothing in common with anything that could 
be called a “progressive alternative,” let alone a socialist one.
“The Population Slept Peacefully”
Another binary, this one concerning views of the October Revolution, is 
described in the introduction to this book: the Bolshevik seizure of power 
in November 1917 is seen either as the final consolidation of soviet power 
(Trotsky) or as a coup d’état (Souvarine’s). Karl Radek, in 1922, offered 
another interpretation. His analysis begins very much in the manner 
of Trotsky, by describing November 1917 as a moment “when the work-
ing class took power.” However, he immediately modifies this notion of 
workers’ power—not by shifting to Souvarine’s notion of a coup but by 
introducing a third, more subtle perspective: “The Revolutionary Military 
Committee . . . had taken the power in the name of the soviet of the work-




Let us explore this for a moment. The Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee (as it is more commonly called) was established in October 1917 by 
the Petrograd Soviet Executive Committee, its purpose being to organize 
the defence of the capital from potential right-wing threats. As an insti-
tution of the Petrograd Soviet, the committee can be characterized as an 
instrument of the nascent workers’ state. However, because it was in fact 
dominated by the Bolsheviks, it was an instrument of just one party in 
that nascent workers’ state. It was also the instrument that Trotsky used 
to direct the insurrection and seizure of power.
What were the elements deployed by the Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee to ensure the success of that insurrection? The key to everything 
was in Petrograd, which, at the time of the revolution, was a wartime 
city. China Miéville describes it as two cities—“a city of workers, swollen 
by the war to around 400,000” and “a city of soldiers, of whom 160,000 
were stationed there in reserve.”14 The soldiers were not organic to the 
city: they were present only because of war mobilization. They were also 
overwhelmingly from rural, peasant backgrounds and had little familiarity 
with city life. And, finally, they were massively radicalized by the joint 
effects of the catastrophe of war and the land seizures that were sweeping 
the empire. These 160,000 peasants-in-uniform understandably played 
a key role in the revolution. According to Alexander Rabinowitch, they 
played the central role: “The main forces designated to take part in these 
operations were the Pavlovsky Regiment; Red Guard detachments from 
the Vyborg, Petrograd, and Vasilevsky Island districts; the Keksgolmsky 
Regiment; the naval elements arriving from Kronstadt and Helsingfors; 
and sailors from the Petrograd-based Second Baltic Fleet Detachment.”15 
The relative weight of workers in the active forces is difficult to quan-
tify. The Red Guard described itself as follows: “The workers’ Red Guard 
is an organization of the armed forces of the proletariat for struggle with 
counterrevolution and defense of the conquests of the proletariat. The 
workers’ Red Guard consists of workers who are recommended by Social-
ist parties, factory committees and trade-unions.”16 According to William 
Chamberlin, the sailors were “less numerous” than the Red Guards, but 
together the two—Red Guards and sailors—“constituted the more active 
part of the forces of insurrection.” Chamberlin describes the Red Guards 




after the defeat of Kornilov. According to the most reliable sources, about 
twenty thousand Red Guards were available for service on the eve of the 
uprising.”17
Raphael Abramovitch paints a very different picture. “The main forces 
in the ‘proletarian’ revolt,” he writes, “were soldiers and sailors, armored 
cars and guns. The famed workers’ Red Guard acted only as a police force.”18 
And, even if the sailors were “less numerous” than the proletarian Red 
Guards, Chamberlain nonetheless underlines their central importance, 
noting that the final act of the uprising, “the attack on the Winter Palace, 
. . . occurred much later than the scheduled time, because the Kronstadt 
sailors arrived many hours after they had been expected.”19
Insight into the relative weight of workers and peasants-in-uniform 
within the Bolshevik movement can be gleaned from the voting statis-
tics related to the ill-fated Constituent Assembly, which is examined in 
the conclusion to this book. Of the nearly 10.6 million votes won by the 
Bolsheviks, close to 1.7 million came from sailors and soldiers at the front—
evidence, perhaps, of a working-class movement with auxiliary support 
from peasants-in-uniform.20 However, Oliver Radkey, from whom these 
statistics are drawn, says that it is very difficult to determine “whether the 
garrison vote has been included in the vote for a city. Garrisons did not 
have their own commissions but they had separate polling stations and 
so usually the result is totaled up and announced in a bloc. But whether it 
has then been fused with the civilian vote or left segregated is the question 
that bedevils the investigator.”21
Why does this matter? The insurrection of the fall of 1917 has gone down 
in history as a proletarian revolution that created a workers’ state. If the 
principal force was a proletarian Red Guard, assisted by peasant-soldiers 
and sailors, then that characterization would make reasonable sense. How-
ever, if the proletarian Red Guard was simply a “police force” and the bulk 
of the heavy lifting was done by the sailors and soldiers, then we have a 
problem. Is it really possible for peasants from distant rural villages to 
engage in mass actions resulting in the creation of a proletarian state based 
in the major urban centres? In stating that the Military Revolutionary 
Committee took power “in the name of the soviet,” Radek acknowledges 
substitution at one level—the substitution of the committee for the soviet 




was the peasant-in-uniform, then we have another level of substitution: a 
workers’ state captured for the workers by thousands of armed peasants.
In later years, both Lenin and Trotsky would develop narratives about 
the deformation of the revolution. In December 1920, Lenin famously 
wrote that the very notion of the Soviet Union as a workers’ state was “an 
abstraction.” As he went on to point out: “Ours is not actually a workers’ 
state but a workers’ and peasants’ state.” He then added a further qualifi-
cation: “Ours is a workers’ state with a bureaucratic twist to it.”22 Trotsky 
would famously come to analyze the “bureaucratic degeneration of the 
state”23 in the Soviet Union, its transformation into a state controlled by 
a bureaucratic clique rather than through direct democracy exercised 
by the working class—a degenerated workers’ state. Both believed that 
the revolution had been knocked off the rails after a strong beginning. 
But if the beginning (at least the October/November beginning) involved 
substitution on the scale described here—an active element comprising 
predominantly peasants-in-uniform substituting for a largely passive 
working-class mass—then we have to incorporate the flawed beginning 
of what came to be called a “workers’ state” into the conceptions of both 
Lenin and Trotsky.
What do we know of the dynamics at work within both the 
peasants-in-uniform and the urban proletariat? The revolutionary ferment 
among the peasants-in-uniform was clear—the disastrous summer offen-
sive had broken the Russian army as a fighting force. The overwhelming 
desire of peasant-soldiers and sailors was to be released from duty and 
begin the long walk home to participate in these ongoing seizures of land. 
According to Leonard Schapiro, once the Petrograd Soviet established the 
Military Revolutionary Committee on 22 October, it soon garnered the 
support of troops garrisoned in Petrograd, who “were united to a man 
in their determination to resist any proposal to send them to the front.”24 
Schapiro describes what followed:
By 3 November, when the Commander of the Northern Front 
and Kerensky attempted to transfer some troops from Petrograd, 
a series of conferences of units of the Petrograd garrison passed 
resolutions recognizing the Petrograd Soviet as the only authority 




exaggeration to say that the “Provisional Government was on that 
date already overthrown,” at any rate in Petrograd.25
But what of the urban working class? It was, after all, their actions that 
had launched the whole revolutionary process eight months earlier, when 
workers arose in protest on Women’s Day. That a revolutionary ferment 
still existed among urban workers in Petrograd is clear from the role of 
the Red Guards in the October insurrection. Nikolai Sukhanov, one of the 
great chroniclers of the revolution, puts it like this: “The workers’ districts 
of Petersburg were boiling over before everyone’s eyes. Only the Bolshe-
viks were listened to.”26 The question remains, however, whether these 
workers were prepared for an overnight military action “giving” their class 
power. The picture that Sukhanov paints needs to be seen alongside others.
Just days prior to the insurrection, Bolshevik delegates from other 
localities reported on their situation to the Petrograd Committee of their 
party. Some reports were encouraging: “In the Vyborg region, the masses 
will support us.” In “Obukhov factory: a decisive change in our favour.” 
In “Finland district: the quicker the better.” But reports from elsewhere 
were mixed:
• Krasnoe Selo . . . Out of (our organization of) 5000, 500 will come 
here, the rest will remain in Krasnoe Selo to see what happens.
• In Kronstadt, morale has dropped considerably. . . . Among the 
postal and telegraph workers . . . we have few sympathizers.
• In Vasil’evsky Ostrov . . . there is no mood for insurrection.
• Moscow district: the masses will come out at the bidding of the 
Soviet, but few at the bidding of our party.
• Schlüsselburg district: the masses will rise at the bidding of the 
Soviet.
• Lettish district: the comrades will come out at the bidding of the 
Petersburg Bolshevik Committee, but not of the Soviet . . . Estonia: 
the same.
• Narva district: in general . . . no urge to insurrection.





• Trade Unions: in case of a counter-revolutionary attack, the masses 
will resist, but they will not come out of their own accord.27
At a Bolshevik Central Committee meeting just nine days before the 
insurrection, committee members were equally equivocal. According to 
Abramovitch, the Bolshevik leader Volodarsky, “who enjoyed great popu-
larity in the factories,” said that “in factories in which he had occasion to 
address the workers, ‘the masses received our call with bewilderment.’” 
Another key Bolshevik, Shlyapnikov, speaking for the steel workers’ union, 
said that “the rising planned by the Bolsheviks is not popular; rumors 
about an imminent rising even started a panic.”28
Leon Trotsky addressed an emergency session of the Petrograd Soviet 
as the insurrection was unfolding. Parts of his statement are riveting. “On 
behalf of the Military Revolutionary Committee. . . . I declare that the Pro-
visional Government no longer exists.” In Rabinowitch’s vivid description:
To storms of applause and shouts of “Long live the Military Revo-
lutionary Committee!” he announced, in rapid order, that the 
Preparliament had been dispersed, that individual government 
ministers had been arrested, and that the rail stations, the post office, 
the central telegraph, the Petrograd Telegraph Agency, and the state 
bank had been occupied by forces of the Military Revolutionary 
Committee. “The Winter Palace has not been taken,” he reported, 
“but its fate will be decided momentarily. . . . In the history of the 
revolutionary movement I know of no other examples in which such 
huge masses were involved and which developed so bloodlessly.”29
But another part of his statement is simply astonishing: “The popu-
lation slept peacefully and did not know that at this time one power was 
replaced by another.”30 A city’s population can sleep while power is trans-
ferred from one class to another? Raphael Abramovitch makes a similar 
point, but puts it in a much more negative light: “The ‘proletarian revo-
lution’ was accomplished while the working masses of the capital stood 
by passively. The struggle for the ‘world socialist revolution’ was won by 




A Temporary New Class
The Russian Revolution has entered the history books as a socialist work-
ers’ revolution. And without question, the city that was the centre of the 
revolution, Petrograd, was also the centre of working-class life in the Rus-
sian empire. But a more complex reality was revealed when the first session 
of the newly formed Petrograd Soviet met in the days after the outbreak 
of the February (March) Revolution. According to Orlando Figes: “Of the 
3,000 delegates, more than two-thirds were servicemen—and this in a city 
where workers outnumbered soldiers by three or four to one. . . . Most 
of the soldiers were peasants.”32 It was not for nothing, then, that the full 
name of the Petrograd Soviet was the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and 
Soldiers’ Deputies. Some consideration must be given to the similarities—
and differences—in the experiences and dynamics essential to, on the one 
hand, the urban working class, and on the other, the peasants-in-uniform, 
who, by their thousands, were temporarily housed inside the cities.
A swirl of controversy has developed around the role of these two 
groups in the revolutionary events of 1917. Richard Pipes argues emphat-
ically that, despite its standard depiction as a workers’ revolt, the February 
Revolution “was, first and foremost, a mutiny of peasant soldiers whom, 
to save money, the authorities had billeted in overcrowded facilities in 
the Empire’s capital city.”33 Abramovitch places a similar emphasis on the 
military angle, but he argues that these “peasant soldiers” were unlike 
ordinary soldiers. Mass war and mass slaughter had led to what he calls 
“the birth of a new ‘class.’”34 The first years of the war had seen mobilization 
“on a scale that was unprecedented in Russian history”:
Between 12 and 15 million peasant lads, from villages in remote 
Siberia and other far-flung districts of the vast empire, had been put 
in military uniforms and crowded into urban areas, most of them 
along the northwestern and southern frontiers. . . . Here then, was 
an enormous new social formation—a soldiery that had ceased to be 
peasants in the social and economic sense, that was falling under the 
influence of urban political ideas, and yet had no material roots in 
the working class. Toward the end of 1916, vague ideas of revolution 
and socialism had come to permeate these young men. But their basic 




death or mutilation and to return to normal life, either in the towns or 
in their distant villages, where their families and land awaited them.35
Abramovitch sees this new—and temporary—social formation (or class) 
as “the main force of the revolution. The pressure from millions of sol-
diers, the only armed force in the country, proved overwhelming.” Indeed, 
“without or against them, nothing could be done even by those social-
ist parties which were closest to them—the Mensheviks and the S-R’s 
[Social-Revolutionaries] before the autumn of 1917 and the Bolsheviks 
thereafter.”36
Throughout this book, I frequently use the shorthand “peasant-soldiers 
and sailors.” The inclusion of sailors in this shorthand needs to be quali-
fied. Israel Getzler writes that by February 1917, the Kronstadt sailors 
“were probably the most literate, technically skilled and modern, the most 
ethnically Russian, least servile and the most disaffected of all Russia’s 
armed forces.” Getzler says that the tsarist authorities “faced a recruitment 
problem and found that ‘in view of the special complexity of the modern 
battleship, the Russian peasant, straight from the sokha [wooden plough] 
cannot immediately become a sailor, while it is the working element that 
is somewhat prepared for the handling of machines.’”37 That said, the pro-
found link between the countryside and the sailors was brought into sharp 
relief during the Kronstadt revolt of 1921. And, for Iulii Martov, the key 
factor creating a distance between the mass of soldiers and sailors and the 
working class in the cities was the brutal phenomenon of four years of war.
In a prescient 1919 monograph titled World Bolshevism, Martov argues 
that when Bolshevism first made its appearance as a mass phenomenon in 
the Russian empire, European left-wing commentators were unanimous in 
the view that its roots were in the agrarian nature of that empire and that a 
similar “maximalist” socialist movement was unlikely, if not inconceivable, 
in the very different urban settings of Germany or France. However, “it 
became obvious after the experience of the first three months of revolu-
tion in Germany that Bolshevism was not only the product of an agrarian 
revolution.” He says that “of course, the characteristics of Bolshevism in 
Russia are largely explained by our agrarian relations,” but argues that 




Martov begins by pointing to the relationship between Bolshevism and 
wartime mobilization and the resulting “influence of the soldier and the 
army environment on the revolution in Russia.”
The role that the army plays in social life, thanks to the world war, is 
without any doubt the first common factor that is manifested in the 
revolutionary processes of countries as socially different as Russia, 
Germany, England, and France. There is an undeniable connection 
between the role of soldiers in the revolution and the Bolshevik 
element in that revolution. Bolshevism is not simply a “soldiers’ 
revolution,” but the influence of Bolshevism on the course of the 
revolution in each country is proportional to the participation of 
armed soldier masses in this revolution.39
Martov goes on to differentiate the socialist consciousness typically 
associated with the proletariat, which is developed through struggles in 
the workplace and the socialist consciousness emerging from soldiers in 
the trenches. “From the very first days of the Bolshevik wave,” he writes, 
“Marxists identified the ‘communism of the consumer’ as the only social 
interest binding together social elements that are very different in their 
class composition and even declassed—that is, detached from their nat-
ural social milieu.”40 With the phrases “communism of the consumer” or 
“consumption communism,” Martov is emphasizing the distance between 
soldiers in revolution and workers in revolution. For the latter, the central 
question is control of the means of production in the workplace. This is 
an absolutely collective concept: modern workplaces, with their complex 
division of labour, can only be taken over collectively. For the soldier, the 
emphasis shifts. Soldiers, as such, are divorced from production: their only 
relationship to the economy consists in the consumption of the products 
of labour. That consumption is overlaid by the horrifying experience of 
war, an experience putting the oppressed soldier mass up against military 
hierarchy and officer caste privilege. There is a “band of brothers” com-
munism that does emerge in such circumstances, but its focus is not on 
controlling the means of production but rather on equalizing or levelling 
access to consumption.
The soldier’s desire for a radical levelling—to make the position of the 




the historical appetite of the Russian peasantry for an end to land priv-
ilege and a “levelling” of inequalities in the countryside. For a peasantry 
whose orientation is toward subsistence farming, with little opportunity or 
motivation to produce a surplus for the market, the impulse toward level-
ling likewise manifests itself in the realm of consumption, not production. 
For both soldier and peasant, the goal is a kind of communism—not the 
communism associated with the workers’ movement, but a different, more 
ancient notion of consumer or consumption communism. Its historical 
parallels are to be found in the extreme left wing of the French Revolution 
or the English Revolution. It is not the same as the communism associated 
with advanced capitalism in the twentieth century.
The Martov/Abramovitch thesis has other critical dimensions. Martov 
emphasizes the “social revolutionary psychology” of this new class, “their 
peculiar ‘anti-parliamentarism.’” Martov sees this as “quite understandable 
in a social environment not shaped, as in the past, through the school of 
collective defence of its interests, but in the present drawing its strength 
and influence exclusively from the possession of weapons.”
English newspapers reported the following curious fact. When 
English troops on the French front were sent ballots during the 
most recent parliamentary elections, in many cases soldiers burned 
masses of them, stating, “When we return to England, we will put 
things right there.” In both Germany and Russia we have seen many 
examples of how the soldier masses showed their first active interest 
in politics by expressing their desire to “put things right” through 
force of arms—whether that be “from the Right,” as happened in 
the first months of the Russian revolution and the first weeks of the 
German one, or “from the Left.”
Martov describes this “anti-parliamentarism” as “a particular corporate 
consciousness nourished by the certainty that possession of weapons and 
the ability to use them makes it possible to control the destinies of the 
state”—an outlook that “comes into fatal, irreconcilable conflict with the 
ideas of democracy and with parliamentary forms of government.”41 
In addition, both Martov and Abramovitch call attention to the recom-
position of the working class on the home front. Abramovitch argues that 




1913. The intervening years had witnessed an exodus of older, experienced 
militants and an influx of peasants: 
Quite a number of the older workers, who had been part of the 
Revolution of 1905 or who had been acquainted with the Social 
Democratic parties or the trade-union movement under the 
semi-constitutional regime, had been absorbed into the army 
and lost to industry. Meanwhile, the defense industries, greatly 
expanded, had received an enormous influx of new workers. Some 
of these came from among the urban poor, but many more came 
from the peasantry—a politically unschooled mass which knew 
little of the traditions of an industrial working class. Nor could such 
traditions be rapidly acquired, since the working-class movement 
was stifled in war time.42
Martov puts it this way:
The working masses have changed qualitatively. The old cadres, 
the most class-educated, spent four and a half years at the front. 
Detached from productive work, they became permeated with the 
psychology of the trenches, spiritually dissolved into the social 
milieu of declassed elements. On their return to the ranks of the 
proletariat, they brought a revolutionary spirit but, at the same 
time, the spirit of soldiers’ rabble-rousing. During the war, these 
class-educated cadres were replaced in industry by millions of new 
workers drawn from ruined artisans and other “little people,” rural 
proletarians, and working-class women. These new proletarians 
worked under conditions where the political movement of the pro-
letariat had completely disappeared and the trade union movement 
had been reduced to pitiful dimensions. . . . Class consciousness in 
these new proletarian masses developed extremely slowly, as they 
had almost no experience in collective struggle alongside more 
advanced strata of the working class.43
Martov takes seriously the demoralizing effects of the war, not only 
on workers who were transformed into soldiers but also on those called 




While those who had lived in the trenches for many years lost their 
professional skills, were detached from regular productive labour, 
and were exhausted by the psychologically and physically inhuman 
conditions of modern warfare, the masses who took their place in 
the factories expended tremendous energy working overtime to 
acquire the bare necessities whose prices had increased massively. 
Most of this exhausting labour was carried out to produce means 
of destruction, labour that was, from the social point of view, 
unproductive and could not contribute to generating in the work-
ing masses the consciousness of the indispensability of their labour 
for the existence of society. But this consciousness constitutes an 
extremely essential element in the class psychology of the modern 
proletariat.44
Martov believed that the combination of these two related phenom-
ena—the formation of a temporary new class through the experience 
of the war, and the concomitant recomposition of the existing working 
class—provided the social base, not only for Bolshevism in Russia, but for 
the “essential features of proletarian Bolshevism as a world phenomenon.” 
So profound was the impact of the trenches that this was even true, accord-
ing to Martov, in those countries where the armies were not as weighted 
toward the peasantry as was the Russian army. This “World Bolshevism” 
had, he says, three features:
The first is maximalism, that is, the desire for immediate, maximum 
results in the implementation of social improvements without any 
attention to objective conditions. This maximalism presupposes a 
dose of naive social optimism, the uncritical belief that the realiz-
ation of such maximum results may be achieved at any time, that 
the resources and wealth of the society that the proletariat aspires to 
acquire are inexhaustible.
The second is a lack of attention to the requirements of social 
production—the predominance, as with the soldiers, of the consum-
ers’ point of view over that of the producer.
The third is the propensity to resolve all issues of political strug-
gle, the struggle for power, by the direct application of armed force, 




propensity arises from a skeptical attitude toward the possibilities of 
finding a democratic solution to social and political problems.45
The great vision of self-emancipation embedded in the socialism of 
Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, and their political generations was based 
on a profound conviction about the democratic and emancipatory urge 
essential to the collective working class in the cities. There did exist a 
parallel emancipatory urge essential to the temporary new class of 
peasants-in-uniform from the countryside. However, democracy and a 
respect for rights and justice were completely absent, given the origin of 
these peasant-soldiers in the patriarchal, cudgel-ruled mir, coupled with 
their long experience in the trenches. The rough and violent instrument 
chosen by the Bolsheviks to carry out the revolution carried with it the 
seeds of the destruction of the essence of that revolution.
Coercion and Consent
So far, the emphasis has been on the adjective “new” in the description 
of this “temporary new class.” But equally important is its “temporary” 
nature. Wars do not last forever. Mass armies are eventually demobilized. 
There is, at some point, a return to life centred on the means of production, 
not the means of destruction. For Russia, this transformation happened 
extremely quickly. If, in October and November 1917, the pivotal role of the 
temporary new class of peasant-soldiers was indisputable, it was already 
a class in the process of decomposition. As noted earlier, the overwhelm-
ing desire of these soldiers was to return to their villages and take part in 
rural land seizures. By 1918, they had melted away to such an extent that 
when the German army resumed its offensive, it encountered almost no 
resistance. The Russian army had evaporated.
Antonio Gramsci argues that a “dual perspective” exists in political 
life, one whose manifestations may be relatively simple or complex but 
that ultimately expresses itself at “two fundamental levels”: “the levels 
of force and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civiliz-
ation.”46 As the temporary new class dissolved, the tens of thousands of 
peasants-in-uniform left the cities where they had been barracked, and 
the natural composition of urban populations was gradually restored. 




the traditional workers’ movement began to reassert itself. The Bolsheviks 
stood at a crossroads. One road would lead them to strive for consent by 
adapting their policies to the demands of a movement now returning to 
normal—that is, a socialist movement committed to pluralism in govern-
ment, independence of trade unions, convening the Constituent Assembly, 
and so on. The other road would lead them toward coercion, holding firm 
to the rule of a minority and enforcing that rule in the only way that any 
minority can enforce its rule against the will of the majority—by force. 
We know now that it was the latter road that was taken.
Many at the time knew exactly what was at stake. Just days after the 
revolution, several members of the newly formed Council of People’s 
Commissars resigned their posts in protest against Bolshevik opposition 
to a coalition government. Among them was veteran Bolshevik leader 
Viktor Nogin, who “declared on behalf of the secessionists: ‘We hold that 
it is essential to form a socialist government comprising all the Soviet 
parties. . . . We consider that beside this there is only one other path: —
the maintenance of a purely Bolshevik government by means of political 
terror. The Council of People’s Commissars has entered upon that path.’”47
A few weeks later, on 1 (14) December, at an open session of the Soviet 
Central Executive Committee, an epic confrontation between Steinberg 
and Trotsky revolved around the same issues. Steinberg reports being in 
the presence of “some thousand excited delegates—workers, soldiers, sail-
ors—dressed in work clothes, military tunics and peasant garb.”48 At issue 
was the status of the Kadets—the Constitutional Democrats—a party that, 
while very much part of the revolutionary bloc in February and March of 
1917, had by then become “an outspoken opponent of the October Revo-
lution.” On 28 November (11 December), the new Bolshevik-dominated 
government had proclaimed all leaders of the Kadets “enemies of the 
people” subject to immediate arrest.49 Steinberg, when called by the chair 
of the meeting to speak, argued that “a victorious revolution had no need 
to condemn its opponents in summary judgement. We, the victors, were 
strong enough to apply true justice.”
But, I maintained, we could not place an entire group—unspeci-
fied anonymous groups of people—outside the pale of human law. 
We dared not simply and blindly repeat the mistakes of the French 




twenty-five years. Withdraw legal protection from the liberals today, 
and the same is likely to happen to other political groups tomorrow. 
It is easy to start the terror, but impossible to stop it.50
Steinberg describes Trotsky as he rose to reply: “Pride, power, fury, con-
tempt were in those eyes. He seemed personally insulted.”
“There is not the slightest doubt,” he intoned icily, “that the party 
of the Kadets is organizing the counter-revolution. Every one of its 
leaders must be made harmless. They complain—and sentimental 
socialists join them in the complaint—at being thrown into jail! Let 
them instead be grateful. In past revolutions their kind was dealt 
with differently. They would have been taken to the Palace Square 
and there made . . . a head shorter!”
Trotsky threw out the last phrase with vicious fervor—and 
waited for the storm of applause. Was he not speaking in the name 
of the people, and for their glory? But the expected did not occur, 
and the silence spoke louder than any applause. I had the firm 
impression that there was a murmur of dissent against his blood-
thirsty phrases from these simple people, fresh from the battlefields 
of the revolution. They neither liked nor trusted the bourgeois 
Kadets, but they disliked no less the vulgarity of their own leader.51 
How closely balanced were the two positions of Steinberg and Trotsky 
is evidenced by the fact that, just days later, Steinberg would join the 
government as People’s Commissar of Justice, for a time sitting at the 
same leadership table as his opponent, Trotsky. In the end, coercion would 
overwhelm consent as the revolution and then the counter-revolution 
unfolded, a story to which we will return in the conclusion of this book.
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To understand fully the role of the peasants as a class, it is imperative to 
have a clear view of the economic and political contours of the countryside 
in the Russian empire in the pre-revolutionary years. All such investi-
gations require attention to the writings of Vladimir Lenin. Political 
economy was a key component of Lenin’s epistemology, and central to 
this political economy were analyses of dynamics in the countryside. 
According to Tamás Krausz, Lenin’s early works “expose the Russian illu-
sions concerning small-holder peasant agriculture.”1 This was clearly still 
the case in 1907, where in an analysis of Russian agriculture, Lenin wrote:
Not only is landlordism in Russia medieval, but so also is the peas-
ant allotment system. The latter is incredibly complicated. It splits 
the peasantry up into thousands of small units, medieval groups, 
social categories. It reflects the age-old history of arrogant inter-
ference in the peasants’ agrarian relationships both by the central 
government and the local authorities. It drives the peasants, as into 
a ghetto, into petty medieval associations of a fiscal, tax-levying 
nature, into associations for the ownership of allotment land, i.e., 
into the village communes.2
Here, Lenin condemns as medieval not only large, privately owned estates 
but also the village communes, which are described as “petty medieval 
associations.” Yet the overwhelming trend in his analysis would be to regard 
the peasants as “petit bourgeois.” This chapter will provide evidence to 
show that the latter characterization was quite misleading and would have 
serious consequences both for the peasants and for post-revolutionary 
Russia overall.





The key institution in the countryside was the mir, or obshchina—two 
roughly synonymous terms both generally translated as “commune.” A 
centuries-old institution, the mir had acquired a new role in the wake 
of the Manifesto of 1861, which formally abolished serfdom and granted 
former serfs some of the rights of other citizens. Ex-serfs received land 
through emancipation, but the mir was responsible for allotting strips 
of land to individual peasant families and, crucially, also responsible for 
the enormous debt incurred after the transfer of land from nobility to 
former serfs. Because of this impossibly burdensome debt, the peasants, 
while legally free, were in fact tied to the land almost to the same extent 
as they had been before the abolition of serfdom. Their labour was owed 
to the commune, and this labour was also controlled by the commune—
or, more precisely, by the patriarchal village assembly, which controlled 
everything. The endless cycle of debt meant that there was no incentive 
for the individual peasant to increase the productivity of labour. It was a 
life of eternal toil with no possibility of eventual reward.
Russian peasants, around the time of World War I. Courtesy of George 




Rosa Luxemburg clearly understood the manner in which this patri-
archal institutional structure enforced economic underdevelopment in the 
Russian countryside. Citing a statistic from the 1890s, she noted that “70 
percent of the peasantry drew less than a minimum existence from their 
land allotments, 20 percent were able to feed themselves, but not to keep 
livestock, while only 9 percent had a surplus above their own needs that 
could be taken to market.”3 Her point was later echoed by Edward Carr: 
“By far the largest part of the population was engaged in near-subsistence 
farming, producing food crops primarily for its own consumption and for 
the satisfaction of its immediate obligations to some superior authority.”4
Without question the mir was economically reactionary. Rosa Lux-
emburg describes membership in the village commune—the “mark 
community” (Markgenossenschaft), to use her term—as “an iron chain 
of hunger around the necks of the peasants.” But it was also politically 
reactionary. Many poorer members of the mir attempted to escape from 
their bondage, with sometimes brutal consequences. “Hundreds of fugi-
tives were returned by the police to their communities as undocumented 
vagabonds,” Luxemburg writes, “then made an example of by being beaten 
on a bench with rods by their mark comrades. But even the rods and the 
enforcement of passport controls proved powerless against the mass flight 
of the peasants, who fled from the hell of their ‘village communism’ to 
the city.”5
Lenin was acutely aware of these structures of exploitation and oppres-
sion, and he consistently opposed the “utopian” trend within Russian 
socialism popularized by the Narodniks, who romanticized the mir as 
somehow capable of providing a jumping-off point for postcapitalist com-
munist production.6 As Krausz observes, “Lenin connected the features 
of the world market—today it would be called globalization—with the 
demise of traditional forms of village community.”7 In his first major work, 
The Development of Capitalism in Russia, published in 1899 (with a second 
edition following in 1908), Lenin forecast a dim future for the mir:
Agricultural capitalism is taking another, enormous step forward; it 
is boundlessly expanding the commercial production of agricultural 
produce and drawing a number of new countries into the world 
arena; it is driving patriarchal agriculture out of its last refuges, such 




agriculture, namely, the purely industrial production of grain, based 
on the co-operation of masses of workers equipped with the most 
up-to-date machinery.8
But if Lenin’s critique of the feudal character of the commune was 
clear enough, his prognosis as to its future proved abstract and unrealis-
tic. He considerably overestimated the speed with which this traditional 
socioeconomic system could make the transition to modern production 
techniques. He was telescoping historical processes into a foreshortened 
time frame, a limitation that his analysis, on this point, shared with that 
of Luxemburg. She also anticipated the relatively rapid disappearance of 
the mir, but, as Peter Hudis points out, she was “considerably overstating 
the case . . . since the mir hardly went out of existence by the time of the 
end of the 1905 Revolution. Not only did it still exist, in some respects it 
rebounded in strength immediately following the 1917 Revolution.”9
Krausz clearly outlines the stubborn survival of the patriarchal mir, 
noting that “the imperialist world war . . . had thrown the already weak-
ened institutions and structures of social solidarity into disarray, breaking 
the moral checks on murderous instincts and allowing the ‘obshchina 
revolution’ to spread quickly, mediated by the armed peasant soldier in the 
ranks.”10 The term “obshchina revolution” is one that Krausz borrows from 
Vladimir Buharayev to describe the land seizures that occurred during 
the 1917 revolution. In Buharayev’s description, the obshchina commun-
ity was “pitiless toward anyone who did not use land for its traditional, 
natural purposes but expected income from it, whether merchants, banks 
or those who did not cultivate their land themselves.”11 In other words, it 
is not sufficient to simply say that peasants seized the land in 1917; rather, 
the peasants who seized the land did so not for themselves as individuals, 
but in the name of the mir, their actions serving to reassert its dominance. 
Those peasants who, laying claim to their individual identity, had managed 
to escape the mir and establish independent family farms were pulled back 
into the mir, their land expropriated along with that of the large landlords.
Krausz also outlines Lenin’s expectation of the relentless dissolution of 
the mir under the impact of the insertion of Russia into the world capitalist 
market. He mentions that this did not happen and that, in fact, the 1917 




two contradictory points—the expectation of the end of the mir versus 
the reality of its stubborn survival and even post-1917 strengthening. He 
notes, without critical commentary, that Lenin saw only two possible paths 
to capitalist development in the Russian countryside: the “Prussian” path 
leading to “big landlord economies,” with large landowners hiring rural 
wage-labourers, and the “American” path of “small peasant economies,” 
in which landed estates would be replaced by individually owned and 
operated family farms, with rural wage-labour playing a minor role.12 
With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that neither of the two paths 
envisioned by the young Lenin were taken. It was the very Russian mir 
that proved relatively impervious to either Prussian landlordism or the 
American family farm. He overestimated the extent to which insertion 
in the world economy would lead to change in the Russian countryside. 
The core institution of the countryside—the traditional patriarchal com-
mune—would prove deeply resistant both to the inroads of capitalism and 
to workers’ revolution, posing almost insoluble problems in the coming 
decades. Petr Stolypin, the prime minister in tsarist Russia from 1906 
until his assassination in 1911, tried to encourage the American path, 
but his experiment was cut short by war and revolution. Lenin, after the 
revolution, would assume that the Stolypin experiment had opened up 
the Prussian path, seeing the kulaks as the “big peasants” of his youthful 
analysis. The reality in the countryside was very different. By the end of 
the Great War—and certainly by the end of the Civil War—the destruction 
of life in the countryside had been so thorough that kulaks, understood 
as a class of rich peasants, had basically ceased to exist.
Petty Producers and the Family Farm
The foundation for all of Lenin’s subsequent theorization of the peasantry 
was laid in The Development of Capitalism in Russia and in related writings 
from the same era.13 In these early works, Lenin sketched out a schematic 
political economy with an unrealistic “class against class” projection about 
the future evolution of agrarian relations in the countryside. This schem-
atic political economy later became encapsulated in Lenin’s practice of 
using the term “petit-bourgeois” to describe agrarian labour in the Russian 
empire of Lenin’s time and to capture the essence of the Russian experi-




population, it was just a small step to calling Russia itself “petit-bourgeois,” 
which he did on various occasions, stating: in 1913, Russia is “one of the 
most petit-bourgeois countries”; in 1914, “Russia out of all the capitalist 
countries is one of the most backward, most petit-bourgeois”; and in 1917, 
“Russia is the most petit-bourgeois of all European countries.”14 
Bertram Wolfe suggests that “Russian Marxists, both Bolshevik and 
Menshevik, tended to view the peasantry with strong reserve as a back-
ward, property-loving, potentially hostile ‘petty bourgeoisie.’”15 Wolfe goes 
on to identify a profound gulf between the urban left analyzing the peas-
antry and the peasants themselves: “Most Social Democrats knew so little 
about the countryside that the issues eluded them. Most Bolsheviks, too, 
faced the muzhik [peasant] with ignorance, and a vague, unconscious 
dread, or with contempt, enclosed in the formula, ‘property-minded, 
petit-bourgeois.’”16
But how well did that formula—“property-minded, petit-bourgeois”—
actually describe the Russian peasantry? In the examples from Lenin 
provided above, “petit-bourgeois” is my translation from the Russian. 
In all three cases, the translators of Lenin: Collected Works (the stan-
dard English edition) have instead used “petty bourgeois.”17 Throughout 
LCW, the translators sometimes deploy “petit” and other times “petty” 
as the modifier for “bourgeois” when translating melkoburzhuaznyi and 
meshchanskaia.18 While both translations are linguistically acceptable, 
“petit-bourgeois” and “petty bourgeois” are by no means equivalent from 
the standpoint of political economy. In its most typical usage, the latter 
word, “petty,” signifies “small” in the sense of trivial or unimportant. The 
former word, “petit,” like the “bourgeois” adopted from the French lan-
guage, very precisely signifies “small” in the sense of “little” and small in 
size, which is exactly the sense in which the term is employed in political 
economy—to identify those who engage in production of commodities 
for sale in the market (hence capitalist or bourgeois), but who do so on 
a small or restricted scale (hence little or “petit”). That it was the latter 
meaning—petit bourgeois capitalism understood as small-scale capital-
ism—that Lenin had in mind is made clear in a major work written in May 
1917, where he wrote: “Millions and tens of millions . . . have awakened and 




For the most part, small-scale proprietors, small-scale bourgeois, people 
standing in the middle between the capitalists and the wage workers.”19
But if that was the formal intent when employing the term 
petit-bourgeois—to precisely identify the “small capitalist” nature of life 
in the countryside—the term was often used by many, including Lenin 
himself, in a very imprecise manner—to develop not a point of polit-
ical economy emphasizing the position of peasants in relation to capital 
accumulation, but a sociological one emphasizing the narrow basis of the 
peasant economy. Put another way, the English-language translators of 
Lenin’s Collected Works were not entirely imprecise in choosing the term 
petty on occasion. It was a sloppy translation choice that directly paral-
leled a sloppy method in political-economic analysis that was employed 
by many, Lenin among them, when they used either “petty bourgeois” or 
“petit bourgeois” not as a scientifically grounded category describing a 
small accumulator of capital (“property-minded, petit-bourgeois”), but 
rather as a sociological description of someone whose scale of production 
is “petty”—that is, trivial and unimportant.
This was by no means an imprecision peculiar to Lenin. Iulii Martov 
in 1917 was expressing a widely held view that “non-proletarian revolu-
tionary democracy” was the political expression of “the urban and rural 
petit bourgeoisie,” with it understood that the latter (sel’skaia melkaia 
burzhuaziia) was a perfectly accurate descriptor for the Russian peas-
antry.20 But again, that section of the Russian peasantry who toiled in the 
communes—the majority of those in the Russian empire, the vast majority 
in Russia itself—could in no way merit the “bourgeois” half of the label. 
Their production was not for the market. It was production to keep body 
and soul together. They only episodically intersected with the capitalist 
market forces that could have allowed them to “qualify” as petit-bourgeois 
producers. Perhaps their labour was “petty.” It was not “petit-bourgeois” 
in any political economy sense.
Karl Radek, in 1922, provided a classic example of this elision between 
a quasi-scientific category and sociological description when he talked 
about “the peasants” first as “petty producers of goods” and then, without 
transition, as “petit-bourgeois.”21 These two categories—petty producer 
and petit-bourgeois—are by no means identical. If the “petty” labour being 




for the vast majority of Russia’s peasants trapped in the prison of the 
mir—then the word “petty” plays merely a descriptive role and is in no 
way a “scientific” description of the petit-bourgeois or small capitalist. If 
small-scale, or “petty,” production consistently only produces enough for 
the producers to subsist, then that labour can in no way be called small 
capitalist—petit-bourgeois. Without the market, products of labour are not 
commodities for sale—that is, if products of labour are not transformed 
into commodities through being put on the market, then the labour that 
produces them absolutely cannot be categorized as “small capitalist.”
Lenin was not consistent in his use of the term petit-bourgeois. In 
1904, in his pivotal One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, while describing 
what he sees as the petit-bourgeois nature of the intelligentsia, he, in an 
offhand way, defines “the conditions of petit-bourgeois existence” in general 
as equivalent to “working in isolation or in very small workplaces, etc.”22 
This repeats the error of Radek outlined above. The key is not working 
in isolation or in a small workplace, but doing so in the context of capital 
accumulation—i.e., while oriented to the market. He does make precisely 
this distinction in May 1918, in the near aftermath of the revolution, dis-
tinguishing the class of small-scale rural capitalists from those engaged in 
“natural, peasant farming” in the patriarchal context of the mir. He goes 
on to argue: “It is clear that in a small-peasant country the petit-bourgeois 
element predominates and cannot help but predominate; most, the vast 
majority of farmers, are small commodity producers.”23 Here, his analysis 
in the abstract is clear and precise, but his attempt at a concrete assessment 
of the state of the countryside is wide of the mark. In fact, it was quite clear 
that small-scale production for the market did not dominate the Russian 
countryside of 1918.
Implicit in Lenin’s use of both “petit-bourgeois” (small capitalist) to 
designate the class position of the peasantry and “commodity” to designate 
the products of their labour is an assumption that “small capitalism”—the 
small-scale production of goods (commodities) for the market—pre-
dominated in the Russia of his day. The problem confronting the Russian 
countryside in 1918 was precisely the relative absence of a class of “small cap-
italists”—a petit-bourgeois class. Overwhelmingly, production remained 
dominated not by small, market-oriented (petit-bourgeois) family farms 




male heads of households, was intent not on maximizing production 
through an increase in the productivity of labour but rather on the pro-
tection of petty privileges that stemmed from their right to divide and 
distribute the land cultivated by the mir.
There were exceptions to this picture. The dominant role of the mir 
was characteristic of Russia proper (what would later become the Russian 
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic or RSFSR). As Carr writes: “Once the 
peasants . . . had broken up the Stolypin holdings and flocked back into the 
mir, an overwhelming proportion of agricultural land in the RSFSR—as 
much as 98 per cent in some provinces—was held in this form of tenure, 
and subject to periodical redistribution.”24 The same was not true in many 
of the eastern European regions to which Russia laid claim. In what was 
then Byelorussia (today Belarus), “the mir was virtually non-existent, and 
in the Ukraine west of Dnieper it was weak.”25 These peripheral areas did 
have a large class of family farmers—the “petit-bourgeois element” of 
Lenin’s analysis—that was better able to survive the upheavals of 1917. 
In Russia itself, however, these farmers were by far the exception rather 
than the rule. 
The characterization of the peasantry as “petit-bourgeois” would have 
made sense had the schema of Lenin’s The Development of Capitalism in 
Russia been accurate and had the patriarchal mir in fact been replaced by 
family farming—the quintessential rural institution of the small-capitalist 
or petit-bourgeois farmer. However, as we have seen, so tenacious was 
the mir as an institution in the countryside that it took state intervention 
from Stolypin to protect and encourage the development of a new class of 
petit-bourgeois family farmers. Prior to the outbreak of war, this new class 
was increasing in size, but still remained in the shadow of the much larger 
class working on the commune. With the outbreak of war, the process of 
transitioning to small-scale family farming was slowed considerably, and 
then entirely reversed in 1917, when the “land to the peasants” revolution 
meant the seizure, by a temporarily reinvigorated patriarchal mir, of both 
landlord-controlled farms and petit-bourgeois-controlled family farms.
This is complex territory. Stolypin’s reforms did find a hearing in the 
Russian peasantry and did begin a process of the dissolution of the mir 





The policy of his Government, in his own words, had “for its one 
object, the establishment of small individual property in land,” the 
destruction of the commune and the foundation of an economic 
system of free enterprise in rural Russia. As his daughter writes 
in her memoirs: “The abolition of communal land tenure and the 
resettlement of the peasants on homesteads (na khutora) was the 
dream of my father from the time of his youth. In this change he 
saw the principal security of the future happiness of Russia. To make 
every peasant a proprietor and give him the chance to work quietly 
on his own land, for himself, this must enrich the peasantry.”26
According to George Tokmakoff, “a Soviet agrarian expert stated in 1918 
that the yearning for a khutor was a characteristic inclination of peasants 
in many parts of the country on the eve of the 1917 Revolution.”27
Regarding the progress achieved by government reforms, Leonid 
Strakhovsky quotes Stolypin’s comments to the State Council in March 
1910: “During the three years that the provisions of this law have been 
in operation, i.e., up to 1 February 1910, over 1,700,000 heads of fam-
ilies have declared their desire to obtain their land in private ownership. 
This represents about 17 per cent of all peasants in village communes.”28 
Strakhovsky adds that, by the end of 1914, “nearly two million heads of 
families enjoyed private land-ownership, while an additional half million 
had received certificates entitling them to ownership of their communal 
lots in villages where there had not been a redistribution of land for the 
last twenty years. All told, this represented over 25 per cent of peasants in 
village communes.”29 Even the advent of war and the mobilization of mil-
lions of peasant lads into the army did not stop this process. “All through 
the war the movement continued,” writes Wolfe, “so that by January 1, 1916, 
6,200,000 families, out of approximately 16,000,000 eligible, had made 
application for separation.” He goes on to note that “if the same trend had 
been continued at the same rate, all land would have been owned by indi-
vidual peasants by 1935 or 1936.”30 In short, Stolypin’s program of reforms 
clearly made inroads among a sizeable percentage of the rural population.
Earlier, I outlined Lenin’s identification of two potential paths for cap-
italist farming in Russia: the Prussian path, whereby large landowners 
hire a wage-labouring rural proletariat, or the American path, the arche-




a marginal role. “Following Lenin,” argues Judith Pallot, Soviet historians 
“identified in the reform a conscious attempt on the part of Nicholas II’s 
government to protect the interests of the large landowners by propelling 
Russia along a Prussian path of agrarian capitalism.”31 Recall, however, 
that the 1917–18 agrarian revolution was characterized by seizures of land 
not by peasants as individual proprietors but rather through the mir. It 
is worth dwelling on this point in some detail. By 1917, Russian peas-
ants formed three principal categories—those working in the mir, those 
working on the large landlord-owned estates, and those who had taken 
advantage of the Stolypin reform and worked on individual family farms. 
Let us look at each in turn.
Those working in the mir might best be characterized not as 
petit-bourgeois but as semi-feudal. I have already quoted Lenin to this 
effect, denouncing the village communes as “petty medieval associations 
of a fiscal, tax-levying nature” (which, interestingly, was at odds with his 
general characterization of their labour as petit-bourgeois).32 Feudalism is 
characterized by the control of conditions of work and products of labour 
by an all-powerful lord. No such lord existed as an individual in the mir, 
but the heads of households, meeting in assembly, acted as a patriarchal 
collective substitute for the feudal lord. Hence the characterization of the 
mir as semi-feudal.
No one would, in the context of actual feudalism, think of calling serfs 
“petit-bourgeois.” They owned no land, and what they produced was not 
destined for the market but was used partly for their own subsistence and 
partly to satisfy the conditions of work dictated by the local landlord. In 
like manner, no one should consider the peasants working in the mir 
“petit-bourgeois.” As in the case of serfs, what they produced was simi-
larly used for subsistence and to satisfy the conditions of work, dictated 
in their case by the local patriarchy-in-assembly. In the patriarchal mir, 
there was little incentive for or possibility of an increase in the produc-
tivity of labour. The tendency was, rather, toward stagnation. Under this 
economic system—very much the opposite of anything resembling “small 
capitalist”—very little surplus was available for urban consumption.33
The term patriarchal, however, fits very well, since it captures the power 
structure ruling the commune—the male heads of households and their 




classified the modes of socioeconomic organization that presently existed 
in Russia, beginning with one he called the “patriarchal, that is, largely 
natural, peasant farming.”34 Regardless of whether we designate the mir 
as petty medieval, semi-feudal, or patriarchal, however, the key point in 
terms of political economy is the fact that it was profoundly resistant to 
the pressures to increase productivity exerted by the capitalist market. The 
commune was stagnant and unproductive, a terrible institution on which 
to rely for the production of surplus agricultural goods as commodities 
for sale to the hungry cities (and, of course, a terrible institution on which 
to rely for some “leap” into socialism).
The second category was landlord-controlled farming on large 
estates—the remnants of the old aristocratic holdings of the serf era—that 
employed agricultural labourers. Here, the conditions of work were very 
different from those in the mir. These peasants were agricultural prole-
tarians in a classic sense, their very existence dependent on selling their 
labour power. In contrast to the mir, the production on these estates was 
almost entirely oriented toward the market. The landlords required the 
production and sale of a surplus to sustain their holdings and to accumu-
late wealth. From the exploitation of these agricultural proletarians, a 
considerable portion of the food surplus necessary to sustain life in the 
cities was produced.
The family farms, the great creation of the Stolypin era, accounted 
for the third category. These family farmers were the one section of the 
peasantry who were petit-bourgeois in an absolutely classic sense. With 
ownership of their farm and control over the product of their labour, they 
had, like the petite bourgeosie everywhere, a huge incentive to increase 
their production of a surplus for the market. Because the fruits of their 
labour were theirs to dispose of—crucially, the surplus beyond what was 
necessary for the sustenance of their family—the more they produced 
and sold, the more they could accumulate. As George Tokmakoff notes, 
“private ownership did encourage personal initiative and consequently 
output.”35 From the family farms, fostered and sustained by Stolypin’s 
reforms, an increasingly important portion of food for the cities was pro-
duced. Tokmakoff provides evidence of this increase in output:
Whereas in 1905, 7,278,000 puds of fertilizer were used, by 1913 this 




also proceeded swiftly; in 1911 over 12 million rubles were spent on 
mechanized agricultural machinery, as compared with the nearly 7 
million rubles spent in 1907. These figures reflect the government’s 
drive towards intensive cultivation, as well as the growing feeling 
on the part of individual families that land might yet prove a good 
capital investment.36
Leonid Strakhovsky agrees that Stolypin’s agrarian reforms stimulated 
the increase in production. He quotes Soviet economist S. M. Dubrovsky 
from his monumental 1925 analysis of Stolypin’s reforms: “Stolypin’s legis-
lation was significant because it was staked not on the mere legalization of 
capitalist processes in the countryside, but on the forcing of them—that is 
forcing the conversion of the countryside from an extensive to an inten-
sive agricultural economy.”37 As Dubrovsky further noted: “From 1906 to 
1915 the total area of land under cultivation increased by 14 per cent; at 
the same time the development of productive forces in agriculture was 
the result not only of the increase in cultivated areas but also of a better 
productivity of the cultivated land, i.e., an increase in the yield of har-
vests.”38 Strakhovsky goes on to point out that, between 1900 and 1913, the 
total value of agricultural production in Russia increased by 79.5 percent. 
As he concludes: “Truly it was said: ‘One does not know of such a rapid 
development of agriculture in the history of any European country.’ Its 
stimulus was Stolypin’s agrarian reform.”39
This process was stalled by the First World War. Earlier, I cited Wolfe 
saying that applications for separation from the mir continued to increase 
right up to 1916. But the depopulation of the countryside by the call-up 
of millions of young men made this desire to acquire independent land 
holdings difficult if not impossible to implement. The shift toward family 
farming was then completely rolled back by the agrarian revolution of 1917. 
The land seizures during that revolution virtually eliminated, in Russia 
proper, two categories of peasant labour: the agricultural proletariat and 
the agricultural petite bourgeoisie. The mir, which was in retreat during 
the years of the Stolypin reform, massively reasserted itself through the 
bayonets of the millions of peasant-soldiers returning from the trenches. 
David Mitrany, in a classic 1951 study of Marxism and the agrarian ques-




The land settlement of the previous decade was wiped out in many 
parts by the revival of the mir. The total extent of land seized by 
the communes in 1917–18 for redistribution was put at about 70 
million dessiatins (189 mill. acres) from peasants and about 42 
mill. dessiatins (114 mill. acres) from large owners. About 4.7 mill. 
peasant holdings, i.e., about 30.5 per cent of all peasant holdings, 
were pooled and divided up. The effect of the agrarian revolution, 
therefore, was in the first place to wipe out all large property, but 
also and no less to do away with the larger peasant property. In fact, 
as we have seen, more land was taken away and “pooled” from peas-
ant owners than from large owners, and the levelling and equalizing 
trend became more marked after October, 1917, and was sanctioned 
by the law of January, 1918, under which land was socialized.40
Lenin’s attitude to these developments was contradictory. According 
to Krausz, “Lenin considered Stolypin’s reforms ‘progressive’ for their 
destruction of the feudal chains and their acceleration of the evolution 
of capitalism.”41 Krausz could have added the adverb “grudgingly.” In 
November 1907, just as the Stolypin’s reforms were beginning to be imple-
mented, Lenin described them as “progressive in clearing the way for 
capitalism,” but immediately added that “it was the kind of progress that 
no Social-Democrat could bring himself to support.”42 While the reform 
was economically progressive, Lenin considered it politically reactionary, 
because in Lenin’s view, Stolypin’s aim was to create a conservative, eco-
nomically prosperous rural class that could act as a counter-revolutionary 
buffer in the countryside, a role that such a class had already performed 
admirably in France and England. Thus, while recognizing the econom-
ically progressive potential of Stolypin’s reforms, Lenin condemned his 
program as politically reactionary.
Let’s look more closely at the analysis Lenin develops. Describing 
Stolypin’s reforms as “avowedly a landlords’ programme,” Lenin asks:
But can it be said that it is reactionary in the economic sense, i.e., 
that it precludes, or seeks to preclude, the development of capital-
ism, to prevent a bourgeois agrarian evolution? Not at all. On the 
contrary, the famous agrarian legislation introduced by Stolypin 
under Article 87 is permeated through and through with the purely 




capitalist evolution, facilitates and pushes forward that evolution, 
hastens the expropriation of the peasantry, the break-up of the vil-
lage commune, and the creation of a peasant bourgeoisie.43
However, in spite of Stolypin’s reform being “progressive in the 
scientific-economic sense,” he argues that it cannot be supported. He 
claims that what it will lead to is “bourgeois evolution of the landlord type.” 
Such a path “implies the utmost preservation of bondage and serfdom 
(remodelled on bourgeois lines), the least rapid development of the pro-
ductive forces, and the sluggish development of capitalism.” He declares 
that what must be encouraged is “bourgeois evolution of the peasant type,” 
which “implies the most rapid development of the productive forces and 
the best possible (under commodity production) conditions of existence 
for the mass of the peasantry.”44
As we have seen, these two potential paths were characterized by Lenin 
as the Prussian way (large-scale landlord farms) and the American way 
(small-scale family farms):
In the first case feudal landlord economy slowly evolves into bour-
geois, Junker landlord economy, which condemns the peasants to 
decades of most harrowing expropriation and bondage, while at the 
same time a small minority of Grossbauern (“big peasants”) arises. 
In the second case there is no landlord economy, or else it is broken 
up by revolution, which confiscates and splits up the feudal estates. 
In that case the peasant predominates, becomes the sole agent of 
agriculture, and evolves into a capitalist farmer.45
There is an important historical parallel to this policy. “Forty acres and 
a mule” was a phrase that, would, in Eric Foner’s words, “echo throughout 
the south” in the last year of the Civil War in the United States.46 It was 
shorthand for the policy of breaking up the former slave plantations and 
redistributing the land to the newly-emancipated former slaves. Too often 
reduced to a policy implemented by Union Army General William T. Sher-
man, it in fact emerged as a demand from within the African American 
community. On 12 January 1865, Sherman met in Savannah Georgia with 
twenty leaders of the African American community, seeking advice as to 




areas in which the Union Army was operating. At that meeting, Baptist 
minister and former slave Garrison Frazier defined freedom as “‘placing 
us where we could reap the fruit of our own labor’” and said that “the 
best way to accomplish this was ‘to have land, and turn it and till it by our 
own labor.’”47 Four days after this meeting, Sherman “issued Special Field 
Order No. 15,” which set out to implement a version of this policy in parts 
of South Carolina. This demand was taken up by leaders of what Du Bois 
called “abolition democracy,”48 among them Thaddeus Stevens, who in 
September 1865 said that “each adult freedman should be given forty acres 
which approximately would dispose of about forty million acres.”49 This 
policy would ultimately fail, crushed by the counter-revolution symbol-
ized by the terror of the Ku Klux Klan. But the link with the discussion 
here is clear—“40 acres and a mule” signifying an attempt to replace mass 
coerced labour—parallel to, in Russia, replacing the semi-coercion and 
unproductive reality of the mir with independent, small family farms.
Lenin saw Stolypin’s reforms as leading to a class of wealthy landlord 
farmers, who he referred to as “Junkers” (an honorific title derived from 
the German jung Herr, or “young lord”).  Lenin was, without question, 
wrong. The effects of Stolypin’s reform were more in line with “forty acres 
and a mule” than with Junker landlords. What was beginning to emerge 
through these reforms was a class of small family farmers—perhaps 
“petit-bourgeois,” but certainly not Grossbauern. “Stolypin headed in the 
‘American’ not the ‘Junker’ direction,” writes Donald Treadgold. “He nei-
ther declares for in words, nor provides for in deeds, the strengthening 
of landlord farming; and the chief authorities do not contest the fact that 
landlord farming declined more or less rapidly from the emancipation to 
the revolution.”50 Far from producing a class of Grossbauern, the Stolypin 
reform aligned more closely with the so-called American path.
Mistaken Theory, Catastrophic Practice
Lenin held on to his misleading understanding of the countryside 
throughout the years of what has come to be known as “war communism.” 
According to Alec Nove:
This term is used to describe and define the period roughly from 




Lenin’s leadership, adopted a policy of requisitioning farm pro-
duce (the so-called prodrazvestka), sought to ban all private trade, 
nationalized almost all industrial establishments and tried to achieve 
central control over production and allocation of goods, partially 
replacing money (which was rapidly depreciating) by accounting in 
kind.51
There is a very big debate about the entire collection of “war communist” 
policies, taken as a whole. Victor Serge sees the 1918–1921 period extremely 
positively. He says that the label “war communism” was inaccurate and 
that those years should really be seen as “the first attempt to organise a 
socialist society.”52 He cites the work of Lev Kritsman, who says in a pro-
vocative 1926 book, The Heroic Period of the Great Russian Revolution, 
that those years witnessed “the organisation of the natural economy of 
the proletariat.”53
Boris Souvarine, Tamás Krausz, and many others see this very dif-
ferently. They argue that war communism, and the 1918–21 attempt by 
the state to “force” the country into socialism, was both impossible and 
extremely costly. Souvarine says that “driven by the desperate necessities 
of civil war and by the mystical-romantic strain inherited from anarch-
ism,” the Bolsheviks undertook, in the war communist years, to establish 
socialism “by assault.” The Bolshevik-led state “destroyed all private 
enterprise, though they could not replace it by popular initiative; they 
confiscated the product of individual labour before they had created col-
lectivist production,” and went so far as to think, by 1920, “that they could 
dispense with money.”54 Krausz makes much the same point, saying that 
Lenin identified the “nationalization and the administrative liquidation 
of market conditions with the possibilities for the immediate realization 
of socialism” and “overestimated the possibilities of socialization, of social 
supervision within the framework of nationalization, and underestimated 
the inveteracy of the market and money in a regulating role, a fact he later 
recognized.”55
The task here is not to evaluate the policies of war communism in 
their totality, but to examine only the first one highlighted by Nove—the 
policy of “requisitioning farm produce” (prodrazvestka). The profound 




opened the door to a catastrophic mistake in practice that fuelled a civil 
war between the workers in the cities and the peasants in the countryside.
Lenin’s war communism policies were justified—as was Stalin’s forced 
collectivization policy a decade later—through a demonization of the 
“kulak.” Addressing the Moscow Soviet in April 1919, Lenin identified 
the biggest obstacle to the consolidation of communism in Russia as the 
“anarchy of the petty proprietors, whose life is guided by one thought: 
‘I grab all I can—the rest can go hang.’” Lenin labelled these “petty pro-
prietors” as an enemy “more powerful” than the counter-revolutionary 
generals, such as Kornilov, leading the counter-revolutionary armies.56 
In fact, in order to conjure up this all-important enemy, Lenin in effect 
collapsed two categories—petit-bourgeois farmer and wealthy landlord 
(Junker) farmer—into one category, the “petty kulaks,” in whom he located 
the chief obstacle to the consolidation of the workers’ state in Russia. This 
confused political-economic analysis led to a generation of tragically mis-
informed policies imposed on the countryside.
More than anyone, Isaac Steinberg captures this tragedy. He makes a 
persuasive case for the idea that, while there were multiple engines of revo-
lution in 1917—the peasants on the land, the workers in the city, national 
minorities, and the intelligentsia—it was the peasant revolution on the 
land that was decisive. “The supreme slogan that carried the revolution as 
a whole,” writes Steinberg, “was the peasant call, sanctified back in Populist 
days: Zemlya i Volya (‘Land and Freedom’).”57 So powerful was the wave 
of returning peasant-soldiers, arms in hand, determined to redistribute 
the land, that nothing could stand in their way. Almost without resistance 
from either the landlords on the big estates or the so-called Stolypin farm-
ers on the new family farms, they swept all land back under the control of 
the mir, redistributing it to peasant families.
The whole process was codified into law in the remarkable January 1918 
Third Peasant Congress, held in Petrograd, “which was the first to merge 
with the Third Soviet Congress of Workers and Soldiers. Nine hundred 
proletarian and six hundred peasant deputies established a unity of the 
Russian working people, a unity symbolized by the ‘handshake of Lenin 
and Spiridonova.’”58 The latter, Maria Spiridonova, was the revered leader 
of the Left Social-Revolutionaries, a party to which Steinberg belonged 




delegates drafted what Steinberg calls “their basic law,” including man-
dating pensions for all those who could not work, and the distribution of 
land “in such manner as to assure each family of an honorable, ample and 
secure existence.” The congress deputies remained in the city, waiting for 
the Central Soviet Executive to ratify their law. Steinberg says that on 27 
January (9 February), “this ratification took place in a solemn session.”
Spiridonova’s report on the work accomplished left those present 
shouting with enthusiasm. “No debates! Vote! Vote!” A forest of 
hands shot up. And still the deputies refused to leave Petrograd 
until they could hold printed copies of the law in their hands. Two 
printing presses worked a day and a night, and then the delegates 
departed, spreading the glad tidings to the far corners of the land.59
The euphoria of this moment would not last. Within weeks, peace 
talks with Germany collapsed, and in the resulting chaos, “the Germans 
occupied large parts of the food-producing areas, leaving Central Russia 
cut off from her sources of supply.” In that context, “the Government 
decided to requisition bread from the peasants by force”—the initiation 
of so-called war communism.60 “The Bolsheviks could not have called 
down a greater curse,” Steinberg writes. “The village had only just passed 
through its highest spiritual exultation. It had not only liberated itself 
from the landowners’ yoke, it had also laid the foundations for economic 
and social equality in its everyday life.” Then, suddenly, in what can only 
have seemed to the peasants a massive act of betrayal, “the Bolshevik state 
launched something like a class war against them.”
In the village itself the Bolsheviks—falling back once more on their 
outmoded theory—branded the working peasants as “small bour-
geois,” as men imbued with the psychology of trade, private markets 
and the instinct for acquisition. They organized the few remain-
ing “paupers” to oppose the overwhelming mass of peasants; they 
established Soviets of “peasant paupers.” They thus set themselves to 
demolish the foundations of the new revolutionary village. But even 
that was not enough: into the village they sent thousands of specially 
mobilized industrial workers for “bread requisitioning.” . . . These 




protesting peasants, corrupted their proletarian participants and led 
to acts of unbelievable brutality.61
This wresting of grain from the hands of the peasants cannot be seen 
solely as a policy forced onto the Bolsheviks in the context of an emergency. 
Lenin’s “kulak” theory was informing Bolshevik (soon to be Communist) 
practice before the German occupation of the bread-producing regions. 
On 6 (19) February 1918, immediately after the historic peasant-worker 
congress and the “handshake of Lenin and Spiridonova,” and before his 
government signed the punitive Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin addressed 
a group of activists from both governing parties, the Bolsheviks and the 
Left SRs, who were about to travel to the countryside to help to advance the 
revolution. It is a speech in which he repeats the view that the countryside 
has a large class of wealthy peasants (kulaks), the presumed products of 
the Prussian path promoted by Stolypin (a path not in fact taken), and 
assumes that this class had somehow survived the land expropriation 
movement (it had not). This did not stop Lenin from warning the delegates 
of the threat that awaited them: “Out there in the countryside, you will 
come across ‘bourgeois’ peasants, the kulaks, who will try to upset Soviet 
power.” As he went on to advise:
You must explain to the people in the villages that the kulaks and 
sharks must be pulled up short. . . . Ten working people must stand 
up against every rich man who stretches out his avaricious paw 
towards public property. . . . 
The external war is over or nearly so. There is no doubt on that 
score. It is an internal war that is now before us. The bourgeoisie, its 
plundered goods hidden in its chests, is not worried and thinks: “We 
shall sit this out.” The people must ferret out the sharks and make 
them disgorge. This is your task in the localities. If we are not to 
collapse, we must get at them in their hideouts.62
Lenin claimed that “every worker and peasant earning his own livelihood 
feels, deep down in his heart, that there is no salvation from famine and 
ruin but in Soviet power,” and that the peasants in the countryside would 
therefore clearly see that “it is not punitive expeditions but propagandists 




those in every village who earn their own livelihood and have never lived 
at the expense of others.”63 But in fact, every subsequent intervention from 
city to country would be felt precisely as a “punitive expedition,” until, 
in March 1921, what Krausz calls the “dead end of war communism”64 
collapsed of its own contradictions and gave way to the New Economic 
Policy (NEP).
The New Economic Policy was economically the opposite of war com-
munism. “Private trade, small-scale manufacture, foreign concessions, 
even projects for mixed companies with the participation of Russian pri-
vate capital, the abandonment of free distribution, the turning of state 
trusts into commercial enterprises—all this followed.”65 Its key provision 
was the abandonment of forced requisitioning of grain, allowing peasants 
to sell their grain on the market. However, this economic opening was not 
accompanied by a political opening. In fact, the political regime became 
even more repressive.
From the vantage point of the late 1970s, Roy Medvedev persuasively 
argued that the Bolsheviks should have implemented the New Economic 
Policy in 1918, rather than “in the much more complicated and difficult 
situation of early 1921.”66 In fact, well before that policy was adopted, sev-
eral prominent voices in Russia had called for an end to war communism. 
Nikolaii Rozhkov, Menshevik and eminent historian, made a personal 
appeal to Lenin in January 1919—two years prior to the implementation 
of the NEP—for an end to war communism. A former leading Bolshe-
vik, Rozhkov knew Lenin well.67 Now, however, he was writing to his 
former comrade “not because I hope to be heard and understood by you, 
but because I cannot remain silent, in the face of a situation that to me 
seems desperate. I must do everything in my power to avert the looming 
disaster.”68
According to Krausz, in his letter to Lenin, “Rozhkov gave voice to 
the most important demand of the New Economic Policy in that he rec-
ommended a free market for basic food articles, the organization of the 
all-Russian market, and shutting down the requisitioning gangs.”69 Indeed, 
Rozhkov made his case in no uncertain terms. “All your threats of block-
ing [barrier] units will not help,” he wrote, referring to the armed squads 
mobilized to stop the trade in grain. He argued that Lenin must disband 




exports.”70 Very much along the lines of the NEP policy to come, Rozhkov 
argued that “without the assistance of private trade initiatives, not you, 
nor anybody else will be able to cope with the inevitable disaster. If you 
do not do it [make this policy change] your enemies will.” He went on to 
say: “It is impossible in the twentieth century to turn the country into a 
conglomerate of closed, local medieval markets. This was natural in the 
Middle Ages, when the population within present-day Soviet Russia was 
20 times smaller. Now it is a blatant absurdity.”71
For Rozhkov, the looming disaster had two components. First, he feared 
that in the winter of 1919, half the population of Petrograd would die from 
hunger. “Under such conditions, even if you were not being directly threat-
ened by the imperialists and the White Army [counter-revolutionaries], 
you would not hold onto power. You, an economist, should understand 
this.” Second, the emergence of “a counter-revolutionary dictator” would 
inevitably follow from the stubborn refusal to allow a return to free trade 
in grain: “There is no such clever dictator yet, but there will be. ‘Show me 
a swamp, and I’ll show you the devil.’”72
Rozhkov, a supporter of the Mensheviks, was isolated from the levers 
of power. But in these early years, Leon Trotsky was not. He was among 
those at the very top of the state hierarchy. In February 1920, one year after 
Rozhkov’s appeal to Lenin, and one year prior to the belated introduction 
of NEP, Trotsky put forward a proposal to the Communist Party’s Central 
Committee, a proposal that directly paralleled that of Rozhkov’s. Noting 
that “the food resources of the country are threatened with exhaustion,” 
Trotsky argued that the seizure of grain should be ended and replaced by 
“a levy proportionate to the quantity of production (a sort of progressive 
tax on agricultural income), set up in such a way that it is nevertheless 
more profitable to increase the acreage sown or to cultivate it better.”73 
According to Erik Landis, Trotsky’s proposals “resembled what would 
be adopted by the party” one year later.74 They were, however, rejected 
by the Central Committee, by a vote of eleven to four.75 Other senior 
government officials, months before their abandonment, made the case 
for moving away from the policies we now retrospectively put under the 
headline of “war communism.” One month earlier, on 20 January, at the 
Third All-Russia Congress of the Soviets of the People’s Economy, Yuri 




proposals very similar to Trotsky’s. Larin was at the time a “member of 
the Soviet regime’s highest economic body, the Supreme Council of the 
People’s Economy (VSNKh)” and “the Communist Party specialist on 
financial affairs.” Although Larin’s proposals received serious attention at 
the congress, they ultimately failed to win approval. Lenin, when informed 
of the proposals, “pushed for Larin’s removal” from his position on the 
VSNKh.76
These critics of war communism had the hard facts of hunger on their 
side. “Throughout this period,” writes Alec Nove, “it was in fact quite 
impossible to live on the official rations, and the majority of supplies even 
of bread came through the black market.”77 Leonard Schapiro points out 
that “in spite of severe repression, right up to 1920 the illegal market 
accounted for more food supplied to the towns than the legal system of 
distribution.”78 Nove cites a 1924 article by Kritsman—like Larin, in the 
early years of the revolution a senior member of VSNKh—reporting that 
Soviet citizens relied on the illegal market for up to 70 percent of their food 
needs.79 We have seen that Rozhkov warned Lenin that half the population 
of Petrograd was doomed to die of starvation.80 In other words, had war 
communism been successful in completely suppressing the trade in bread 
thousands if not millions more would have starved. But the warnings from 
Rozhkov, Trotsky, and Larin went unheeded. War communism would drag 
on until 1921, and along with it the concomitant vilification of the “kulak” 
in Lenin’s writings.
Perhaps no other word in the Russian revolutionary vocabulary has 
been so abused as the term kulak. Originally used to designate those people 
in the countryside “whose wealth came from usury or trading rather 
than from agriculture,” the word later came to signify a “new stratum of 
better-off peasants in the Soviet countryside,” variously identified with 
“rural bourgeoisie” and “village capitalists” applied interchangeably.81 
But the notion of the “rich peasants,” who sometimes were considered 
“rich” because they had one or two horses as opposed to none, was com-
pletely out of step with the subsistence reality of the Russian countryside. 
Remember Tito’s definition of a kulak—“the test of being a kulak was not 
the size of a man’s holding, but whether he was for ‘socialism’ or against 




More than anything else, kulak became a term of opprobrium. From 
1918 until his death, Lenin hurled abuse upon what he saw as communism’s 
greatest internal enemy—labelling them in June 1918 as “the criminals 
who are subjecting the population to the torments of hunger”83 and in 
February 1919 as “the shameless rich peasants who fill their money-bags 
out of the people’s need and the hunger.”84 In an August 1918 telegram to 
the Gubernia Executive Committee in Penza, he argued for “a campaign 
of ruthless mass terror against the kulaks, priests and whiteguards; sus-
pects to be shut up in a detention camp outside the city.”85 Speaking to a 
session of the Petrograd Soviet in March 1919, he identified what he saw 
as a growing class division in the countryside, and argued that “the bulk 
of the poor peasants, and of the middle peasants who are close to them, 
are on our side. Against the kulaks, who are our inveterate enemies, we 
have but one weapon—force.”86 
This anti-kulak discourse was deeply at odds with the reality in the 
countryside. As we have seen, the Stolypin reform had created a new class 
of family farmers. But as E. H. Carr (echoing many others) notes, the 
expropriations that had swept through Russia in 1917 were “not confined 
to landowners’ land. Large peasant holdings, created under the Stolypin 
reform or earlier, were also broken up and distributed—a process after-
wards referred to as ‘a dekulakization of kulaks.’”87 The seizure of the land 
by the peasants in 1917 had ended landlordism. It had also virtually ended 
family farming of the American type, at least in Russia proper. 
As indicated earlier, there were exceptions to the above analysis—in 
what is today Belarus and in western Ukraine, where the mir either did 
not exist or existed on the margins. In those areas, the family farmer was 
better able to survive the 1917 upheaval, unlike the newly created Stolypin 
family farmer in Russia proper. In those areas, outside of Russia proper, 
there was a “kulak target” to be found for Lenin’s vitriole—if, of course, 
we persist with the mistake of seeing the family farmer qua family farmer 
as a kulak. But as well as being a mistaken approach, in the context of 
these non-Russian areas, Lenin’s anti-kulak diatribes acquire an especially 
unsavoury dimension. They can be interpreted as serving to position the 
kulak as “other,” a specifically non-Russian other, against which his largely 




In sum, it is completely misleading to pin the label “petty-bourgeois” 
or “petit-bourgeois” on the Russian countryside. The mir exhibited no 
capitalist dynamic for increased productivity or production for profit. 
Rather, it was an institution that enforced subsistence. There was a brief 
emergence of a new class of petit-bourgeois family farmers as a conse-
quence of the Stolypin reform. These farmers—freed from the mir—were 
in fact oriented toward profit maximization in a classically petit-bourgeois, 
or small-capitalist, fashion, and the rise of this class was accompanied by 
a general improvement in the productivity of agriculture in the Russian 
countryside. But—and this point cannot be stressed enough—in Russia 
proper, this small-capitalist class was virtually destroyed by the Great War 
and the land seizures of 1917, and petit-bourgeois peasants were reabsorbed 
into the mir. Farming in this context was petty—the land available for each 
family was indeed tiny—but it was not in any way bourgeois. As Carr 
points out, “the small peasant with his family lived at subsistence level, 
and grew for himself and not for the market.”88
War on the Kulaks and Socialist Consciousness
In the context of forced collectivization and the “war on the kulaks” of the 
first five-year plan, Trotsky displayed similar confusions as to the nature of 
the agrarian relations in post-revolutionary Russia. In part 3, in an exam-
ination of Trotsky’s political biography of Stalin, I review the well-known 
criterion central to Trotsky’s understanding of the class nature of the Soviet 
Union—the question of nationalized property. In fact, Trotsky develops, in 
that book, another less well-known criterion. The counter-revolution, in 
Trotsky’s view, had failed to eliminate not only the “nationalization of the 
means of production and the land” but also “the socialist consciousness 
of the masses.”89 Where might Trotsky in the 1930s find evidence for the 
continuing existence of this socialist consciousness, given the horrifying 
violence directed against the advanced urban workers?
He finds it in the context of Stalin’s forced collectivization war on the 
kulaks, surveyed earlier—the same forced collectivization that led to a 
horrendous artificial famine and that should in fact be seen as a war on the 
peasantry as a whole. In Trotsky’s view, “the nationalization of the means 
of production and of the land, is the bureaucracy’s law of life and death, 




to say that guarding this nationalization of the means of production and 
the land “was the reason for its [the bureaucracy’s] struggle against the 
kulak. The bureaucracy could wage this struggle, and wage it to the end, 
only with the support of the proletariat.”90
Millions of peasants died in Stalin’s misnamed war on the kulaks. Boris 
Brutzkus, a leading Russian agricultural economist, describes the brutal 
process of dekulakization during the winter of 1929–30:
The local authorities prepared a list of condemned families. Then 
at night they gathered, armed, together with the members of the 
local komsomol [Communist youth organization] and perhaps a few 
poor peasants. They invaded the house of their victim; his means of 
production were confiscated for the local collective farms; a large 
quantity of consumer goods was usually looted for the private use 
of the executants of the dekulakization. All members of the family 
were pitilessly turned out of their homes into the snow-covered 
streets and it was forbidden to give them any help. The head of the 
family was generally imprisoned. The instruction was to divide the 
kulaks into three groups. To the first belonged those who could be 
considered as active counter-revolutionaries. These were to be shot 
immediately, without referring their case to the central authorities. 
The second—usually the most numerous—consisted of those who 
were destined to be deported to the northern forest regions. They 
were transported not in passenger carriages, but in railway trucks; 
the wagons were overcrowded to such an extent that there was no 
room to sit down. There was no heating, the people were very poorly 
clothed, and hardly had any food; so it was natural that a great 
number of them, and especially children, could not stand the long 
journey and died at a considerable rate. The third group consisted 
of those kulaks who were allowed to stay in the district, but were 
banned from admission to the kolkhozes [collective farms]. In this 
third group the death-rate was also very high because of hunger and 
cold in the first winter after dekulakization. Many children were 
parted from their parents; they formed the bands of homeless chil-
dren which were one of the great social problems of Soviet life.91
Trotsky gave his qualified support to this one-sided war against the peas-




elite but from the progressive social foundations of a new order. “Thanks 
to the support of the proletariat,” he declared, “it ended with victory for 
the bureaucracy.”92
The Soviet state’s one-sided war against the peasantry is not evidence of 
socialist consciousness. To the extent that the proletariat did support what 
Souvarine rightly calls “the nightmare of collectivization,” they became 
complicit in a mass murder so extreme that some have called it geno-
cide. It resulted in “an agricultural disaster, justly compared to the effects 
of a major war.”93 And in the end, the disaster in the countryside was 
accompanied by disaster in the cities—first in 1934, in the purge of Lenin-
grad, and then in 1937–38, in the Great Terror—crushing the remnants of 
the organized workers themselves. How Trotsky could find evidence of 
“socialist consciousness” in all of this is unclear.
These atrocities belong to Stalin. But it was Lenin who decisively set 
Bolshevik policy regarding the peasantry. Lenin never abandoned his 
“petit-bourgeois” analysis of labour in the countryside, and it led to cat-
astrophic errors in policy. His—and the Bolsheviks’—agrarian policy was 
premised on the existence of a greedy “peasant bourgeoisie,” a so-called 
kulak class, that was hoarding grain and starving the cities. They declared 
war on this group, banning free trade and sending armed urban gangs 
into the countryside to confiscate grain. This “war communism” was an 
unsustainable policy against which they were warned by many. But it 
was not abandoned until March 1921, in the context of mass actions by 
peasants, workers, and sailors in the fateful Kronstadt uprising of March 
1921, to which we return in the conclusion.
Earlier, I quoted Bertram Wolfe saying: “Most Social Democrats knew 
so little about the countryside that the issues eluded them.”94 He was clearly 
correct. If chapter 4 identified a strategic confusion, manifested in the 
assumption that a mobilized class of rural peasants-in-uniform can sub-
stitute for a self-activated urban working class, this chapter has identified a 
theoretical confusion—categorizing the labour inside the patriarchal com-
mune as somehow “small capitalist” in nature. It is one thing to observe 
these kinds of confusions in debates among isolated intellectuals on the 
fringes of politics. It is quite another when they inform the policies of mass 




Poland and Georgia—The Export 
of Revolution6
The political framework of Bolshevism, sketched in the previous chapters, 
was built within Russia but would soon impact politics on the world stage. 
This transition was marked by the second (1920), third (1921), and fourth 
(1922) congresses of the Communist International (Comintern)—con-
gresses that Trotsky, writing in 1933, singled out as occasions on which key 
issues were subjected to “a principled analysis that has remain unsurpassed 
until now.”1 Four events were, overtly or covertly, central to these con-
gresses: the 1919 revolution in Hungary, the 1920 Russian war with Poland, 
the 1921 attempt at a general strike in Germany (what became known as 
the “March Action”), and the 1921 invasion of Georgia. We know a little 
bit about the 1921 March Action. There is some research on the 1919 revo-
lution in Hungary. Both will be examined in the next chapter. Both are 
classic examples of the problem of substitutionism—bypassing the mass 
self-emancipation of the working class and attempting to substitute for it 
the actions of a minoritarian “radical” section of the class. This chapter will 
examine two events about which we know considerably less, the Russian 
invasion of Poland in 1920 and of Georgia in 1921. Both were extreme 
cases of substitutionism—the attempt to substitute for the revolutionary 
class not a minoritarian party, as was the case in Germany and Hungary, 
but the bayonets of the peasants-in-uniform organized in the Red Army 
and Red Cavalry.
In his introduction to the proceedings of the third congress, John Rid-
dell relegates this historical episode to a footnote: “In April 1920, Polish 
troops launched an offensive in soviet Ukraine. The Red Army was able 
to push them back into Polish territory and then continued its advance 




retreat. An armistice ending the war was signed in October.”2 This is true 
but incomplete. There is much more to the story.
The war did begin with a Polish invasion of Ukraine. By 6 May 1920, the 
Bolshevik troops had been expelled from Kyiv, “the eleventh time that Kiev 
had been occupied since 1917.”3 Kyiv was a city seen by many as the “birth-
place of Russian civilization,” and suddenly the Bolsheviks had unfamiliar 
allies—conservative former monarchists rallying to the defence not of 
communism but of “Mother Russia.”4 Within weeks, writes Orlando Figes, 
14,000 former officers from the tsar’s army “had joined the Red Army to 
fight the Poles, thousands of civilians had volunteered for war-work, and 
well over 100,000 deserters had returned to the Red Army.”5 By mid-July, 
the Russians had driven the Polish army out of the conquered territory. 
They then stood on the threshold of a momentous decision—whether to 
move from a defensive war to an offensive one, which meant an invasion 
of Poland by Russian troops. This was hotly contested in the Bolshevik 
Party. Lenin and his supporters won the day: the Russian army invaded 
Poland, came to the gates of Warsaw, and was thrown out of the country 
in disarray, suffering horrendous casualties.6
“This Should Not Get into the Press”
In the aftermath of the invasion, in a speech to Communist Party mem-
bers, Lenin explained the thinking of the Central Committee majority, 
which had thrown its support behind the invasion. As the war against 
imperialism progressed, he explained, the Central Committee had rec-
ognized the existence of “a new, fundamental question”—namely, that of 
moving from the defensive to the offensive.
And so, in sum . . . the conviction ripened in us that the military 
offensive of the Entente against us was over, that the defensive war 
with imperialism was over, and that we had won. Poland was the 
stake. And Poland thought that, as a power with imperialist trad-
itions, it was in a position to change the nature of the war. Hence, 
the assessment was as follows: the period of defensive war was over.
At this point, Lenin interjects a phrase loaded with significance: “I request 




did not get into the press, staying in the closed archives until the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Perhaps Lenin’s reticence to have his views made known 
was simply because of the scale of the defeat suffered by the Russian army. 
We, of course, cannot know his motivations, but keeping this text from 
public view for several generations had the effect of keeping from public 
view one of the least attractive aspects of Lenin’s epistemology—his belief 
in the possibility of exporting socialism through military invasion.
We faced a new task. The defensive period of the war with world-
wide imperialism was over, and we could and had the obligation 
to, exploit the military situation to launch an offensive war. We had 
defeated them when they advanced against us; we would now try to 
advance against them in order to assist the sovietization of Poland.8
He was not reticent on this point. One of the most horrifying aspects 
of modern warfare is the use of bayonets in hand-to-hand combat—a 
barbaric relic reminiscent of the militarism of the middle ages, surviving 
into modernity. Lenin, however, deploys the image of this awful weapon 
as part of a thumbnail outline of his political objectives.
We decided to use our military forces to assist the sovietization of 
Poland. Our subsequent overall policy flowed from this [decision]. 
We did not formulate it as an official resolution recorded in the min-
utes of the Central Committee and representing the law for the party 
and the new congress, but we said among ourselves that we must 
probe with bayonets [to discover] whether the social revolution of 
the proletariat in Poland had ripened.9
Tamás Krausz recommends treating this speech with some caution, 
as it “was not intended for the public, and was never edited in its written 
form,” but he then proceeds to do the opposite, treating it very incau-
tiously, investing it with the work of laying the foundation for a Marxist 
understanding of international relations. The speech, he says, “contains, in 
a nutshell, Lenin’s political and theoretical fundamentals on the links and 
interconnections between world progress and the international revolution-
ary transformation.”10 This implies that the interconnections so revealed 
hold positive lessons. They do not. The “interconnections” revealed here 




in Poland are nothing more than the interconnections revealed in standard 
texts of international relations: the borders and government of one state 
can be changed by another through the use of physical force. Implicit 
in Krausz’s positive gloss on Lenin’s speech is that “progressive change” 
(i.e., socialism) might be the result of such actions. But while it is true 
that Lenin used the language of revolutionary upheaval to describe his 
aspirations, the extent to which hopes for socialist transformation were 
embedded in his speech represented, at best, wishful thinking.
At the level of military strategy, the Russian invasion of Poland resulted 
in “an enormous defeat,” to use Lenin’s words.11 This defeat should have 
surprised no one. At the level of geopolitics, the thought that the people 
of Poland, long oppressed by Russia, would welcome an army from Russia 
entering its territory was absurd. At the level of political theory, the idea 
that “revolutionary transformation” could be effected by the bayonets 
of an invading army runs completely counter to the self-emancipation 
politics outlined by Karl Marx, Rosa Luxemburg, and Luxemburg’s close 
ally and friend, Paul Levi. It was axiomatic to their politics that a country 
could only be “sovietized” through the self-activity and self-organization 
of the vast majority of the oppressed and exploited. Luxemburg and Levi 
were leading figures in the anti-war German left group, the Spartacus 
League, and would both become founding members and leaders of the 
German Communist Party (KPD). Luxemburg summarized the core of 
their politics in 1918: “The Spartacus League will never take over govern-
mental power except in response to the clear, unambiguous will of the 
great majority of the proletarian mass of all of Germany.”12 This is the 
opposite of Lenin’s grotesque “probe with bayonets” approach. 
Like the Spartacists, Iulii Martov “completely rejected an aggressive 
revolutionary war.” On 5 May 1920, he addressed a joint session of the 
Moscow Soviet and the All-Russian Central Trade Union Council:
After voicing support for all that Soviet power had done to deflect 
Polish aggression, Martov expressed concern that the conflict might 
be transformed from an action to defend the RSFSR into an offen-
sive, cautioned against any adventuring eastward (into Turkey and 
India), and called for the prompt conclusion of the peace treaty that 




Martov’s, of course, was not a voice to which the Bolsheviks would listen: 
“There was so much noise in the hall that he could not finish his speech.”13 
However, Martov turned out to be correct, and his hecklers wrong. 
Turning a war to defend Russia against Polish aggression into a Russian 
offensive war to conquer Poland brought to the fore not the nationalism 
of an oppressed nation, but rather the ugly patriotism of Great Russian 
chauvinism. The flood of volunteers who entered the Red Army brought 
with them traditional Russian patriotism and prejudice. “Many Russians, 
including former Whites who had fought against the Bolsheviks in the 
Russian Civil War, opposed the reestablishment of Polish independence, 
and regarded the war as a traditional conflict between two opposing 
states,” notes Kirsteen Davina Croll. “As a result, numerous former tsar-
ist officers joined the ranks of the Red Army.” One of those officers was 
A. A. Brusilov, who believed that “agitation of national patriotism” was 
necessary to an army being “strong and battleworthy.”14
It was one thing to refuse to listen to the voice of the isolated and 
much abused Martov, but what of the voice of the then-authoritative Leon 
Trotsky, who was also opposed to invading Poland?15 Of all the Bolshevik 
leaders, Trotsky was, without question, the one most experienced in these 
matters. In 1917, he was head of the Military Revolutionary Committee of 
the St. Petersburg Soviet when they organized the November seizure of 
power. From 1919 to 1925, he served as People’s Commissar of army and 
navy affairs and was the pre-eminent political and organizational leader of 
the Red Army, which would emerge victorious and save Russia from defeat 
by foreign invasion and internal civil war. Krausz tells us that Trotsky 
“took a highly skeptical stance regarding a large Soviet military advance 
on Warsaw.”16 Broué says that Trotsky did not believe “in the export of the 
revolution at the point of bayonets.”17 But even Trotsky was ignored, and 
the invasion of Poland proceeded, with little sense of restraint or caution.
The gap between aspirations and reality was starkly revealed during 
the 1920 Second Congress of the Communist International, which was in 
session while the invasion was under way.18 The Poland question received 
barely a mention during the congress. One of the few exceptions was 
toward the end of the first session, when Paul Levi brought to the floor a 
resolution appealing to the workers’ movement outside of Russia to block 




Other than that, it hardly figured into the Congress official discussions. 
Victor Serge, in his participant’s account of the Second Congress, lists 
three issues that were central to the congress: “the necessity for com-
promise and participation in electoral and Parliamentary politics,” “the 
possibility, and even necessity, of inspiring Soviet-type revolutions in the 
Asiatic colonial countries,” and the need to “work for splits that would 
break with the old reformist and Parliamentary leaderships” in Europe.20 
Cover of a 1920 issue of Communist International magazine. Tim Davenport 
Collection, Online Archive of California, Wikimedia Commons.
However, with an air of mystery, Serge adds that there was a fourth 
“even more important” issue, which, however, “was not touched upon 
in open session.” This hidden agenda item was, precisely, the war on 
Poland—more precisely, the possibility of using the war with Poland to 
spark revolutions in Western Europe. Serge says that this “fourth prob-
lem was not on the agenda and no trace of it will ever be found in the 




leadership consciously kept this fourth “even more important” agenda 
item away from the public eye. Lenin, in his secret speech, is explicit. The 
Bolshevik leaders “said among themselves” that Poland should be probed 
with bayonets to see if it was ripe for socialism. However:
Here we raised a practical question which, as it turned out, was not 
entirely clear in theoretical terms to the best communist elements of 
the international community, that is the Communist International. 
. . . When the Comintern Congress convened in July [1920] in 
Moscow, we were settling this question in the Central Committee. 
We could not raise this question at the Comintern congress because 
that congress had to proceed openly—that was its enormous revolu-
tionary, global political significance, which will become much more 
evident than has been the case up until now.22
If not discussed publicly, Serge says that the sovietization of Poland 
through Red Army bayonets was “discussed with considerable heat by 
Lenin, in a gathering of foreign delegates in a small room,” where “a map 
of the Polish front was displayed on the wall.” He paints a vivid picture: 
“Lenin, jacketed, briefcase under arm, delegates and typists all around him, 
was giving his views on the march of Tukhachevsky’s army on Warsaw. He 
was in excellent spirits, and confident of victory.”23
Werner Angress describes a similar scene. Lenin gathered Comintern 
delegates from Germany around a map, asking them where in East Prussia 
there was likely to be an uprising to greet the victorious Red Army after 
it had swept through Poland and reached the border with Germany. The 
Germans, one of whom was Paul Levi, “stared at him in amazement. East 
Prussia was known as one of the most conservative German regions.”24 
Levi, as we saw above, moved the resolution to urge nonintervention in the 
war with Poland on the part of Western powers. That in no way meant that 
he expected the residents of traditionally conservative German areas bor-
dering Poland to rise with enthusiasm to greet invading Russian troops.
If it was absurd to expect conservative German peasants to rise up 
at the sight of Red Army bayonets, it was even more absurd to expect 
Polish peasants—long the victims of Great Russian chauvinism—to greet 
a Russian army as their liberators. The Polish nation was just a few months 




the oppression of Russian tsars, German kaisers, and Austro-Hungarian 
emperors. Understandably, Poland rallied to oppose the Russian inva-
sion and defend its newly won independence. Serge points out another 
reason for Polish workers to oppose the victory of the Red Army. Included 
on the “Revolutionary Committee that was to govern Poland” was Felix 
Dzerzhinsky, the feared head of the Cheka, “the man of the Terror.”25 Serge, 
a leading participant in the Second Congress, writes, “I declared that, far 
from firing the popular enthusiasm, the name of Dzerzhinsky would freeze 
it altogether. That is just what happened.”26
The Russian general leading the invasion—Mikhail Nikolaievich 
Tukhachevsky—had achieved extraordinary success in the Civil War. In 
Russia, Tukhachevsky could march his massive armies through land where 
the peasants would “provide them with supplies and make good his losses 
in men.”27 The peasants feared the White, counter-revolutionary armies 
more than they feared the Red Terror. According to Serge, Tukhachev-
sky’s opponents in the Civil War—the White officers—had made “two 
cardinal errors: their failure . . . to carry out agrarian reform . . . and their 
reinstatement everywhere of the ancient trinity of generals, high clergy, 
and landlords.”28 The effect of both errors was to decrease support for the 
Whites and increase it for the Reds. But Poland was not Russia, and other 
factors were at work. The relation of Poland to Russia was analogous to that 
of Ireland to Great Britain. The Polish people were an oppressed nation 
within the prison-house of nations that had been tsarist Russia. An army 
of Russian peasants was not going to be greeted as a liberation army any 
more than a British army would in Ireland.
And what of the instrument chosen to perform this sovietization? 
Edgar D’Abernon, a British diplomat present in Poland during the war, 
kept a diary of events and recorded his impression of Russian prisoners 
of war interrogated by one of his colleagues. He expressed surprise at 
their “entire lack of enthusiasm or conviction regarding the Soviet Gov-
ernment.” He concluded that the only force driving them forward was 
“the terror which the Tcheka and its network of spies and denunciators 
inspire. It was apparent that this dread institution was greatly feared by 





An army driven forward by fear of the Cheka is clearly a problem 
when that army is presumed to be an agent of progressive social change. 
This was not the only problem. Much of the territory through which the 
Russian army was marching had a very large Jewish population—part 
of the historic Jewish Pale of Settlement, “an area in the western border-
lands of the empire to which the residence of the Jewish population was 
almost exclusively confined.” At the turn of the century, 95 percent of the 
Russian empire’s Jewish population of roughly five million resided there.30 
Tukhachevsky might very well have been a brilliant general. He also had a 
history, as a young man, of being an antisemite. In 1917, during World War 
I, he was a prisoner of war in Bavaria, and there made the acquaintance 
of French journalist Remy Roure, “one of the most prominent journalists 
and newspapermen in France in his day, a founder of Le Monde and its 
political editor from 1945 to 1952.”31 In 1928, Roure published, in Paris, a 
biography of his now famous former cellmate. He records a conversation 
where Tukhachevsky made vile statements denigrating Jewish people: 
“The Jews brought us Christianity. That’s reason enough to hate them. But 
then they are a low race. I don’t even speak of the dangers they create in 
my country.”32 Just a few months later, Tukhachevsky was back in Russia 
and a member of the Bolshevik Party.
Antisemitism was an issue not just for ex-aristocrats like Tukhachev-
sky, but also for the very poor peasant class that formed the core of the 
Red Army. Three-quarters of the Red Army soldiers were peasants, and, 
according to Orlando Figes, “its rank-and-file soldiers frequently became 
involved in violent looting, especially when passing through non-Russian 
(particularly Jewish) areas.”
The Red Army, it is important to bear in mind, was predominantly 
Russian in its ethnic composition. Even units conscripted in the 
Ukraine and other non-Russian regions (for example the Tatar 
Republic) were largely made up of Russians. Anti-Semitism was a 
powerful and growing force in the Red Army during the civil war, 
despite the fact that a Jew, Lev Davidovitch Trotsky (Bronstein), 
stood at its political head. Trotsky received hundreds of reports 
about his own soldiers’ violence and looting in Jewish-Ukrainian 




In 1920, this chronic problem became acute when, after being defeated 
at the gates of Warsaw, the Red Cavalry began retreating in disarray back 
to Russia. “The men had begun deserting in large numbers,” writes Adam 
Zamoyski, “while those who remained took out their disappointment on 
the inhabitants of the villages and towns they passed through, particularly 
the Jews.”34 The political commissars attached to this cavalry were horri-
fied. When the retreat took this military force, now reduced to a rabble, 
into the heavily Jewish city of Zhytomyr (Zhitomir in Russian) in Ukraine, 
a telegram dripping with urgency was sent to Lenin: 
In recent days Zhitomir has faced a new task. A new wave of 
pogroms has swept over the district. The exact number of those 
killed cannot be established, and the details cannot be established 
(because of the lack of communication), but certain facts can be 
established definitively. Retreating units of the First Cavalry Army 
(Fourth and Sixth Divisions) have been destroying the Jewish popu-
lation in their path, looting and murdering. . . . Emergency aid is 
vital. A large sum of money and food must be sent.35
The horror of these pogroms was made known to the Russian 
public through the compelling short stories of Isaac Babel, the famous 
Jewish-communist writer who accompanied the troops. At the core of 
the Red Cavalry were the traditionally antisemitic horsemen known as 
Cossacks. One of the characters in Babel’s “The Red Cavalry Stories” says: 
“The Red Cavalry is a public conjuring trick pulled off by our Party’s 
Central Committee. The curve of the Revolution has thrown the Cossack 
marauders, saddled with all kinds of prejudices, into the forefront.”36 This 
understanding of the motley character of the Red Cavalry was echoed 
by others. “These wild sons of the steppes” might have been “excellent 
fighters,” writes William Chamberlin, but “they included a very small per-
centage of Communists and listened suspiciously and coldly to the moral 
lectures of the political workers who were sent into their ranks for pur-
poses of agitation. For many of them booty was a more desirable objective 
than the triumph of the world revolution.”37 Babel’s stories of the crimes 
committed by the defeated Red Cavalry made things increasingly difficult 
for him inside Stalinizing Russia, and he eventually paid with his life for 




Russian bayonets were not going to lead to liberation in Poland. Using 
them as a “probe” was not only a mistake, it was a crime.
Photograph of Lenin in Sverdlov Square (now known as Theatre Square) 
delivering a speech to a group of Red Army soldiers headed to the Polish 
Front, 5 May 1920. Also pictured are Kamenev and Trotsky, the two men 
standing on the platform to Lenin’s left. Photograph by Grigory Goldstein, 
Wikimedia Commons.
Trotsky called the invasion of Poland “the catastrophe before Warsaw.” 
Because of the invasion, he argued, “the development of the Polish revolu-
tion received a crushing blow.”38 Lenin said, after the fact, “we have suffered 
an enormous defeat, a colossal army of a hundred thousand is either pris-
oner of war, or [interned] in Germany. In a word, a gigantic, unheard-of 
defeat.”39 Despite these words, Lenin only partially confronted the scale 
and importance of the defeat in this speech, never mind the reasons for it. 
He did not, for instance, address the fact that it was a defeat preceded by 
a completely wrong perception of the likely response of the Polish nation 
and that it could have been avoided had he heeded the advice of Trotsky 
and Martov. In addition, Lenin was almost certainly understating Russian 
losses. Adam Zamoyski, in 2008, estimated Russian losses in excess of 
200,000. Tukhachevsky, “like his hero Napoleon in 1812 . . . had lost an 
army.” In the days before finally signing a peace treaty, with conditions 




Smolensk and Moscow lay wide open.”40 The defeat in Poland, then, not 
only destroyed prospects for revolution in Poland; it severely jeopardized 
the very existence of Soviet Russia.
A Tactic or a Principle?
In Trotsky’s political biography of Stalin, which I examine in detail in 
chapters 8 and 9, Trotsky presents a more equivocal position on the Soviet 
invasion of Poland. Rather than talking of the “catastrophe before Warsaw” 
or emphasizing the question of Polish national oppression, he makes a 
much more limited argument, saying that he “was opposed to the march 
on Warsaw because, considering the weakness of our forces and resources, 
it could end successfully only on condition of an immediate insurrection 
in Poland itself, and there was absolutely no assurance of that.”41
In Stalin, Trotsky puts the blame for the defeat in Poland on the shoul-
ders of Stalin, who at the time was in command of the “Western group of 
the Southern armies” and refused to come to the aid of the army advancing 
on Warsaw because he “was waging his own war. He wanted at all costs 
to enter Lvov at the same time that Smilga and Tukhachevsky were to 
enter Warsaw.”42 But surely this is a side issue. At the time, neither Trot-
sky nor Karl Radek believed that an invasion could succeed, quite apart 
from this or that tactical blunder. “Trotsky was convinced,” according to 
Pierre Broué, “that the entry into Polish territory by a Russian army, even 
under a red flag, would be felt like an invasion in the manner of Tsarism 
and would provoke a leap in Polish nationalism.”43 William Chamberlin 
indicates that this is precisely what happened: “To the average Pole of all 
classes a Russian Army, no matter what glowing proclamations it might 
issue, was an army of hereditary enemies and oppressors.”44
There was a strong nationalist feeling among all classes of the 
people, not excluding the workers. The peasants, the majority of the 
Polish population, generally followed the leadership of the priests 
and of the middleclass intellectuals. And when the Red Army troops 
were actually within sight of the suburbs of Warsaw they were pro-
foundly discouraged to find Polish workers coming out, not with red 




Trotsky’s opposition to “the export of the revolution at the point of bay-
onets,” summarized by Broué, represented a principled opposition to the 
invasion, rather than the tactical one outlined in Stalin.46 In the immediate 
aftermath of the defeat in Poland, Karl Radek shared this principled oppos-
ition. Tamás Krausz cites a speech by Radek, also delivered at the Ninth 
All-Russian Conference of the RCP(B), where Radek “underscored that 
the party and the leadership of the Comintern were vastly over-estimating 
‘how ripe for revolution’ Central Europe was.” And he declared: “We must 
reject the method of ‘probing’ the international situation ‘with bayonets.’”47 
Radek’s views on this are not consistent. According to Serge, at the 
moment Russian troops were at the gates of Warsaw, Radek declared: “We 
shall be ripping up the Versailles Treaty with our bayonets!”48 But in the 
wake of defeat, his view of the utility of bayonets had changed. His speech 
at the Ninth Conference drips with sarcasm in his criticism of the party 
leadership’s decision to go to war.
Now Comrade Lenin shows a new method of collecting informa-
tion: not knowing what is being done in a given country he sends an 
army there. I ask, comrades, do we really have no other methods by 
which we could get the same results in the sense of becoming fam-
iliar with the situation in the country? Vladimir Ilyich argued that 
we learned about the situation in Germany and England with the 
help of probing with bayonets. If Vladimir Ilyich had more time to 
read foreign newspapers, he would have learned without a bayonet. 
. . . The bayonet will be fine if we have to assist a specific revolution, 
but in order to find out the situation in this or that country we have 
another weapon—Marxism, and for this we don’t need to send Red 
Army soldiers.49
Much of the discussion at this conference—Lenin’s and Radek’s 
speeches included—remained secret until the 1990s. As Krausz writes, 
“Lenin did not desire a public debate of the issue of ‘probing.’ In a two-line 
note of 6 October regarding a piece of writing by Radek that followed up 
the conference, Lenin reacted, ‘I oppose a discussion of the (possible) 





Surely these are the key issues around which a criticism of the Polish 
invasion should be debated. In addition to the impossibility of the Russian 
army being greeted as liberators by the recently independent Poles—an 
army associated with the long oppression of those very people—in what 
way can any progress for the Left happen through “probing with bayon-
ets”? Socialism cannot be exported at the point of a gun barrel.
In Stalin, Trotsky does not raise these points in his criticism of the 
Russian invasion of Poland except in countering accusations made by S. 
E. Rabinovich in his History of the Civil War (published as a manual for 
military schools in the Red Army). Trotsky cites Rabinovich, outlining 
what he saw as “Trotsky’s errors in determining the Polish War, namely 
that the fundamental political aim of the war on our part was to hasten the 
revolution in Poland and bring the revolution to Europe from the outside 
on the bayonets of the Red Army.”51 In response, Trotsky comments:
In this way the old accusation is turned inside out! As late as 1927, it 
was recognized that I was an opponent of the March on Warsaw and 
the crime charged against me was my disinclination to introduce 
Socialism at the point of a bayonet. But in 1938, it was proclaimed 
that I advocated the March on Warsaw, guided by my determination 
to bring Socialism into Poland at the point of a bayonet!52
This is a point worth emphasizing. Trotsky names Lenin as “the chief 
initiator” of the Russian invasion of Poland, or “the Polish adventure,” 
as Trotsky calls it.53 The invasion led to the “catastrophe before Warsaw.” 
Trotsky deals with this invasion and its consequences critically but par-
enthetically, focusing his attention on a side issue (the role of Stalin). This 
has the effect of downplaying what were certainly the two main issues—
the underappreciation of the long shadow of the Russian oppression of 
Poland and the horrifyingly wrong perspective of exporting socialism by 
force of arms.
The armed forces, including their use of bayonets, had of course been 
a central part of the whole revolutionary experience, as we saw in chap-
ter 4. Trotsky reflects back on that experience: “During the first period, 
when the Revolution was spreading from the industrial centres toward the 
periphery, armed fighting detachments of workers, sailors and ex-soldiers 




detachments frequently had to wage minor wars.” In those circumstances, 
however, “enjoying as they did the sympathy of the masses, they easily 
became victorious.”54 Whatever the historical accuracy of this claim, there 
can be no doubt that in Poland in 1920, the Red Army encountered not 
the sympathy but the suspicion, distrust, and at times hatred of the Polish 
masses.
After Poland—Georgia
There was to be a reprise of all these issues in one of the defining moments 
in the rise of Stalin—the consolidation of Bolshevik rule over his native 
Georgia. Late in 1922, Lenin became aware of and concerned about a dis-
pute between Stalin and the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of Georgia. Stalin wanted to incorporate Georgia into a wider, regional 
republic. The Georgian Communists were opposed. Lenin endorsed the 
position of the Georgian Communists and condemned both Stalin and 
Stalin’s key supporters on the question—among them Ordzhonikidze and 
Dzerzhinskii. As Thomas Twiss notes, Lenin observed that the “centralist 
and authoritarian actions” of these three men were “typically bureaucratic” 
and “characteristic of ‘that really Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvin-
ist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant.’” Several days later, Lenin “criticized 
‘Stalin’s haste and his infatuation with pure administration, together with 
his spite against the notorious “nationalist-socialism”’, and he denounced 
Stalin as a ‘Great-Russian bully.’”55
The words from Lenin quoted by Twiss come from the series of letters 
he dictated from his sickbed in 1922, letters that collectively have come to 
be known as his “testament.”56 This testament has become iconic and has 
spawned much discussion about Lenin charging Stalin with “Great Rus-
sian chauvinism.” But despite that spotlight on Lenin being the defender of 
Georgia against Stalin in 1922, very little attention has been paid to Lenin’s 
involvement in the far more important Georgia-related events of 1921. In 
that year, with Lenin’s support, the Russian Red Army invaded Georgia, 
sending the governing socialists (the Georgian Mensheviks) into exile 
and reimposing rule from Moscow over a country that had, only three 
years earlier, emerged from long decades of Russian domination. Lenin’s 
condemnation, in late 1922, of Great Russian chauvinism contrasts sharply 




The invasion of 1921 was almost universally opposed by the people of 
Georgia, who had little inclination to trust the Russian Bolsheviks and a 
long history of support for the Mensheviks. The ability of the Mensheviks 
to build a base in Georgia had both general and specific reasons. Stalin, 
who was originally from Georgia, would be associated with antisemit-
ism throughout his entire career, despite the fact that, in a way almost 
unique to the Russian empire, Georgia had experienced a relatively har-
monious relationship between the dominant nationality and the minority 
Jewish population. Edvard Radzinsky goes so far as to say, categorically: 
“Anti-Semitism is not a Caucasian characteristic. From ancient times 
innumerable peoples have lived in the Caucasus, side by side.”57 Eric Lee 
makes the same point, specifically about Georgia: “Georgia, almost alone 
among European countries, had no history of anti-Semitism and was a 
country where Jews had lived happily for many centuries.”58 There was, 
therefore, relatively open terrain in Georgia for a group such as the Men-
sheviks to sink roots, their party having, as we will see in chapter 11, a 
higher proportion of Jewish members than the Bolsheviks. Some Men-
sheviks “were also active in the [General Jewish Labour] Bund.”59
More specifically, Georgia had experienced revolution and local peas-
ant self-rule in the earlier years of the twentieth century, in the little known 
and little studied Gurian Republic. According to Eric Lee:
During the nearly seven decades that separated the publication of 
the Communist Manifesto in 1848 and the Russian Revolution in 1917, 
there were only two examples of socialists seizing political power 
and attempting to realise their vision of a new society. One was the 
Paris Commune of 1871, which Marx and later Lenin described as 
a kind of prototype for a future socialist society. The other was the 
“Gurian Republic” of 1902‒6, widely known at the time but utterly 
forgotten today.60
Until brutally crushed in January 1906, the peasants in this little south-
ern section of Georgia, after pushing out the tsarist state, ran their own 
affairs politically and economically. The local Menshevik organization 
responded effectively to this revolutionary experiment, which allowed 
them to build a mass base with which the local Bolsheviks could never com-




“A year into the rebellion, in May 1903, the Social Democrats in western 
Georgia held a conference, and took a stand firmly in support of the peas-
ants.” This stance by Social Democrats—who, just a few weeks later, would 
overwhelmingly side with the Mensheviks in the bitter split with the Bol-
sheviks—led to the “transformation of their party from a small, elitist group 
based on urban workers into a mass party of the people.” Although crushed 
in January 1906, “unlike the Paris Commune, the Gurian experiment had a 
second act,” which occurred after the Revolution of 1917.61 The overwhelm-
ing strength of the Mensheviks in the region, which was clearly related to 
their leading role in the Gurian Republic, was revealed in the postwar revo-
lutionary ferment. “By the time the tsarist regime collapsed in March 1917,” 
writes Lee, “there was practically no Bolshevik organisation left in Georgia. 
The few Bolsheviks in the country put their factional differences with the 
Mensheviks behind them, and established a joint party committee with 
their formal rivals.”62 In Transcaucasia, of which Georgia was a part, in the 
late 1917 vote for the doomed Constituent Assembly, violently suppressed in 
1918, “the Bolsheviks received just 86,935 votes compared to 662,000 votes 
for the Mensheviks.”63 We return in chapter 9 to the question of Menshevik 
and Bolshevik fortunes in this little country.
Georgia existed as an independent republic for a few short years after 
the dust had settled from the revolutionary year 1917, its government con-
trolled by the Mensheviks. But this small country of three million was 
permanently at risk from its far bigger and more powerful neighbour to 
the north. In November 1919, the Bolsheviks attempted a coup—essentially 
a rebellion by pro-Bolshevik soldiers. The coup had little support among 
either peasants or workers in Georgia, and it failed miserably. On 7 May 
1920, Soviet Russia and Menshevik Georgia signed a peace treaty, in which 
the independence of Georgia was formally recognized. At the time, the 
Red Army was fully engaged in the war with Poland, but the breathing 
space for Georgia thus created proved to be brief indeed. The Red Army 
was defeated in its invasion of Poland, marking the end of the civil wars. 
Russia could now turn its attention toward Georgia and begin a war that 
clearly falls into a different category—a war of Russian expansionism. In 
February 1921, under the pretext of supporting a rebellion against Georgia’s 
Menshevik government, a Russian army numbering tens of thousands 




occupied by Red Army troops, its government forced to flee into exile 
and its independence quashed by the overwhelming power of Russian 
armed forces. Souvarine’s summation of these events is biting: “What the 
Red Army could not accomplish in Finland and Poland it did accomplish 
first in the Ukraine, then in the Caucasus, by methods similar to those 
adopted by the United States in the annexation of Texas. The Georgian 
Socialists’ dream of creating a new Switzerland between Europe and Asia 
was nothing but a dream in the circumstances.”64
While they were militarily victorious, the Bolsheviks were extremely 
isolated politically. In July 1921, Stalin, on “returning to Tiflis in early July 
1921 after many years away from his native Georgia . . . addressed a crowd 
of more than 5,000 workers in the Nadzaladevi Theatre.”
He began by congratulating the workers on overthrowing the 
Menshevik yoke. Audience members began to shout. “Lies! There 
was no Menshevik yoke here! There was no Communist revolution 
in Georgia! Your troops have removed our freedom!” A furious 
Stalin responded by ordering a change in the leadership of the local 
Bolshevik party—and an increase of the Red Terror. This included 
the shooting of oppositionists at night in Tiflis’ Vake Park. There 
was no trial. In 1923, the Cheka secret police executed ninety-two 
Georgians in retaliation for the murder of three policemen in Guria. 
Ordzhonikidze threatened to kill 1.5 million Georgians if necessary.65
Despite this repression, organizing against occupation continued, cul-
minating in an uprising in August 1924 that was crushed within three 
weeks. The uprising was coloured by the shadow of the past: its strongest 
centre was Guria, the site of the 1902–6 Gurian Republic. It also fore-
shadowed the terrible years of totalitarianism to come, a key leader of 
its repression being the “newly appointed deputy head of the republic’s 
Cheka, Lavrentiy Beria.”66 As Lee tells us, the repression meted out to the 
rebels was horrifying:
Thousands were killed—according to some estimates, up to 4,000. 
Many of these were hostages. Some rebels from Imeretia, a province 
in western Georgia, were stuffed into six railway carriages, taken to 
a place where graves were dug and there executed, some by Mauser 




Senaki, a town in western Georgia. Nearly 1,000 men, described as 
“the cream of Georgia’s intelligentsia and nobility,” were shot on 1 
September.67
Beria would climb the ranks until, by the 1950s, he was widely seen as 
Stalin’s successor—a climb that, as we saw earlier, was only terminated 
with his arrest, trial, and execution after the death of Stalin in 1953.
Stalin’s role in these events is clear: he pushed for and supported the 
use of Red Army bayonets to crush this last stronghold of Menshevism, 
thus violating the 1920 recognition of Georgian independence. Lenin’s role 
is less clear. He seems to have been at least partially out of the loop, not 
completely aware of the extent of the military action and mass repression 
that was taking place. Jeremy Smith says that the invasion “was opposed in 
the Politburo by Karl Radek,” who, along with Trotsky, had also opposed 
the 1920 invasion of Poland. “The Commissar for War, Trotsky, was absent 
in the Urals, but was so incensed by the news of the invasion . . . that on 
his return to Moscow he demanded, unsuccessfully, the creation of a party 
commission to investigate the events.”68 If Trotsky had any ambivalence 
in private about the invasion and repression, he hid it well, defending 
both of these actions publicly in one of his least impressive texts, Between 
Red and White, where he actually characterizes this massively unpopular 
invasion of a long-oppressed former section of the Russian empire as a 
“Soviet Revolution.”69 Brian Pearce reminds us that the book was “written 
on party instructions,” and, while it did become “a best-seller in British 
communist circles in the early twenties,” it is probably best filed under the 
category of propaganda rather than political analysis.70
In the aftermath of the invasion, both Lenin and Trotsky became very 
clear about the problems of Soviet rule over Georgia. We saw above that a 
key issue in Lenin’s late-in-life break with Stalin was what Lenin perceived 
as the “Great Russian chauvinism” that Stalin was unleashing on the newly 
occupied Georgia. It was in part over this concern about the repression 
of Georgia’s national rights that Lenin attempted—again, late in life—to 
form a bloc with Trotsky against Stalin. Trotsky’s account of this in his 
autobiography is riveting:
It was the beginning of March 1923. Lenin was lying in his room 




near; it was preceded by a series of lesser shocks. . . . Vladimir Ilyich 
was very much disturbed by Stalin’s preparations for the coming 
party congress, especially in connection with his factional machin-
ations in Georgia. “Vladimir Ilyich is preparing a bomb for Stalin 
at the congress”—that was Fotiyeva’s [Lenin’s secretary] phrase, 
verbatim. The word “bomb” was Lenin’s not hers. “Vladimir Ilyich 
asks you to take the Georgian case in your hands; he will then feel 
confident.” On March 5, Lenin dictated this note to me: 
“Dear Comrade Trotsky: I wish very much to ask you to take 
upon yourself the defense of the Georgian case in the Central Com-
mittee of the party. At present, the case is under the ‘persecution’ of 
Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot trust their impartiality. Quite 
the opposite. If you were to agree to undertake the defense, my mind 
would be at rest.”71
To properly grasp the outlines of Bolshevik policy toward Georgia, it 
is insufficient to focus solely on these 1922 and 1923 progressive musings 
by Lenin that challenged Great Russian chauvinism. In these musings, we 
can perhaps glimpse, in Lenin’s last months, the dawning of consciousness 
about the problems associated with a politics of violent substitutionism—
of attempting to “impose socialism” from above by force. But if in fact 
there was a dawning of such a consciousness, it was too little and too late. 
The drift toward totalitarianism was far more powerful than any scruples 
from one or two individuals—even leading individuals such as Lenin and 
Trotsky.
Stephen Jones maintains that “the 1920s represent one of the brightest 
periods in the social and political development of the Soviet national 
groups.” He bases this claim on some genuinely interesting policies such 
as “indigenization” (“an attempt to integrate the nationalities into a new 
multi-national state by accommodating national cultural aspirations”) 
and “policies of ‘affirmative action’ and wide opportunities for national 
self-expression,” which “resulted in a new confidence among the native 
élites.”72 These are very fine and interesting initiatives, but they need to be 
soberly embedded within the history of recurring attempts to challenge 
the national rights of historically oppressed nations, such as Georgia and 






The different perspectives on the invasion of Poland—best crystallized 
in the contrast between the vehement opposition to invasion articulated 
by Trotsky and Radek and the naïve and quite wrong support for the 
invasion by Tukhachevsky and Lenin—reflect tensions at the very heart 
of the Bolsheviks’ understanding of the nature of revolution. Tukhachev-
sky expresses this naïveté most clearly. In a 1920 account of the debacle, 
he argues that the defeat “was due, not to politics, but to strategy.”73 He 
goes on to say that “our western and south-western armies were fighting 
almost at right angles to one another” and that “lack of co-operation by 
our Fourth Army tore victory from our hands and led to our catastrophe.”74 
This parallels Trotsky’s position in Stalin, which similarly identified the 
actions of the southwestern armies—and Stalin in particular—as the cause 
of the defeat. Trotsky’s more principled approach summarized by Broué—
understanding that bayonets cannot be an instrument for liberation and 
that the oppressed people of Poland were unlikely to greet their former 
Russian masters as liberators—exists in an uneasy epistemological tension 
with his tactical approach in Stalin. No such tension exists in the approach 
of Tukhachevsky. In fact, he doubles down and draws from his tactical 
approach a logical, if completely unrealistic, conclusion.
There is not the slightest doubt that, if we had succeeded in break-
ing the Polish Army of bourgeois and seigneurs, the revolution of 
the working-class in Poland would have been an accomplished fact. 
And the tempest would not have stopped at the Polish frontier. 
Like a furious torrent it would have swept over the whole of East-
ern Europe. The Red Army will not forget this attempt to carry the 
revolution outside our frontiers, and if ever the European bourgeoi-
sie braves us to new fights, the Red Army will crush it and spread 
revolution throughout Europe.75
The people of Poland, Hungary, Romania, and East Germany, among 
other countries, learned from bitter experience that a Red Army conquest 
of Eastern Europe would bring not socialism but the Stasi and Stalinist 
totalitarianism.76
After the fact, both Trotsky and Radek tried to minimize the extent 




Trotsky insisted that the Bolsheviks did not give the Red Army “any 
independent significance of its own,” but saw it “as an auxiliary force 
introduced into the struggle of the European forces,” a force that “might 
bring down the landslide of revolution.”77 The same year, in a speech to 
the leadership of the German party, Karl Radek made much the same 
point, insisting that 
the aim was not to impose Bolshevism at bayonet point, but only to 
break through the crust of the military might of the ruling classes. 
. . . The Executive believed that in Germany things were already 
ripening for the seizure of political power. It was believed that if we 
held Warsaw, there would be no further need to advance all the way 
to Germany.78 
The next chapter’s examination of the March Action will demonstrate that 
there was no such readiness for revolution in Germany. There was even 
less readiness in Poland. And the enthusiasm expressed by Tukhachevsky 
for Napoleon-era military invasions as a vehicle for “revolution” indicates 
that at least some members of the senior leadership did, in fact, give the 
Red Army an “independent significance of its own.”
Let us return to the account of the war by D’Abernon, which provides 
a factual foundation for understanding both the military limitations of 
the manner in which the 1920 Polish–Soviet war was conducted and the 
political limitations of Tukhachevsky and Lenin. D’Abernon argues that 
the fighting in Poland should not be classified with other wars of the 
early twentieth century or even of the nineteenth century. The Polish–
Soviet War of 1920, he argues, “should be classified with a totally different 
period—probably some 200 years earlier.”79 He says that most of the sol-
diers “were in the fight either through compulsion and fear of being shot 
at home, or because there was no other immediately available means of 
livelihood.” On both sides, when “outnumbered, outmanoeuvred, or out-
flanked,” the soldiers “either retired or surrendered; authority among their 
officers was insufficient to induce them to take any other” course. In short, 
“both the Polish and Soviet Armies were eighteenth century rather than 
modern in many aspects.”80
If D’Abernon’s analogy with the eighteenth century is correct (and I 




that was two centuries out of date. The great European revolution of the 
eighteenth century was the French Revolution, and, to some extent, it 
was able to be exported at the point of a bayonet. Napoleon did leave, in 
the wake of his invading armies, societies and states more modernized 
and efficient than they had been, and more capable of developing in a 
capitalist direction. But the spread of socialism cannot be reduced to these 
same categories of modernization and efficiency. If socialism is to mean 
anything at all, its spread has to be both voluntary and associated with the 
emergence of political organs of mass, democratic self-rule.
Lenin and Trotsky found themselves on opposite sides of the issue of 
invading Poland. Without question, Trotsky’s position was closer to the 
correct one, while Lenin’s was completely wrong. This was not the first 
moment when Trotsky and Lenin found themselves on opposite sides of 
an issue. Ian Thatcher characterizes the relationship between Trotsky and 
Lenin during the war years immediately preceding the 1917 revolutions 
as “a story of almost continuous opposition.”81 This opposition was not 
softened with anything resembling diplomacy. In 1914, Lenin wrote, “Trot-
sky has never had any ‘physiognomy’ at all; the only thing he does have 
is a habit of changing sides, of skipping from the liberals to the Marxists 
and back again, of mouthing scraps of catchwords and bombastic parrot 
phrases.”82 The previous year, Trotsky had written about Lenin: “The entire 
edifice of Leninism at the present time is built on lies and falsification and 
carries within itself the poisonous inception of its own dissolution.”83 We 
can reject the simplistic explanation for this history of antagonism offered 
by Stalinist historians, whose purpose is to portray an unbroken line of 
Trotskyist “crimes” in order to discredit his political legacy. What this 
antagonism does represent, I would suggest, are quite different under-
standings of the key aspects of the class struggle in Russia and Europe on 
which Trotsky and Lenin built their perspectives.
Trotsky, in the manner of Luxemburg and Gramsci—and the much 
maligned and neglected Iulii Martov—understood the profoundly 
democratic, self-emancipatory core of the working-class, urban, Euro-
pean workers’ movement. It was not for nothing that in both 1905 and 
1917, Trotsky was elected chair of the soviet in St. Petersburg. On several 
occasions before 1917, Trotsky expressed the opinion that Lenin did not 




European revolution. Trotsky, in 1915, said that within Lenin, “revolution-
ary democratism and socialist dogma live side by side without having 
been amalgamated into a living Marxist whole.”84 This echoes the young 
Trotsky, who, in the wake of the famous 1903 split in Russian social dem-
ocracy, argued that Lenin was too much the Jacobin and not enough a 
social democrat (which, at the time, meant “revolutionary socialist”).85 
Jacobinism was the political form appropriate to modernizing antiau-
tocratic revolutions, such as the French Revolution. The leading section 
of those revolutions was a relatively small layer of the urban petite bour-
geoisie, relying in its revolution on the periodic intervention of the urban 
masses and, in the countryside, on the periodic mass actions of the rural 
peasantry. From this layer evolved a highly centralized urban core of the 
Jacobins, with a strong emphasis on militarization, operating with a cer-
tain suspicion of the urban and rural masses. For the Jacobins, it was in 
particular the mass action in the cities that posed problems, as such action 
tended to push beyond the bounds of a modernizing antifeudal revolution 
and into the territory of anticapitalism, something the Jacobins were not 
prepared to countenance.
The Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 involved a combination of this 
kind of Jacobinism—a modernizing revolution against autocratic, tsarist 
conditions—and something that was completely new and demanded very 
different strategies and tactics—a workers’ revolution against capitalism. 
Neither revolution could win without the victory of the other. Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks navigated the difficult project of combining both revolu-
tions, and Lenin openly embraced the incorporation of Jacobinism into 
the workers’ movement. “The Jacobin inseparably connected with the 
organisation of the proletariat—a proletariat conscious of its class inter-
ests—this is the revolutionary Social-Democrat,” he said in 1904.86 This 
incorporation of Jacobinism into the workers’ movement was, however, 
full of dangers. The tactics appropriate to the modernizing, anti-autocratic 
revolution are not easily imported into the proletariat anticapital-
ist revolution. Within the latter—at its core, urban, working class, and 
democratic—forward progress is only possible through mass self-activity. 
Built into this experience is a high degree of democracy, which takes its 




Upheavals against premodern autocracy were different. They did, 
of course, involve furious mass action by the rural peasantry, but they 
also always necessitated a highly centralized, militarized struggle—for 
instance, the Roundheads of Cromwell’s era and the Jacobins of the French 
Revolution. The insistence on invading Poland represented a retreat to 
eighteenth-century tactics in the name of twentieth-century goals. The 
next chapter will argue that in a parallel sense, the push in Germany for 
an insurrection during the March Action, even though the KPD repre-
sented a small minority of the working class, represented an attempt to 
sidestep the self-activity of the urban working class. Both the invasion 
of Poland and the March Action in Germany reflect the extent to which 
the Bolshevik cadre misunderstood how the European class struggle had 
evolved from the tactics of an earlier era to those of the mass, democratic 





Germany and Hungary—The United 
Front7
At both the third and fourth congresses of the Communist International, 
delegates were confronted by the complicated situation in Germany. It was 
in the cauldron of the German revolutionary years, roughly from 1917 to 
1923, that the tactic of the united front crystallized. In a comprehensive 
review of the recently published Toward the United Front, the complete 
proceedings of the Fourth Congress, Ian Birchall writes that “the central 
theme of the congress, which recurred under various headings, was the 
united front. . . . That meant unity in action with the reformist organisations 
that still retained the loyalty of the majority of workers in most countries.”1 
Today, we might replace “united front” with “coalition-building”—a con-
temporary term for the politics of self-emancipation. One of the key events 
of the German revolutionary years was the event that came to be known 
as the March Action of 1921. A study of the March Action, together with 
the short-lived 1919 Hungarian revolution—linked to the German events 
through the person of Béla Kun, who played a leading role in both—brings 
into sharp relief the catastrophic consequences of not basing Left political 
strategy on serious and sincere coalition building. It also brings into sharp 
relief the insightful political theories of Paul Levi, whose contributions, in 
a way not dissimilar to those of Martov’s, have been, until recently, either 
ignored or denigrated.
The March Action
At the time of the March Action, the KPD, despite having more than four 
hundred thousand members at the time—a genuine mass party—none-




and was thus far smaller and less influential than the traditional party of 
German labour, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which was still many 
times the size of the KPD. Its minoritarian status notwithstanding, the 
KPD tried, in its own name, to call a general strike in March of 1921—what 
came to be known as the March Action. It was an attempt to “force” the 
German workers into revolution. David Morgan says that, “the essence 
of the March Action, as it was later described by an admirer, was that ‘the 
party went into battle without concerning itself over who would follow 
it.’ It was a classic attempt to create mass action by sheer act of will. . . . 
Rather than break off the contrived operation, the leadership increased the 
pressure on members and used all the means it could think of, including 
sabotage and faked bomb attacks on Communist property, to bring other 
workers out on strike.”2
According to Pierre Broué, between two hundred thousand and five 
hundred thousand workers chose to participate.3 Tragically, the former 
figure is probably the more accurate one, as John Riddell notes in his intro-
duction to the proceedings of the Third Congress. “In Session 5, Heinrich 
Malzahn of the German opposition estimated that strikers totalled only 
two hundred thousand—just over half the party’s pre-March member-
ship—a figure not challenged in the congress.”4 Strikes are supposed to 
be actions of the working class, whose members far outnumber the small 
minority of that class that organizes itself into this or that political party. 
The fact that the March Action, a so-called general strike, involved at best 
half of the members of the party that called the strike, is powerful evidence 
of just how isolated from the mass of the working class the KPD was. 
Worse, the March Action was associated with numerous acts of violence 
by the small minority supporting the strike against the vast majority who 
had chosen not to follow the KPD’s call to action. “The strike took on 
the character of a fratricidal struggle,” writes Riddell. “Indeed, in many 
instances, Communists battled non-Communists among the workforce; 
in some cases workers were cleared out of the workplace by force.”5
The party paid an enormous price for its adventurism: it was, argu-
ably, irreparably damaged. Thousands of party members were arrested: 
by early June, “there were already 400 sentenced to some 1,500 years hard 
labour, and 500 to 800 years in jail, eight to life imprisonment and four to 




with party membership plummeting from 450,000 to 180,443.7 Broué 
documents the very accurate analyses of the Luxemburgists Clara Zetkin 
and Paul Levi, who, just before the March Action, were absolutely clear 
that the German Left was in no position to challenge state power, and who 
were the first to openly oppose the ultra left-wing politics that had led to 
such a disaster.8 By contrast, the Comintern leaders—the members of the 
Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI)—pushed 
hard for the March Action and were proven completely wrong. Lenin and 
Trotsky, after the fact, provided extremely clear critiques explaining the 
failure of the March Action—critiques made available in the documents 
of both the third and fourth congresses. But hindsight is always 20/20, 
and during the decisive weeks in March, the ECCI’s key representatives in 
Europe were aggressive advocates for this very costly failure. The lessons 
from this catastrophe are codified in the politics of the united front (hence 
Riddell’s choice of title for the Fourth Congress proceedings, Toward the 
United Front), and in an orientation toward influencing the majority of the 
working class as opposed to confining left-wing politics to the corridors of 
small minority organizations (hence Riddell’s choice of title for the Third 
Congress proceedings, To the Masses).
The tragedy of the March Action was shaped by what came to be 
known as “the theory of the offensive.” This theory asserts that “offen-
sive,” and sometimes insurrectionary, tactics are appropriate, even when 
communists constitute only a small minority of the working class and 
the oppressed. It was at the root of not just the 1921 political catastrophe 
in Germany but also the 1920 military catastrophe for the Russian state 
in its war with Poland, examined in detail in the previous chapter. In his 
introduction to To the Masses, Riddell links these two episodes.
the Red Army’s Polish offensive inspired an article by Nikolai 
Bukharin in the Comintern’s world journal, headlined “The Policy of 
the Offensive,” which drew on precedents from the French revo-
lutionary wars of the 1790s to make the case that Soviet military 
advances could spark revolution beyond Soviet borders. In the 
run-up to the Third Congress, Bukharin’s formula was born to a new 
life in the theory developed by the German party’s majority leader-




Paul Levi and Béla Kun
A comparative analysis of Paul Levi and his nemesis, Béla Kun, can help 
bring the issues in question into focus. There is, today, much agreement 
that the March Action was an irresponsible adventure that shattered the 
party and isolated it from the mass of the German working class. However, 
around one key aspect of this experience—the role of KPD leader Paul 
Levi—there is little unanimity. Levi was clearly correct in opposing the 
March Action, yet he was expelled from the party on spurious charges of 
breaking discipline. He has been held in low esteem by many ever since. 
Those who examine Levi’s career will inevitably encounter “the traditional 
epithets and insults of ‘traitor’ and ‘renegade’” that permeate the bulk of 
the Stalinist-influenced scholarship on this period, writings that shame-
fully and inaccurately portray Levi “as no more than a ‘class enemy’ and a 
potential traitor, even when he was a leader of the KPD.”10 Levi’s “crime,” 
for which he was expelled, was to publish in the nonparty press a pamphlet 
critical of the party’s role in the March Action11—a pamphlet whose essen-
tial analysis has stood the test of time. Ian Birchall unhelpfully calls Levi’s 
action “political scabbing,” which only serves to heighten the emotion 
around the issue and lessen the possibility of reasoned political inquiry.12 
The expulsion of Levi for the publication of a pamphlet is a sign of the 
degeneration not of Levi but of the KPD.
To the Masses gives us a tool with which to correct the historical record. 
Levi, having been expelled from the party, was not allowed to be present at 
the Third Congress. But in Riddell’s book, almost a century later, he returns 
in spirit. Some of the most exciting content of To the Masses can be found 
in the appendices, which include “Paul Levi Appeals to Third Congress.”13 
A carefully worded condemnation of the tactics of the KPD leadership, 
this piece constitutes an indictment of the actions of the Comintern rep-
resentative in Germany—the Hungarian Béla Kun. Another appendix 
contains “Resolution by Clara Zetkin on March Action,” a cogent defence 
of the “to the masses” united front approach.14
In a letter to Lenin, also in the appendices of To the Masses, we hear the 
chilling voice of Béla Kun unapologetically defending the March Action: 
“Beyond any question, the March Action has brought us great political and 
organisational successes and will bring us many more in the future.” This 




words, we also gain insight into his use of slander and prevarication. “Levi 
and Zetkin are utter hysterics,” he writes, “and what they are saying in the 
German party right now consists of nothing but lying gossip. No one can 
believe it contains even a grain of truth.” Kun proclaims that Paul Levi is 
“universally recognised as dangerous.” On one occasion, says Kun, “Levi 
tried to conceal his swinishness and stupidity behind Radek’s authority.” 
But his worst venom is reserved for Levi’s close comrade, Clara Zetkin: 
“As for the statements of the aged comrade Zetkin, I would like to say 
only this: the old woman is suffering from senile dementia. She provides a 
living proof that Lafargue and his wife acted entirely correctly,” he writes, 
referring to the suicide of Paul Lafargue and Laura Marx.15
These words—characteristic not of a serious activist but of a petty, 
prejudiced bureaucrat—come from what was meant as a private letter 
to Lenin. Its preservation and publication give us insight into the char-
acter and methods of one of the key figures of the era. The impression 
formed is not flattering. Even worse, we now know that in slandering 
and denouncing Levi and Zetkin, Kun was attacking the two figures most 
closely associated with developing the united front/coalition-building 
method, which is the chief contribution of these congresses to the con-
temporary Left. Levi, Zetkin, and others developed their politics in that 
section of the German Left influenced by Rosa Luxemburg, who, from a 
position of deep respect for the Russian revolutionaries, knew that Bol-
shevik methods could not be applied without amendment to the very 
different circumstances of Germany. The Luxemburgist current in the 
German Left insisted that strategy and tactics shaped by the experience 
of the revolution in Russia had to be radically modified in order to fit the 
extremely different conditions prevailing in Germany.16
One example can illustrate why we should study Levi’s section of the 
Left and its unique approach to strategies and tactics. An early and import-
ant moment in the development of the united front method began with the 
metalworkers’ union in Stuttgart, which, in 1920, called for the uniting of 
the minority communist workers with the mass of noncommunist work-
ers in “a joint struggle for concrete improvement in the workers’ living 
conditions.”17 This initiative inspired the issuing of an open letter from the 




Clara Zetkin (left) and Rosa Luxemburg in Magdeburg, Germany, for the 1910 
congress of the Social Democratic Party. Photographer unknown, Wikimedia 
Commons.
To the Masses makes available the full text of “Open Letter to German 
Workers’ Organisations,” the authors of which “appear to have been Paul 
Levi and Karl Radek.”18 The letter calls for workers’ organizations to work 
together to achieve various objectives: to “begin unified struggles for 
higher wages,” “raise all payments to victims of the War and pensioners in 
line with the demanded wage increases,” “grant the unemployed across the 
whole country uniform payments,” “distribute foodstuffs at reduced prices 
to all wage earners and those with low incomes,” “confiscate immediately 




realizable immediate reforms to improve the conditions of the poor and 
working-class populations of postwar Germany.19
The open letter originated in Stuttgart and illustrates the importance 
of developments in Germany. As Riddell tells us, “late in 1920, a meeting 
representing 26,000 Stuttgart metalworkers called for joint struggle for a 
list of basic demands; the appeal was published 10 December 1920. It was 
the first formulation of the united front policy that the Comintern was to 
adopt a year and eight days later.”20 The letter also highlights the central 
role of Levi and Zetkin. Levi, on returning from the war to Germany in 
1918, made Berlin his centre of work, but he “maintained his connections 
with Stuttgart where Clara Zetkin lived, where the Spartacists had a major-
ity among the local Independent Socialists (USPD), and where Levi helped 
organize deserters from the armed forces.”21
The open letter’s sensible, careful call for united action—for coali-
tion building—was unfortunately rejected by the leadership of the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the party to which the vast majority of politicized 
German workers adhered. However, this call was also met with derision 
from the “left” section of the communists in Germany, who denounced 
it as reformist. These “lefts” would shortly displace Levi and Zetkin and 
take the KPD into the catastrophe of the March Action.
If rejected by the SPD leaders and the communist Left, the open letter 
was greeted with enthusiasm at the base of the workers’ movement. As 
Clara Zetkin wrote, “the demands of the Open Letter had as their result 
that the masses organised in trade unions drove the union bureaucracy 
forward.”22 Heinrich Malzahn, a prominent shop steward and KPD 
member, said that the open letter allowed the KPD to “win a powerful 
influence before the March Action”:
This Open Letter, together with the slogan of a workers’ and employ-
ees’ united front against the employers’ general offensive, won for 
us the trust of the working class. The best measure of the extent of 
our trade-union influence is the fact that the union bureaucrats felt 
that their power was threatened and responded by dismissing union 
staffers and expelling Communists. That did not harm us, but rather 




After its publication on 8 January 1921, the KPD “called on the workers 
to organise democratic assemblies in order to impose their demands on 
their leaders, and to declare their will to undertake a general struggle to 
win them.”24 Meeting after meeting took place endorsing the letter’s call 
for unity in struggle.
On 11 January 1921, the delegate meeting of the workers in the 
Vulkan naval shipyard in Stettin took place, on 17 January, that of 
the production workers and office staff at Siemens in Berlin, in 
the Busch Circus, on the 19th that of the railwaymen in Munich, 
and in the days which followed, meetings of the metalworkers in 
Danzig, Leipzig, Halle and Essen, of the railwaymen in Leipzig, 
Schwerin, Brandenburg and Berlin, the national congresses of the 
saddle-makers and the carpet weavers, the meetings of the miners in 
Dorstfeld, and a large workers’ gathering in Jena, all fully endorsed 
the Open Letter, and called for a struggle to be organised around its 
demands.25
To the Masses reveals the uneven response from leading Russian com-
munists to this very fine initiative. It was “quite artificial,” according to 
Zinoviev. “I do not believe that one can call on the workers to form an 
alliance with other workers’ parties.”26 Bukharin agreed, arguing that the 
open letter approach “does not correspond at all to Communist demands” 
and “is not revolutionary. After all, we want communism; we want the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . But what the letter says is that we want 
the proletariat to live. That is bizarre. Are we living for a new capitalism?”27 
These responses clearly demonstrate that an inability to understand the 
need for coalition building was not the preserve of irresponsible elements 
in the German party or of bureaucratic figures like Béla Kun, but went 
right to the top of the Russian party. Lenin, in contrast, sided completely 
with Zetkin and Levi and the open letter approach, putting himself in 
opposition to the German Left and to Zinoviev and Bukharin. In a letter 
to Zetkin and Levi, he called the open letter “an entirely correct policy (I 
have condemned the contrary opinion of our ‘Lefts’ who were opposed 
to the letter).”28 To the Masses also contains the text of Trotsky’s hour-long 




position and a defence of the united front/coalition-building approach.29 
Even today, almost a century later, it retains its relevance.
But while there is much to learn from To the Masses and Toward the 
United Front, not all of these lessons are about “what to do,” but rather 
are warnings about “what not to do.” For example, a vote to endorse Levi’s 
expulsion from the congress was pushed through before the debate on the 
March Action. Surely, in a genuinely democratic organization, the debate 
on the March Action would have happened first, prior to any discussion of 
expulsion. Even worse, “Levi’s appeal to the congress demanding reversal 
of his expulsion was apparently not made available to the delegates.”30 
Surely, in a genuinely democratic organization, the document of a former 
leading member, written to that organization, would have been made 
available to those passing judgment on his fate.
In the end, Levi remained outside the ranks of the KPD and the 
Comintern, even though his political positions were ultimately endorsed 
by those organizations. And Kun—whose political positions were thor-
oughly discredited and rejected—remained a treasured member of the 
Comintern’s leadership. This juxtaposition alone—the banning of Levi 
and the protection of Kun—indicates deep problems in the Comintern 
project. One year later, at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, Zetkin 
and Kun made back-to-back speeches to mark the fifth anniversary of the 
Russian Revolution.31 One can only imagine what Zetkin thought of her 
placement next to Kun.
The KPD in Germany had become a mass party through its fusion, 
in December 1920, with the left-wing section of the Independent Social 
Democratic Party (USPD). At a USPD convention in Halle in October 
1920, “a majority of the delegates voted to accept the Twenty-One Con-
ditions and join the Comintern,” writes Riddell, going on to say that 
“Zinoviev gave the main speech in support of Comintern affiliation.”32 
This is true, but incomplete. What we can now add is that the critical 
legwork had been done in the years preceding the Halle Congress by the 
KPD leadership under Levi. The party he inherited after the assassination 
of Luxemburg was riven with ultra-left, March Action–style politics. In 
1919, he succeeded in separating from these elements through an expul-
sion of the most ultra-left section of the party, which, while it reduced the 




served to liberate it from what we might call the March Action section 
of the party. On that basis, he was able to begin negotiations with the left 
wing of the massive USPD and its eight hundred thousand members.33 As 
David Fernbach writes, “Levi approached the leaders of its left wing, who 
agreed to co-operate on a unifying tactic.”34 Zinoviev did indeed deliver 
an impressive speech at the Halle Congress, a speech that we now have in 
English, along with the riveting counter-position by the Russian antiwar 
Menshevik-Internationalist Iulii Martov.35 Ben Lewis’s comment that “the 
long hard work of Zinoviev and [the] Comintern yielded a good harvest” 
minimizes the role of the soon-to-be expelled Levi.36 Zinoviev’s speech 
would never have had an audience without the careful organizing of Levi 
in the preceding years.
Hungary 1919
Béla Kun’s politics were shaped by his experience in the Hungarian Revo-
lution of 1918–19. On 21 March 1919, Hungary became a soviet republic. 
The new government “implemented a series of ultraleft measures,” writes 
Riddell, measures that included “refusing to give expropriated land to poor 
peasants and overhasty collectivisation,” and that led to the new republic’s 
increasing isolation.37 We now have new resources in English to add to 
our understanding of these events, specifically Paul Levi’s critique, writ-
ten just days after the Communists took power in Hungary. Levi warned 
that the Hungarian soviet republic came not from proletarian strength 
but from capitalist weakness and that “the possibility for the dictatorship 
of the proletariat exists not when the bourgeoisie collapses but when the 
proletariat rises.”38 He reminded readers of the program of the Spartacists: 
“The Spartacus League will never take over governmental power except 
in response to the clear, unambiguous will of the great majority of the 
proletarian mass of all of Germany.”39
Kun took power without anything like a majority in the working class. 
It was estimated that in Budapest, the Communist Party had ten to fifteen 
thousand members, while in rural Hungary, the membership numbered 
twenty to twenty-five thousand.40 This is a good beginning for a left-wing 
party, but it by no means makes it the mass instrument capable of leading 




In a confusing series of events in early 1919, Kun was jailed as a danger-
ous radical, but while still in jail, he emerged as the key figure in “unity” 
talks with his former opponents, the Social Democrats. Without ques-
tion, the attraction of Kun, for the Social Democrats, was his association 
with the Russian state, from whom they hoped to receive military aid. 
Through diplomacy—not the mass action of the workers—Kun and the 
Social Democrats drafted a text proclaiming that “a new regime was to 
be set up on the Soviet model”—as if workers’ power can be established 
by diplomacy and decree. Kun did not stop at this. Béla Menczer tells us 
what happened next:
Decrees ordering the “socialisation” of all industrial, commercial 
and landed property employing over twenty persons were published. 
Also decrees to establish “Revolutionary Tribunals” to repress any 
action against the new order, to rename the armed forces and the 
Police “Red Army” and “Red Guard” and fixing the elections for 
“Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils” (in Russian: Soviets) for April 7th. 
The Socialist and Communist Parties were merged.41
A fledgling communist party that represents, at best, a small minority 
of the working class and that assumes “power,” not on the back of a mighty 
millions-strong movement, but through a back-room deal focused on 
issues of geopolitics and international relations that were negotiated in a 
prison cell, is clearly going to be in a very weak position. While both Karl 
Radek and Paul Levi recognized the weak position of the Hungarian com-
munists, they drew completely opposite conclusions. Radek horrifyingly 
maintained that “the Communists should have maintained the gallows 
next to the government-buildings in order, if necessary, to demonstrate to 
their dear allies the concrete meaning of proletarian dictatorship.”42 Levi’s 
rejoinder was clear, accurate, and cutting:
To propose the gallows, at the moment of the establishment of 
soviet-power, as the method of unifying and amalgamating the 
proletariat; to undertake the organisation and consolidation of the 
proletariat not on the basis of the “clear, unambiguous will of the 
great majority of the proletariat”, “its conscious affirmation of the 
views, aims, and methods of struggle” of the Communists (accord-




all this strikes me—I do not want to use strong words—as a very 
unfortunate method for the unification of the proletariat.43
Just 133 days after Kun’s “revolution,” Levi’s warnings against substitu-
tionist methods—that is, the Left taking power without basing itself on 
the mass self-activity of the working class—proved tragically correct. The 
Hungarian communists, by now completely isolated, had to flee for their 
lives, ushering in years of right-wing dictatorship.
Two Perspectives
Let us return to events in Germany. Two books have been influential in 
shaping an understanding of the German revolutionary years, both with 
the March Action at their core: Chris Harman’s Lost Revolution: Germany, 
1918–1923 and Pierre Broué’s Révolution en Allemagne: 1917–1923, available 
since 2006 in English translation as The German Revolution, 1917–1923. 
While these two books are, in many ways, very similar, they draw very 
different conclusions when it comes to the March Action of 1921.
Harman and Broué both agree that the March Action was an irrespon-
sible adventure, shattering the party and isolating it from the mass of the 
German working class. However, around one key aspect of this experi-
ence—the role of KPD leader Paul Levi—they diverge sharply. Shortly 
after the March Action, as we have seen, Levi found himself outside the 
ranks of the party. Harman characterizes Levi’s actions as his “departure 
from the party,” a “resignation barely a week before the Action.”44 This is 
misleading. Harman is here conflating two quite different episodes. The 
first occurred on 22 February 1921, when Levi, Zetkin, and three others 
resigned—not from the party but from the party’s leading body.45 They 
resigned precisely over the related issues of adventurism and ultra-leftism, 
issues on which they felt isolated in the leadership; they believed, quite 
rightly, that they would be able to prosecute their positions more effect-
ively as rank-and-file members. What Harman calls Levi’s “departure” 
from the party happened later, on 15 April, and it was not voluntary. Levi 
was expelled from the party by the very leading body he had left just 
weeks before.46 The verbal move from the highly charged (and accurate) 
term “expulsion” to the neutral and ambiguous term “departure” mini-




the pro-Russian leadership that took his place. It also seriously distorts 
Levi’s place in this story.
Harman’s emotionally charged dismissal of Levi makes it more difficult 
to assess accurately the political positions of the day. A key precursor to 
the united front approach—perhaps the key precursor—was the previ-
ously mentioned open letter, which called for unity in action of Social 
Democrats and Communists against the threat of the far Right. Levi’s role 
was central in the drafting of this letter, and he was without question its 
key advocate.47 According to Broué, the open letter “certainly expresses 
the political line which Levi had been defending for several months.”48
Broué devotes two chapters to an examination of Levi’s contribution to 
the German Left.49 In doing so, Broué usefully highlights the efforts—by 
Levi, Clara Zetkin, and others deeply influenced by Rosa Luxemburg—to 
develop an approach to activist politics that was meaningful to their own 
context. Again, this meant an insistence that strategy and tactics shaped 
by the experience of the revolution in Russia—a country with pockets 
of industry surrounded by a sea of peasants—had to be radically modi-
fied in order to fit the extremely different conditions prevailing in urban, 
industrialized Germany.50 Levi’s politics were shaped through years of 
involvement with the section of the German Left influenced by Rosa Lux-
emburg, a current that included Levi, Zetkin, and Karl Liebknecht, among 
others best known for their role in building “the Spartacists,” which origin-
ated as an antiwar group within the SPD after that party’s parliamentary 
group capitulated to German nationalism and supported the slaughter of 
the First World War. There is much to learn from these Luxemburgists.
By contrast, Harman says little more about Levi in the period after the 
March Action, except to indicate that he would end his political life “veer-
ing towards the left wing of Social Democracy.”51 Throughout his book, 
Harman consistently minimizes the role of Levi and all the Luxemburgists, 
underlining their inexperience, small size, and lack of roots. He completely 
ignores the scholarship of David W. Morgan, who argues that the Spar-
tacists “had put their advantage as the first outspoken opponents of the 
war to good use, building themselves strong positions in the party organ-
izations in Stuttgart, Braunschweig, and parts of Berlin . . . and achieving 
significant minority positions in Düsseldorf, Leipzig, and elsewhere. Spar-




interest here is the identification of Stuttgart as one of the key bases for the 
Luxemburgists. This influence of the Luxemburgists—particularly in the 
person of Clara Zetkin—continued into the early 1920s, which helps us 
to understand why the open letter, the first big unity-in-action initiative 
in Germany, came out of Stuttgart in 1920, laying the basis for the united 
front method. In other words, the emergence of the united front approach 
from Stuttgart is not the result of Paul Levi’s efforts alone, but reflects the 
approach of an entire Luxemburgist current within the German Left, a 
current that included Clara Zetkin.
Morgan opens another area of inquiry with the critical observation that 
to properly understand the united front method, we must take seriously 
the other large formation on the German Left, the Independent Social 
Democratic Party. “The term ‘united front’ is historically associated with 
the Communist Party,” he says, but “in 1921 and 1922 the USPD was par 
excellence the party of united-front tactics. The explicit goal of party policy 
. . . was to find programs that would override ideological differences and 
bring the three parties [of the German Left] together in a struggle for the 
essential requirements of the German proletariat.”53
Harman’s work suffers from an inadequate engagement with some of 
the key literature on the German revolutionary years. In this chapter, I have 
sketched out the contributions of three scholars whose works were pub-
lished before Harman began his research—Pierre Broué, Werner Angress, 
and David W. Morgan. Harman either ignores these three entirely or uses 
their research carelessly. Harman does not reference Morgan’s research at 
all. He critiques Angress for minimizing the strength of the KPD during 
the next great upheaval in class struggle in Germany, in the autumn of 
1923.54 Harman does rely heavily on Broué; indeed, his book has a structure 
uncannily similar to Broué’s. Despite this similarity in structure, he draws 
completely opposite conclusions from those of Broué concerning Levi and 
the Luxemburgists. Broué engages with their work carefully and seriously; 
Harman, by contrast, is quite dismissive. Harman’s book is weaker because 
of his inadequate engagement with the work of these three intellectuals.
For activists in the twenty-first century, the importance of the united 
front method is, without question, the most meaningful insight from 
this entire period. The united front approach—what we now might call 




activists can gather around a defined set of demands and seek unity in 
action, despite adhering to different politics. The very opposite of the 
united front approach was exemplified by what came to be known as 
the March Action of 1921. We have many positive lessons to learn in this 
regard from Paul Levi, a pioneer of the united front/coalition-building 
method, and only negative lessons to learn from the ineffective and div-
isive approach of Béla Kun. Broué’s careful approach brings these points 
out carefully and clearly.
The Teacher–Student Binary
Trotsky in 1933, as we saw above, regarded the first four congresses as 
“unsurpassed” in their approach to political events of the day. In a 2012 
review of Toward the United Front, Ian Birchall cautioned against taking 
such an evaluation too far, reflecting on the dangers of relying too heavily 
on the Comintern congresses:
Many years ago, when I was young, it was common to find ortho-
dox Trotskyists who claimed they based their politics on “the first 
four congresses of the Comintern.” (You can probably still find such 
people in the remoter reaches of the Trotskyist blogosphere.) A 
position that made some sense in the 1930s, when Trotskyists were 
insisting that there was a clear break between Lenin and Stalin, 
became less and less relevant as both capitalism and the working 
class went through enormous changes.55 
This is an important point. An uncritical reliance on the first four con-
gresses inevitably leads to a simplistic understanding of the contrast 
between the “experienced Russian” leadership of the Comintern, and the 
“inexperienced, mistake-prone” leadership of the non-Russians. I have 
already highlighted the “inexperienced, mistake-prone” Russian and 
Comintern leadership in the March Action, the Hungarian soviet republic, 
and the invasions of Poland and Georgia. However, an approach to the first 
four congresses that blurs these mistakes is not limited to the “Trotskyist 
blogosphere,” as Birchall implies.
To illustrate, here is an excerpt from the 1985 history of the Comintern 
written by the late Duncan Hallas, a founder and, for many years, a central 




Birchall were associated for decades: “On the main issues, on the central 
thrust of its political line, the Comintern leadership was right and all its 
opponents, in their different ways, were wrong. That is precisely why the 
heritage of the first four congresses, in principles, in strategy and in tactics, 
is so indispensable to revolutionary socialists today.”56
This perspective informs Hallas’s entire approach. In the introduction 
of The Comintern, he quotes Trotsky: “The International Left Opposition 
stands on the ground of the first four congresses of the Comintern.”57 He 
then argues that “the Socialist Workers Party, in Britain, also stands on this 
ground—which is why the emphasis of this book is on the Comintern’s 
revolutionary period, the period of the first four congresses and immedi-
ately after.”58 Two years after the publication of his book, Hallas went on 
a North American speaking tour to mark the seventieth anniversary of 
the Russian Revolution of 1917. In an interview published at the time, he 
spoke “of Bolshevism and of the Communist International in its early 
years after the Russian Revolution,” saying that for himself and others 
looking to find lessons from that era, “the whole complex of both ideas 
and experiences that were developed during this period of socialist history 
are what guide us.”59
Hallas’s book highlights the great accomplishments of the Comin-
tern, including the creation of the united front method. He documents 
clearly the degeneration of the Comintern after the first four congresses, 
when it became little more than an extension of the foreign policy of 
the state-capitalist Soviet Union. And he critiques aspects of its work in 
the earlier period: “The perspective of the Red International of Labour 
Unions was mistaken and, by 1921, this should have been recognised and 
the necessary conclusions drawn.”60 But his overall emphasis is on the key 
role of the first four congresses and, in those congresses, the superiority 
of the Russian experience, the Russian political method, and the Russian 
leadership, all of which he contrasts with the inexperience and political 
confusion that existed outside of Russia. The March Action story, of 
course, strains this orientation considerably, and Hallas recognizes the ter-
rible role of the Comintern leadership in that event. But he dilutes this by 
deflecting the blame toward the German Communist Party, emphasizing 
that the enthusiasm of the Executive Committee of the Communist Inter-




of the German party. That is true, but it is beside the point. With the 
evidence he presents, a story could be told of a far-seeing German cadre, 
trained by Rosa Luxemburg, who had a pretty good sense about what 
to do in Germany in the early 1920s, but who were muscled out of the 
way by a well-financed, well-staffed Comintern cadre, who had no sense 
about what to do in Germany in the early 1920s. We cannot schematically 
separate the “good judgment” of the experienced, well-trained ECCI from 
the “bad judgment” of the inexperienced, ill-trained German leadership. 
It is a frame that simply will not work.
Hallas does qualify his close identification with the Russian leadership 
and their political decisions during the first four congresses, saying, “We 
cannot simply apply these lessons mechanically without thought to differ-
ent situations.”61 But an overdrawn portrait of the virtues of the Comintern 
and the Russian party’s leadership makes it difficult to identify and analyze 
the sometimes serious errors that they made. The Comintern leadership, 
in the period of the first four congresses, was not always right on the main 
issues. The invasions of Poland and Georgia and the March Action in 
Germany were not small, tactical blunders; they were mistakes that had 
historic, and tragic, consequences. Birchall is right: an angular perspec-
tive maintaining that “on the main issues . . . the Comintern leadership 
was right and all its opponents . . . were wrong” does open the door to 
difficulties. But these words and the framework are from Hallas, a central 
theoretician of Birchall’s former party, not someone from the “Trotskyist 
blogosphere.” 
Birchall is aware of the limitations of Hallas’s book. In his biography of 
Tony Cliff, Birchall argues that Hallas’s work and certain other Trotskyist 
histories “are valuable in that they defend what was best in the early years 
of the Comintern . . . while sharply contrasting that early period to the 
later Stalinist horrors. Yet they remain essentially defensive.” He contrasts 
Hallas’s perspective with that of Tony Cliff, who “drew on a different trad-
ition, the work of Alfred Rosmer and Victor Serge, which combined a 
total commitment to the basic aims and ideals of the Comintern with a 
recognition of its limitations in practice.”62
In fact, some of Cliff ’s criticisms of the actions of the Comintern leader-
ship are very harsh. He says that the March Action, “unlike other defeats,” 




the adventurist policy imposed on the German party by the leadership of 
the Comintern.”63 Even worse, this mistake was only partially confronted: 
the Comintern leaders responsible for the disaster—Zinoviev, Bukharin, 
Radek, and Kun—were barely reprimanded. Paul Levi—in Cliff ’s words, 
“the talented former leader of the KPD, who had been wronged by the 
central leadership of the Comintern”—would end up expelled and outside 
the party.64 With good reason, then, Cliff calls this chapter of his biography 
of Lenin “The Great Cover-Up.”
But remember that Cliff writes about the March Action as an isolated 
exception to a general rule. That event, he says, was “unlike other defeats.” 
In his four-volume biography of Lenin, the 1920 invasion of Poland—
much more serious than the March Action, certainly in terms of lives 
lost and probably also in terms of its impact on the Russian state—is 
not even mentioned. He does deal with it in his biography of Trotsky, 
agreeing that “Lenin’s policy turned out to be wrong and costly.”65 But 
this seriously understates the scale of the catastrophe. The overwhelming 
emphasis in the bulk of Cliff ’s many writings on the Russian Revolution 
is on the superiority of the Russian leadership—of Lenin in particular—
when compared with the leaders of the Left outside of Russia. Cliff, in the 
spirit of Hallas, paints a picture of an experienced, wise Russian leadership 
interacting with an inexperienced, sometimes foolish non-Russian Left 
that was prone to errors and mistakes needing to be corrected through 
a deep study of Russian Bolshevik history. Cliff makes this point very 
sharply in his biography of Trotsky: “The Congresses of the Comintern 
were schools of strategy and tactics, and at them Lenin and Trotsky played 
the part of teachers, while the leaders of the young Communist Parties 
were the pupils.”66
This approach is not helpful. The error of the March Action was not a 
single moment in an otherwise unblemished record. The 1920 catastro-
phe in Poland was equally destructive to the revolutionary process and 
equally the result of the “teachers”—in that case, Lenin—making an error 
of enormous proportions. This error was not a minor, accidental one, but 
one that exposed crucial flaws in Lenin’s and the Bolsheviks’ very con-
ception of revolution. As already noted, Lenin outlined the most serious 
of these flaws in his 1920 speech, examined in the previous chapter, in 




the social revolution of the proletariat had ripened in Poland.”67 This is a 
shocking position. The attempt to export the revolution through military 
invasion is the antithesis of the notion of self-emancipation that underlies 
any meaningful progressive politics and that was the essence of the Soviet 
experience at the core of the Russian Revolution. 
The invasion of Poland was not just an episodic mistake. On 23 July 
1920, “Lenin wrote to Stalin raising the possibility of a thrust through 
Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary with the aim of staging a revolu-
tion in Italy. In his reply, Stalin agreed that ‘it would be a sin’ not to try.”68 
This approach was taken up and codified by Tukhachevsky in a theory of 
the “revolutionary offensive war”—an explicit argument that socialism 
could be advanced through force of arms.69 Trotsky furiously combat-
ted these deeply substitutionist notions of socialist transformation; his 
opposition to these notions, according to Isaac Deutscher, ran “like a red 
thread through his writings and speeches of this period.”70 In a critique of 
Tukhachevsky, Trotsky openly links the Russian invasion of Poland in 1920 
with the German attempt at a revolution in Germany in 1921. “Since war is 
a continuation of politics by other means, must our policy be offensive?” 
he asks. He goes on to answer this question: “This was a very great and 
criminal heresy, which cost the German proletariat needless bloodshed 
and which did not bring victory, and were this tactic to be followed in 
the future it would bring about the ruin of the revolutionary movement 
in Germany.”71
If the teacher–student binary is taken to an extreme, the conclusions 
can be not just wrong but dangerous. In 1978, writing while the Labour 
Party was in office in the United Kingdom, Cliff wrote: “In our times there 
is not a single issue which can be decided by ballots. In the decisive class 
battles bullets will prevail. The capitalists count the machine guns, the bay-
onets, the grenades at their disposal, and so does the proletariat.”72 These 
strange and shocking words were embedded in a four-volume biography 
of Lenin that for a while had some influence in the British and, to some 
extent, the international Left. It is one thing for Lenin and Tukhachevsky 
to have mistaken the twentieth century for the eighteenth century. Russia 
was a kind of hybrid society that did in fact combine premodern rural 
forms of life with modern twentieth-century industry and science. But 




to strategy and tactics in the advanced capitalist world, the results, when 
not tragic, are embarrassing.
The teacher–student binary is similarly misleading as a framework with 
which to understand the very core of the Fourth Congress and the key 
term in the title of the Fourth Congress proceedings, “the United Front.” 
As Birchall pointedly notes: “The united front was not spun out of the 
skulls of the Comintern’s leaders. It was born of the experience of workers 
in Germany.”73 Let us return to the central role of the Stuttgart workers in 
the emergence of a united front in Germany. According to Riddell:
The ongoing need for such a united front was posed by an assembly 
of Stuttgart’s metalworkers in December 1920, acting on the initia-
tive of local KPD activists who were strongly influenced by Zetkin. 
The metalworkers adopted a resolution calling on the leadership 
of their union, and of all unions, to launch a joint struggle for 
tangible improvements in workers’ conditions. . . . Although the 
Social-Democratic leaders rejected this appeal, the Communist 
campaign in its favour won wide support from union councils. 
A month later, in January 1921, the KPD as a whole made a more 
comprehensive appeal for united action to all workers’ organisa-
tions, including the Social Democrats. This “Open Letter” reflected 
the views of party co-chair Paul Levi, working in collaboration with 
Radek.74
It is very significant that it was workers in Stuttgart, Germany who were 
the first to arrive at the united front approach. As Riddell indicates, it is 
Stuttgart where Clara Zetkin had her base and where she had influence. 
As outlined earlier, this base had been built over years by Zetkin, Luxem-
burg, and the Spartacists. The united front/coalition-building approach 
thus emerged out of the experience of the German workers themselves—
out of the work, in particular, of the politicized workers around Zetkin 
and the other Luxemburg-influenced members of the KPD. The united 
front approach was momentarily generalized into the German movement 
through the open letter, which was, in large part, the initiative of another 
German leader, Paul Levi. But this open letter encountered almost uni-
versal opposition from the representatives of the Comintern working in 
Germany, and its whole united front/coalition-building approach was 




after this catastrophe that the united front approach was generalized as a 
method within the Communist International as a whole.
It is true that during both the Third and Fourth Congresses, Trotsky 
clearly outlined the key principles of the united front, and in this sense, 
he was the teacher, lecturing to pupils at a school of strategy and tactics. It 
is true that he articulated a clear opposition to Lenin in the run-up to the 
Polish invasion and did his best to “teach” the Bolsheviks of their mistake 
in the months that followed. But it won’t help to replace Lenin with Trotsky 
and retain the frame of “teacher–student” to understand the dynamics of 
the Comintern. To paraphrase the young Karl Marx, circumstances are 
changed by human beings, and educators must themselves be educated.75 
The emergence into consciousness of the need for the crucial united front 
orientation came from the experience of the German workers and was 
at first argued for publicly by key German socialists such as Zetkin and 
Levi. It was in the active, organizing experience on the ground, in which 
serious socialists interacted with advanced workers, that the educators 
became educated.
The proceedings of the Third and Fourth Congresses published in 
Toward the United Front and To the Masses—along with the earlier vol-
umes published by Riddell—complete the record of the early years of the 
Cominterns and make possible a rounded assessment of the work of these 
congresses and of the entire era of the Russian Revolution, an assessment 
that embraces the successes and the failures—the constructive positions 
that were taken as well as the catastrophic and destructive ones. One of 
the striking aspects emerging from these volumes is the light they shed on 
the deep humanity of the participants. As Birchall notes, “these delegates 
were tough women and men who had lived through an exceptionally 
demanding decade.”76 A close examination of these proceedings and those 
of the early congresses enhances the reputation of some militants of that 
era whose politics reflected a commitment to self-activity (Clara Zetkin 
and Paul Levi, for instance) and diminishes that of others whose politics 
were imbued with substitutionism (Grigory Zinoviev and Béla Kun, to 
name two). That is all to the good. To properly assess the lessons of the 
past, we need all the information from that past, and on the basis of that 
information, we can draw our own conclusions about how best to use this 
history in our own work in the twenty-first century.

PA R T  3
the rear-View Mirror
The Russian Revolution, which began with such hope on Women’s Day in 
1917, ended with the horrors of Stalinism and counter-revolution. Analysts 
have been gazing back at 1917 ever since, hoping—in the spirt of the Owl 
of Minerva cited in the preface—that, now that “the shades of night” have 
gathered, genuine understanding and wisdom can finally take flight. But 
recall that the preface also referenced a more pessimistic outcome, that 
outlined by Marshall McLuhan. Sometimes hindsight is no benefit, and 
we “look at the present through a rearview mirror” and end up march-
ing “backwards into the future.” With both of these possible outcomes in 
mind, part 3 of this book is organized around two of the key contributions 
of the twenty-first century that have sharpened our understanding of the 
Russian Revolution in the years since night has fallen.
This takes us into a time warp. As of this writing, the most recent 
twenty-first-century contribution to our understanding of the Russian 
Revolution was in fact drafted more than seventy years ago. But it was 
only in 2016 that we could acquire, for the first time, a complete pub-
lished version of all the finished and unfinished fragments of Trotsky’s 
last book—his political biography of Joseph Stalin. In that volume, he 
articulates, in a manner more compatible with Raya Dunayevskaya and 
C. L. R. James than with the Trotsky of Revolution Betrayed, the notion 
that the essence of the Soviet Union in the 1930s can be determined by 
the criterion of control of the surplus product. In placing Stalin’s authori-
tarianism within this classic historical-materialist framework, he omits 
only the conclusion—that Stalin’s elite represented a new class and that 




a “degenerated workers’ state.” Trotsky’s book exists in unacknowledged 
dialogue with the first great historical-materialist attempt to assess the 
nature of Stalin’s Russia—that of Boris Souvarine, who broke a taboo of 
Leninist orthodoxy and explored the idea that there was something in the 
very nature of the Leninist party machine that created a breeding ground 
for a political “type” such as Stalin. At first, Trotsky vehemently disagrees 
with Souvarine on this point, but he then quietly and repeatedly returns 
to it. Chapters 8 and 9 develop and analyze key themes that emerge from 
Trotsky’s analysis.
Chapters 10 and 11 are organized around themes developed in the 2015 
intellectual biography of Lenin by Tamás Krausz, the most impressive 
outline of Lenin’s epistemology published in this century. These chap-
ters assert that in order to understand the history of revolution and 
counter-revolution in Russia, we need to put behind us the quasi-religious 
reverence toward Lenin that, for more than a century, has been a barrier 
to sober analysis. Chapter 10 begins with comments on Krausz’s intro-
ductory biographical chapter and proceeds with a critical examination 
of Lenin’s approach to the Russian Revolution of 1905; an assessment of 
Nikolay Chernyshevsky, a key influence on Lenin; and a survey of some 
of the other core subjects taken up by Krausz. I then broach the wider 
issue of historical materialism and the role of the individual in history, 
comparing the approaches of Krausz, Georg Lukács, and Leon Trotsky 
and making a case for the need to move beyond a focus on the individual 
in history—in particular, one imbued with reverence. Chapter 11 looks 
at one aspect of Lenin’s theory of political organization and challenges a 
common view that he saw intellectuals as central to that process. In fact, 
from 1904 on, a profound anti-intellectualism was embedded in the core of 
Lenin’s epistemology. This and other aspects of Lenin’s epistemology need 
to be critiqued and transcended—which is impossible unless we finally 
develop a historical materialism that rises above the reverence analyzed 
in the previous chapter.
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Trotsky on Stalinism—The Surplus 
and the Machine8
Few events capture the tragedy of the Russian Revolution more graphically 
than the terrible moment in August 1940 when an assassin, operating on 
instructions from Moscow, mortally wounded Leon Trotsky—the most 
iconic of anti-Stalinists—by driving an ice-climbing axe into his skull. 
On Trotsky’s desk, in the study where the murder took place, was the 
unfinished manuscript of a massive political biography titled Stalin: An 
Appraisal of the Man and His Influence. 
Charles Malamuth—the translator hired by Trotsky—prepared for 
publication an English-language version of the work, the first half of which 
was approved and checked by Trotsky before his death. The remaining 
portions were in various stages of completion and Malamuth connected 
these unfinished fragments, writing what he called “extensive interpola-
tions,” which he says “in every case” were “set off from the author’s text 
by brackets.”1 Thus edited, the text was ready for publication in 1941, but 
held back from sale until 1946. There was concern that its publication 
would jeopardize the war-time alliance with Stalin’s Russia—exposing 
as it did the venal nature of Stalin’s rule and the horrifying consolidation 
of a dictatorial state. When finally published, it “provoked outrage” from 
mainstream communists, at the time almost entirely under the influence 
of Stalin.2 The book found few supporters even among anti-Stalinists. 
Rob Sewell says that in the preface to certain editions of the book, Trot-
sky’s widow, Natalia Sedova, warned readers to distrust “phrases inserted 
throughout this book by Charles Malamuth,” saying that Malamuth was 
“a political opponent of Trotsky.”3
Now, thanks to the diligent work of Alan Woods, we have access 




revised by Trotsky before his death (all but the seventh chapter of the 
English translation were also checked by him), plus all of the unfinished 
fragments, including tens of thousands of new words not published by 
Malamuth. In addition, Woods has removed all of Malamuth’s many 
bracketed insertions. Woods emphasizes this point: “Every trace of Mala-
muth’s interference with the text has been expunged. Where this has 
created gaping holes in the text, I have added some ‘bridging’ passages, 
which are clearly indicated in square brackets.”4 The implication is that 
we can now, for the first time, gain unfiltered access to the evolving 
epistemology of one of the great figures of the twentieth century as he 
attempted to explain one of the great tragedies of the twentieth cen-
tury—the rise to power of Stalin and the totalitarian system that was 
constructed on the bones of 1917.
Leon Trotsky in exile in Mexico in 1940, flanked by visiting friends. 
Photographer unknown. Leon Trotsky and American Admirers, Mexico, 1940. 
Courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration, Wikimedia 
Commons.
A Voice from Beyond the Grave
Aware since the 1970s of the controversy surrounding this text, I did a 
detailed “parallel” reading of the two editions, setting out to discover the 




question, that this antipathy was unwarranted. A careful comparison of 
the two editions makes it clear that if Malamuth did “filter” the words of 
Trotsky to his own ends, the filter deployed was rather porous. Woods says 
that Malamuth “describes the October Revolution as a ‘coup,’ which simply 
repeats the slanders of bourgeois critics,” and which “constitutes a gross 
distortion of the ideas of Trotsky.”5 Woods is undoubtedly correct on the 
latter point—Trotsky would never have referred to the October Revolution 
as a coup, and I did find two occasions, in his bracketed interpolations, 
where Malamuth uses the terms “coup” and “coup d’état” to describe the 
October 1917 events.6 Woods has quite rightly removed them from his 
edition. But—with the exception of one well-worked-over passage exam-
ined below—nothing else of substance in the Malamuth translation has 
been altered. The two editions are, without any question, more similar 
than different.
The similarity is partially acknowledged by Woods. The portion com-
pleted by Trotsky and the translation checked by him—almost half the 
manuscript—Woods reprints with only incidental changes. As to the half 
of the Malamuth translation not checked and approved by Trotsky, Woods 
states that “having examined every sentence of the second half of Stalin 
. . . I consider that in general Malamuth’s English translation is not all bad. 
Although it can hardly be considered a literary masterpiece, it is mostly 
a correct translation.”7 By Woods’s own admission, then, many tens of 
thousands of the English words published in his edition were translated 
by Malamuth, not by Woods—to the point that Malamuth really should 
be listed as co-translator of the book. More pertinent than this question of 
publication ethics, however, is the question of political orientation. Absent 
the phrases inserted by Malamuth, and with all the new material from 
Trotsky translated by Woods, the core epistemologies of the two editions 
are identical. Malamuth’s use of the word “coup” on two occasions may 
have been a trigger for the emotional responses of Trotsky’s supporters, 
but it was little more than that. I will suggest here that the controversy 
created by the publication of Stalin was caused not by Malamuth but by 
Trotsky. A significant—and to some, uncomfortable—evolution in his 





Furthermore, reading both editions brings into focus another work—
Boris Souvarine’s Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism, published in 
French in 1935 and translated into English by C. L. R. James in 1939. 
Nathalie Babel (Isaac Babel’s daughter) called Souvarine’s Stalin “the 
first biography and historical study of Joseph Stalin.”8 Souvarine, born 
Boris Lifschitz, was a co-founder of the French Communist Party and, 
from May 1921 until January 1925, a resident in Moscow—where, writes 
Michel Surya, he “became a member of three of the leading bodies of the 
Comintern,” exerting what Surya describes as “considerable” influence 
over Communist Party leadership in the Soviet Union.9 For a position 
on one of those three bodies—secretary to the executive of the Com-
munist International—he was nominated by Lenin himself, for whom 
Souvarine was, in Hella Mandt’s words, a “political protégé.”10 Trotsky 
refers to Souvarine’s work repeatedly throughout his own biography of 
Stalin, criticizing it on key points, but nonetheless describing it as “without 
doubt the most conscientiously researched work in its selection of facts, 
documents and quotations.”11 Souvarine was part of the earliest wave of 
anti-Stalinists, famously labelled “the first disenchanted by communism” 
by his biographer Jean Louis Panné. In 1924, Souvarine was expelled from 
the Communist International and therefore from the French party that 
he had helped to form just a few years earlier.12 However, he remained a 
committed activist of the Left, founding, in 1931, what Surya calls “one of 
the most remarkable journals to emerge from the extreme left between 
the wars, La Critique sociale.”13
So, in what way does Trotsky’s Stalin reveal a controversial evolution in 
the author’s epistemology? First, Trotsky emphasizes that to understand 
the class nature of the Soviet Union, one must not solely employ the con-
cept of state ownership of the economy, the main criterion advanced in 
his well-known Revolution Betrayed. One must also, and in fact primarily, 
employ a more orthodox, historical-materialist concept—that of control 
of the surplus product. Second, Trotsky notes that Stalin’s rise needs, in 
part, to be understood in relation to the specific dynamics of the party 
machine so carefully constructed by Lenin. Both of these ideas are deeply 
embedded in the Souvarine text as well. At times, the reader of Stalin gets 




I argue in this chapter that the Stalin biography made Trotsky’s fol-
lowers uncomfortable (it was essentially shunned for more than half 
a century), not because of the distortions introduced by Malamuth, 
but because of these two epistemological challenges to what was then 
historical-materialist orthodoxy. Furthermore, the epistemological 
evolution represented by these two ideas accompanied a willingness to 
interrogate and sometimes challenge other key aspects of the Leninist 
story, an interrogation that was pulling Trotsky the elder back toward 
positions he had held as Trotsky the youth. This honest questioning and 
scholarship by one of the key actors in the Russian revolutionary drama 
provides an indispensable resource for any serious student of that drama. 
It is important that the shunning be abandoned and that both editions of 
Trotsky’s last work—and Souvarine’s pathbreaking 1935 work with which 
Trotsky was engaging—be studied very seriously.
An Epistemology in Flux
Trotsky wrote Stalin while he was bending heaven and earth to hold 
his followers to the view that in spite of the Thermidor (what others 
called counter-revolution), about which he was so painfully aware, there 
remained something progressive about the Soviet Union, something 
worth defending. In his view, the Soviet Union remained (in the peculiar 
vernacular of the period) a “degenerated workers’ state.” However, he was 
more and more swimming in a milieu that found it increasingly difficult 
to apply the phrase “workers’ state” and the adjective “progressive” to a 
regime associated with the creation of famine, with forced labour camps, 
and with purges that together destroyed the lives of millions.
Certainly, Souvarine did not see the Soviet Union as in any sense pro-
gressive. In a postscript to the 1939 English translation of his book, he said 
that counter-revolution had resulted in “a nightmare.”
“The expropriation of the expropriators” has led to a sort of bureau-
cratic feudalism under which the proletariat and the peasantry, 
debased by officialdom and the mandarinate, have been reduced 
to a kind of serfdom. If the methods of production are not exactly 




for the majority of the Soviet pariahs, the system deserves rather the 
name of slavery.14 
This was not the first time that the term feudal had been attached to the 
methods of Stalin. As the regime returned, in 1928, to forcible seizure 
of grain from the peasants and then began the horror of forced collec-
tivization in late 1929, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, who were leading 
Bolsheviks, “accused the Party of pursuing a policy of military-feudal 
exploitation of the peasantry.”15 This charge was vehemently denied by 
Stalin in a long speech from which I have already cited extensively.16
Souvarine, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky were not alone in trying to 
identify the mechanisms of exploitation in what was clearly a new, hier-
archical, and class-ridden society. One of Trotsky’s closest friends and 
collaborators was Christian Rakovsky, who was exiled to the far north 
in the late 1920s. Rakovsky clung to the view that the Soviet Union had 
progressive “survivals,” but he saw clearly that it was dominated by a “great 
class of directors” for whom state ownership was, in fact, a kind of collec-
tivized private property. Souvarine, in an important section of his book, 
takes Rakovsky quite seriously and quotes him extensively:
From Siberia, Rakovsky and his deported friends wrote as early as 
1930: “From a workers’ State with bureaucratic deformations, as 
Lenin defined the form of our Government, we are developing into a 
bureaucratic State with proletarian-communist survivals. Under our 
very eyes has formed and is being formed a great class of directors, 
which has its internal subdivisions and which increases through cal-
culated co-option and direct or indirect nominations (bureaucratic 
advancement or fictitious electoral system). The element which 
unites this original class is a form, also original, of private property, 
to wit, the State-power.” And they took their stand very pertin-
ently on a phrase of Marx, “The bureaucracy possesses the State as 
private property.” Just as the Consulate was neither a republic nor a 
monarchy, the Secretariat is neither a democracy nor Tsarism, the 
consequence of a revolution which was neither socialist nor bour-
geois.17
The English translation of Souvarine’s work was done by C. L. R. James 




Jacobins. At the time, James was a leading member of the US Socialist 
Workers Party (SWP), the most important of the political organizations 
that looked to Trotsky for leadership.18 In April 1939, he was part of a 
delegation from the SWP that travelled to Mexico to visit Trotsky in exile, 
an event principally known for the discussions with Trotsky that helped 
shape the way in which socialists relate to the struggle against racism.19 
We have no evidence of any views on the trajectory of the Russian revo-
lution expressed by James during that visit, but we do know that just 
a few months later, James was openly challenging Trotsky’s position on 
Russia. In an article provocatively titled “Russia—A Fascist State,” James 
wrote that the Soviet bureaucracy, while it does engage in the “planning” 
indispensable to a workers’ state, it does so in the manner of “any other 
capitalist class.” He said that the Soviet bureaucracy “plans in order to get 
as much surplus value as possible from the workers, it plans to preserve 
itself against other capitalist classes.”20
We also know that the woman who was soon to become James’s close 
collaborator was in Mexico at the same time. In 1938, Trotsky’s staff in 
Mexico was joined by the then twenty-eight-year-old Raya Dunayevskaya, 
who for a while served as Trotsky’s Russian language secretary.21 Her col-
laboration with Trotsky ended abruptly after the Hitler–Stalin pact of 
1939.22 About that pact, she wrote in 1941:
Because we did not clearly understand the class nature of the present 
Soviet state, the Soviet Union’s integral participation in the Second 
Imperialist World War came as a monstrous surprise. The Red Army 
march on Poland, the bloody conquest of part of Finland and the 
peaceful conquest of the Baltic states proved that the Stalinized Red 
Army had no more connection with the spirit, purpose and content 
of October than has the Stalinist state, whose armed might it is. 
What an abhorrent relapse from the conquests of October are the 
Stalinist conquests!23
James and Dunayevskaya would go on to jointly develop the analysis that 
the Soviet Union under Stalin had degenerated into a form of state cap-
italism.
The point is that Trotsky’s Stalin was written at a time when many of his 




of Stalinism and looking for new ways of analyzing the postrevolutionary 
developments. Trotsky did not formally change his characterization of 
Russia as a workers’ state, but without question, Stalin indicates a shift in 
certain of his fundamental points, specifically on two issues—the surplus 
and the machine.
Control of the Surplus Product
Mapping the different paths taken by Woods and Malamuth in the trans-
lation process reveals interesting bits of evidence as to editorial intention. 
As noted earlier, Woods believed that Malamuth had produced “mostly a 
correct translation,” and as a result, Woods copied hundreds of pages and 
thousands of paragraphs verbatim from Malamuth—not only from the 
first seven chapters and appendix approved and/or checked by Trotsky, but 
from all the other portions of the Malamuth text. However, on a very few 
occasions, Woods did make serious attempts to retranslate. One portion 
in particular stands out. The Malamuth edition quotes Trotsky as saying:
The Thermidor rested on a social foundation. It was a matter of 
bread, meat, living quarters, surplus, if possible, luxury. . . . 
The same social motivation is to be found in the Soviet Thermi-
dor. It was first of all a matter of throwing off the Spartan limitations 
of the first period of the Revolution. But it was also a question of 
achieving increasing privileges for the bureaucracy. It was not a 
question of introducing a liberal economic régime. Concessions in 
that direction were temporary in character and lasted a considerably 
shorter time than had been originally intended. A liberal régime on 
the basis of private property means concentration of wealth in the 
hands of the bourgeoisie, especially its higher-ups. The privileges of 
the bureaucracy have a different source of origin. The bureaucracy 
took for itself that part of the national income which it could secure 
either by the exercise of force or of its authority or by direct inter-
vention in economic relations. In the matter of the national surplus 
product the bureaucracy and the petty bourgeoisie quickly changed 
from alliance to enmity. The control of the surplus product opened 




The Woods translation makes roughly a dozen changes to this passage, 
including the following: 
• “It was not a question of introducing a liberal economic régime” 
becomes “It was not a question of introducing a bourgeois eco-
nomic regime”
• “Concessions in that direction were temporary in character” 
becomes “Concessions towards capitalism were temporary in char-
acter”25
The direction of these edits will seem minor to most. However, for those 
immersed in debates over “the Russian question” their direction is clear. 
Trotsky’s text, as translated by Malamuth, can give the impression that 
there was a new exploiting ruling class emerging within the Soviet Union. 
Woods is at pains to keep Trotsky “orthodox” and to indicate that what 
was emerging was a new bureaucratic caste, not a new exploitive ruling 
class. Such a subtle distinction is indispensable to maintaining a view that 
the counter-revolution was not yet completed, that a new ruling class had 
not yet emerged, that the Soviet Union remained a “degenerated workers’ 
state.”
In a bridging passage in the latter half of his translation, Woods pro-
vides a succinct summary of the orthodox position of Trotsky’s followers 
in the 1930s as it concerned the nature of the Soviet Union: “The restor-
ation of limited free trading by the NEP [New Economic Policy] in 1921 
was a retreat back to bourgeois expropriation. But in practice the freedom 
of trade was so limited that it did not undermine the foundations of the 
regime (the nationalization of the means of production), and the reins of 
government remained in the hands of the Russian Bolsheviks.”26 In other 
words, the foundation of the regime—what makes it “postcapitalist”—is 
the single criterion of “nationalization of the means of production.” An 
afterword to the text by Alan Woods reiterates the decisive, for him, role 
of this single criterion using the example of the Soviet defeat of Germany 
in World War II: “Only the colossal vitality of the nationalized planned 
economy . . . saved the Soviet Union.”27 This is unpersuasive. In 1812, as 
in 1945, Russia similarly repelled an invading army, one led by Napoleon 
and not Hitler. In 1812, as in 1945, we don’t have to look any further than 




That criterion—the nationalization of the means of production—was 
the key (often the sole) criterion by which to assess the class nature of the 
Soviet Union for Trotsky and his followers in the 1930s. The problem is 
that throughout Stalin, Trotsky hardly mentions this criterion. Where he 
does, he is equivocal:
The counter-revolution sets in when the spool of progressive social 
conquests begins to unwind. There seems no end to this unwind-
ing. Yet some portion of the conquests of the revolution is always 
preserved. At any rate, the struggle against equality and the estab-
lishment of very deep social differentiations has, so far, neither been 
unable to eliminate the socialist consciousness of the masses nor 
the nationalisation of the means of production and the land, which 
are the basic socialist conquests of the revolution. . . . Thus, in spite 
of monstrous bureaucratic distortions, the class basis of the USSR 
remains proletarian. Although it undermines these achievements, 
the bureaucracy has not yet ventured to resort to the restoration of 
the private ownership of the means of production.28
His invocation of the continuing “socialist consciousness of the masses” 
was analyzed earlier, in chapter 5. If, as was argued in that chapter, there is 
little evidence of the continuing “socialist consciousness of the masses” in 
the 1930s, then indeed the only remaining criterion for claiming the con-
tinuation of socialism in the USSR would be nationalization of the means 
of production. Importantly, however, Trotsky concludes his point with the 
following caveat: “But let us bear in mind that the unwinding process has 
not yet been completed, and the future of Europe and the world during the 
next few decades has not yet been decided.”29 Trotsky then proceeds—in 
the paragraph that Woods so painstakingly revised from the Malamuth 
translation and throughout the book in other nonrevised sections—to 
suggest and develop a completely different criterion by which to assess 
the class nature of the Soviet Union—the control of the surplus product.
Trotsky asserts that “the substance of the Thermidor was, is and could 
not fail to be social in character. It stood for the crystallization of a new 
privileged stratum, the creation of a new substratum for the econom-
ically dominant class. There were two pretenders to this role: the petty 




(by this, he means primarily the so-called rich peasants) is clearly a class 
designation, but here he is putting the bureaucracy in the same category, 
which suggests that, in his thinking, it too was becoming a class.
In the latter half of Stalin, in notes that are slightly different versions of 
early material in the book, Trotsky writes: “Possession of the surplus pro-
duce opened the bureaucracy’s road to power.”31 Developing a class analysis 
on the basis of control of the surplus product is, of course, the essence of 
Marx’s method—and of historical materialism. However, Trotsky does not 
draw the conclusion that this control of the surplus product by a state elite 
results in a new class. Rather, he suggests that “the introduction of a liberal 
economic regime was out of the question. . . . A liberal regime based on 
private property means the concentration of wealth in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie and its upper layers. But the privileges of the bureaucracy 
did not flow from the automatic development of the existing economic 
relations.”32 True enough. But students of capitalism are all too aware that 
while aspects of capitalism’s present might be “liberal,” there was nothing 
liberal about its origins in state-directed mercantilism and the completely 
illiberal trans-Atlantic slave trade.
Souvarine makes many of the same points that Trotsky does, but does 
not hesitate to conclude that the Soviet Union is no longer in any way 
progressive or that it constitutes some kind of a workers’ state. “So-called 
Soviet society rests on its own method of exploitation,” he writes, “of man 
by man, of the producer by the bureaucracy, of the technician by the 
political power.”
For the individual appropriation of surplus value is substituted a 
collective appropriation by the State, a deduction made for the para-
sitic consumption of functionaries. Stalin reckoned for 1933 about 
8,000,000 functionaries and employees, whose precise income it 
is impossible to estimate. But official documentation leaves us no 
doubt: the bureaucracy takes an undue part of the produce, corres-
ponding more or less to the old capitalist profit, of the subjugated 
classes, which it submits to an inexorable sweating system. There has 
thus been formed around the Party a new social category, interested 
in maintaining the established order, and perpetuating the State 





Souvarine does not give the resulting class society an official designation. 
But if he will not say what it is, he is absolutely clear what it is not:
Stalin denies “State socialism” in the USSR on the ground that the 
means of production are collective property. But the appropriation 
of profit has an unquestionably private character, and it is this which 
matters. Private profit is apparent in the growing social inequality, 
which is more revolting in its arrant injustice than in the capitalist 
countries where it is diminishing, more intolerable in the termin-
ology of hypocritical equalitarianism. No society, it is true, has ever 
existed without a hierarchy, without authority, without natural and 
artificial privileges. But the socialist dream of founding one has in 
Russia turned into a nightmare.34
His polemic here is directed against Stalin’s view of the “progressive” 
nature of the Soviet Union. It could equally be directed at Trotsky.
“With the Aid of an Impersonal Machine”
The second area where Trotsky is carving out new territory, challenging an 
orthodoxy he helped create, has to do with theorizing a link between the 
rise of Stalin and the history of and nature essential to the Leninist party 
machine of professional revolutionaries (or to use contemporary language, 
professional staff). Very early on in the text, he makes this explicit:
Stalin took possession of power, not with the aid of personal qual-
ities, but with the aid of an impersonal machine. And it was not he 
who created the machine, but the machine that created him. That 
machine, with its force and its authority, was the product of the pro-
longed and heroic struggle of the Bolshevik Party, which itself grew 
out of ideas. The machine was the bearer of the idea before it became 
an end in itself. Stalin headed the machine from the moment he cut 
off the umbilical cord that bound it to the idea and it became a thing 
unto itself. Lenin created the machine through constant association 
with the masses, if not by oral word, then by printed word, if not dir-
ectly, then through the medium of his disciples. Stalin did not create 




He comes back to this idea frequently throughout the text. Calling Stalin 
by his frequently used party nickname “Koba,” Trotsky says the following:
• “Koba was protecting ‘the apparat’ [political machine] against pres-
sure from below.”36 
• “Koba preferred to have firm ground under his feet. He prized the 
apparatus more than the idea.”37
• “In all those instances when it is necessary for him to choose 
between the idea and the political machine, he invariably inclines 
toward the machine.”38
• “Pulling wires from behind the scenes, relying on the illegal appar-
atus. In that activity Stalin undoubtedly proved himself more apt 
than anyone else.”39
What Trotsky presents is a very strong claim that the party machine—
disconnected from “the idea,” his shorthand for the theory and program 
of Russian social democracy, and without the hand of its creator, 
Lenin—becomes the perfect breeding ground for authoritarianism and 
dictatorship. Critically, he does not see this as an aberration emerging 
late in the party’s history, but as something embedded in its very nature, 
in that the “negative aspects of Bolshevism’s centripetal tendencies” were 
making themselves apparent as early as 1905 at the Third Congress of the 
Russian Social-Democracy.
The habits peculiar to a political machine were already forming in 
the underground. The young revolutionary bureaucrat was already 
emerging as a type. The conditions of conspiracy, true enough, 
offered rather meager scope for such of the formalities of democracy 
as electiveness, accountability and control. Yet, undoubtedly the 
committeemen narrowed these limitations considerably more than 
necessity demanded and were far more intransigent and severe with 
the revolutionary workingmen than with themselves, preferring to 
domineer even on occasions that called imperatively for lending an 




This is as scathing an indictment of the conservative tendencies of Leninist 
staff-driven centralism as any written by Luxemburg or Martov. Trotsky 
is, however, hesitant to draw too sweeping a conclusion:
In this connection it is rather tempting to draw the inference that 
future Stalinism was already rooted in Bolshevik centralism or, 
more sweepingly, in the underground hierarchy of professional 
revolutionists. But upon analysis that inference crumbles to dust, 
disclosing an astounding paucity of historical content. Of course, 
there are dangers of one kind or another in the very process of 
stringently picking and choosing persons of advanced views and 
welding them into a tightly centralized organization. But the roots 
of such dangers will never be found in the so-called “principle” of 
centralism; rather they should be sought in the lack of homogeneity 
and the backwardness of the toilers—that is, in the general social 
conditions which make imperative that very centripetal leadership 
of the class by its vanguard.41
Here, his logic becomes confusing. Cultural backwardness requires 
centralism in the formation of a party. That centralism creates a conserva-
tive apparatus that privileges the place of the full-time staff of professional 
revolutionaries and that becomes a petri dish for the creation of bureau-
crats in the Stalin mould. The negative effects can be offset by “the idea” 
and the presence of Lenin. But without Lenin, “the idea” disappears, and 
the authoritarian bureaucrat (Stalin) comes to prominence. If all this 
is true, then what possible justification could there be for such austere, 
staff-driven centralism in the first place? The whole schema only works, 
apparently, if we have access to a Lenin—to one great individual. A pol-
itical program that embeds into its schema the necessity for one great 
individual is, to say the least, unsatisfying.
At one point, Trotsky links this analysis to his first major work, the 1904 
book cited earlier, a book he wrote that provided a scathing criticism of 
Leninist centralism.42 He says that the book “contains not a little that is 
immature and erroneous in my criticism of Lenin,” but that it does con-
tain “pages which present a fairly accurate characterization of the cast of 
thought of the ‘committeemen’ of those days.”43 However, in the context 




of the machine and the professional revolutionaries, he is much harder 
on this 1904 work, calling its approach “a logical reduction to absurdity.”44
In the recently published book by Boris Souvarine entitled Stalin, 
Stalin’s moral standing is deduced from his “belonging to the order 
of professional revolutionists.” Souvarine’s generalization in this case 
as in others is superficial and arbitrary. . . . He attempts to deduce 
the whole evolution of the Soviet Republic from certain original sins 
he attributes to the nature of Bolshevism—as if Bolshevism operated 
in an empty space or with an amorphous mass; as if Bolshevism 
were a demi-god of history which sculptures human material in its 
own image and likeness; and as if there were no interaction with the 
social environment.45
Trotsky says that Souvarine’s “mind is formalistic and utterly devoid 
of historical penetration and intuition. He does not see the phenom-
ena in three dimensions,” only looking for “literary precedents and not 
the inherent laws of development.”46 Even a short examination of Sou-
varine’s impressive book shows that this is completely unfair. I have 
relied as much on Souvarine as on Trotsky for analysis and for concrete 
and material-historical (i.e., not formalistic) examples with which to 
sketch out the social and material foundations of war, revolution, and 
counter-revolution in the Soviet Union. Both Trotsky and Souvarine are 
indispensable in such a project, and both often take the same approach 
to key historical issues. Take just one example—the role played by Lenin 
in advancing the career of the future dictator, Joseph Stalin. Souvarine’s 
discussion of Stalin at the time of his 1912 co-optation onto the Central 
Committee is virtually identical to that of Trotsky:
The Mensheviks had excluded this “professional revolutionary,” the 
Bolsheviks advanced him. Unknown to the Party of which he was 
the instrument, he became one of the leaders solely by the decision 
of the other leaders. He was never elected; at all stages from the 
local and provincial committees in the Caucasus, up to the supreme 
All-Russian Committee he rose patiently and gradually in the hier-
archy of the organisation without requiring the confidence of the 
masses or thinking of responsibility to them. He belonged exclu-




the organised. The Party knew nothing about him at the time of his 
nomination and was to remain in ignorance for a long time. . . . In 
contrast to a Trotsky, independently developed, ripened in dispute 
and in controversy with Plekhanov, Lenin, and Martov, and associ-
ated with the representatives of international socialism, Stalin was a 
product of the Party, grown up under its tutelage; but this was only 
a section of the Party which was itself incorporated in the directing 
organisation.47
Trotsky’s account of the same issue—Stalin’s rise in the ranks of the 
party—is as follows. At the Prague conference in 1912, “Stalin wanted 
to become a member of the Central Committee” and “Lenin deemed it 
necessary to have him elected to the Central Committee.” However, “Lenin 
. . . met with serious opposition. There was but one thing he could do: 
wait until the conference came to an end and then appeal to the small 
leading circle, which either relied on Lenin’s recommendation or shared 
his estimate of the candidate. Thus, Stalin for the first time came into the 
Central Committee through the back door.”48 The point to underline here 
is that it was a back door held open by Lenin.
Not only are Souvarine’s and Trotsky’s approaches to this issue more 
similar than different, but they both show that what is at stake is not 
centralism per se (organizing underground against autocracy imposed a 
kind of centralism on all political currents), but rather undemocratic and 
unaccountable centralism.
For Souvarine, who had come to the conclusion that the authoritar-
ianism of the Stalin era had roots in the authoritarianism of the Lenin 
era, such an approach was straightforward. Trotsky, though, was writing 
as an orthodox Leninist, for whom the key organizing idea is the need for 
a centralized party of professional revolutionaries. For him to so clearly 
identify the party machine as the breeding ground for Stalinism was not 
straightforward. His antipathy toward Souvarine is explicable as antip-
athy toward the conclusions drawn by Souvarine—that it was the Leninist 
era that created the conditions for Stalinism. But it is not explicable as 
antipathy toward Souvarine’s analysis itself. In all key respects, Souvarine’s 
line of analysis parallels that of Trotsky. We have already seen that Trot-
sky was obliquely moving back toward his 1904 analysis of the limits of 




that Souvarine is not at all oblique about this analysis, but synthesizes the 
twenty-four-year-old Trotsky’s arguments clearly and without embellish-
ment—an analysis that Trotsky, now an orthodox Leninist, would find 
uncomfortable. In the polemics against emergent Leninism in 1904, Sou-
varine says this: 
The most violent, if not the most effective blows, were dealt by Trot-
sky in the pamphlet Our Political Tasks, in which he described Lenin 
as “head of the reactionary wing of our Party” and the “dull carica-
ture of the tragic intransigence of Jacobinism.” Leninist methods, 
said Trotsky, would lead to a situation in which “the organisation of 
the Party takes the place of the Party itself, the Central Committee 
takes the place of the organisation, and finally the dictator takes the 
place of the Central Committee.” They would in the end impose on 
the Party the discipline first of the barracks, and then of the fac-
tory.49
Or, as Trotsky put it, “Rigour of organisation as opposed to our oppor-




A Movement’s Dirty Linen9
Some two decades before the young Souvarine became a protégé of Lenin, 
a young Trotsky had played that same role. In 1902, after his first escape 
from exile, the twenty-three-year-old Trotsky arrived in London, and his 
first destination was the apartment of Lenin and Nadyezhda Krupskaya.1 
Krupskaya and Lenin had a long political and personal partnership, begin-
ning in the 1890s, that would last until Lenin’s death in 1924. By contrast, 
this first moment in the comradeship between Trotsky and Lenin would 
last less than a year. In 1903, when Lenin created the Bolsheviks from a split 
in the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP), Trotsky sided 
with Lenin’s Menshevik opponents, soon to separate from them as well, 
and, until 1917, took a “non-factional” position, arguing for the building 
of a united Left in Russia.
This divide between Trotsky and Lenin was bridged in July 1917, sym-
bolized by the merger between the four-thousand-strong Inter-District 
Committee (or Mezhraionka, the non-factional group Trotsky had joined 
after arriving in Russia) and the now mass Bolshevik Party. From that 
point forward, Trotsky saw himself as both a Bolshevik and a Leninist, 
and after Lenin’s death, while he prosecuted his long battle against Stalin, 
Trotsky’s followers proudly took the name “Bolshevik-Leninist,” a name 
proposed to them by Zinoviev when he, Kamenev, and Krupskaya were 
briefly part of what was called the United Opposition.2 This claim to 
orthodox Leninism did not prevent Trotsky, in the pages of Stalin, from 
engaging in a deeply honest and at times highly critical analysis of the 
Russian Revolution and the role in that revolution played by Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks.
One key issue was the Bolsheviks’ use of criminal and often violent 




rooted in the defeat of the 1905 revolution (the story of which will be 
detailed in chapter 10), which was also, not coincidentally, the moment 
when the figure of Joseph Stalin first indistinctly emerged onto the pages 
of history, under the alias of Ivanovich.
The “Muddy Wave” of Bolshevik Expropriations
In April 1906, in the wake of the suppression of the 1905 revolution, at a 
party unification congress held in Stockholm, Ivanovich (Stalin) declared, 
“We are on the eve of a new explosion. . . . On that all of us are agreed.” 
In 1907, Lenin repeated this prediction: “Ahead is a new, an even more 
menacing . . . revolutionary crisis.” As Trotsky notes: “This conclusion 
proved erroneous. Although the revolution was still strong enough to 
leave its impress on the arena of Tsarist pseudo-parliamentarism, it was 
already broken.” Stalin and Lenin’s mistake led inexorably to deep prob-
lems. It was the basis for advancing a “policy of attack,” which “became 
increasingly the policy of guerrilla clashes and scattered blows. The land 
was widely inundated with so-called ‘expropriations’—armed raids on 
banks, treasuries, and other repositories of money.”3
The story of these expropriations is one of the most depressing narra-
tives in the history of the Russian Left. Armed actions had an honourable 
enough origin as actions of self-defence against tsarist reaction. As Sou-
varine writes, in the reaction against the 1905 revolution, “the authorities 
shot rebels in the army and the navy without mercy, crushed rural rioting 
by punitive expeditions on a considerable scale.”4 This state terror was 
opposed by the “drujiny—fighting squads of the various revolutionary 
parties.” However, the armed actions of these fighting squads were being 
carried out not in the context of a rising tide of mass action, but in a con-
text of retreat, decline, demoralization, and mass passivity. In other words, 
as the mass movement retreated, small bands of armed rebels tried, for a 
while, to continue to attack in a futile attempt to substitute for the mass 
action of the now passive peasants and workers. In Souvarine’s words, 
“the boyeviki (armed militants, sharpshooters, guerrillas) turned to the 
offensive. . . . Murderous attacks on policemen, Cossacks and govern-
ment agents, armed expropriations of public and private funds began to 
multiply.”5 An attempt by an armed minority to substitute for the now 
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demoralized working class and peasantry degenerated into actions of 
common criminals: 
The flying squads were mixed up with mischievous elements which 
were not disinterested but indisciplined and operating on their own 
account. Signs of degeneration, cases of common assault, acts of 
terrorism against the inhabitants, soon threw great discredit on the 
movement. Robbers and bandits, who made it their business to hold 
the population to ransom rather than to annoy the authorities made 
the “war of the partisans” suspect. It became difficult to distinguish 
between “ex’es” of all sorts and various forms of brigandage.6
Souvarine quotes Rosa Luxemburg characterizing these “innumerable 
thefts and robberies on private persons,” which “passed like a muddy wave 
over this period of depression when the revolution was temporarily on 
the defensive.”7
This was all a departure from Russian social-democratic policy. The 
same 1906 Stockholm Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour 
Party where Ivanovich / Stalin made his entrance into party history voted 
against the use of armed terrorism.8 The party subsequently divided into 
warring camps, with one half of the schism, the Mensheviks, holding to 
that position and the other half, the Bolsheviks, abandoning it.
A disproportionate percentage of the expropriations took place in the 
Caucasus, which includes Stalin’s native Georgia. Between 1904 and 1908, 
the Bolsheviks had “a large share” in the 1,150 “acts of terrorism” (to use 
Souvarine’s phrase) committed in the Caucasus.9 However—returning 
to an issue broached in chapter 6—in that region the Bolsheviks were 
simultaneously responsible for only a risible share of political activists. 
The Georgian Bolshevik Filipp Makharadze admitted “in bitter terms” that 
“at the beginning of 1905 the Social-Democratic organization . . . under-
went a schism,” and in the Caucasus, “the directing organs of the Party 
passed entirely into Menshevik hands. This circumstance made the rally 
of the masses to the Menshevik position inevitable.”10 The weakness of the 
Bolsheviks in Georgia was underlined by the 1906 Stockholm unification 
congress. Tiflis, the main city of Georgia, elected eleven delegates to the 
conference—ten Mensheviks and only one Bolshevik, Stalin, travelling 




in the Caucasus in an even worse light. They were not solely the sub-
stitution of a left-wing minority in the context of passivity of the mass 
movement. They were also armed actions being carried out by a minority 
within that minority, activists with no mass base in the area in which they 
were operating.
Bolshevik political isolation in the city notwithstanding, Tiflis was the 
location for the most spectacular—and most notorious—of the Bolshevik 
expropriations. On 23 June 1907, ten members of a Bolshevik armed group 
hurled bombs at a government mail coach. As Isaac Levine describes it: 
“When the smoke had cleared away, an appalling scene was revealed. 
Around the central Pushkin Park scores of bodies were swimming in pools 
of blood. Many were writhing in pain. The harvest totalled fifty dead and 
wounded.”12 The bombers escaped with 341,000 rubles, roughly equiva-
lent (in 2015) to USD$10 million.13 As Souvarine wrote: “The Tiflis affair 
exploded (the word is justified) like a bomb”; it took place just three weeks 
after the closing of the Fifth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic 
Labour Party, held in 1907 in London, where the delegates had voted 
unanimously to disband all fighting squads associated with the party.14
For years, this bombing and other unsavoury fundraising activities 
undermined the reputation of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in the eyes of the 
international Left. One of their more distasteful undertakings involved 
assigning two young male members to seduce two sisters, heirs to the for-
tune of a wealthy supporter, N. P. Schmidt, who had died in 1907. The goal, 
which was achieved, was to redirect the sisters’ inherited fortune into Bol-
shevik coffers.15 At one point, proceeds from a variety of these unsavoury 
activities were handed over to “three German social democrats, Franz 
Mehring, Klara Zetkin and Karl Kautsky, as trustees.”16 This occurred at a 
plenum of the Central Committee, held at the beginning of 1910, which, 
in the words of Nikolai Popov, author of the official “high Stalinist” history 
of the Communist Party, “was dominated by the influence of those who 
favoured union” between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks.17 At that 
plenum, it was decided that “all factional centres were charged to transfer 
their funds to the general party treasury.”18
In response, Lenin convened what he called a “conference” of the entire 
party in Prague in 1912. In a clever fictionalized biography of Krupskaya, 
Jane Casey writes that in January of that year, “spies and thugs were 
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flocking in droves to Ilyich’s [Lenin’s] all-Russian Party Conference.”19 
Leaving aside Casey’s unflattering characterization of the delegates, she 
is certainly wrong as to the quantity. It was a “conference” in name only 
and attended by very few, although the exact number varies in different 
reports. Robert Williams puts the number at fourteen, “twelve Leninists 
and two Mensheviks”; Trotsky claims it was fifteen.20 Popov lists, besides 
Lenin and Krupskaya, thirteen delegates: one was a representative of the 
Mensheviks, two were police spies, and the rest were virtually unknown 
but loyal Leninists.21 James White says eighteen attended, sixteen Bol-
sheviks and two Mensheviks—and by his account, three of the eighteen 
were police spies.22 The RSDRP aspired to be a party for the entire Russian 
empire. However, there were no representatives present from any of the 
oppressed nations that made up that empire. All the delegates were from 
Russia proper. According to Abraham Ascher, the conference delegates 
“at best represented one-fifth of the membership of the Social Democratic 
movement.”23 This tiny gathering called itself the “Sixth All-Russia Con-
ference” of the RSDRP and met in session for twelve days, passing almost 
two dozen resolutions.24
One resolution characterized the vast majority of those who were not 
in attendance as “liquidators” and declared them outside the party. Twenty 
percent of the party, in other words, had, through a bureaucratic man-
oeuvre, expelled the other 80 percent.
A subsequent resolution, titled “Property in the Hands of the Former 
Trustee, and Financial Reports,” argued in essence that: a) the German 
trustees (represented by Klara Zetkin) were holding funds and trying to 
determine to which wing of the party they should be delivered; b) with the 
exclusion from membership of the 80 percent, the 20 percent now consti-
tuted the entire social democratic movement; and, c) therefore there was 
now only one party to which the funds could be returned (the party of the 
20 percent). With this syllogism in hand, they passed the resolution, which 
instructed “the Central Committee to take all measures immediately to 
obtain the property of the Party from Comrade Zetkin.”25 That obtaining 
control of these funds was the goal of the 1912 conference was made fairly 
evident the following month. Lenin travelled to Berlin, met with Kautsky, 
and “demanded the money held by the trustees. Failing in this, Lenin 




seeking counsel from his legal representative. “‘I myself was a lawyer,’ 
mused Lenin. ‘I studied French law and German law, regulating arbitra-
tion court relations. I have no doubt that Zetkin is completely wrong.’”26
It has been widely assumed that Stalin was a key player in the criminal 
activities that generated the funds in dispute, although it is something 
about which Stalin always remained silent. Trotsky, bizarrely, calls this a 
mysterious “romantic period” in Stalin’s life.27 Others saw it more nega-
tively. According to Trotsky:
On the eighteenth of March, 1918—that is, a few months after the 
founding of the Soviet regime—the Menshevik leader, Iulii Martov, 
wrote in his Moscow newspaper: “That the Caucasian Bolsheviks 
attached themselves to all sorts of daring enterprises of an expropri-
atory kind should be well known to the same citizen Stalin, who in 
his time was expelled from his Party organization for having some-
thing to do with expropriation.” Stalin deemed it necessary to have 
Martov brought before the judgment of the revolutionary tribunal.28
Whatever the exact nature of Stalin’s role, it was during this compli-
cated, distasteful period of robberies and criminal activity that he first 
entered the leadership of the party. 
Martov Versus Lenin
In 1911, Iulii Martov penned an explosive pamphlet titled Saviours or 
Destroyers? that documents the recourse by Lenin and the Bolsheviks to 
criminal activities to finance their operations.29 In the pamphlet, Martov 
deals with the aforementioned 1907 Tiflis robbery, which, as we saw, 
injured and killed numerous innocent bystanders. “All those arrested in 
this connection were more or less well-known Bolsheviks.” Their par-
ticipation in these activities was against party policy, and they were thus 
expelled and “barred from membership of any other party organ.”30 These 
criminal activities continued, however, and Martov decided to publish the 
complete record because “the methods by which it [the Leninist group] 
maintains its supremacy in underground circles and which it is seeking to 
impose on the overt workers’ movement are introducing confusion and 
dissension into the latter.”31
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The pamphlet was not well received. Clara Zetkin called it “grubby.”32 In 
1914, Lenin published a lengthy journal article, “The Bourgeois Intelligent-
sia’s Methods of Struggle Against the Workers,” in response to a second 
charge from Martov—that a senior Bolshevik, Roman Malinovsky, was 
in fact a police agent. Referring to the earlier scandal, Lenin commented: 
“When Martov, in collaboration with and on the responsibility of Dan, 
wrote the special libellous pamphlet, Saviours or Destroyers, even the mild 
and cautious Kautsky . . . called it ‘disgusting.’”33 More precisely, Kautsky 
condemned it as the “washing of dirty linen in public.”34 Lenin linked 
the first scandal (exposing the Bolsheviks’ “fund-raising methods”) to 
the second (claims that Malinovsky was a police agent), drawing general 
conclusions. “Scandal-mongering,” he said, was the characteristic method 
not just of Martov, but of an entire “social stratum” of what he called 
“intellectualists.” “Every social stratum has its own way of life, its own 
habits and inclinations,” he wrote.35
As it turned out, the charge of scandalmongering was spurious, at least 
as it concerns Malinovsky. In the spring of 1917, the provisional govern-
ment opened the tsarist-era secret police files, which clearly documented 
Malinovsky’s long-standing role as a police agent infiltrating Lenin’s inner 
circles. Lenin’s attitude toward Malinovsky, in the words of R. C. Elwood, 
“changed abruptly,” a considerable understatement given that the new 
information led to Malinovsky’s execution “before a Soviet firing squad 
in the early morning hours of 6 November 1918.”36
Lenin was actually wrong on all matters of substance. Martov and the 
Mensheviks were correct not only about Malinovsky, but also about the 
Bolsheviks’ criminal activities. In later years, many who had, with high 
emotion, distanced themselves from Martov’s 1911 exposé began to change 
their minds. Kautsky, for one, “much later, told the Menshevik Boris Nico-
laevsky that his scathing assessment had been mistaken.”37 In fact, from 
the very beginning, while Martov’s pamphlet might have been attacked 
because it was seen to be in poor taste, it could not be challenged as to its 
factual basis. Souvarine writes that “the sincerity and truthfulness of his 
[Martov’s] testimony cannot be contested” and that “other sources provide 
details and facts which confirm his allegations.”38
The “airing of dirty linen” is always controversial in the heat of the 




analyses of an arc of history, all dirty linen, controversial or not, must be 
brought into the light of day and examined. Trotsky does not shy away 
from this: he openly deals with the prehistory of Bolshevism brought to 
light by Martov in 1911, as well as with the practice of Bolsheviks once 
they were in power.
Adventurism, Staff, and the Political Volunteer
Trotsky says that at the time of the Tiflis bank robbery, Lenin’s support 
for criminal activities was opposed by “the majority of the Bolshevik fac-
tion.”39 He provides little insight as to why Lenin would lead in such a 
damaging direction, except to say that in the case of the Tiflis expropria-
tion, he “could not resist the temptation.” Trotsky does not pass judgment 
on the period, except to say that the robbery “contained in it a goodly 
element of adventurism, which as a rule was foreign to Lenin’s politics.”40 
This is a very understated, almost muted, critique of events that were, in 
their time, controversial and destructive.
Trotsky wasn’t always so understated in his critiques. At the peak of the 
controversy in 1910, while travelling to the Eighth World Congress of the 
Second International in Copenhagen, Trotsky told Lenin that in a forth-
coming article in the main newspaper of the German Social Democratic 
Party, he had criticized the Bolsheviks on the issue of expropriations. Trot-
sky knew that, as he put it in his autobiography, “the most prickly question 
in the article was that of so-called ‘expropriations.’ After the defeat of the 
revolution, armed ‘expropriations’ and terrorist acts inevitably tended to 
disorganize the revolutionary party itself.” The article, which was to appear 
that morning, led to what Trotsky characterized as the “sharpest conflict 
with Lenin in my whole life.” Lenin tried, unsuccessfully, to get him to send 
a telegraph asking that the article be pulled. Plekhanov sought to bring 
Trotsky to trial. In the end, the affair blew over. In 1929, Trotsky repudiated 
his 1910 position, saying that “as a matter of fact, the article was not right.”41 
But as I have outlined here, by 1940, he was more willing to portray the 
whole expropriations episode in a negative light, as he had in 1910.
Trotsky said little else about the money question. “Prior to the Con-
stitutional Manifesto of 1905,” he writes, “the revolutionary movement 
was financed principally by the liberal bourgeoisie and by the radical 
intellectuals. That was true also in the case of the Bolsheviks, whom the 
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liberal opposition then regarded as merely somewhat bolder revolutionary 
democrats.”42 It is Souvarine who links the decline in funds from these 
sources after the defeat of 1905 to the increasing dependence on criminal 
activity: “Party subscriptions were insignificant. . . . The revolutionary 
profession, extended to a Party, or at all events to its officials, required 
more funds, and the ‘ex’es’ were the main source of supply for the Bol-
shevik Centre.”43
According to Souvarine, “the money question was disastrous.”44 The 
Tiflis episode and the whole era of Bolshevik fundraising through crime 
was representative of “the eternal and disgusting question of cash,” which 
had “acquired so much importance for international Bolshevism.”45 He 
links the addiction to criminal enterprise to more than adventurism, 
arguing that it was tied directly to Lenin’s commitment to maintaining a 
party machine staffed by what Lenin called “professional revolutionaries”: 
the “money question,” then, was “the invariable corollary of the idea of 
professional revolutionaries.”46
Raising funds played out differently for the Mensheviks, whose activists 
were “very rarely supported by the party”: each “had to earn his living as 
best he could.”47 To use contemporary language, the Bolsheviks were like 
a staff-driven NGO, while the Mensheviks were more like a coalition run 
by political volunteers.48 To finance their activities, the Mensheviks relied 
largely “on the infinitesimal subscriptions” (dues) from their members. In 
the period of reaction after the defeat of the 1905 revolution, these sub-
scriptions declined drastically for both parties. Despite this decline, the 
Bolsheviks were able “to maintain a legion of militants, to send emissaries 
to all quarters, to found journals, to distribute pamphlets.”49
These resources also facilitated the inflation of Bolshevik presence at 
party congresses. Souvarine writes that one participant in these expropri-
ations “relates in his memoirs that his group paid to the Bolshevik Central 
Committee 60,000 roubles; 40,000 roubles to the Regional Committee, 
providing, among other things, for the publication of three newspapers; 
and in addition subsidised the journeys of delegates (certainly Bolshe-
viks) to the London Congress.”50 The cost of attending this 1907 congress 
in London was, of course, a huge burden for anyone coming from the 
difficult conditions prevailing in Russia during the years of reaction after 




to the relative size of the party’s component parts at that congress. Sou-
varine says that in 1907, at the time of the Fifth Congress, the Mensheviks 
had more members than the Bolsheviks—43,000 compared to 33,000.51 
Later research indicates that Souvarine has the poles reversed: J. L. H. 
Keep writes that at the time of that congress, the party’s total membership 
was in excess of 148,000, of which 46,000 were Bolsheviks, 38,000 were 
Mensheviks, 25,000 were part of the Polish section, another 25,000 were 
part of the Jewish Bund, and 13,000 were from Latvia.52 By either set of 
figures, the Bolsheviks were far from a majority in the party, yet unlike 
the congress in 1906, they were usually able to win majorities. In 1911, 
Martov claimed that this capacity “was due solely to their command of 
secret financial resources.”53 The Bolsheviks were much more staff-oriented 
than other portions of the party, and staff did play a large role at the Fifth 
Congress. Souvarine says that “the statistics state” that the 312 delegates 
included “56 ‘professional revolutionaries’ and 118 delegates ‘living at the 
expense of the Party.’”54
At one level, the entire drama here is simply grotesque. On the big 
questions of the day (such as opposition to imperialist war), Leon Trotsky, 
Vladimir Lenin, and Iulii Martov were in complete agreement, but they 
nonetheless engaged, for years, in the most extreme polemics, one against 
the other. Revulsion at the criminal exploits of Bolshevik armed bands cer-
tainly fuelled the emotion behind these divisions. It all came to a head in 
the summer of 1914, when a special conference of the Second International 
was scheduled. Pavel Axelrod and Rosa Luxemburg, writes Martov, “were 
charged with drawing up a manifesto on the necessity of unity, directed 
against the splitting policies of the Bolsheviks. Lenin’s faction was thus 
completely isolated.”55 As Ruth Fischer notes, Luxemburg and Axelrod 
were perfectly aware that Lenin’s group would not countenance a forced 
unity with the rest of the Russian Left and that the “unification would have 
meant, in effect, the expulsion of the Bolsheviks from the International.”56 
This sordid piece of history is rarely mentioned in discussions of either 
Lenin or Luxemburg. According to Martov, “the World War, breaking out 
after a few weeks, brought the unity effort thus begun to an end.”57 With the 
outbreak of war and the subsequent revolution and counter-revolution, 
squabbles that would otherwise have been inconsequential and forgotten 
(except, of course, for the victims of the robberies, seductions, and related 
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activity) now became part of the prehistory of one of the big stories of the 
twentieth century.
Trotsky does not shrink from confronting this sordid history. The 
machine built by Lenin was, in part, rooted in the “muddy wave of expro-
priations,” a key by-product of which was the emergence into leadership 
of Joseph Stalin.
The Muck of Ages I: Orientalist Discourse
The youthful collaborators Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, while still in 
their twenties, were realists about the human material with which their 
hoped-for new world would be created, as is clear from their writing in 
The German Ideology:
Both for the production on a mass scale of this communist con-
sciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration 
of men on a mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only 
take place in a practical movement, a revolution; the revolution is 
necessary, therefore, not only because the ruling class cannot be 
overthrown in any other way, but also because the class overthrowing 
it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of 
ages and become fitted to found society anew.58
Some of that “muck of ages”—prejudices and stereotypes inherited from 
the society in which they lived—sullied the work of the young men who 
penned this warning. Marx’s eleven theses on Feuerbach—written in 1845, 
when Marx was not yet thirty—contain many brilliant observations (most 
famously the last: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in 
various ways; the point is to change it”). Yet in the first thesis—in which 
Marx criticizes Feuerbach for conceiving material reality only in the 
form of objects, rather than subjectively—he argues that, in The Essence 
of Christianity, Feuerbach “regards the theoretical attitude as the only 
genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only 
in its dirty-Jewish [schmutzig-jüdischen] form of appearance.”59 This latter 
portion of the first of the theses is cited with far less frequency than the 
well-known portion that precedes it. The words appeared in a manu-
script never published in Marx’s lifetime, and we can only speculate about 




of the “Theses on Feuerbach” intended for publication. However, this is 
not the only occasion where Marx uses what Abigail Bakan calls “highly 
problematic formulations.” Regardless of “the common assumptions of the 
period,” Bakan argues, “the generalization of ethnic stereotypes is hardly 
an inspiration for contemporary activists.”60 A complete appreciation of 
the theses and of the legacy of Marx and Engels demands that we con-
front both the insights into social life that they offer and the insights into 
the prejudices of nineteenth-century European society—prejudices from 
which Marx was not immune.61
The “muck of ages” also sullies, to varying degrees, some of the lit-
erature from the Russian Revolution, even before the rise of Stalin and 
Stalinism. Let’s be clear: Lenin, Trotsky, and the key representatives of 
the Russian Left were far in advance of their contemporaries on many 
key issues. While many of their liberal contemporaries, for instance, were 
buried in this or that apology for the “progressive” nature of imperial-
ism, the year before the outbreak of the Great War, Lenin prophetically 
wrote a passionate condemnation of “backward Europe” and a hymn of 
praise to “advanced Asia.” He argues that in Europe, “the commanding 
bourgeoisie, fearing the growth and increasing strength of the proletariat, 
comes out in support of everything backward, moribund and medieval.” 
As an example of “this decay of the entire European bourgeoisie,” he cites 
“the support it is lending to reaction in Asia.” He goes on to contrast this 
with Asia, where, he says, “a mighty democratic movement” is emerging. 
“Hundreds of millions of people are awakening to life, light and freedom,” 
all while “‘advanced’ Europe . . . is plundering China and helping the foes 
of democracy, the foes of freedom in China!”62 Leon Trotsky is famously 
identified with the related theories of Uneven and Combined Develop-
ment, and Permanent Revolution.63 Both theories focus on areas of the 
world that most of his contemporaries regarded as “backward”—Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America, in particular. Trotsky argued that, quite to 
the contrary, these areas of the world were the key to human progress, 
since they were the likely arenas for mass movements against imperialism, 
war, and capitalism. Given the horrors that transpired in the twentieth 
century—two world wars, the rise of fascism, and European and Amer-
ican military debacles in Indochina, Algeria, Korea, the Philippines, and 
elsewhere—and given the anticolonial movements that reshaped world 
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politics, in particular after World War II, we can now see that Lenin and 
Trotsky were both on the right side of history in their analyses.
However, being progressive in policy orientation was not always 
reflected in their choice of language or argument. Whatever their merits 
(and they have many), the biographies of Stalin by Trotsky and, to a lesser 
extent, Souvarine occasionally resort to a casual discourse in the category 
of what Edward Said would call Orientalism.64 Although they employ this 
discourse rarely, each occurrence is jarring and offensive to modern read-
ers. On the very first page of his biography of Stalin, Trotsky writes: “The 
late Leonid Krassin . . . was the first, if I am not mistaken, to call Stalin 
an ‘Asiatic.’” Trotsky does show an awareness of the problematic nature of 
the use of this word and tries to excuse its use: 
He [Krassin] had in mind no problematical racial attributes, but 
rather that blending of grit, shrewdness, craftiness and cruelty which 
has been considered characteristic of the statesmen of Asia. Bukha-
rin subsequently simplified the appellation, calling Stalin “Genghis 
Khan,” manifestly in order to draw attention to his cruelty, which 
has developed into brutality. Stalin himself, in conversation with a 
Japanese journalist, once called himself an “Asiatic.”65
But this “essentialist” digression is no justification at all. Both the use of the 
word “Asiatic” and the essentialist apology with which its use is excused 
are offensive on their face.
Elsewhere, Trotsky uses Orientalist discourse without qualification. 
Explaining why Stalin wrote so little in the public press, Trotsky says: 
“Sluggishness and inordinate cautiousness, utter lack of literary resource-
fulness, and, finally, extreme Oriental laziness combined to make Stalin’s 
pen rather unproductive.”66 Describing generations of Russian occupation 
of Stalin’s homeland Georgia, Trotsky writes that “in two centuries the 
Petersburg bureaucracy could not replace the old Asiatic barbarism with 
a European culture.” Georgia’s “semifeudal social structure was based on a 
low level of economic development and was therefore distinguished by the 
traits of Asiatic patriarchy, not excluding Asiatic cruelty.”67 Even worse, he 




In the countries of the Mediterranean Sea, in the Balkans, in Italy, in 
Spain, in addition to the so-called Southern type, which is character-
ized by a combination of lazy shiftlessness and explosive irascibility, 
one meets cold natures, in whom phlegm is combined with stub-
bornness and slyness. The first type prevails; the second augments it 
as an exception. It would seem as if each national group is doled out 
its due share of basic character elements, yet these are less happily 
distributed under the southern than under the northern sun. 
Again, he tries to draw back from this offensive approach, saying: “We 
must not venture too far afield into the unprofitable region of national 
metaphysics.”68 But the damage has already been done.
Let us turn to Souvarine. He speaks of Stalin’s “oriental dexterity in 
intrigue, unscrupulousness, lack of sensitiveness in personal relations, 
and scorn of men and of human life,” his predisposition to “a typical Ori-
ental method of avoiding a definite decision,” and “his oriental method 
of dividing in order to rule.”69 This use of a casual Orientalist discourse 
casts its shadow into post–World War II scholarship as well: even the 
esteemed Isaac Deutscher, in his own political biography of Stalin, writes 
of “a relative eclipse of European Russia in favour of the backward Asiatic 
and semi-Asiatic periphery.”70
Again, this casual Orientalist discourse occurs very infrequently in 
Trotsky’s writings. In the magnificent work of his youth—his history of 
the 1905 revolution—the term “Asian despotism” occurs twice: “Tsarism 
represents an intermediate form between European absolutism and Asian 
despotism, being, possibly, closer to the latter of these two,” and, similarly, 
“our autocracy, placed between European absolutism and Asian despot-
ism, had many features resembling the latter.”71 This use of “Asian” to form 
a contrast with “European,” in an attempt to make generalizations about 
aspects of the underlying political economy, parallels Deutscher’s use of 
the term. Tamás Krausz also treats the term in this fashion, saying, without 
other comment, that “Trotsky placed Russian tsarism after 1907 some-
where between European absolutism and Asiatic despotism.”72 In Trotsky’s 
three-volume history of the Russian Revolution, his use of “Asiatic” is 
infrequent and has a similar tenor.73
Not all in the Russian socialist movement were as restrained in the use 
of an Orientalist discourse. One of those who showed less restraint was 
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Vladimir Lenin, the man to whom both Trotsky and Souvarine had once 
looked for inspiration. A casual use of Orientalist discourse is prevalent 
throughout Lenin’s writings.
Sometimes, as with Trotsky, Lenin’s use of Orientalist terms is clearly 
intended as a literary shorthand to contrast feudalism with capitalism, 
autocracy with democracy. In 1905, he wrote: “The democratic reforms 
in the political system, and the social and economic reforms that have 
become a necessity for Russia . . . will, for the first time, really clear the 
ground for a wide and rapid, European, and not Asiatic, development of 
capitalism.”74 And two years later he referred to the necessity of “a ‘clearing’ 
of the medieval agrarian relationships and regulations, partly feudal and 
partly Asiatic.”75 Not only do these references remain offensive, despite 
their innocuous function, but they are exceptions to his usual practice, 
described quite accurately by Bertram Wolfe, who says that “the word 
‘Asiatic’ was frequently used as a term of opprobrium concerning Russia’s 
past and institutions.”76 This is such a pervasive and little appreciated lit-
erary device in Lenin’s work that it is worth providing examples from two 
decades of his writing:
• 1894—“Asiatic abuse of human dignity”77
• 1897—“from autocratic and semi-Asiatic Russia to cultured, free 
and civilised England”;78 “Asiatic backwardness”79
• 1901—“Asiatic-barbarian”80
• 1902—“Asiatic reaction”;81 “the Asiatically barbarous way in which 
the many-million-strong peasantry is dying out”82
• 1905—“Asiatic bondage”;83 “the accursed heritage of serf-ownership, 
Asiatic barbarism, and human degradation”;84 “all the infamy, 
viciousness, Asiatic barbarity, violence, and exploitation that 
pervade the whole social and political system of Russia”;85 “wildly 
Asiatic . . . autocracy”;86 “all the savagery of the Asiatic”;87 “with us 
despotism is Asiatically virginal”;88 “the Asiatic conservatism of 
the autocracy”;89 “in Russia purely capitalist antagonisms are very 
very much overshadowed by the antagonisms between ‘culture’ 





• 1906—“Asiatic despotism”;91 “the accursed Asiatic canker and 
serfdom which is poisoning Russia”;92 “a ruthless mass struggle 
against Asiatic despotism and feudal landlordism”;93 “the clumsy, 
dull-witted and Asiatically corrupt Russian officials”94
• 1907—“Asiatic despotism”;95 “Asiatic semi-decay”96
• 1908—“the most backward farming methods and of all that Asiatic 
barbarism which is called patriarchal rural life”97
• 1911—“an ability to conceal . . . Asiatic ‘practices’ behind glib 
phrases, external appearances, poses and gestures made to look 
‘European’”;98 “an absolutism impregnated with Asiatic barbarity”99
• 1913—“slave, Asiatic, tsarist Russia”;100 “hardened, Asiatic phil-
istinism”;101 “lovers of Asiatic scandal-mongering”;102 “Asiatic 
primitiveness”;103 “bureaucracy and Asiatic barbarism”104
• 1914—“what a great difference there is between Vandervelde, the 
true European, who attaches no importance to Asiatic gullibility 
or rule-of-thumb methods but collects the facts, and the Russian, 
liquidationist and liberal-bourgeois windbags, who pose as ‘Euro-
peans’!”105
Suddenly, in 1914, Lenin’s use of an Orientalist discourse virtually 
disappears from his writings. One of his last uses of the term “Asiatic” 
displays, for the first time, the kind of qualification as to its use that we 
saw earlier in Trotsky’s writing: “Knowing full well that there is much 
in the relationships and frontiers created or fixed by this class that is 
un-European and anti-European (we would say Asiatic if this did not 
sound undeservedly slighting to the Japanese and Chinese), the Cadets, 
nevertheless, accept them as the utmost limit.”106 That this was written in 
a journal article on the right of nations to self-determination is highly 
significant. Building solidarity between the Great Russian Left and the 
nations of Asia oppressed by Great Russian imperialism would be made 
more difficult by using “Asiatic” as a literary device to signify backward-
ness in contrast to “European” to signify progress and civilization. With 
the outbreak of war that same year, Lenin distinguished himself and his 
section of the Left with an insistence on the importance of the right of 
national self-determination, which might well explain the abandonment 
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of his earlier practice. But for twenty years, he relentlessly used the term 
“Asiatic” in a completely Orientalist fashion. If the use of Orientalist dis-
course is an issue when reading Trotsky and Souvarine in the twenty-first 
century, it is a much more serious issue when reading Lenin.
Lenin, Trotsky, and Souvarine must of course be put in their context. 
All were part of a Left that paid a heavy price for its willingness to combat 
racism and prejudice within Eurasia. But that Left also suffered, as did 
most European ideologies at the time, from an unexamined modernist 
prejudice that, with little reflection, equated Europe with civilization and 
progress and Asia with barbarism and backwardness. It is a warning to 
the modern reader to avoid any inclination to put any of these authors 
on a pedestal and treat their writings as holy writ. They were all taking on 
difficult and important work, but they were doing so with all the strengths 
and weaknesses of the culture of which they were a part.
“An Old Buggy with a Leaky Roof, That’s Lost Its Wheels”
Trotksy’s Stalin, in its honest grappling with the legacy of Lenin and the 
rise of Stalin, can help us in the task of putting things in their proper 
context, and of not putting any one individual on a pedestal. There is no 
essential difference between the 1941 and 2016 translations of the book, 
the first by Malamuth and the second by Woods (the latter incorporat-
ing virtually unaltered the bulk of Malamuth’s work). Certainly, the two 
places where Malamuth uses the word “coup” to describe the Bolshevik 
seizure of power would annoy followers of Leon Trotsky. But these in no 
way define the essence of the text. The “hue and cry” over Malamuth is 
a distraction. The high emotions associated with this unfinished classic 
have to do with the uncomfortable challenge to 1930s orthodoxy, a chal-
lenge clearly evident in Trotsky’s loyal but highly critical treatment of the 
Leninist machine, and in his emphasis on control of the surplus product 
as a key criterion by which to assess the class nature of the Soviet Union. 
Trotsky’s epistemology was in flux, and that posed a huge challenge to 
those who had been trained in his writings from the early 1930s.
Woods, in his 2016 work, fully accepts the inherited prejudice against 
Malamuth, repeating some of the claims made against him, but then con-
cludes that Malamuth’s translation is “not all bad” and in fact “is mostly a 




translated text in his own translation, but he leaves Malamuth’s name out 
of the credits. We need to move beyond this old factional squabble and 
get to the substance of the analysis.
In spite of his protestations to the contrary, Trotsky was being influ-
enced by a younger generation—certainly including Souvarine, and 
probably also including James and Dunayevskaya—leading to his empha-
ses on the surplus and the machine, notable departures from his previous 
writings. As a true intellectual, his ideas were evolving. We will never 
know where that evolution would have taken him, since he became one 
of the counter-revolution’s millions of victims, stopped dead by a cow-
ardly Stalinist assassin. But we need no longer be stopped from engaging 
with the text because of prejudice over the role of Malamuth. Woods, 
his unfortunate treatment of Malamuth aside, has done us a service by 
making the whole text available for study and reflection in the context of 
the centennial of the Russian Revolution. Both Trotsky and Souvarine 
wrote serious classic texts grappling with the horror of Stalinism, texts that 
are an important resource for new generations of scholars and activists in 
the twenty-first century.
One of Souvarine’s best friends was the famous communist poet Isaac 
Babel, who we encountered in chapter 6. In the early 1920s, Babel was 
one of the most famous literary figures in Russia, but, by the end of the 
decade, he had become persona non grata. Cynthia Ozick says that “Babel’s 
publications grew fewer and fewer. He was charged with ‘silence’—the sin 
of Soviet unproductivity.”107 In 1939, he mysteriously disappeared, and “his 
name was not officially heard again until 1954,” his daughter writes.108 “As 
we now know, his trial took place on January 26, 1940, in one of Lavrenti 
Beria’s private chambers. It lasted about twenty minutes. The sentence 
had been prepared in advance and without ambiguity: death by firing 
squad.”109 The execution was carried out the following day, “and his body 
was thrown into a communal grave.”110 Babel’s fate mirrored that of the 
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Mug shot of Isaac Babel taken in May 1939 by the NKVD or the People’s Com-
missariat for Internal Affairs. Photographer unknown, Wikimedia Commons.
In 1932—before the worst of the forced collectivization famine hit in 
1933; before the expulsion of tens of thousands (maybe hundreds of thou-
sands) from Leningrad in 1934; before the Great Terror of 1937–38—Babel, 
having been away for three years, returned to Paris, where his wife and 
daughter lived. There, he visited his friend Yuri Annenkov and spoke of 
his concern for the future:
“I have a family: a wife and daughter,” said Babel. “I love them and 
have to provide for them. Under no circumstances do I want them 
to return to Sovietland. They must remain here in freedom. But 
what about myself? . . . Should I return to our proletarian revolu-
tion? Revolution indeed! It’s disappeared! The proletariat? It flew off, 
like an old buggy with a leaky roof, that’s lost its wheels.”
“Now, dear brother,” he continued, “it’s the Central Committees that 
are pushing forward—they’ll be more effective. They don’t need wheels—






In this chapter and the next, we turn from Trotsky’s Stalin to Tamás 
Krausz’s monumental intellectual biography of Lenin. Published in 2015, 
only months before Woods’s translation of Stalin, Krausz’s Reconstructing 
Lenin is based on the author’s “40-year immersion in the study of the spe-
cifics and historical contexts of Lenin’s thoughts.”1 Paul Buhle’s response 
to the publication of the Krausz volume was enthusiastic. Referencing the 
experience of the United States in the late 1960s, Buhle says that mem-
bers of the New Left movement were not particularly into Lenin. They 
were more taken with Marcuse, but did not look “reverentially at either,” 
instead seeking “a third solution.”2 It is from this critical, nonreverential 
standpoint that Buhle approaches Krausz’s work and concludes by giving 
it high praise. Krausz “gives us a Lenin who is deeply relevant for the 
present,” he writes, ending his review with: “We need more ‘leaps,’ and 
this volume will help us.”3
Buhle suggests that Krausz’s book has succeeded in its professed 
aim—to reconstruct the intellectual biography of Lenin and, in doing 
so, to approach Lenin dispassionately and without reverence. As Krausz 
puts it, he was “looking for a path between the ‘cult’ and ‘anti-cult.’” The 
“cult” glorified Lenin’s singular and indispensable role as the founder of 
a party and a state. The “anti-cult” replaced what Krausz calls “uncritical 
glorification” with a focus on Lenin’s thought “purely as an ideology of 
legitimization.”4
Finding a path beyond reverence, between the cult and the anti-cult, 
is a very worthwhile project. The Lenin personality cult will be familiar to 
any who watched with horror as Lenin statues were built by the thousands 
in a Soviet Union dominated by totalitarian Stalinism and the Gulag. 




ideology of Leninism sank into the pits of history along with the system 
itself.”5 The anti-cult of personality became prominent in the Soviet Union 
in the 1980s and accelerated in the post-Soviet era as a “new system cried 
out for a legitimizing ideology.”6 Krausz’s book is impressive, and its goal 
laudable. My own book has on many occasions relied on Krausz’s schol-
arship. But this scholarship sometimes veers off of the nonreverential 
path. This chapter will look at three such moments—the approach Krausz 
takes to Lenin’s biography, to Lenin’s analysis of the 1905 revolution, and 
to Lenin’s relationship to nineteenth-century novelist and social analyst 
Nikolay Chernyshevsky.
A Biographical Cul-de-sac
The signs that Krausz’s approach will have difficulty rising above the 
stance of reverence are revealed in the book’s first section, a seventy-page 
introductory biography of Lenin. Here, Krausz obsessively sketches trivial 
details of Lenin’s personal life that are of no conceivable use to the project 
of dissecting Lenin’s epistemology. He notes that Lenin liked cats and 
enjoyed singing songs of revolution as well as the occasional aria, that 
he “picked mushrooms passionately,” that he had a humble diet (“soup, 
bread, fish, and tea”), that he “enjoyed the company of children, perhaps 
because he could have none himself due to his wife’s autoimmune defi-
ciency,” that he went hunting a few days before his death. “It would have 
naturally crossed his mind,” Krausz writes, “that he was saying goodbye 
to the life from which he had received fulfillment: revolution. Yet he was 
disappointed as his death approached, for the work remained a torso and 
not an entire body.”7
Other reviewers have called this biographical chapter “excellent” 
and “sparkling.”8 But if Krausz’s project is to navigate the middle waters 
between cult and anti-cult, the chapter is in fact distracting, too closely 
related to the long history of reverential treatment of every aspect of Len-
in’s life story.
From 1970 to 1982, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism embarked on 
a multivolume publishing project (twelve volumes in total) on Lenin’s 
life, “in which the whole of his life can be traced year after year, by day, 
and sometimes by hour.”9 We are introduced to this publishing project 




of Marxism, the creator of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
the leader of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the founder of 
the world’s first socialist state.” Apparently, “millions of people around 
the world” are eager to know every possible detail about him and “his 
theoretical and revolutionary-transformational activities.”10 A critical 
researcher, on reading this panegyric, will be suspicious about the qual-
ity and reliability of material written through such a lens of reverence.
The Krausz text, far from distancing itself from this kind of effusive 
praise, at times embraces it enthusiastically. Krausz insists that the “unity 
and coherence” in Lenin the mature politician were already visible in 
Lenin as a youth: “The theoretical and methodological coherence of his 
investigations is surprising, given that Lenin had not even finished his 
university education when he had already emerged from his first study of 
Marx.”11 He castigates “those who . . . deliberately or unwittingly overlook 
the coherence of Lenin’s political and historical-theoretical analyses.”12 At 
times, the unrestrained encomium is almost embarrassing:
Lenin embodied all that was necessary in the Russian Revolution for 
its survival: his organizational drive focused on decisive fields; he was 
inspiring to the masses; he had great political flexibility, uncompro-
mising, plebeian and internationalist commitment, and stamina; he 
was self-sacrificial. . . . His energy, strength of will, and his passion 
for life infused his surroundings and became a sort of incitement to 
significant masses of workers, which was partly instrumental in the 
party’s, or the Soviet government’s ability to suddenly change tack in 
its politics whenever this proved necessary.13
Both the emphasis on the trivial and the overly effusive praise are symp-
tomatic of an incomplete break from the stance of reverence, and might 
explain some of the limitations in Krausz’s sketch of the development of 
Lenin’s epistemology.
The 1905 “Dress Rehearsal”
Krausz argues, in essence, that self-emancipation was at the core of Len-
in’s epistemology. For Lenin, says Krausz, “dialectical materialism (and 
epistemology) incorporates the self-movement in things, phenomena, 




Thus, it is not a matter of the historical dialectic of ideas, but rather the 
self-movement and self-creation of history through social classes and indi-
viduals.”14 It was the historical event of the 1905 revolution that actualized 
this theoretical approach, bringing to the stage of history the self-active 
urban proletariat organized in workers’ councils (soviets)—the institu-
tional embodiment of workers’ self-activity. Lenin famously called 1905 a 
“dress rehearsal” for “the revolutions of 1917—both the bourgeois, Febru-
ary revolution, and the proletarian, October revolution.”15 Krausz asserts 
that “Lenin was the first, along with Rosa Luxemburg, to realize that in 
historical terms a new form of revolution had taken place in 1905.”16
The equation of Lenin and Luxemburg in their understanding of the 
1905 events will not hold up to sustained analysis. Krausz is, of course, 
right to include Luxemburg as a key theorist of the 1905 events. Her “Mass 
Strike” remains a classic text, shaped by the great events of which 1905 
was the culmination.17 So also does Leon Trotsky’s 1905, which is not 
mentioned by Krausz but which also rates as a classic.18 Luxemburg and 
Trotsky, in fact, approach 1905 in ways quite different from Lenin. Their 
views reflect an epistemology quite different to that of Lenin’s, and these 
views (along with their epistemology) have stood the test of time much 
more than have Lenin’s.
Luxemburg saw 1905 as the culmination of years of interaction between 
economic and political struggle, years during which, through mass strikes, 
the Russian workers developed the consciousness and organization to 
challenge the autocracy. She traces an unfolding process of class struggle 
in the Russian empire, from the strike of St. Petersburg textile workers in 
1896 right up to the outbreak of the revolution in 1905.19
The trigger for the Russian Revolution of 1905 occurred on 22 January. 
As Luxemburg describes it: “The demonstration of 200,000 workers ended 
in a frightful bloodbath before the czar’s palace. The bloody massacre in 
St. Petersburg was, as is well known, the signal for the outbreak of the 
first gigantic series of mass strikes which spread over the whole of Russia 
within a few days.” She goes on to say: “This January mass strike was with-
out doubt carried through under the immediate influence of the gigantic 
general strike which in December 1904 broke out in the Caucausus, in 




Luxemburg then traces the history of economic struggle underpinning 
the entire movement. March 1902 saw a strike in the Caucasus. In Nov-
ember of that same year there was a general strike in Rostov-on-Don. In 
1903, “the whole of South Russia in May, June and July was aflame. Baku, 
Tiflis, Batum, Elisavetgrad, Odessa, Kiev, Nikolaev and Ekaterinoslav were 
in a general strike in the literal meaning of those words.” The foundation 
of these great protests was economic. “In Tiflis the strike was begun by 
2000 commercial employees. . . . In Elisavetgrad a strike began in all the 
factories with purely economic demands. . . . In Odessa the movement 
began with a wage struggle. . . . In Kiev a strike began in the railway work-
shops on July 21. Here also the immediate cause was miserable conditions 
of labor, and wage demands were presented. . . . In Nikolaev the general 
strike broke out under the immediate influence of the news from Odessa, 
Baku, Batum and Tiflis.”21
“Thus,” concludes Luxemburg, “the colossal general strike in south 
Russia came into being in the summer of 1903. By many small channels 
of partial economic struggles and little ‘accidental’ occurrences it flowed 
rapidly to a raging sea, and changed the entire south of the czarist empire 
for some weeks into a bizarre revolutionary workers’ republic.”22 The now 
“raging sea” of workers’ protests became general. First in Baku, “due to 
unemployment,” a general strike broke out, the working class “again on the 
field of battle.” Finally, “in January 1905 the mass strike in St. Petersburg 
broke out.”
Here also as is well known, the immediate cause was trivial. Two 
men employed at the Putilov works were discharged on account 
of their membership in the legal Zubatovian union. This measure 
called forth a solidarity strike on January 16 of the whole of the 
12,000 employees in this works . . . in a few days 140,000 workers 
were on strike.23 
The defining basis of Luxemburg’s analysis, then, is the powerful foun-
dation of confidence and organization built up in the economic struggle 
that underpinned the emergence of a political movement.
The young Leon Trotsky approached 1905 from a different but comple-
mentary angle. He emphasized the role of the soviets, which came about 




culmination—and, at the same time, its tragic conclusion—in the activities 
of the Petersburg Soviet of Workers’ Deputies.”24
The Soviet grew as the natural organ of the proletariat in its immedi-
ate struggle for power as determined by the actual course of events. 
The name of “workers’ government” which the workers themselves 
on the one hand, and the reactionary press on the other, gave to 
the Soviet was an expression of the fact that the Soviet really was a 
workers’ government in embryo. . . . The Soviet was, from the start, 
the organization of the proletariat, and its aim was the struggle for 
revolutionary power.25
Without question a new form of revolution had taken place. It was the 
introduction, to the world, of workers’ council democracy through the 
institution of the soviet. Pierre Broué captures this brilliantly:
The first soviet made its appearance at Ivanovo-Voznessensk, the 
“Russian Manchester.” It was born from a strike committee and 
daily assemblies of strikers during the seventy-two days of the 
conflict. The form of the elected council of delegates, controlled 
by their constituents and recallable at any time, had appeared on 
Russian soil and was rapidly adopted in all the working-class areas. 
It seems that it was on the initiative of the print workers that the 
St. Petersburg soviet was born. It quickly expanded to include 
factory delegates from all the workers of the capital, representa-
tives of non-working-class unions, and of the different factions of 
social democracy. It was the soviet that led the general strike and 
took responsibility for keeping order while simultaneously man-
aging transportation and other public services whose functioning 
was indispensable for the strike’s success. It was the soviet that . . . 
imposed the eight-hour day in workplaces. The soviet took the 
initiative to publish the daily Izvestiia (News); organized a boycott of 
taxes; launched the celebrated manifesto warning creditors that the 
revolution would not pay interest on Russia’s debts; and imposed, 
against rising inflation, the payment of wages in gold coin. The 
soviet gave impetus to the organization of unions, organized work-
ers’ self-defence groups that repressed an attempted pogrom by the 




example and through the publicity that was made about it, led to the 
formation of soviets in all the large cities.26
Trotsky responded to the soviets in a manner that put him ahead of 
his time. “Placed at the heart of the St. Petersburg Soviet experience,” 
writes Broué, Trotsky “drew up the balance sheet of its actions, and con-
cluded: ‘There is no doubt that at the next revolutionary explosion, similar 
councils of workers will form in every country. A pan-Russian soviet of 
workers, organized by a national congress . . . will assume leadership.’” 
That future pan-Russian soviet, Broué quotes Trotsky as saying, would 
be able to organize “revolutionary collaboration with the army, the peas-
antry and the plebian sections of the middle classes,” and would organize 
the abolition of absolutism, the police, and the bureaucratic apparatus. It 
would be in a position to initiate “the eight-hour day; the arming of the 
people and, above all, the workers; the transformation of the soviets into 
revolutionary organs of self-government in the cities, the formation of 
peasant soviets to direct, on the spot, the agrarian revolution,” and finally, 
it would be able to ensure “elections to the Constituent Assembly.”27
Trotsky, in 1905, worked closely with the Mensheviks—a faction of the 
Left that Lenin strongly opposed, but that, like Trotsky, had a clear sense 
of the importance of the soviets. According to Broué: “The Mensheviks, 
whose propaganda willingly advanced watchwords such as ‘popular state,’ 
‘self-government’ or ‘commune,’ supported the creation of the soviets and 
in them played a not insignificant role.”28 Israel Getzler says this more 
forcefully. Placing a strong emphasis on the elective principle in both the 
party and the wider workers’ movement, he writes: 
It may not be unreasonable to suggest that by May 1905 [Menshevik 
leader Iulii] Martov’s thinking and Menshevik thinking in general 
had already established the principles which in October 1905, were 
to become the organization and ideological basis of the Petersburg 
Soviet, i.e. a representative council of the entire working class elected 
in industrial plants, factories and workshops by democratic vote.29
By contrast, Lenin’s wing of the Left—the Bolshevik faction—was 
completely sectarian. Pierre Broué says that the Bolsheviks “were much 




among them saw in the soviets an attempt to develop an informal and 
irresponsible organism in competition with the authority of the party. 
The Bolsheviks of St. Petersburg began by refusing to participate” in the 
soviets.30 According to Trotsky: “The part of the Bolshevik Central Com-
mittee then in St. Petersburg resolutely opposed an elected non-party 
organization because it was afraid of competition with the party.”31
The extent to which Lenin shared this sectarian position is not clear. He 
did challenge it in a letter written from exile to the Bolshevik leadership on 
the ground: “I think it inadvisable to demand that the Soviet of Workers’ 
Deputies should accept the Social-Democratic programme and join the 
Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.”32
This certainly shows Lenin pushing back against the sectarianism of 
the local Bolshevik leadership. But Lenin was very tentative, very unsure 
of himself, prefacing his remarks with the comment: “I may be wrong, but 
I believe (on the strength of the incomplete and only ‘paper’ information 
at my disposal) that politically the Soviet of Workers’ Deputies should be 
regarded as the embryo of a provisional revolutionary government.”33 This 
is in sync with a caveat he introduces very early in the letter: “I consider it 
absolutely necessary to make a most important reservation. I am speaking 
as an onlooker. I still have to write from that accursed ‘afar,’ from the hate-
ful ‘abroad’ of an exile.”34 Most significantly, the letter was not published 
in the Bolshevik press of 1905, lying dormant in the archives until 1940, 
years after Lenin’s death. The fact that a letter from Lenin, written in the 
midst of revolution and suggesting a complete change of course for the 
Bolsheviks, should have remained unpublished speaks volumes.
Trotsky sharply differentiates Lenin’s position from that of the local 
leadership: “The sectarian attitude of the Bolshevik leaders toward the 
Soviet lasted until Lenin’s arrival in November.”35 Others present a different 
picture. James White says that Lenin “was rather dismissive of soviets as 
a means of mobilising the workers.”36 According to Broué, “Lenin himself 
did not seem to give the Soviets either the importance or the significance 
that he would give them in 1917.”37
A survey of Lenin’s writings in subsequent years shows clearly that 
he did not emphasize the mass strike movement, à la Luxemburg, or the 
soviet experience, à la Trotsky, but rather focussed on an event that has 




thousand militant fighters in Moscow in December (perhaps five hun-
dred of them either Bolshevik or Menshevik).38 “The December action 
in Moscow,” wrote Lenin, “vividly demonstrated that the general strike, 
as an independent and predominant form of struggle, is out of date, that 
the movement is breaking out of these narrow bounds with elemental 
and irresistible force and giving rise to the highest form of struggle—an 
uprising.”39 The same emphasis can be found in a piece by Lenin marking 
the five-year anniversary of the 1905 revolution.40 So focused on armed 
insurrection was Lenin that in volume 8 of his collected works, which 
covers the first six months of 1905, the word “insurrection” appears 44 
times, “dynamite” twice, “bomb” 4 times, “revolver” 4 times, and “upris-
ing” 202 times, 40 of which are part of the phrase “armed uprising.”41
The 1905 uprising had no chance of success. It was crushed by the 
overwhelmingly superior armed strength of the tsarist state, leading to a 
horrific reaction. In February 1907, according to Trotsky, “Lenin charac-
terized the political situation of the country in the following words: ‘The 
most unrestrained, the most brazen lawlessness . . . The most reactionary 
election law in Europe.’”42 Trotsky argued that “Lenin’s prestige was decid-
edly lowered by the December defeat.”43 It took years, however, for Lenin 
to admit that the moment for armed uprising had passed. Through 1906 
and 1907, Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades, in the face of continuing 
fierce reaction from the tsar, had not abandoned armed insurrection as 
an immediate objective.
Today, few looking back on the events of 1905 would identify the failed 
uprising of two thousand armed workers in Moscow as the highest form of 
struggle in 1905. Most would identify—à la Luxemburg and Trotsky—the 
mass strike of hundreds of thousands and the emergence of a network 
of workers’ councils across the Russian empire as the highest forms of 
struggle. Certainly in 1906, Lenin had not yet come to this conclusion, 
calling the general strike “out of date” and identifying the armed uprising 
as “the highest form of struggle.”44 A January 1917 lecture by Lenin on the 
1905 revolution is more rounded: he incorporated some of Luxemburg’s 
emphasis on the importance of mass strikes and the interaction between 
the economic and the political, and he at least noted the emergence of “the 





Broué provides a summary of the evolution of Lenin’s thinking about 
1905 that parallels the summary given here. In the heat of revolution in 
1905, Lenin supported the conservative position of the St. Petersburg Bol-
sheviks, “in whose eyes the soviet was ‘neither a workers’ parliament, nor 
an organ of workers’ self-government,’ but only a ‘combat organization for 
attaining certain definite aims.’”
In 1907 he admitted that it was necessary to scientifically study the 
question to understand if the soviets truly constituted “a revolution-
ary power.” In January 1917, at a conference on the 1905 revolution, 
he only mentioned the soviets in passing, defining them as “organs 
of struggle.” It was only in the course of the following weeks that 
he would modify his analysis, under the influence of Bukharin, the 
Dutch socialist Pannekoek, and above all the role played by the new 
Russian soviets.46
Clearly, then, Lenin’s position on the 1905 revolution did evolve and 
mature. By 1917, he was clearer as to the real significance of the event, 
the importance of the mass strikes, and the importance of the institution 
of the soviet. But this evolution was painstaking, took years, and lagged 
far behind the positions of both Luxemburg and Trotsky. Krausz’s claim 
that “Lenin was the first, along with Rosa Luxemburg, to realize that in 
historical terms a new form of revolution had taken place in 1905” is 
simply wrong.
What Is to Be Done . . . with Chernyshevsky?
If great historical events, such as the 1905 revolution, can be foundational to 
epistemologies, so can influential works of literature. In this regard, Lenin 
scholars, Krausz among them, inevitably reference the nineteenth-century 
figure of Nikolay Chernyshevsky when sketching Leninist epistemologies. 
Krausz points out what many others have noted—that Lenin’s favourite 
book as a youth was Chernyshevsky’s novel What Is to Be Done? Lenin 
paid explicit homage to this novel, borrowing its title for his famous 1902 
pamphlet on party organization.47 Krausz argues that Chernyshevsky’s 
novel, “in which the protagonist, Rakhmetov, is a revolutionary,” can be 
“held responsible for Lenin becoming a revolutionary. . . . During one 




very strong claim: “Throughout his life, Lenin declared that next to Marx, 
Engels, and Plekhanov, Chernyshevsky had the greatest influence upon 
his thinking.”48
Krausz is not alone in this emphasis on Chernyshevsky. China Miéville, 
in his contribution to books published on the centenary of the revolution, 
begins his account with a reference to “the trenchant Nikolai Chernyshev-
sky” and returns to the novel in his epilogue.49 Tariq Ali, in his contribution 
to the centenary literature, frequently references Chernysehvsky and, like 
Krausz, makes strong claims as to the novel’s influence on Lenin, saying 
that “the book that changed him was not Capital, as official hagiographers 
would later maintain, but Chernyshevsky’s novel What Is to Be Done?”50 
At the same time, both Miéville and Ali display some ambivalence about 
the literary value of Chernyshevsky’s novel, which Miéville calls a “strange 
book.”51
As an artifact of a moment in Russian history, What Is to be Done? 
is worth reading and studying. Chernyshevsky’s novel was part of the 
literary ferment against tsarist oppression that was so characteristic of 
nineteenth-century Russian literature. However, those who tackle it in the 
current period will not encounter an easy book.52 As a work of literature, 
the novel is laborious and tedious, reminiscent at times of high Stalinist 
“socialist realism” and at others of writings by the rational egoist Ayn 
Rand, one of the twentieth century’s most prominent anticommunists. 
However, a reverential approach to Lenin too often spills over into a rev-
erential silence about these aspects of his favourite author.
Written while the author was imprisoned, completed in 1863, and 
serialized in the publication Sovremennik (Contemporary), the novel 
proved “quite too liberal” for the tsarist authorities. As the translators 
of the 1886 English edition stated in their preface, the novel “was hardly 
brought out in book form before it was ruthlessly suppressed.” Nonethe-
less, they wrote, it “made an immense sensation throughout Russia. It is 
said that hundreds of young girls living in disagreeable circumstances 
started to follow Véra Pavlovna’s example, and hundreds of young men, 
to live honorable, lofty, philosophical lives in the fashion of the types 
represented by Lopukhoóf and Kirsánof.”53
Richard Peace describes the novel’s protagonist, Rakhmetov, as 




Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons.54 Writing in the introduction to the 1989 Eng-
lish translation of What Is to Be Done? Michael Katz and William Wagner 
characterize Bazarov’s world view as “destructive at best. He aims only ‘to 
clear the ground’ and has absolutely no positive program in mind.”55 In 
Turgenev’s novel, Bazarov sums up his philosophy by proclaiming to his 
friend Arkady, “Give us fresh victims! We must smash people!”56 Bazarov 
fails miserably at love and dies a tormented death after recklessly poison-
ing himself with typhus during a needless autopsy on a peasant. There is 
little to learn from his example.
As a role model, Rakhmetov has moved beyond this all-embracing 
nihilism and is, in that sense, an improvement. But Rakhmetov’s alterna-
tive to nihilism has its own problems. He is guided by “a set of original 
principles to govern his material, moral, and spiritual life,” Chernyshevsky 
writes. “He said to himself, ‘I shall not drink one drop of wine. I shall not 
touch any women.’” Although he had been “brought up on a sumptuous 
diet,” he “gave up white bread and had only black bread at his table. For 
weeks at a time he never put a lump of sugar into his mouth; for months 
at a time he ate no fruit, no veal, and no poultry.”57
Apart from the avoidance of women, these ascetic predilections might 
be understood as a young activist’s desire to live like the “common people.” 
In Rakhmetov’s words: “Anything the common people eat on occasion, 
I too can eat on occasion. Anything that is never available to them, I too 
must never eat. That is essential so that I can appreciate how difficult their 
life is compared to mine.” But not all of his dietary choices can be so cat-
egorized. We learn that “he needed to eat beef, a great deal of beef. . . . He 
ordered his landlady to purchase good quality beef, the very best cuts for 
him.” He also had one habit about which he felt “remorse”—his smoking: 
“Out of his 400-ruble income, almost 150 went for cigars.”58
The puritanical traits listed to this point strike us as quaint but harm-
less. Others, though, are bizarre and abhorrent. One morning, Kirsanov 
(earlier spelled Kirsánof) is summoned by Rakhmetov’s landlady, who 
senses something amiss. He goes in haste to his friend’s apartment. 
“Rakhmetov unlocked the door with a broad, grim smile,” and Kirsanov 
was confronted with a terrible sight. 
The back and sides of Rakhmetov’s underclothes . . . were soaked 




was also covered with blood; in the felt were hundreds of little nails, 
heads down and points up sticking out almost half a vershok [nearly 
an inch]. Rakhmetov had been lying on them all night. “What on 
earth is this, Rakhmetov?” cried Kirsanov in horror. “A trial,” he 
replied. “It’s necessary. Improbable, of course, but in any case neces-
sary. Now I know I can do it.”59 
This was the man that Chernyshevsky labelled “extraordinary.”
According to Katz and Wagner, Chernyshevsky “drew heavily on 
British utilitarianism to explain human behavior and to refute idealist 
conceptions of morality. The resulting theory of rational egoism enabled 
him to reconcile the individual’s need for personal self-fulfillment with 
the collective interests of the community.”60 So strong is this rational egoist 
component of Chernyshevsky that a widely cited defence of Ayn Rand—
Chris Matthew Sciabarra’s Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical—sees a direct 
link between Chernyshevsky and Rand. According to Sciabarra, the ethics 
of Chernyshevsky amount to “a form of psychological egoism, where each 
person always acts selfishly,” a stance perfectly in sync with Rand’s Atlas 
Shrugged and The Fountainhead.61
Krausz surmises that it was during “the summer that followed his 
expulsion from Kazan University” that Lenin read What Is to Be Done? 
five times. That would have been the summer of 1888, when Lenin was 
eighteen years old. What was it that drove the young Lenin to consume 
this novel over and over again that summer? Lenin’s student activism, for 
which he was expelled from Kazan University in December 1887, came 
only months after the death of his elder brother, Aleksandr, who was 
arrested and executed in May for his involvement in a plot to assassinate 
Alexander III. This might well have drawn a grief-stricken teenage Lenin 
toward Rakhmetov. According to Nathan Haskell Dole and S. S. Skidelsky, 
“nearly all the characters” of the Chernyshevsky novel “are supposed to 
be drawn from real life,” including Rakhmetov, who “is considered by 
many Russians to be a true picture of Karakózof, who in 1866 attempted 
to assassinate the Emperor Alexander II.”62 Dole and Skidelsky are not 
speculating about a hidden meaning planted by Chernyshevsky; the novel 
was finished three years prior to the assassination attempt. It is, rather, a 
reflection of the way in which the novel was so aligned with the spirit of 




We can have some patience for Lenin’s fascination with the pecu-
liar figure of Rakhmetov. Lenin was young and grieving the loss of his 
brother. We should have less patience with Lenin’s biographer, who leaves 
the reader with the false impression that it is Chernyshevsky the novelist 
who stayed with Lenin all his life—alongside Marx, Engels, and Plekhanov.
Except for the homage to the novel embedded in the title of Lenin’s 
own What Is to Be Done? Lenin never refers to Chernyshevsky the novel-
ist in the Collected Works.63 He writes with respect about Chernyshevsky 
“the materialist,” who “ridiculed the petty concessions to idealism and 
mysticism that were made by the then fashionable ‘positivists.’”64 He 
praises Chernyshevsky the “revolutionary democrat,” who “approached 
all the political events of his times in a revolutionary spirit and was able to 
exercise a revolutionary influence by advocating . . . the idea of a peasant 
revolution, the idea of the struggle of the masses for the overthrow of 
all the old authorities.”65 He cites Chernyshevsky’s careful analysis of the 
Peasant Reform of 1861. Chernyshevsky, Lenin writes, saw that so-called 
reform as “vile.” From its inception, “he clearly saw its feudal nature, he 
clearly saw that the liberal emancipators were robbing the peasants of 
their last shirt.”66 This “emancipation” of the peasants included punitive 
“land redemption payments,” which were so extreme that “for half a cen-
tury the peasants have languished in hunger, and have died on those land 
allotments, weighted down by such payments.”67
A genuine intellectual biography of Lenin demands that we separate 
Chernyshevsky the mediocre, Rand-like novelist from Chernyshevsky 
the dedicated political activist. We should similarly separate the teenage 
Lenin grieving for his elder brother from the adult Lenin trying to organ-
ize a socialist movement. Such separations, however, become impossible 
once the biographer loses objectivity through an attitude of reverence 
and deference.
Historical Materialism and the Role of the Individual in 
History
Paul Buhle says that “Krausz might well be regarded as successor to Georg 
Lukács,” referring to a 1924 book on Lenin by another philosopher from 
Hungary.68 Krausz agrees. “The subject of this book,” he writes in the pref-




field of Lenin research. A publication by Georg Lukács of what he called 
‘an occasional study’ on the ‘unity of Lenin’s thought’ came out as early as 
1924. His 100-page essay is an autonomous philosophical work of extra-
ordinary value, and as such still has its own independent life.”69
But this puts a whole lot of weight onto a little pamphlet that, as Martin 
Jay points out, was “hastily written in February 1924, to commemorate the 
loss” of what Lukács called “the greatest thinker to have been produced 
by the working-class movement since Marx.”70 The pamphlet is replete 
with panegyrics of the same type: Lenin was a “genius” who saw “the true 
essence, the living, active main trends . . . behind every event of his time.”71
This is compatible with a tradition, already visible before Lenin’s death, 
of treating him with a reverence that had the flavour of religion (or of a 
Chernyshevsky novel). In an article titled simply “Lenin,” to mark the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of party organizing in Russia, the always florid 
Karl Radek wrote: “All revolutionists amongst the proletarians of every 
country are filled with the thought and the wish that this Moses, who 
has led the slaves from the land of bondage, may pass with us into the 
promised land.”72 Reaching back more than two thousand years to find a 
mythical biblical character as a reference point for a biographical sketch 
of a living person is both unnecessary and embarrassing. 
In the immediate aftermath of Lenin’s death, Trotsky, usually more 
measured, also wrote in quite florid terms, calling Lenin “the great leader, 
Lenin, Ilyich, the unique, the only one.” He went on to say, “Lenin is no 
more. These words fall upon our mind as heavily as a giant rock falls 
into the sea. . . . The party is orphaned; and so is the working class.” And 
finally: “How shall we go forward? Shall we keep to the road, shall we not 
go astray? For Lenin, comrades, is no longer with us.”73
We can perhaps understand Lukács’s and Trotsky’s emotional responses 
to the death of a head of state and of a comrade, but we need to put these 
responses in their context. Part of that context was politics—deadly ser-
ious politics that must be appreciated in our reading of both Lukács and 
Trotsky from that year. Trotsky’s little pamphlet titled “Lenin Is Dead,” 
as Bertram Wolfe notes, “was written hurriedly because Lenin had just 
died. . . . It was rushed to the press because Stalin had cunningly deceived 




he could not possibly arrive from a sanitarium in the Caucasus in time 
for the funeral.”74
Martin Jay says something similar about Lukács’s Lenin, which was 
“probably designed to head off the accusations of heresy stimulated by 
History and Class Consciousness,” Lukács’s attempt at a philosophical 
defence of Bolshevism published the year before Lenin’s death. In the small 
pamphlet to commemorate Lenin, Lukács purged “virtually all references 
of his ultra-leftist sectarianism.”
Instead, Lenin’s “Realpolitik” . . . was invoked as an antidote to the 
utopian musings of the Left sectarians. . . . He praised Lenin’s theory 
of the vanguard party with few of those Luxemburgist qualifications 
evident in at least the early essays of History and Class Consciousness. 
Although the soviets were still lauded as the locus of dual power 
under a bourgeois regime and the means by which the split between 
economics and politics was overcome, they were severed entirely 
from any notion of majoritarian democracy, for “it must always 
be remembered that the great majority of the population belongs 
to neither of the two classes which play a decisive part in the class 
struggle, to neither the proletariat nor the bourgeoisie.”75
This is awkward territory for both Lukács and Trotsky—and of course, for 
Krausz. A method by which to analyze the role of the individual in hist-
ory does not automatically flow from the categories central to historical 
materialism, a paradigm that is focused on the intersection between pol-
itical economy, social movements, and class struggle and that consciously 
disparages the liberal approach (and the Chernyshevsky approach), which 
fetishizes the role of “great men” (and they are usually men). Yet these 
hastily written eulogies—and Krausz’s twenty-first-century recapitulation 
of the same themes—feel much more rooted in either that disparaged 
liberal tradition or the unexamined Chernyshevsky tradition rather than 
in historical materialism.76
There are much better attempts at situating the individual—including 
the individual named Vladimir Lenin—within the wider dynamics of 
political economy and class struggle. Compare Trotsky’s grief-stricken 




In 1934, Trotsky eschewed the “genius” category employed in Lukács’s 
1924 panegyric. “Lenin was not a demiurge of the revolutionary process,” 
writes Trotsky. “He merely entered into a chain of objective historic forces. 
But he was a great link in that chain.”77 For Trotsky, that link is one that 
includes the collective institutional actor, the Bolshevik Party. The Octo-
ber Revolution “was inferred from the whole situation,” but could not 
have happened “without a party. The party could fulfill its mission only 
after understanding it. For that Lenin was needed.” Trotsky identifies the 
equivocation of authoritative leaders such as Lev Kamenev and Joseph 
Stalin, who were “tossed by the course of events to the right. . . . Inner 
struggle in the Bolshevik Party was absolutely unavoidable. Lenin’s arrival 
merely hastened the process. His personal influence shortened the crisis.”78
This is a much deeper analysis than that provided by Lukács. It does 
not deny the role of the individual: in fact, Trotsky writes that “the role of 
personality arises before us here on a truly gigantic scale.” However, “it is 
necessary only to understand that role correctly, taking personality as a 
link in the historic chain.”79 However one evaluates the actions of Lenin, 
Trotsky, and the Bolsheviks, at the plane of understanding class struggle 
dynamics, this analysis is head and shoulders above that put forward by 
Lukács—and Trotsky—in 1924.
A Plural, Not a Singular, Left
Krausz argues that “it is impossible to excavate the legacy of Lenin without 
steady determination and strict analysis.”80 However, imbued with the very 
reverence against which he warns us, his book falters on both counts. In 
fact, the very existence of one more biography of Lenin (we already have 
hundreds) poses its own questions. Too much of the Left’s long engage-
ment with the Russian Revolution has been coloured by a counter-intuitive 
focus on the role of the lone figure of Vladimir Lenin—counter-intuitive 
because historical materialism, the method claimed by most who focus 
on 1917, points us not toward individuals but toward political economy 
and social classes.
In the Russian revolutionary era, probably the key test for any notion of 
party building was posed by the necessity of opposing an imperialist war. 
Perhaps the key moment in creating an antiwar movement was the famous 




Lenin who pushed for this conference.81 In fact, it was the product of a 
much wider layer in the antiwar Left than just the Bolsheviks.82 Israel 
Getzler notes that “though the original initiative came from the Italian 
socialists,” a key mover was Lenin’s nemesis, Iulii Martov. When leading 
Italian socialist Odino Morgari was in Paris in April 1915, five months 
before Zimmerwald, Martov, in the words of Getzler, “worked on” him and 
“appealed to Robert Grimm to replace what was planned as a conference 
of socialists of neutral countries only, by an international conference of 
all socialists pledged to peace.”83
To this point, Lenin and the Bolsheviks had advocated a peculiar and 
divisive policy known as “revolutionary defeatism.” Sometimes this policy 
focused only on Russia. A resolution “adopted by the foreign (i.e., outside 
Russia) sections of the Bolshevik party at their conference in Berne in 
March 1915” called the defeat of Russian tsarism “under all conditions, 
the lesser evil.”84 At other times, the policy implied that such an approach 
should be applied by all socialists to all countries involved in the Great 
War. In 1915, Lenin and Zinoviev, in their pamphlet Socialism and War, 
argued that “the Socialists of all the belligerent countries should express 
their wish that all ‘their’ governments be defeated.”85 Besides being difficult 
to understand, this position was prone to extreme misinterpretation. In 
Brian Pearce’s words, there was the “danger of a sterile nihilistic conclu-
sion being drawn from his presentation of the way to fight against the 
war.” Noticing that Lenin was calling for the defeat of Russia in the war, a 
Ukrainian nationalist approached him in January 1915 to seek a working 
agreement, asking for the Bolsheviks to work openly with those allied with 
Russia’s wartime enemies. Lenin, notes Pearce in his succinct account, had 
to “rebuff ” these “hopeful overtures,” telling the anti-Russian Ukrainian: 
“We are not travelling the same road.”86 Both Luxemburg and Trotsky 
saw Lenin’s position as simply social patriotism in reverse. Whereas the 
“social patriots” lined up with the militarism of their own state, Lenin’s 
policy would be used by those who were lining up with the militarism of 
the opposing states—but all militarisms had to be opposed.
At Zimmerwald, Lenin’s position on revolutionary defeatism was sup-
ported by just eight delegates. Trotsky, who was with the majority, argued 
that the Leninist position, sectarian and confusing, pushed a program of 




activism in the here and now for an immediate peace. Trotsky proposed 
a manifesto that put the question of an immediate peace at the centre and 
that provided a socialist analysis as to the causes of the war. In contrast 
to Lenin putting “defeatism” to the fore, Trotsky advanced the position of 
“the struggle for peace . . . a peace without annexations or war indemnities 
and based on self-determination for all peoples.”87 Lenin, knowing that 
he was isolated, decided to not vote against this, and Trotsky’s position 
was carried unanimously and without amendments. But Lenin did not 
immediately change his mind. “After Zimmerwald,” writes Pearce, “Lenin 
continued for just over a year to plug away at his ‘defeatism’ thesis.” And, at 
the next antiwar gathering in Kienthal, in April 1916, he again attempted, 
without success, to have his defeatist views adopted as the standpoint of 
the movement. After Kienthal, he published two more pieces defending 
the defeatist standpoint, but these appear to be his last statements on the 
matter.88 In their work on the ground, many Bolsheviks, in practice, came 
around to the more concrete position of Trotsky, Martov, and the majority 
of the Zimmerwaldians.
Pierre Broué calls Zimmerwald a “decisive turning point” in the con-
struction of a New Left from the ashes of the Second International.89 
The pressure of the wider movement pushed Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
away from their sharply formulated, confusing, and extremely sectar-
ian positions, around which no mass movement could be built, toward 
more concrete, comprehensible slogans, around which a “peace now” 
mass movement could be built. It was this internationalist Zimmerwald 
platform—and its corollary emerging from the follow-up conference at 
Kienthal—that provided the basis for the creation of a united Left, how-
ever temporary, in Russia. This united Left included the fusion, in July 1917, 
of the four-thousand-strong Mezhraionka (Inter-District Committee) and 
the Bolsheviks, a union that brought not only Trotsky into the party, but 
also many prominent activists.90 The anonymous author of “Memoirs of a 
Bolshevik-Leninist” goes so far as to say that these new recruits “became 
the ideological and organizational backbone of the Bolshevik Party.”91
The Zimmerwald perspective, shaped by Trotsky, was not, in other 
words, a momentary step on the road toward Bolshevism but a defining 
and enduring reorientation of the Left, away from the too strident pos-




not shaped by Lenin the helmsman. It was an emergent, collective Left of 
which Lenin was a part, but which had many other key players, including 
Iulii Martov, Leon Trotsky, Clara Zetkin, and Robert Grimm—not to men-
tion Rosa Luxemburg, who had a powerful impact. This decisive moment 
in the story of the Left and the social movements of the twentieth century 
was made possible by a plural, not a singular, Left, which is a significant 
lesson for us from this period.
It is worth reiterating a key point from this narrative. Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks were pressured into this change of position by developments 
in the wider movement; they did not think their way toward them on 
their own. In fact, Lenin’s thinking on the whole question of socialists, 
imperialism, and war had been, if anything, oblique and confusing. In a 
series of letters to Inessa Armand, he tried to outline the key points of his 
theory, saying that socialist policy in the second decade of the twentieth 
century had to be different from socialist policy in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, because: “In 1891 there was no imperialism at all . . . 
and there was not, nor could there have been, an imperialist war on the 
part of Germany.”92 Imperialism was absent from the world stage in 1891? 
Not only does Lenin’s comment disregard the unlikeliness of such a great 
change in international political economy occurring in only twenty-five 
years, but it also ignores the vast expanse of the British Empire, which was 
at the peak of its power in the very decade when the world had supposedly 
not yet arrived at imperialism!
Living as we are in the shadow of the hundredth anniversary of the 
Russian Revolution, it is timely to attempt to reconstruct Lenin. Krausz’s 
reconstruction, which was “four decades in the making,” is an impressive, 
meticulously researched book spanning the decades that marked the end 
of the cult of Lenin and the entrenching of the anti-cult.93 But it is part 
of an emergent discourse not yet able to separate itself from a reverential 
attitude, which, as I have tried to show in this chapter, stands as a barrier 
to clarity and understanding. While Krausz’s attempt at an epistemological 
reconstruction of Lenin is a welcome contribution to a necessary conver-
sation, this reconstruction itself requires considerable deconstruction.
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The Leninist story has its roots in an attempt, at the turn of the twenti-
eth century, to gather the scattered left-wing groups across the Russian 
empire and organize them into a single unified party. Alexander Potresov, 
a person central to this process, wrote that “at the end of our deportation, 
we established what Lenin called the ‘Triple Alliance’ (Lenin, Martov, 
and I), with the aim of creating an illegal literary centre of the movement 
around the paper Iskra [Spark] and the magazine Zaria [Dawn] and to 
make of these publications a tool to build a truly all-Russian, unified and 
organized party.”1
At one level, the history of this project is well known, including the 
launch of these two publications (Iskra in 1900, Zaria in 1901), the theor-
izing of their use in Lenin’s What Is to Be Done? and the unexpected 
split that broke the unity of the “Triple Alliance” at the end of the 1903 
Congress, putting Lenin at odds with Martov and Potresov. At another 
level, it is virtually unknown. At best, our received wisdom is partial. 
First, the “publication as organizer” concept is universally credited to 
one person—Lenin. In fact, as Potresov tells us, Lenin had two intimate 
collaborators—Martov and Potresov. Second, the concept is universally 
associated with the newspaper Iskra as the publication around which the 
organization would be built. In fact, the project envisaged a newspaper for 
popular consumption (Iskra) along with a theoretical journal for in-depth 
history and theory (Zaria). The eclipse of two of the three collaborators 
speaks to the long habit of elevating the role of Lenin and minimizing (or 
erasing) the role of others—the theme of the previous chapter. The eclipse 
of the theoretical journal from the “publication as organizer” concept 
speaks to the anti-intellectualism that is the theme of this chapter. Krausz’s 
scholarship helps us open the door to this aspect of Lenin’s thought.
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The Turn to Anti-intellectualism
Navigating the relationship between the left and the intelligentsia was a 
critical task in Lenin’s time as much as it is in our own. Tamás Krausz and 
many others highlight the centrality to Lenin, at the time of the launch 
of Iskra and Zaria, of a theory of political organization in which intel-
lectuals—or intelligentsia—would play a crucial role. In the early 1900s, 
Lenin believed that socialist “consciousness had to be injected from the 
outside,” as Krausz notes.2 Therefore, he ascribed a central role to intellec-
tuals coming into the movement from outside the working class. In 1902, 
Lenin articulated his views in What Is to Be Done?:
The theory of socialism . . . grew out of the philosophic, historical, 
and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of 
the propertied classes, by intellectuals. By their social status the 
founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, them-
selves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia. In the very same 
way, in Russia, the theoretical doctrine of Social-Democracy 
arose altogether independently of the spontaneous growth of 
the working-class movement; it arose as a natural and inevitable 
outcome of the development of thought among the revolutionary 
socialist intelligentsia.3
Whatever the merits of this argument, it was not one unique to Lenin. It 
is well-known (and documented within Lenin’s text) that his view that the 
socialist movement required the uniting of working-class militants with 
radical intellectuals outside the working class leaned heavily on the writ-
ings of Karl Kautsky.4 It is not well-known that in 1900, Iulii Martov, who 
was later to become Lenin’s principal critic, had published the book Red 
Banner in Russia: An Essay on the History of the Russian Labor Movement, 
which was organized around a thesis almost identical to that of Lenin’s.5 
Savel’ev and Tiutiukin summarize the focus of Martov’s book: “From an 
initial premise that the contemporary international socialist movement 
resulted from the unification of two elements that had long been devel-
oping separately (the workers’ economic struggle and the ideological and 
theoretical activity of socialist intellectuals), Tsederbaum [Martov] studied 
the merger of these two currents, specifically in the Russian context.”6 
Lenin spoke favourably of Martov’s book at the time of its publication.7
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A photograph of Lenin (centre, sitting behind table), Martov (to Lenin’s left, 
elbow on table), and other young intellectuals taken after a meeting of the 
St. Petersburg chapter of the League of Struggle for the Emancipation of 
the Working Class, February 1987. Photograph by Nadezdha Konstantinovna 
Krupskaya, Wikimedia Commons.
That said, Lenin decisively parted company with Kautsky’s and 
Martov’s views from 1903 until his death, making a hard turn toward 
anti-intellectualism. The trigger for this turn was the split in the Russian 
Left in 1903. Krausz suggests that Lenin saw “sociological and psych-
ological reasons” for the split. This line of argument was developed in 
Lenin’s polemical work titled One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, where 
he “entertained a digression about the ‘significance of the mentality of the 
intelligentsia.’ According to him, differences in mentality were bound to 
hamper consolidation, at least until the time the workers took control of the 
party.”8 Krausz goes on to argue that “a certain degree of anti-intelligentsia 
bias was characteristic of Lenin’s political disposition. It stemmed from his 
approach to class (the interests of intellectuals being different from that 
of the working class).” Lenin’s “political experiences” showed him that, 
“due to its ‘individualist’ traits, a significant majority of the intelligentsia 
would not subject itself to the ‘social order and discipline’ of the Soviet 
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system.”9 Krausz is outlining what can only be called a problematic and 
simplistic sociology and, at the same time, minimizing the significance of 
this simplistic sociology to Lenin’s thought. This “anti-intelligentsia” bias, 
based on an essentialist sociology, was more than a diversion: it became 
embedded in the core of Lenin’s writings and lasted until his death.
Lenin’s One Step Forward, Two Steps Back crystallizes this turn to 
anti-intellectualism. In that work, his characterizations of the intellectual 
can be placed into two categories: (a) the economic reductionist sociology 
summarized by Krausz; and (b) invective and insults. Let’s begin with 
the latter, which set the tone for his entire book. He counterposes “the 
individualism of the intellectual, with its platonic acceptance of organisa-
tional relations” to “the proletariat,” which “is trained for organisation by 
its whole life, far more radically than many an intellectual.”10 He declares: 
“Onward! That’s what I understand! That’s life! Not the endless, tedious 
intellectual talk, which comes to an end not because people have resolved 
the issue, but because they are tired of talking.”11 These outbursts are in no 
way isolated. Lenin denigrates “the mentality of the radical intellectual, 
who has much more in common with bourgeois decadence than with 
Social-Democracy.”12 One Step Forward, Two Steps Back contains many 
more similar instances of invective.
• “intellectual feebleness,” “flabby whimpering of intellectuals,” “the 
instability and feebleness of the intellectual”13
• “the ‘flabby whimper’ of defeated intellectuals”14
• “opportunism and intellectualist instability,” “the intellectualist 
instability of the minority,” “the intellectualist instability of certain 
comrades”15
• “unstable intellectuals”16
• “the dissolute intellectual”17
When Lenin leaves the terrain of insult and invective, the level of his 
analysis rises only slightly. The key to the rightward drift outside the Bol-
sheviks, he argues, is “the minority’s intellectualist individualism.”18 He 
claims that “to the individualism of the intellectual,” with “its tendency 
to opportunist argument and anarchistic phrase-mongering, all prole-
tarian organisation and discipline seems to be serfdom.”19 He describes 
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“the political complexion of this typical intellectual, who on joining the 
Social-Democratic movement brought with him opportunist habits of 
thought.”20 He contrasts “the psychology of the unstable intellectual and 
that of the seasoned proletarian, between intellectual individualism and 
proletarian cohesion.”21 He invokes the categories of the French Revolution 
to make his case, counterposing “the Girondist timidity of the bourgeois 
intellectual” to the Jacobinism of his faction. “The Jacobin inseparably 
connected with the organisation of the proletariat—a proletariat con-
scious of its class interests—this is the revolutionary Social-Democrat,” 
he declares. The next sentence then fully combines the two approaches—
insult followed by sociological reductionism: “The Girondist yearning for 
professors and school boys, who is afraid of the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat, and who sighs about the absolute value of democratic demands, 
this is the opportunist.”22
In a leaflet written in July 1904, but published only in 1923, the invec-
tive, insults, and reductionist sociology again blur together:
We are fighting in the interests of the working-class movement in 
Russia against émigré squabbling. We are fighting on behalf of the 
revolutionary proletarian trend in our movement against the oppor-
tunist intellectualist trend. . . . We are fighting for a united party 
organization of our working-class vanguard and against intellectual-
ist licentiousness, disorganization, and anarchy. We are fighting for 
respect for party congresses and against flaccid recklessness, against 
divergence of word and deed, against contempt for agreements and 
decisions adopted by common consent.23
The anti-intellectual diatribes continued through 1905, dropped off in 
1906, then reached a crescendo in 1907. Samples from the latter year follow, 
organized by month.
January: “a gang of intellectual phrase-mongers”;24 “the musty 
atmosphere of intellectualist politicking”;25 “vague, intellectualist 
pretension”;26 “unstable intellectual opportunists”;27 “arrogant Men-
shevik intellectuals”28
February: “the Russian Marxist intellectuals, who are debilitated by 
scepticism, dulled by pedantry”;29 “an intellectual philistine who 
moralises”;30 “The Russian intellectual is limp and despondent”;31 
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“the plaints of the miserable, frightened and faint-hearted intel-
lectuals”;32 “The spinelessness and political short-sightedness, 
characteristic of the petty-bourgeois intellectuals and philistines”33
April: “the whining of petty-bourgeois intellectuals”;34 “genuine, 
impotent, intellectualist grumbling”;35 “The intellectualist Menshe-
vik hens have hatched out ducklings”;36 “intellectualist-philistine 
weariness with the revolution”;37 “An ‘intellectual’ who cannot find 
himself an audience that is not indifferent to those problems as 
much resembles a ‘democrat’ or an intellectual in the best sense 
of the word, as a woman who sells herself by marrying for money 
resembles a loving wife. Both are variations of officially respectable 
and perfectly legal prostitution”;38 “whining intellectualist trash”39
May: “idle dreams of an idle intellectual”;40 “As an intellectualist 
party, bourgeois liberalism is impotent”41
August: “the intellectuals who have wormed themselves into the 
Social-Democratic movement . . . display such cowardice and 
spinelessness in the struggle, such a shameful epidemic of renegade 
moods, such toadyism towards the heroes of bourgeois fashion or 
reactionary outrages—so let our proletariat derive from our bour-
geois revolution a triple contempt for petty-bourgeois flabbiness 
and vacillation”42
October: “the boundless servility of intellectualist philistinism”;43 
“the green mould of intellectualist opportunism”44
December: “intellectualist tittle-tattle”;45 “intellectualist-bureaucratic 
chatter”46
What was the context for this torrent of verbal abuse? The initial 
anti-intellectual tirade in 1904 was directed toward his new opponents 
in the party, Iulii Martov and the Mensheviks, from whom he had divided 
in 1903. Again in 1907, Menshevik intellectuals were his major target, 
but the context is one sketched out earlier—what Luxemburg called the 
“muddy wave” of Bolshevik expropriations, actions whose most vocal 
critics were, again, Martov and the Mensheviks. The most notorious of 
these expropriations—the Tiflis bank robbery—occurred in 1907, corres-
ponding to the crescendo of insults documented here. Hurling insult and 
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invective is a classic method by which to deflect attention from unsavoury 
actions, which the “muddy wave” period certainly saw in abundance. The 
anti-intellectualist theme appears again and again in Lenin’s writings in 
the years that follow.
Rosa Luxemburg was solicited by Martov and the other editors of Iskra 
“to analyze the split between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in the Rus-
sian Social-Democratic Party.”47 What resulted was a careful, systematic, 
and devastating rebuttal of Lenin’s views. In her article—published in 
the German theoretical journal Neue Zeit, edited by Karl Kautsky—Lux-
emburg critiqued Lenin’s denigration of the intellectual and sociological 
glorification of the proletariat, linking both to his extreme emphasis on 
military-like discipline and centralism inside the party. What Luxemburg 
found “surprising,” she wrote, was his “conviction that all the precondi-
tions for the realization of a large and highly centralized workers’ party 
are already to hand in Russia.”
When he optimistically exclaims that it is now “not the proletar-
iat but certain intellectuals in Russian social democracy who are 
lacking in self-education in the spirit of organization and discipline,” 
and when he praises the educational significance of the factory 
for the proletariat in making it completely ripe for “discipline and 
organization,” this once again betrays an over-mechanistic concep-
tion of social democratic organization. The “discipline” that Lenin 
has in mind is instilled into the proletariat not just by the factory 
but also by the barracks and by modern bureaucracy—in a word, 
by the entire mechanism of the centralized bourgeois state. . . . It is 
not through the discipline instilled in the proletariat by the cap-
italist state, with the straightforward transfer of the baton from the 
bourgeoisie to a social democratic Central Committee, but only 
the defying and uprooting this spirit of servile discipline that the 
proletarian can be educated for the new discipline, the voluntary 
self-discipline of social democracy.48
Lenin wrote a response in which he abandoned invective altogether 
and did his best to bolster the sociological side of his argument, con-
trasting “the intellectual-opportunist and proletarian revolutionary 
trends” in the Russian Left, and elsewhere altering this slightly to “a 
proletarian-revolutionary and an intellectual-opportunist wing of our 
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Party.”49 But his reply fails to address the points of substance raised by 
Luxemburg, which may explain why it was never published in Neue Zeit 
and remained unpublished until 1930, when the drive to construct a Lenin 
cult was in full swing.
Much has been written about Lenin’s epistemology as it concerns the 
relationship between radical intellectuals and the working class.50 How-
ever, it is only the young Lenin’s pro-intellectual views that have been 
examined in detail; very little attention has been paid to the “mature” 
Lenin’s turn to anti-intellectualism. At the very least, in order to properly 
arrive at an appreciation of the merits and demerits of Lenin’s approach, 
we need to incorporate Luxemburg’s critique, which carefully links the 
two questions of the role of the intellectual and the building of a political 
organization, avoiding both anti-intellectualism and sociological reduc-
tionism.
One more point needs to be added. In part, the dichotomy between 
“intelligentsia” and “proletariat,” so evident in Lenin’s writings, reflected a 
class analysis that had not come to grips with the increasingly important 
role of mental labour within the proletariat. Theodor [Fedor] Dan, in 
his last book published in 1946, presented a characteristic analysis of the 
Russian intelligentsia of his era, an analysis in sync with what both Lenin 
and Martov had written at the turn of the last century (but not of course in 
sync with Lenin’s turn to anti-intellectualism). Dan says that “intelligent-
sia” is a “specifically Russian word” and it “does not mean a professional 
group of the population but a special group united by a certain political 
solidarity.” Like educated people everywhere, he says, they tend to come 
from the “upper classes,” but do not identify with these “upper classes.” 
He says that “what is common to all the educated people included in it 
[the intelligentsia] is their political and social radicalism,” and that this has 
to do with the specificities of Russian economic and social development. 
This means that “in other languages there is no adequate expression for 
the Russian word ‘intelligentsia’ because outside Russia there was and is 
no such social phenomenon.”51
The identification of a special role for a group of intellectuals whose 
origin is outside either the peasantry or the proletariat (understood 
narrowly as the manual working class) is important. But there are lim-
itations to such an approach. First, if by upper classes we mean the 
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aristocracy and the bourgeoisie (which in a strict class analysis is the only 
thing that “upper classes” can mean), it by definition cannot account for 
the presence within the Russian intelligentsia of people such as Dan him-
self—the son of a pharmacist and a representative of that portion of the 
intelligentsia that was Jewish. In an environment as antisemitic as the old 
Russian empire, Jews were completely excluded from both “upper classes,” 
whether aristocrat or bourgeois.52 A sketch of the background of Martov, 
another outstanding Jewish member of the Russian intelligentsia, can 
help us understand the intelligentsia more precisely. Martov’s biographer 
says that Martov’s great-grandfather was “the enlightened watchmaker of 
Zamosc.” His grandfather “was the founder and editor of the first Jewish 
journals and newspapers in Hebrew, Yiddish, and Russian.” One uncle 
was “headmaster of the famous Odessa Talmud Torah.” Another “financed 
his medical studies at the university of Berlin by translating Turgenev’s 
works into German.” His father was “secretary-general of the Russian 
Steamship Company” and “the Eastern correspondent of the Peterburgs-
kie vedemosti (the Petersburg Record).”53 Perhaps “secretary-general” of a 
steamship line would qualify as being part of the managerial class, and in 
this limited sense qualify as “upper class.” But the rest of Martov’s back-
ground—comprised of watchmakers, editors, headmasters, translators, 
newspaper correspondents and medical doctors—clearly does not.
Too often our understanding of “the proletariat” is restricted to manual 
labourers, excluding the white-collar section of the proletariat, those who 
we might classify as “mental labourers.” Too often, these white-collar 
mental labourers are put into the elastic and ill-defined category of 
“middle class” or “petit-bourgeois,” and through this conceptual back door 
are shoved into the category of “upper class.” Such a conceptual move per-
haps would be understandable a century ago, when much manual labour 
was in fact menial labour—when in other words, the “lifestyle” divide 
between manual and mental labourers was extreme. Today, that divide is 
much diminished. Many who would qualify as “manual labourers” are in 
fact highly skilled, deploying training and education indispensable in an 
increasingly complex economy. By contrast, many who would qualify as 
“mental labourers” are doing far more work formerly offloaded to others 
in the workforce. To give just one simple example—the typing pool has 
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been absorbed into the personal computer and word processing software 
used daily by every contemporary professional.
If our understanding of the working class is broadened to include 
mental labourers, if we permit ourselves to mix together collars both blue 
and white, then this changes our understanding of the intelligentsia dra-
matically. With that perspective, the experience of Russia looks less sui 
generis and more anticipatory—a precursor to a phenomenon that has 
become increasingly widespread. The New Left student movement of the 
1960s and 1970s is an excellent example. A small—a very small—number 
from among the New Left might have been considered “children of the 
bourgeoisie.” Some were “children of the proletariat” narrowly under-
stood as the blue-collar workforce. Most were “children of the proletariat” 
properly understood as comprising both manual and mental labourers. 
This late twentieth-century New Left intelligentsia, just like the early 
twentieth-century Russian intelligentsia, often “stood outside” their place 
of origin (identifying with the peasants in Vietnam, for instance, and not 
with the US working class army with which they were at war) and were 
very much united by a sense of political and social radicalism. But saying 
that they came from the “upper classes” (which many conservative analysts 
did, in order to label, ridicule, and dismiss them) can only be maintained 
if the white-collar working class is designated as “upper class”—a position 
that is less and less tenable. To properly embrace both manual and mental 
labour within the working class demands a rejection of all politics based 
on anti-intellectualism.
The Muck of Ages II: Anti-Intellectualism and Antisemitism
A discussion on anti-intellectualism, left here, would be incomplete. 
Lenin was writing in the context of tsarism and the Russian empire—a 
society imbued with a host of prejudices. In the context of the upheaval 
of 1917, one of those prejudices was directed against the intelligentsia. 
Orlando Figes writes of the “deep anti-intellectualism that was widely 
shared by the rank and file who had joined the [Bolshevik] Party since 
1917.” This anti-intellectualism could, in part, be seen as a component of 
anti-capitalism. Derived from bourgeois, “the popular term burzhoois . . . 
was used as a general form of abuse against employers, officers, land-
owners, priests, merchants, Jews, students, professionals, or anyone 
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well-dressed, foreign-looking or seemingly well-to-do.” Students and other 
“intellectuals” were thus painted with the same brush as the “other” priv-
ileged people who oppressed the lower classes. Ominously, the one word 
that stands out in this list is “Jews.”54 The anti-intellectualism of the crowd 
had a sinister dimension.
Anti-Jewish racism—by convention, usually referred to as antisem-
itism—was one of the most divisive and pervasive of the prejudices that 
corrupted the culture from which the revolutionary movement emerged.55 
Marc Ferro recounts that as Kerensky fled Petrograd after the Bolshe-
vik seizure of power, he saw graffiti “painted in enormous letters, ‘Down 
with the Jew Kerensky, Long Live Trotsky.’”56 Kerensky was, of course, 
not Jewish, while Trotsky was. Raphael Abramovitch, a participant in 
and chronicler of the revolutionary process, notes something similar, 
remarking on the “odd combination of social demagogy, revolutionary 
mood and anti-Semitism” one would encounter on the streets of Petrograd 
in 1917. “As the days of October approached, the more openly one could 
hear the same groups of people on the street that shouted for peace, also 
talking about Kerensky, saying that he was Jewish and that his real name 
was Kerenson.”57 The point is not simply to highlight this irony, but rather 
to point out the equation in popular consciousness of “the other” with 
“the Jew”—the essence of anti-Jewish racism. Russian political activists 
were swimming in a milieu where casual antisemitism was pervasive, even 
among the revolutionary urban crowds that overthrew tsarism.
Early twentieth-century Russia was not the only place where 
anti-intellectualism became enmeshed with antisemitism. Writing in 
the early 1960s about the Cold War, Richard Hofstadter challenged the 
anti-intellectualism of the McCarthyite Cold Warriors: 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in a mordant protest written soon after the 
election, found the intellectual “in a situation he has not known for 
a generation.” After twenty years of Democratic rule, during which 
the intellectual had been in the main understood and respected, 
business had come back into power, bringing with it “the vul-
garization which has been the almost invariable consequence of 
business supremacy.” Now the intellectual, dismissed as an “egg-
head,” an oddity, would be governed by a party which had little use 
for or understanding of him, and would be made the scapegoat 
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for everything from the income tax to the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
“Anti-intellectualism,” Schlesinger remarked, “has long been the 
anti-Semitism of the businessman.”58
The key takeaway here is Hofstadter’s observation that anti-intellectualism 
can be a kind of disguised antisemitism. The overlap between these 
two forms of prejudice, whether intentional or not, was a factor in the 
Lenin-era disputes.
This is a complex subject. Antisemitism became a dominant aspect 
of life in Stalin’s Russia. By contrast, the Bolshevik Party, while Lenin 
was alive, was famous for combatting antisemitism in Russia. Early 
in his career, Lenin emphatically made the case for what we might, 
in the twenty-first century, call an intersectional approach to political 
activism. He thought that, too often, activism was defined in narrow 
class-reductionist and trade-union terms, an approach that would prevent 
the union of the many strands of opposition developing against tsarism 
and capitalism. He asserted: “It cannot be too strongly maintained . . . 
that the Social-Democrat’s ideal should not be the trade-union secretary, 
but the tribune of the people, who is able to react to every manifestation 
of tyranny and oppression, no matter where it appears, no matter what 
stratum or class of the people it affects.”59 These words were backed up by 
practice. Before 1917, tsarist oppression took its sharpest form in the per-
iodic pogroms organized against the oppressed Jewish population of the 
Russian empire. Opposition to these pogroms was central to the activity 
of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. To cite just one example, in the run-up to a 
party congress in 1905, Lenin wrote: “We have been promised the report 
of a comrade who helped organise hundreds of workers for armed resist-
ance in the event of an anti-Jewish pogrom in a certain large city. . . . It is 
of the highest importance that the greatest possible number of comrades 
undertake such and similar work at once.”60
This commitment to combatting antisemitism was systematically 
eroded as the Stalinist bureaucracy cemented its authority. This did not 
happen overnight. Mikhail Baitalsky—a survivor of Vorkuta, an activist 
in the anti-Stalinist opposition, and a keen opponent of antisemitism—
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Even in the varied camp atmosphere of the time, I still did not 
sense any distinct expressions of anti-Semitism. More precisely, the 
attitude existed in graduated intensity. In the world of the criminal 
scum, anti-Semitism was openly expressed. Among the higher social 
layers, I did not notice it. It turns out that the lower depths were 
better at anticipating the coming change.61
The “coming change” was the new turn to repression, which began in 
1947, lasted until Stalin’s death in 1953, and included state-sanctioned 
antisemitism under the guise of a campaign against “cosmopolitanism.” 
Baitalsky’s point about the early 1930s notwithstanding, the signs of this 
shift could be seen much earlier. The economist Yuri Larin held a seminar 
on antisemitism in 1928. Vadim Rogovin, quoting Larin’s 1929 account, 
described the meeting: 
Here the worker-propagandists who had gathered from all corners 
of the nation cited typical questions asked at various meetings. In a 
number of these questions, which reflected the traditional formu-
lations of anti-Semitism (“Why do Jews always manage to get good 
positions?”, “Why don’t Jews want to do heavy labor?”, “Won’t the 
Jews betray if there is a war?”, and so forth), an important place too 
was occupied by “new” questions of the type: “Why was the party 
opposition made up of 76 percent Jews?”62
This presaged the manner in which Stalin would deploy antisemitism as 
a weapon in the years of the Great Terror. The Moscow Trials, held from 
1936 to 1938, were the portion of this terror visible to outside observers. 
These were, of course, trials in name only; they have been clearly exposed 
as judicial frame-ups based on confessions extracted under torture. At 
these so-called trials, writes Rogovin, “a disproportionately high number 
of the defendants were Jewish. At the first show trial, ten (out of sixteen) 
of the defendants were Jews, at the second, eight (out of seventeen). . . . In 
all this, Trotsky saw an attempt by Stalin to exploit the anti-Semitic moods 
that still existed in the country in the struggle against the Opposition.”63
In a 1937 article, “Thermidor and Anti-Semitism,” Trotsky analyzed in 
detail the antisemitism emerging under Stalin, underlining the pre-existing 
widespread antisemitism in tsarist Russia. While the revolutions of 1917 
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had removed antisemitism from law, “legislation alone does not change 
people,” he argued.
Their thoughts, emotions, outlook depend upon tradition, material 
conditions of life, cultural level, etc. The Soviet regime is not yet 
twenty years old. The older half of the population was educated 
under tsarism. The younger half has inherited a great deal from the 
older. These general historical conditions in themselves should make 
any thinking person realize that, despite the model legislation of the 
October Revolution, it is impossible that national and chauvinist 
prejudices, particularly anti-Semitism, should not have persisted 
strongly among the backward layers of the population.64
This latent antisemitism was increasingly deployed as a divide-and-conquer 
tool to inflame passions against the Opposition and deflect criticism from 
the regime. Trotsky saw this as a sign of the reactionary nature of the 
regime in the 1930s, pointing out: “History has never yet seen an example 
when the reaction following the revolutionary upsurge was not accom-
panied by the most unbridled chauvinistic passions, anti-Semitism among 
them.”65
Suzanne Rosenberg lived through the period of state-sponsored anti-
semitism, from 1947 to 1953. “Venom and abuse were hailed upon the 
‘rootless cosmopolites,’” she wrote, going on to describe the campaign as 
“directed mostly against Jewish professionals and intellectuals.”66 In 1952, a 
friend of Nadezhda Joffe travelled to Moscow on vacation. As Joffe recalls: 
“When she returned, she described how the situation there was terrible: 
the anti-Semitism bordered on an atmosphere of pogroms.”67
Mensheviks and Bolsheviks
The question of antisemitism hit different “registers” depending upon the 
wing of the Russian Left in which one resided. Lenin’s key opponents were 
the Mensheviks. The trigger for his turn from being pro-intellectual to 
anti-intellectual was the 1903 RSDRP congress, where the Mensheviks and 
Bolsheviks divided. The Mensheviks continued to be a focus for Lenin’s 
anger in the years that followed the congress—and the Bolsheviks and the 
Mensheviks came from distinctly different social strata. Philip Mendes 
points out that “15 out of the 17 Mensheviks who attended the 1903 RSDLP 
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Congress were Jews.” This close connection between the Mensheviks and 
the radicalization in the Jewish community would continue in later years. 
“Eight out of the 17 members of the Menshevik Central Committee in June 
1917 were Jews,” writes Mendes. “Leading Jewish Mensheviks prior to and 
after the Bolshevik revolution included Julius [Iulii] Martov, Pavel Axel-
rod, Fyodor Dan, Raphael Abramovitch, Mark Liber, Eva Broido, David 
Dallin and Solomon Schwarz.” Mendes makes a point outlined earlier: “A 
number of Mensheviks were also active in the [General Jewish Labour] 
Bund.”68 The Menshevik and Bund stories repeatedly overlap throughout 
this whole period.
Writings by Martov, the leading figure of the Menshevik Left, had been 
instrumental in the founding of the Bund in 1897.69 When the Bund left 
the RSDRP in the fractious year of 1903, this was a damaging blow to 
the party because the Bund was a far larger operation than all the rest of 
the RSDRP combined. Just before the outbreak of the 1905 revolution, 
for instance, the party in Russia, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks combined, 
had 8,400 members, while the Bund on its own had 23,000.70 Its work 
was focused on the Jewish Pale of Settlement, where, as noted earlier, 95 
percent of the empire’s roughly five million Jews resided at the turn of 
the century.71 Concentrated thus, the Bund was—at the time of the 1903 
fracturing of the RSDRP—the one section of the Left in the Russian empire 
that would qualify as a party with roots and influence. (A contemporary 
parallel might be the several thousand members of Québec solidaire, little 
known in the rest of Canada, but with real influence in Québec.) The 
Bund rejoined the RSDRP in 1906. At the congress held during that year 
of reunification, Jewish delegates from the Bund constituted 20 percent 
of the three hundred in attendance. The Menshevik delegation was 20 
percent Jewish, twice the percentage of Jews among the Bolsheviks. From 
that point on, the Mensheviks would be intimately connected with the 
Bund. In fact, according to Abraham Ascher, “there was such intimate 
collaboration between the two groups that several men prominent in the 
Bund were also leaders of Menshevism.”72
The Bolshevik story is quite different. According to Leonard Schapiro, 
“in historical origin and in ideology bolshevism is an essentially Russian 
movement.”73 This, of course, does not mean non-Jewish, since many Jews 
were also Russian, but it does highlight the fact that Bolshevik influence 
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was centred in the “Great Russian” European part of the Russian empire. 
The twenty-five provinces that made up the Pale were concentrated in 
what is today Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine, and were “thus largely out-
side the major areas of ethnic Russian settlement,” and largely outside the 
influence of the Bolsheviks.74
A Question of Discourse
As with the earlier “muck of ages” discussion on Orientalism, under-
standing the contours of antisemitism requires examining the contours of 
discourse, in particular the casual use of language or research that has the 
effect of othering a section of humanity. Isaac Deutscher, writing in the late 
1940s, said that at the 1907 party congress, “there were few genuine Rus-
sians among the moderate Socialists [the Mensheviks]—most of whom 
were Jews or Georgians.”75 The implication that “Jews or Georgians” were 
not “genuine Russians” is misleading. However, a report on the 1907 party 
congress by Joseph Stalin takes us from the misleading to the offensive.
No less interesting is the national composition of the congress. The 
figures showed that the majority of the Menshevik group were Jews 
(not counting the Bundists, of course), then came Georgians and 
then Russians. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the 
Bolshevik group were Russians, then came Jews (not counting Poles 
and Letts, of course), then Georgians, etc. In this connection one of 
the Bolsheviks (I think it was Comrade Alexinsky) observed in jest 
that the Mensheviks constituted a Jewish group while the Bolsheviks 
constituted a true-Russian group and, therefore, it wouldn’t be a bad 
idea for us Bolsheviks to organise a pogrom in the Party.76
Deutscher characterizes this invocation of pogrom as a “heavy jocular 
aside” and maintains that “anti-semitism could hardly be read into this 
. . . because nobody had been more blunt than Koba in the condemnation 
of racial hatred.”77 This is beside the point. Racist jokes are not always told 
by people who are about to engage in racist actions. It does not change the 
fact that they are nonetheless racist. Contrast Deutscher’s approach with 
that of Robert Tucker, who writes:
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[Stalin’s] heavy-handed treatment of this theme and his lack of 
embarrassment about quoting Alexinsky’s anti-Semitic remark add 
credibility to Arsenidze’s memory of his speaking as follows to Geor-
gian workers in Batum in 1905: “‘Lenin,’ Koba would say, ‘is outraged 
that God sent him such comrades as the Mensheviks! Who are these 
people anyway! Martov, Dan, Axelrod are circumcised Yids.”78
Tucker’s point is not that Lenin himself would have actually used such 
language, but that there were unscrupulous and antisemitic members of 
his organization who would.
By the 1930s, Stalinists would frequently use an antisemitic discourse 
in their fight with Leon Trotsky by invoking the biblical figure of Judas. 
As Jeffrey Brooks explains:
By 1937 the contrast between good and evil was fully developed, and 
the forces were personified in the supreme hero and the supreme 
enemy. Trotsky was assigned the role of Judas, and Stalin, by impli-
cation, that of Christ and God combined. Pravda’s editors employed 
this contrast during the second purge trial in January 1937, and it 
suited the anti-Semitic undertone of the campaign against Trotsky 
in particular and the trial in general.79
There is considerable literature identifying the use of the name “Judas” as 
a form of disguised antisemitism. Vladimir Lenin, for example, said: “The 
most important fact about Judas, apart from his betrayal of Jesus, is his 
connection with anti-Semitism. Almost since the death of Christ, Judas 
has been held up by Christians as a symbol of the Jews: their supposed 
deviousness, their lust for money, and other racial vices.”80
Nonetheless, Lenin was not averse to using “Judas” in his polemical 
writings. In 1933, one of these polemical writings—an unpublished draft 
of an article from 1911—began to circulate. Trotsky called it “a new bit of 
gossip emanating from Moscow,” gossip saying that “Lenin had declared 
that Trotsky was a ‘Judas.’” Trotsky explains that “in one of the moments 
of accentuation of the emigrant struggle, Lenin angrily called Trotsky 
a ‘yudushka’ in a note that he wrote.”81 The Russian “Iudushka” (often 
translated as “Judushka”) is a diminutive form of “Judas.” The proper trans-
lation, then, is “little Judas,” which brings out clearly both the racialized 
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reference and the patronizing tone. The standard English translation of 
the article in question airbrushes the diminutive from the record. I have 
restored it in the following extract, the title of which is properly translated 
as “The Little Judas Trotsky’s blush of shame.” Lenin writes: “At the Plenary 
Meeting, the little Judas Trotsky . . . vowed and swore that he was true to 
the Party.” He then describes what happened after the plenum:
The little Judas expelled the representative of the Central Committee 
from Pravda and began to write liquidationist articles in Vor-
wärts. In defiance of the direct decision of the School Commission 
appointed by the Plenary Meeting to the effect that no Party lecturer 
may go to the Vpered factional school, the little Judas Trotsky did 
go and discussed a plan for a conference with the Vpered group. . . . 
And it is this little Judas who beats his breast and loudly professes 
his loyalty to the Party, claiming that he did not grovel before the 
Vpered group and the liquidators. Such is the little Judas Trotsky’s 
blush of shame.82
Trotsky rebuked the Stalinists for unearthing it and circulating it out 
of context. He argued that the term appears in a writing of Lenin’s that 
“was not even an article, but a note written in a moment of anger,” and 
that, like other “polemical letters” from Lenin, it contained “unavoidable 
exaggerations.” The note was written, says Trotsky, “a number of years 
before the October Revolution, the civil war, the building of the Soviet 
state, and the founding of the Communist International.” To get at “the 
true relations between Lenin and Trotsky” would involve quoting from 
“more authoritative documents than that of a note resulting from a conflict 
in emigration.”83 This is true enough, but Trotsky sidesteps the issue of 
the racially charged nature of any use of the term “Judas,” let alone “little 
Judas.” Robert Service suggests that “Lenin or his editorial board had 
second thoughts about [the] publication” of Lenin’s article “because Yudu-
shka or little Judas had a possible anti-Semitic connotation.”84 Hence, the 
article remained in the archives until it was dug up in the highly charged 
context of Stalin’s contest with Trotsky.
Adam Ulam claims that in 1911 and 1912, Trotsky was “regularly called 
‘little Judas Trotsky’” by Lenin.85 He does not, however, provide evidence, 
and in Lenin’s published works, the use of the term “little Judas” does 
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not recur as a term of abuse directed toward Trotsky. But elsewhere in 
his published works, both “Judas” and “Judushka” are on more than one 
occasion deployed as descriptors for others with whom he has a dispute. 
In 1894, he described the state bureaucracy as “made up mainly of 
middle-class intellectuals,” who he described as “Judushkas who use their 
feudal sympathies and connections to fool the workers and peasants.”86 In 
1901, he described the typical landlord as “a usurer and a robber, a beast 
of prey, like any village bloodsucker” possessed with “an ability to conceal 
his Judas nature under a doctrine of romanticism and magnanimity.”87 
That same year, he said that the tsarist government was pursuing a “Judas 
policy of taking bread from the starving.”88 In 1906, in the wake of the 
1905 revolution, he mocked liberals who called for unity: “Why fight, why 
this internecine strife? wails Judas Cadet.”89 In 1912, he characterized the 
liberal publication Novoe Vremia as both “nationalist” and “Judas-like.”90
Frequently, he would use a less direct designation for his opponents—
deploying the literary figure of Porfirii “Little Judas” Golovlyov, a character 
in Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin’s nineteenth-century novel The Golovlyov 
Family. In 1901, he used this figure to denigrate official declarations of the 
Russian government.91 In 1902, he dismissed the positions of the news-
paper Finlandskaia gazeta as “unctuous twaddle in the spirit of ‘Judas’ 
Golovlyov.”92 In 1907, he said: “This Judas Golovlyov of a Cadet . . . really 
does throw dust in the eyes of the people and stupefy them.”93 In 1908, he 
criticized a speech by the liberal Mikhail Kapustin, saying, “Judas Golo-
vlyov falls far short in comparison with this parliamentarian.”94 And in 
1922, he said that so-called left-wing opponents of the Soviet state “try to 
conceal their malicious glee and behave mostly like Judas Golovlyov.”95
Trotsky asserts that it was this fictional character that Lenin was invok-
ing when he called him “little Judas,” a fictional character with “no relation 
at all to the Judas of the Evangel.”96 Perhaps, but invoking the “Judas” 
Porfirii Golovlyov is not unproblematic. I. P. Foote describes the character 
Golovlyov this way:
He is not a villain in the conventional sense. He performs no grand 
acts of wickedness. Such evil as he does is on the mean level sug-
gested by his family nicknames “Judas” and “the bloodsucker.” The 
enormity of Porfirii lies in his hypocrisy. His life is a grotesque ritual 
in which any act of meanness is permissible provided that some 
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aphorism, text or proverb can be invoked to justify it. He nauseates 
chiefly by his incessant moralising and empty talk.97
Saltykov-Shchedrin wrote in an era when those labelled “liberal” in 
terms of their aspirations to move beyond tsarist autocracy were often 
simultaneously antisemitic. As David Aberbach points out, “Russian lit-
erature prior to the 1880s was full of . . . anti-Semitic stereotyping.” He 
includes famous writers in this category, like Lermontov, Turgenev, Gogol, 
Dostoyevsky, and Tolstoy, whose works at times “betray prejudice and 
hatred nourished by the church and kept alive in the popular imagination. 
. . . Pre-1881 Russian writers fell short of their liberal, humanistic ideals 
when they wrote of Jews.”98 Saltykov-Shchedrin worked closely with the 
populist poet Nikolai Nekrasov, who, in 1866, published a horrifying poem 
called “Ballet.” In describing the practicality of “our girls,” the poet writes: 
Their ideal is the golden calf  
Embodied in the grey-haired Jew,  
Whose filthy hand causes these bosoms  
To quiver with gold.99
No commentary is necessary.
According to Shmuel Ettinger in his book A History of the Jewish 
People, in the 1870s, the decade when The Golovlyov Family was writ-
ten, Saltykov-Shchedrin “had joined Nekrasov and others of the same 
camp in savagely denouncing the Jews.” By the early 1880s, the violence 
of anti-Jewish pogroms was forcing many to shift their positions. To his 
credit, Saltykov-Shchedrin was one of these: in the summer of 1882, he 
published “a passionate article defending the persecuted Jew.”100 It was 
too late, however: by this time, his offensive character Porfirii “Judas” 
Golovlyov had taken on a life of his own in the discourse of other writers.
In explaining the reference to Judas Golovlyov, N. P. Kolikov, who was 
responsible for the index of names in volume 6 of the fifth edition of Lenin’s 
Russian-language complete collected works (Polnoe sobranie sochinenii), 
ignores all this. He writes a general note about Saltykov-Shchedrin, who he 
describes as “a great Russian writer-satirist and revolutionary democrat.” 
He mentions the poet Nekrasov as a member of Russia’s “democratic intel-
ligentsia,” but makes no further comment. He says that Lenin thought the 
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portrayal of the character Judas Golovlyov was “immortal” and that he 
“repeatedly used this character . . . to expose social groups and political 
parties hostile to the people.” Lenin also “used others” from the novelist’s 
works, asserts Kolikov, but he gives no specifics.101 There are, in fact, many 
occasions where Lenin makes allusions to Saltykov-Shchedrin’s works 
in his writings, but only one character—Judas Golovlyov—is mentioned 
repeatedly. Kolikov’s editor’s note is insufficient. In the antisemitic atmos-
phere of the Russian empire, there could have been no innocent manner 
with which Lenin could have deployed the words “Judas,” “little Judas,” 
or “Judas Golovlyov.”
The point here is not to pin the label of antisemite on Lenin. His 
periodic vulgar literary outbursts and his sometimes careless choices of 
literary references, crude and unacceptable though they may be, are at 
odds with much of (early) Bolshevik political practice, which made com-
batting antisemitism a principle of the socialist movement. The point is 
to identify the way in which the iconic figure of Lenin was, no more than 
any of his generation, insulated from “the muck of ages.” Revealed here, 
as in the discussion of Orientalism, are unexamined prejudices inherited 
from the society of his day, leading to a recurring habit of casually using 
epithets that played on old and deep prejudices in Russian culture. More 
significant is Lenin’s profound anti-intellectualism, on display from 1904 
until his death, which led him into a cul-de-sac and helped nurture an 
environment where his less scrupulous cadre—for instance, Stalin—could, 
with little effort, drift from anti-intellectualism into the state-sanctioned 
antisemitism of 1947 to 1953. Honestly confronting these issues under-
scores the point that was central to chapter 10: we can learn from the life 






In 1918, a few months after the October Revolution, Lenin succinctly and 
honestly outlined his approach to the challenges facing the new regime.
While the revolution in Germany is still slow in “coming forth,” our 
task is to study the state capitalism of the Germans, to spare no effort 
in copying it and not shrink from adopting dictatorial methods to 
hasten the copying of it. Our task is to hasten this copying even 
more than Peter [the Great] hastened the copying of Western culture 
by barbarian Russia, and we must not hesitate to use barbarous 
methods in fighting barbarism.1
This captures precisely the essence of Lenin’s political methods, char-
acterized by a firm belief that ends justified means. He presided over 
the “muddy wave” of expropriations, serene in the conviction that it 
did not matter how money was acquired, only how it was used once 
acquired. Similarly, while committed to the “dictatorship of the pro-
letariat,” he saw no contradiction in using as his principal agents in 
achieving that proletarian state the very non-proletarian soldier and sailor 
peasants-in-uniform—the temporary new class so clearly analyzed by 
Martov and Abramovitch. Illustrative of Lenin’s willingness to lean on 
non-working-class forces was his outburst days before the insurrection, at 
a meeting of the Petrograd Bolshevik Party Committee. When it looked 
for a moment as though he would be outvoted by his comrades, he offered 
this as a response: “If you want a split, go ahead. If you get the majority, 
take power in the Central Executive committee and carry on. But we 




the working-class of Petrograd and to jump-start the workers' revolution 
through the deployment of sailors from outside Petrograd.
However, means do shape ends. The temporary new class of peasants 
and workers in uniform was a rough and violent instrument, one that 
would shape its Leninist leaders as much as they would shape it. A Janu-
ary 1918 incident illustrates this. Early on the morning of 7 (20) January, 
Isaac Steinberg, then serving as People’s Commissar of Justice, received a 
phone call from a shaken Lenin. In what Steinberg describes as a “hoarse 
voice,” Lenin told Steinberg that during the night two elderly prisoners—F. 
F. Kokoshkin and A. I. Shingaraev, both former cabinet ministers and 
members of the Kadet (liberal) Party—had been murdered in their hos-
pital beds by “unidentified sailors.” The two had been taken to the hospital 
the previous evening, and the murder had occurred a few hours later. 
When, later that morning, Steinberg joined Lenin in his office, the latter 
“looked dejected, even though several hours had passed since the event” 
and “without a word he pushed a typewritten sheet toward me. It was a 
directive to all Government offices to institute a strict investigation of the 
crime and to arrest the guilty sailors.”3
Upon hearing of the situation, Pavel Dybenko, then the People’s Com-
missar of Naval Affairs, “showed no surprise and said calmly, ‘Very well, 
I shall write an appeal to the sailors not to do such things again and to 
bring the culprits to justice.’” What Dybenko said next was a harbinger of 
things to come. “His voice was even, but a little flame played in his eyes 
as he added, ‘Of course, they [the sailors] will take this merely as an act 
of political terror.’ It was the first time that I heard a Bolshevik that day 
describe the plain murder as an act of ‘political terror,’ thus giving it a kind 
of sanction.”4 Dybenko was proven correct, and, by the evening, it had 
become clear that the sailors in the fleet were sheltering the two murderers 
and that any attempt to capture them would involve a confrontation and 
possibly a rupture with them. Lenin’s attitude toward the murders under-
went a complete reversal. Steinberg “raised the question in the Council of 
People’s Commissars. With his customary coolness, Lenin simply handed 
us a few papers which began to circulate the room.”
They were wires from sailors on warships anchored in Reval and in 
Finnish waters. In forthright terms they informed Lenin that they 




murder of the liberal ministers as an act of political terror which 
the Soviet Government would not dare oppose. And Lenin, with no 
effort to suppress a cynical smile, asked, “Well? Would you have us 
go against them?”
“Certainly,” I replied. “If we don’t do it now, it will be the more 
difficult later to appease any thirst for blood. This was a heinous 
crime, not political terror.”
“The Bolsheviks,” says Steinberg, “sat silent, as was their custom in 
delicate situations, and let Lenin do the talking. . . . Lenin had already 
forgotten the impression the murder had made on him that first morning, 
when he had at least recognized the explosive nature of the deed. . . . Was 
it worth incurring the displeasure of some of the sailors? Lenin decided 
that it was not.”5
There are multiple versions of exactly how the murders took place. 
According to a contemporaneous account by Andrej Kalpašnikov, 
Dybenko and several associates were directly involved in the murder. 
These men “awakened the head guard, forced him to show them the rooms 
of their victims, and then, in the presence of everyone, shot them down.”6 
John Spargo, also writing at that time, paints Dybenko’s role differently. 
Spargo writes that, in response to the murders, Dybenko “published a 
remarkable order condemning the assassins as ‘having murdered their 
helpless enemies, rendered harmless by imprisonment.’” But if Dybenko 
appears in a better light by this account, the Cheka does not, because “the 
sailors and Red Guards” according to Spargo “had gone straight to the hos-
pital” from Cheka offices. Spargo claimed that it was “generally believed” 
that the Cheka “had some connection with the murders.”7
Just hours before the transport of the two liberals to the hospital where 
they were murdered, the Constituent Assembly had been dispersed after 
holding its one and only session in a tense atmosphere replete with threats 
and preceded by a violently suppressed demonstration. This coincidence 
was noted at the time. One liberal of the era wrote in his secret diary: “How 
tragically Kokoshkin died; he perished on the day of the existence of that 
very Constituent Assembly whose law he wrote.”8 The two events—the 
murder of the liberals and the dispersal of the Assembly (which will be 




the Bolsheviks called “bourgeois democracy.” In both cases, the instru-
ments of repression were the “revolutionary sailors.”
“The Very Cruelest Revolutionary Terror”
By mid-1918, state-sanctioned Red Terror came to define the Bolshevik 
regime. What do we know about the terror deployed by the Bolshevik 
state? We know that the state justified it as a response to the terror of the 
Bolsheviks’ opponents, the White Armies—and that those White Armies 
did engage in the most appalling atrocities. China Miéville quotes an 
“unlikely source, Major General William Graves, who commanded US 
forces in Siberia,” as saying that he “considers himself ‘well on the side of 
safety when I say that the anti-Bolsheviks killed one hundred people in 
Eastern Siberia, to every one killed by the Bolsheviks.’”9 During the Civil 
War, Elias Heifetz was the chair of the All-Ukrainian Relief Committee 
for the Victims of Pogroms, and with those pogroms still fresh in his 
mind, he published, in 1920, the extraordinary Slaughter of the Jews in 
the Ukraine.10 His chronicle of murder, rape, and humiliation unleashed 
by the counter-revolutionary armies in Ukraine against that country’s 
Jewish population is almost unreadable, the deeds are so horrible. Those 
events would stand as the most horrific moment in the history of Jewish 
oppression, until the Nazi holocaust of World War II.
If we assume that 120,000 deaths were due directly to the pogroms, 
we shall not be guilty of exaggeration. To these must be added the 
injured and wounded, those suffering from nervous and mental 
shock and the violated women. The pogroms swept the Ukraine like 
a hurricane, and it was impossible to undertake a census of such 
cases. The number, however, must be prodigious, running into the 
tens of thousands. 
. . . The Jewish population of the villages and hamlets visited 
by the pogroms left everything behind as it was, and fled without 
further thought to a larger place. The roads were covered with the 
bodies of old men, women and children, and in the larger places the 
same horrible death awaited the fugitives.11
The pro-Bolshevik forces were not all innocents in this process. “To the 




excesses and pogroms by bands calling themselves ‘Reds’ and belong-
ing . . . to the Ukrainian Red Soviet army,” Heifetz tells us.12 He gives an 
unflattering portrayal of the Soviet rank and file, composed, for the most 
part, of “insurrectionist bands of freebooters” who had an “antipathy to 
strangers, especially Jews.”13 However, Heifetz clearly differentiates the 
Reds from the Whites: “In proportion to the entire number of Jewish 
persecutions the excesses of these people play an insignificant role.”14 The 
Red Terror was in very large part a reaction to the horrendous terror of 
the counter-revolutionary forces.
But it was also in part an inevitable product of the terrible oppression 
and suffering experienced for generations by a downtrodden, impover-
ished people, a point developed persuasively by Orlando Figes: “The 
Terror erupted from below. It was an integral element of the social revo-
lution from the start. The Bolsheviks encouraged but did not create this 
mass terror.”15
If our goal is simply to explain the terror, we can leave our discussion 
here. But if our goal is to assess the attitude that political actors should take 
to terror, we have to go further. There is the question of how to approach 
terror as a matter not of strategy and tactics but of principle. Steinberg 
quotes from the January 1919 program manifesto of the fledgling German 
Communist Party, a manifesto written by Rosa Luxemburg: “The proletar-
ian revolution requires no terror for its aims. It hates and despises killing. 
It does not need these weapons because it does not combat individuals 
but institutions.”16
Let us return to the issue of the death penalty, that horrifying instru-
ment of state policy whose restoration for use at the front in 1917 did 
so much to undermine confidence in the Kerensky government and led 
directly to mass radicalization and the events of the October Revolution. 
By the summer of 1918, Iulii Martov was denouncing the death penalty 
not of Kerensky and the right-wing generals but of the Bolsheviks and 
the workers’ state:
The death penalty had been declared abolished, but in every city, 
in every county, various “Extraordinary Commissions” [Chekas] 
and “Military-Revolutionary Committees” ordered the shooting of 
hundreds and hundreds of people. Some were killed as counterrev-




court established whether those sentenced were really guilty, nobody 
can know whether the person executed was really guilty. . . . How 
many innocent people have been killed like that all over Russia! 
With the tacit approval of the Council of People’s Commissars, 
nameless individuals are sitting in Chekas passing death sentences. 
Among these individuals giving orders for executions, we from time 
to time discover criminals, bribe-takers, people who themselves are 
on the run from the law, and former tsarist provocateurs.17
Clearly, Martov had a moral objection to the Red Terror and to capital 
punishment. We can feel it in the passion of these lines. His opposition, 
like Luxemburg’s, was also one of political principle.
We social-democrats are opposed to all terror, both from above and 
from below.
Therefore, we are against the death penalty—this extreme means 
of terror, to which all rulers resort to intimidate people when they 
have lost their trust.
The struggle against the death penalty was inscribed on the ban-
ners of all those who struggled for the freedom and happiness of the 
Russian people, all those who struggled for socialism.18
Lenin’s view was the opposite. He saw terror, including recourse to the 
death penalty, as an embedded part of the transition to socialism. This at 
first put him in opposition to his own comrades. One of the first, if not the 
first, decrees of the Military Revolutionary Committee after the seizure of 
power was to abolish the death penalty for troops at the front. Trotsky was 
present at the vote, but Lenin was not. According to Trotsky, when Lenin 
heard of this decision, “his anger was unbounded. ‘Nonsense,’ he kept 
on repeating. ‘How can one make a revolution without firing squads?’”19 
In the introduction to this book, I outlined the despair and shock that 
engulfed the Russian masses when the death penalty was reintroduced 
for use by the officer corps against the peasants-in-uniform, who were 
their cannon fodder. Lenin’s fierce embrace of precisely this instrument 
as essential to his revolution was a sign of the problems embedded in his 
approach. It was a position from which Lenin never flinched, and that 
Trotsky was shortly to embrace. When, in early 1918, the German army 




included “the threat that all who opposed Government orders would be 
‘destroyed on the spot.’” Steinberg, still the People’s Commissar for Justice, 
“objected that this cruel threat killed the whole pathos of the manifesto. 
Lenin replied with derision, ‘On the contrary, herein lies true revolution-
ary pathos. Do you really believe that we can be victorious without the 
very cruelest revolutionary terror?’”20
Lenin was not alone among the Bolshevik leadership in his embrace 
of the necessity of terror on a mass scale. One of the most chilling state-
ments of that time came from his chief lieutenant, Grigory Zinoviev. In 
a September 1918 speech, Zinoviev said: “To overcome our enemies we 
must have our own socialist militarism. We must carry along with us 90 
million out of the 100 million of Soviet Russia’s population. As for the 
rest, we have nothing to say to them. They must be annihilated.”21 But 
Zinoviev is a handy scapegoat, someone who today has very few follow-
ers. Lenin, by contrast, is still an icon in sections of the Left. That icon 
frequently exhorted his comrades to intensify the terror. When Bolshe-
vik rule was threatened in one region, he urged the local communists to 
“organise immediately mass terror, shoot and deport the hundreds of pros-
titutes who are making drunkards of the soldiers, former officers and the 
like.”22 In August 1918, he sent a telegram to communists in Penza, saying: 
“Essential to organise a reinforced guard of selected and reliable people, 
to carry out a campaign of ruthless mass terror against the kulaks, priests 
and whiteguards; suspects to be shut up in a detention camp outside the 
city.”23 After the assassination of Volodarsky, he rebuked the communist 
authorities who had tried to restrain the crowds from vigilante “justice” 
in Petrograd: “I protest most emphatically! We are discrediting ourselves: 
we threaten mass terror, even in resolutions of the Soviet of Deputies, 
yet when it comes to action we obstruct the revolutionary initiative of 
the masses, a quite correct one. This is im-poss-ible! The terrorists will 
consider us old women.”24
This cannot be reduced to a position to which Lenin had been pushed 
by force of circumstances. Already in the context of the 1905 revolution he 
had a very clear position that mass terror would be a necessary, embedded 
part of any revolution in Russia. In February 1905, he wrote: “All the forces 
of every party should be mobilised. All should have a single technical plan 




that can help the popular uprising.”25 And in August of the following 
year, he declared, “Social-Democracy must recognise this mass terror 
and incorporate it into its tactics.” He did qualify this conception of mass 
terror, saying that a key task would be “organising and controlling it . . . 
subordinating it to the interests and conditions of the working-class 
movement and the general revolutionary struggle, while eliminating and 
ruthlessly lopping off the ‘hooligan’ perversion of this guerrilla warfare.”26 
But that is not the point. For Lenin, the use of mass terror in the transition 
to socialism was a principle. For Luxemburg and Martov, opposition to the 
use of mass terror by the socialists was a principle.
The key organ for administering the terror was the infamous Cheka, 
the predecessor to the KGB. An important insight into the psychology 
of this instrument of terror comes from articles printed in a short-lived 
publication known either as Cheka Weekly or Bulletin of the Cheka, which 
for six weeks in 1918, “was openly intended to vaunt the merits of the 
secret police and to encourage ‘the just desire of the masses for revenge.’”27 
A letter that makes for chilling reading was published in its September 
1918 issue. “In times of fierce civil war you cannot be soft,” said the several 
high-ranking officials from Nolinsk in Vyatka Province who authored the 
letter. “We declared mass terror against our enemies and . . . we decided 
to make this mass terror not a paper thing, but a reality. Mass shootings 
of hostages took place in many cities after this. And this was good.” It 
gets worse. The authors chastise one regional Cheka for releasing British 
diplomatic representative Bruce Lockhart. “Tell us,” they remonstrate. 
“Why didn’t you subject this Lockhart to the most refined tortures, in 
order to get information and addresses? . . . Do you suppose that to inflict 
terrible tortures upon a man is more inhuman than to blow up bridges 
and food stores in order to find in the pangs of hunger an ally for the 
overthrow of the Soviet regime?”28 The editors of Cheka Weekly did not 
denounce this open advocacy of torture. In fact, they were at pains to 
point out that they did not object “in substance to this letter.” Their only 
objection was that such terror was “not at all in our interest.”29 However, 
the letter’s matter-of-fact call for torture led to the editors being rebuked 
by the Central Committee. Cheka Weekly was discontinued.30 Innumer-
able other sources indicate that, in fact, torture was part of the toolkit 




quoting from “a series of peasant reports and Government documents 
for the year 1919,” makes for grim reading.31 In the village of Uranj in 
the province of Kostroma, “the beating of petitioners in the Soviet was 
customary and flogging was carried on in all villages of the province. In 
Beryozovka, for instance, peasants were beaten with fists as well as sticks. 
They were forced to take off their boots and sit for hours in the snow.” 
Steinberg reports a Red Army soldier saying: “Makhov gave us orders 
to give it good to the arrested peasants, that is to whip them thoroughly. 
Instead of dragging them along with us, he said, whip them and let them 
remember the Soviet regime.” The stories of abuse go on and on. “In some 
villages,” Steinberg writes, “the Cheka locked masses of peasants in cold 
warehouses, stripped them and beat them with gun butts.”32
“Let this be enough,” Steinberg concludes. “We have not reached the 
limit, but then we never shall. Such descriptions could be continued 
indefinitely: they are so many, so varied, so cruelly eloquent. We shall 
not return to them. Let our memory, retaining these words and these acts, 
help our minds and our consciences later to draw the final conclusions 
about terror, the Bolshevik terror.”33
Bolsheviks Against Workers
In late 1917 and early 1918, as the temporary new class of peasants-in-uniform 
melted into the countryside, there was a return in the cities to something 
approaching “normal” class relations. This re-emergence of a “traditional” 
workers’ movement is a story steeped in obscurity. Tony Cliff notes that, 
immediately after the November revolution, the Bolsheviks “had to deal 
with another enemy no less dangerous” than the counter-revolutionaries 
who were set to march on the capital. He refers to this enemy as “the 
saboteurs within.” Cliff was a lifelong supporter of workers’ action and 
strikes. However, without commenting on the irony of his observation, 
he attaches the term “saboteur” to the story of a mass strike movement:
On 27 October (9 November) a general strike of all state employees 
was called in Petrograd, and almost all the officials and clerks of 
public institutions came out. 
The employees of the Ministries of Agriculture, Labour, Posts 




So did the teachers. By 15 (28) December, more than 30,000 Petro-
grad teachers were on strike. They were joined by the workers in the 
public libraries and the People’s Houses and by 50,000 bank clerks. 
These strikes confronted the new rulers with grave difficulties.
The telegraphists and telephonists also stopped work. Telegraphy 
was the only quick means of communication across the huge distan-
ces of Russia. These workers were very much under the influence of 
the Mensheviks and Socialist [Social] Revolutionaries. Most of the 
telegraphists refused to work for the Bolshevik intruders.34
Steinberg, one of the harshest critics of the Bolsheviks, similarly saw this 
strike in a very negative light. “In the first months after October, 1917,” he 
writes, “large sections of officialdom and the professional intelligentsia 
sabotaged the new Government. Under the influence of the embittered 
moderates (to say nothing of the open reactionaries), they sacrificed the 
interests of country and people to their hatred of the new regime. They 
stayed away from their offices or refused to carry out their functions in 
public institutions.”35
Others describe this “general strike of white-collar personnel (sluzhash-
chie),” as Richard Pipes calls it, with a completely different emphasis.36 
George Leggett says that within hours of the Bolshevik seizure of power, 
“the Committee for Salvation of Country and Revolution (KSRiR) had 
been formed in the City Duma Building, with the participation of mem-
bers of the Executive of Peasants’ Soviets, and of Menshevik and SR leaders 
such as Dan and Gotz.”37 The strike that ensued was “co-ordinated by 
the Union of Unions,” which “disposed of formidable financial resources, 
out of which the strikers were advanced wages up to 1 January 1918.”38 
Richard Pipes devotes considerable attention to this strike action, calling 
it “a grandiose, non-violent act of protest by the nation’s civil servants and 
employees of private enterprises against the destruction of democracy,” 
and going on to describe its participants and structure:
It quickly acquired an organizational structure, first in the shape 
of strike committees in the ministries, banks, and other public 
institutions and then in a coordinating body called the Committee 
for the Salvation of the Fatherland and the Revolution (Komitet 




of Municipal Duma officials, members of the Central Executive 
Committee of Soviets dissolved by the Bolsheviks, representatives 
of the All-Russian Congress of Peasant Soviets, the Union of Unions 
of Government Employees, and several clerical unions, including 
that of postal workers. Gradually, representatives of Russian socialist 
parties, the Left SRs excepted, also joined.39
After the Union of Unions of Government Employees in Petrograd called 
on its members, on 29 October, to join the strike, “work in all the minis-
tries in Petrograd ground to a halt. Except for porters and some secretarial 
staff, their personnel either failed to come to work or came and sat doing 
nothing.”40 Pipes describes the growth of the action in the ten days that 
followed:
The strike spread to non-governmental institutions. Private banks 
had shut their doors as early as October 26–27. On November 1, the 
All-Russian Union of Postal and Telegraph Employees announced 
that unless the Bolshevik Government gave way to a coalition 
cabinet it would order its membership to stop work. Soon telegraph 
and telephone workers walked out in Petrograd, Moscow, and some 
provincial towns. On November 2, Petrograd’s pharmacists went on 
strike; on November 7, water transport workers followed suit as did 
schoolteachers. On November 8, the Union of Printers in Petrograd 
announced that if the Bolsheviks carried out their Press Decree they, 
too, would strike.41
At the core of these protests was a simple political position—against 
the imposition of a one-party state and for the creation of a pluralist, 
multiparty socialist government. This, in fact, represented the overwhelm-
ing common sense of the Left. At the Second Congress of the Soviets, 
which convened as the Military Revolutionary Committee insurrection 
was underway, the Bolsheviks were in a strong but not overwhelming 
position. Out of 670 delegates, they had 300—a plurality but not a major-
ity.42 Furthermore, according to China Miéville, in matters of voting, their 
influence was bolstered by “somewhat lax organisational arrangements 
that had given them more than their proportional share.”43 As John Good-




just over two-thirds “had sent delegates on the assumption that power 
would be shared among the various socialist groupings.”44
But with the exception of the brief coalition between the Bolsheviks 
and the Left Social-Revolutionaries, there was to be no multiparty gov-
ernment. The new government used force to end the strike, in which the 
call for a coalition socialist government had been the principal demand. 
From mid-November on, the Bolsheviks operated “a counter-offensive,” 
writes Pipes. “The Bolsheviks now physically occupied, one by one, every 
public institution in Petrograd and compelled their employees, under 
threat of severe punishment, to work for them.”45 The strikes were defeated, 
and along with them, any hopes for a pluralist, multiparty, socialist gov-
ernment.
This is a confusing story. Without question, the call for a coalition 
socialist government animated much of the strike movement, but it is also 
true that sections of the leadership of this strike movement comprised 
open reactionaries who were determined to overthrow the new regime by 
force. The Committee for Salvation of Country and Revolution included 
in its leadership individuals who, according to Alexander Rabinowitch, 
“drew up plans to coordinate an uprising in Petrograd with the entry into 
the capital of Krasnov’s Cossacks, expected momentarily.” A successful 
entry of Cossack troops into Petrograd would have undoubtedly ended 
in bloodshed and repression. In the end, only a thousand troops could 
be mustered for the effort, and they confronted a pro-Bolshevik “motley 
army approximately ten times larger, made up of workers’ detachments, 
soldiers of the Petrograd garrison, and Baltic sailors.”46 The Cossacks 
were beaten back, and the military threat, for a time, receded. But in our 
assessment of these events, we need to engage with both aspects of the 
post-insurrectionary turmoil—the reactionary attempt to use military 
force against the new regime and the democratic urge of much of the strike 
movement, animated by a sense of the need for coalition and compromise.
The Cheka and Strikebreaking
The Bolshevik response to this strike movement played a critical role in 
shaping the institutions of terror that were to corrupt Bolshevik rule in 
subsequent years. The Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC), the cen-




force repressing the strike movement. “On 9 November, the MRC ordered 
the arrest of KSRiR [Committee for Salvation of Country and Revolution] 
members,” writes George Leggett. Eleven days later, “the MRC took steps 
to wind up the dissolved Duma and the KSRiR. And on 26 November, 
the MRC declared all employees of public departments who sabotaged 
the national economy to be ‘enemies of the people’. The MRC effort to 
suppress the strike was directed by [Felix] Dzerzhinsky.”47
As the MRC was winding down its operations in December, reports 
reached the government’s leading body, the Council of People’s Com-
missars (Sovnarkom), of new threats on a country-wide scale. Minutes 
from a 7 (20) December meeting of the Sovnarkom indicate that council 
members were concerned with “the possibility of a Russia-wide postal and 
telegraph strike and about the possibility of a Russia-wide general strike 
of all government agency employees.”48 The Sovnarkom thus “resolved 
‘to charge Comrade Dzerzhinsky to establish a special commission to 
examine the possibility of combating such a strike by the most energetic 
revolutionary measures, and to determine methods of suppressing mali-
cious sabotage.’”49 As Leggett writes: “The urgency of the public service 
strike crisis was such that, at its meeting on 7 (20) December (attended 
by Lenin as chairman, by Stalin, Petrovskii, and others), the Sovnarkom 
decided not to disperse until Dzerzhinsky’s improvised special commis-
sion, then still in session, had presented its proposals. That same evening, 
Dzerzhinsky made his report to the Sovnarkom.”50 Dzerzhinsky proposed 
the creation of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating 
Counter-Revolution and Sabotage, the institution that we now know as the 
Cheka, and the Sovnarkom approved his recommendation. Pipes agrees 
that it was in an effort “to break the resistance of financial personnel that 
Lenin initially created, in December 1917, his security police, the Cheka.”51 
Nicolas Werth describes the Cheka’s first action, breaking “a strike by state 
employees in Petrograd”:
The method was swift and effective—all its leaders were arrested—
and the justification simple: “Anyone who no longer wishes to work 
with the people has no place among them,” declared Dzerzhinsky, 
who also arrested a number of the Menshevik and Socialist [Social] 
Revolutionary deputies elected to the Constituent Assembly. This 




people’s commissar of justice, who was himself a left Socialist Revo-
lutionary.52
The anti-strike mandate of the Cheka was not explicit in the records 
of its birth, which outlined the liquidation of “all counterrevolutionary 
and sabotage politics throughout Russia” as its raison d’être.53 The official 
announcement in the daily press, however, was explicit: “The commission 
is to watch the press, saboteurs, strikers, and the Socialist [Social] Revolu-
tionists of the Right.”54 Surely it is important to know that this repressive 
institution had its origin as a tool of strikebreaking.
Perhaps the actions of these white-collar workers can be put in the 
category of “backward consciousness.” The strikers were almost all in 
the category of “mental labourers,” a category that most socialists at the 
time incorrectly called “petit-bourgeois” and did not consider part of 
the working class. We now know, however, that this distinction between 
mental labourers and manual labourers is unhelpful in characterizing 
the proletariat, at the forefront of whose ranks are frequently literate 
mental labourers—in an earlier period, typesetters and printers, postal 
and telegraph workers; in the contemporary movement, teachers, civil 
servants, and nurses. But in analyses of the Russian Revolution, there is 
an embedded bias that restricts the notion of “the proletariat” to manual 
factory labourers and categorizes mental labourers as “middle class” or 
“petit-bourgeois.” Laura Engelstein, in her very helpful history of the 1905 
revolution in Moscow, makes exactly this mistake. 
Another group that made a vital contribution to the labor movement 
in 1905 was the white-collar employees in the non-manufacturing 
sector. They identified with the working-class cause, provided 
organizational guidance, and joined their blue-collar fellows in 
the meeting hall and on the street. Without them, no coherent 
movement would have emerged among either railroad workers or 
municipal employees, two groups indispensable to the success of the 
revolution in Moscow. 
However, rather than saying that this shows how our understanding of the 
working class must change to incorporate mental labourers, Engelstein 




to incorporate “non-working class” forces. “The Moscow labor move-
ment of 1905 was not, strictly speaking, a ‘proletarian’ affair” because “it 
depended for its success on the support and participation of non-working 
class groups.”55 A more reasonable conclusion would be that our notion of 
the working class must expand to include manual and mental labourers.
Earlier, I cited Victor Serge, who on most issues was a strong supporter 
of the Bolsheviks, insisting that “the formation of the Chekas was one of the 
gravest and most impermissible errors that the Bolshevik leaders commit-
ted in 1918.”56 But here we see that the first Cheka was called into existence 
in 1917. This displacement of one year is perhaps explained by the fact that 
Serge, too, labelled the 1917 anti-Bolshevik strikers as petit-bourgeois (or, 
in his words “middle class”). He in fact devotes an entire chapter in his 
Year One of the Russian Revolution to the subject, titled “The urban middle 
classes against the proletariat.”57 He characterizes the strike movement of 
the autumn and winter of 1917 as being part of a revolt by the “middle 
classes in the towns,” who he describes as “the students of the military 
colleges, the youth of the high schools, the officials, the senior staffs, the 
technicians, the intellectuals, the socialists, all of them people of the mid-
dling sort, more or less exploited but highly privileged within the system 
of exploitation and participating in it.”58 Left there, this is quite unpersua-
sive. The category “people of the middling sort” is extremely imprecise. 
His approach does become more precise when, invoking Kritsman, he 
suggests that the “technical intelligentsia” is “simultaneously the organiser 
of production and of exploitation: it is thereby led to identify itself with the 
system, and to conceive of the capitalist mode of production as the only 
one possible.”59 But does this accord with the facts?
It is in fact extremely difficult to argue that the mass opposition to the 
Bolsheviks was restricted to middle-class, petit-bourgeois forces. Serge 
himself acknowledges that big sections of workers were a part of the strike 
movement—16,000 municipal employees and a “number of sections of 
skilled workers.”60 Among those skilled workers would be, presumably, 
the telegraph operators listed earlier. The telegraph—the indispensable 
connecting tissue linking the far-flung cities of the Russian empire—was 
intimately connected with the railways. The communication network 
depended on the physical transportation network, with the telegraph 




empire. Although undeveloped by Western European standards, the rail 
system was enormous and growing. Roger Pethybridge, the expert on this 
question, notes that “by October 1916 there were no less than 1,001,522 
personnel employed on the Tsarist railways, as compared with 432,000 in 
1898.”61 The workers on the rails were also central to the union movement: 
“the Railway Union became the largest of the workers’ organizations prior 
to 1917, embracing manual, clerical and administrative staff.”62 We saw in 
the introduction to this book the critical role the rail workers played in 
the events of that revolution. In Trotsky’s account of the events of 1917, he 
points out that when General Kornilov attempted to march on Petrograd 
and overturn the provisional government, “the railroad workers tore up 
and barricaded the tracks in order to hold back Kornilov’s army.”63 Stein-
berg saw this through a wider lens: “As on a signal, workers, soldiers, 
railway men, postal officials armed themselves, occupied all danger points, 
cut off the military headquarters from the rest of the country and forced 
them to complete capitulation.”64
Without question, the label “petit-bourgeois” cannot be used for the 
rail workers, who quickly became the main group of workers opposed 
to the Bolshevik seizure of power, as Leggett tells us: “On 29 October 
[11 November], Vikzhel, the Menshevik-influenced All-Russian Execu-
tive Committee of the Union of Railwaymen, delivered an ultimatum 
demanding—under threat of a general rail strike—that all socialist parties 
should negotiate for the formation of a widely based coalition govern-
ment.”65 These critical members of the working class did not strike, as the 
mental labourers did, but they did threaten a general strike, with the same 
demand as their white-collar counterparts—for a multiparty, as opposed 
to one-party, state. Theirs was a force that the Bolsheviks could not ignore. 
Vikzhel mediated talks in order to try and transition toward a multiparty 
state. Leggett provides some details:
Under threat of a strike that would halt the delivery of food to 
Petrograd, Vikzhel demanded the creation of a democratic coali-
tion government (often called in those days a homogenous socialist 
government) that ranged from the Popular Socialists to the Bolshe-
viks. Martov was not only the soul of this undertaking but actually 




the RSDLP (Unified), which up to that point had been denying that 
any agreement with the Bolsheviks was even feasible.66
The response from the Bolsheviks was to split the union. Unable to win 
a majority at the Railwaymen’s Congress, Bolshevik rail workers divided 
from Vikzhel and formed “a new Bolshevik-controlled executive body, 
Vikzhedor, composed from the unsuccessful minority at the Railwaymen’s 
Congress.” The job of supervising the railways was given to this new body. 
Economically, it was a disaster, resulting in what Pethybridge calls “chaos 
on the railways.”67 Politically, however, it was a success, creating a lever 
for the Bolsheviks among the rail workers that was capable of deflecting 
their threat.
Steve Smith argues that “most groups of workers—with the exception 
of certain ‘labor aristocrats’ and white-collar workers” supported the Bol-
shevik seizure of power.68 “Labor aristocrats” presumably refers to the rail 
workers, and “white-collar workers” to the public-sector strikers. Perhaps 
this is an adequate characterization of these big events—this class strug-
gle against Bolshevism of late 1917 and early 1918. Perhaps, however, we 
need to say more. Perhaps this working-class opposition to Bolshevism 
can be seen as the attempt to reassert workers’ agency over a revolution 
that had taken an increasingly substitutionist turn. Perhaps this was the 
attempt of the workers at the point of production to put their stamp on a 
revolution that had been initiated by the “temporary new class” described 
by Martov and Abramovitch, and that was increasingly under the control 
of the Cheka and other institutions of terror emanating from the minori-
tarian Bolsheviks.
There is a compelling logic to this latter interpretation, especially when 
we examine working-class support—or lack thereof—for Bolshevik rule in 
the subsequent years and months. Grégoire (Grigorii) Aronson describes 
the process of weakening support for the Bolsheviks within the working 
class:
The October Revolution was barely a month and a half old, when 
large masses no longer believed the slogans and promises of the 
Bolsheviks. Any sympathy for them was gone, and the benevolent 
neutrality of the previous weeks gave way to growing opposition. 




bodies), in early January 1918, had almost everywhere the effect of 
estranging the mass of workers from the Bolsheviks and changing 
their attitude towards them. After the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Brest Litovsk, the convening of the Constituent Assembly became a 
popular slogan. The need for a democratic state authority qualified 
to speak for the whole country became increasingly felt. And in the 
working class areas, sympathy for the Mensheviks and SRs, previ-
ously in decline, began to revive.69
The Constituent Assembly has been referred to periodically through-
out this book. The convening of such an assembly had been a demand 
of the anti-tsarist movement for a generation—to gather democratically 
elected representatives from every region of the empire, to formally con-
struct a new political order, and to address and try to solve the great 
problems of that empire, in particular the agrarian or land question. The 
election happened in November 1917, just three weeks after the Bolsheviks 
seized power. The assembly held one session on 5 (18) January, but was 
dispersed by armed sailors and never allowed to meet again. Oliver Radkey 
is the indispensable source for any study of this assembly. He argues that: 
“The election to the Constituent Assembly has two outstanding features: 
a uniqueness without parallel in the fortunes of other great peoples, and 
a death that makes it all but impossible to reassemble its shattered frag-
ments.”70 To the extent that it is possible, Radkey has reassembled those 
fragments. Table 1 provides a summary of his key findings. 
No party won a majority in the election. The Social-Revolutionaries 
received the greatest share of the vote (38.6 percent), but they put for-
ward their lists of candidates before that party divided and the Left 
Social-Revolutionaries (Left SRs) emerged as a separate party. It is impos-
sible to tell what portion of the overall SR vote would have gone to the Left 
SRs. Based on Radkey’s research, I have made a very rough approximation 
for areas we know were Left SR strongholds, thus reducing the SR totals 
Table 1. Percentage of total votes cast in the Constituent Assembly elections of  
November 1917
SR LSR (est.) Bolshevik Menshevik Kadet Ukrainian Other parties
Total votes cast 44,219,000 34.2 4.4 23.9 3.3 4.7 12.2 17.2
Urban, industrial areas
Petrograd, Moscow 1,707,000 3.6 8.9 46.3 3.0 29.9 0.2 8.1
Other Industrial 5,864,000 33.2 7.2 47.0 2.4 6.9 3.3
Armed Forces
Sailors 165,000 13.3 18.8 46.1 1.2 7.9 12.7
Soldiers at Front, North and West 1,817,000 23.7 61.9 0.9 1.7 9.6 2.3
Soldiers at Front, Other 2,153,000 50.0 22.0 5.4 1.7 16.5 4.5
Russian peasant areas 12,886,000 52.6 4.5 17.6 1.2 4.0 0.0 20.0
Key non-Russian regions
Ukraine 8,167,000 4.8 9.4 10.6 1.3 2.9 58.4 12.6
Transcaucasia (incl. Georgia) 1,887,000 5.6 4.6 30.2 1.3 58.3
Belarus 2,264,000 28.0 55.5 2.1 2.8 11.7
Baltic States 436,000 0.7 50.0 1.3 47.7
Other 6,872,000 53.7 9.6 3.8 3.9 1.0 27.9
Note: Percentages do not add 
up to 100 because there were 
many smaller categories of 
parties that are not included 
in this table.
Source: Compiled from 
statistics available in Oliver 
Henry Radkey, Russia Goes 
to the Polls: The Election to 





to 34.2 percent. Still, this certainly overstates SR support and understates 
Left SR support. The Bolsheviks came second, with 23.9 percent.
As important as the overall totals are the votes by region. In the two 
great urban centres of the Russian empire, St. Petersburg and Moscow, the 
Bolsheviks were dominant, winning close to half the vote. Their big rival 
in these cities was the liberal party—the Constitutional Democrats, or 
Kadets—which captured one-third of the vote. In the other industrial areas 
of the country, the Bolsheviks were similarly dominant, and the Kadets a 
non-factor. The sailors in the fleet voted 45.9 percent for the Bolsheviks, 
and the peasants-in-uniform on the northern and western fronts gave the 
Bolsheviks an astonishing 61.9 percent support. Soldiers on fronts further 
away from urban and industrial Russia backed the Social-Revolutionaries. 
The SR was also overwhelmingly dominant in the Russian peasant villages, 
outpolling the Bolsheviks 52.6 percent to 17.6 percent.
The non-Russian parts of the empire require separate treatment. Two 
of them—the areas that are today Belarus and the Baltic states—strongly 
supported the Bolsheviks. But in two others—today, Transcaucasus and 
Ukraine—Bolshevik support was risible: 4.6 percent and 10.6 percent, 
respectively. In Transcaucasus, of which Georgia is a part, national parties 
classified as “Turko-Tatar” by Radkey won 24.3 percent of the vote, and 
the Mensheviks—hegemonic among Georgian-speaking people—polled 
30.2 percent.
Any democratic government to emerge from this complex election 
would have had to take the form of a coalition. Could the Bolsheviks have 
positioned themselves at the centre of such a coalition? Certainly, a portion 
of the SR vote would have been willing to participate—that portion that 
was, in essence, Left SR, a party whose program was almost identical to 
the Bolsheviks. In table 1, I have identified 4.4 percent of the vote as going 
to the Left SR. That figure is based as much on guesswork as on statistical 
analysis and without question underestimates the Left SR’s real support, 
which was certainly far higher. And, interestingly, the very large bloc of 
votes that went to nationalist parties in Ukraine cannot, by any means, 
be written off as “bourgeois nationalist.” In at least three places—Poltava, 
Kharkiv, and Kherson—the Ukrainian Social-Revolutionaries mounted a 
joint list with the Bolsheviks’ closest allies—the Left SRs—and these joint 




of the Ukrainian nationalist vote should, in theory, have been amenable 
to coalition with the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs. It would, of course, have 
required a staunch defence of Ukraine’s national rights—something that, 
as we have seen, was not to characterize Bolshevik rule. It might, however, 
have led to an unfolding of different Russia–Ukraine relations than the 
appalling near genocide and artificially produced famine whose story was 
outlined in the introduction to this book.
In any case, coalition was not the road chosen. The Bolsheviks argued 
that the vote was illegitimate because its candidates were selected before 
the overthrow of the provisional government and before the emergence 
of the Left Social-Revolutionaries as a separate party. Rosa Luxemburg, 
from her prison cell, puzzled over why “such clever people as Lenin and 
Trotsky” didn’t pursue a different path:
Since the Constituent Assembly was elected long before the deci-
sive turning point, the October Revolution, and its composition 
reflected the picture of the vanished past and not of the new state of 
affairs, then it follows automatically that the outgrown and therefore 
still-born Constituent Assembly should have been annulled, and 
without delay, new elections to a new Constituent Assembly should 
have been arranged.72
No new elections were called, however, and the assembly was forcibly 
suppressed. The manner in which it was suppressed became itself a factor 
in working-class opposition to the Bolsheviks. A demonstration of some 
thousands, “workers with banners, office workers, and intellectuals,” 
marched to welcome the delegates to the Constituent Assembly, only to 
be fired upon by soldiers. The official death toll from this incident was 
twenty-one.73 Inna Rakitnikov, in a report on the demonstration prepared 
for the International Socialist Bureau, said: “On all the streets leading to 
the palace, groups of Red Guards had been established; they received the 
order, ‘Not to spare the cartridges.’ On that day at Petrograd there were 
one hundred killed and wounded.”74
When the assembly finally did convene, the Bolsheviks were in a dis-
tinct minority, and, as Chamberlin writes, “the soldiers and sailors in the 
galleries were the deciding force,” interrupting speeches from other par-




“impatient sailors in the gallery amused themselves by aiming their guns” 
at the head of SR leader Viktor Chernov.76 In the wee hours of the morning, 
after just one sitting, the assembly was dispersed, never to reconvene. 
Ironically, it was sailors from Kronstadt—the same Kronstadt that three 
years later became iconic as the last stand against one-party Bolshevik 
rule—who played a key role in dispersing the assembly. According to Israel 
Getzler, six hundred Kronstadt sailors were dispatched to be present when 
the assembly met. Kronstadt veteran Pavel Dybenko, who, as we earlier 
saw, was implicated in the assassination of the Kadet ministers, spoke 
for the sailors at the assembly. Another leader from Kronstadt, Fiodor 
Raskolnikov, led the walkout by the Bolshevik delegates. And it fell to 
Kronstadt sailor Anatolii Zhelezniakov to order the Assembly members 
to get out “because the guards are tired.”77
Contrary to some reports, this dispersal of the assembly by armed 
soldiers, and the violence that preceded it, did not go unnoticed. William 
Rosenberg writes of a “major outbreak of worker protest in Petrograd. 
. . . Thousands had gathered at the Obukhov works in the southeastern 
district of the city and at nearby plants in the Nevskii district, including 
the important Aleksandrovsk locomotive works. There were also protests 
at several plants in the Vyborg district, and at the Trubochnyi works on 
Vasil’evskii Island.”78
Rosenberg tells us how this working-class opposition to Bolshevism 
took organizational form:
It is largely in this context that one needs to understand the emer-
gence of the Conference of Factory and Plant Representatives as 
a center of worker dissidence. In mid-January [1918] a meeting 
described in the press as a “Workers’ Conference of the Union to 
Defend the Constituent Assembly” took place in Petrograd, organ-
ized in the main, apparently, by self-described “Right” Mensheviks 
disaffected from their Central Committee over the question of 
cooperation with the Bolsheviks. They were determined to build a 
new, representative movement “from below,” shedding formal party 
affiliations. Workers from a number of plants soon joined them in 
forming the conference as a broad-based assembly, hoping among 
other things to counter what one observer lamented as the Petrograd 




meeting of the conference convened in Petrograd on March 13 in 
the midst of new protests over the evacuation, which occurred most 
intensively just before Brest Litovsk, when it seemed the city might 
fall under German control.79
This working-class opposition also took political form. Vladimir Brovkin 
says that: “The Menshevik platform—which insisted that the unions must 
be independent from the employer, be it a ‘workers’ state’ or a private 
entrepreneur; that the soviets had to remain what they had been in 1917: 
workers’ political organizations and not agencies to run municipal servi-
ces—was gaining wide popular support.”80
Finally, the working-class opposition took the form of direct action—
strikes, demonstrations, and campaigns to take control of local soviets. 
The response from the Bolsheviks was increased repression. “In 1918,” 
writes Brovkin, “a wave of general strikes rolled across European Russia.”
General strikes took place in Tula, Nizhnii Novgorod, Kaluga, Tver’, 
Iaroslavl’, and other cities. The Bolsheviks arrested strike commit-
tees, imposed curfews, and declared a state of emergency. Violent 
clashes took place between the Cheka and the workers. The general 
pattern in the escalation of conflict between the Bolsheviks and the 
workers repeated itself over and over: the workers, angered by the 
Bolsheviks’ disbanding of the newly elected soviet, where the oppos-
ition had won, or by the postponement of elections, resorted to 
strikes and protest marches. The Bolsheviks responded with arrests 
and shootings, which in turn led to general strikes and uprisings, 
and on the part of the Bolsheviks to mass arrests, the complete shut-
down of the opposition press, and terror by August 1918.81
Working-class anger at the Bolsheviks coincided with growing peasant 
discontent:
By June [1918] the peasants, who in October had welcomed the 
redivision of land, were angered by grain requisitioning. The army 
had disintegrated, and the soldiers, formerly the backbone of 
Bolshevik support, had become peasants, bagmen on the roads, 
and unemployed—groups not friendly to the Bolsheviks. Even the 




Bolshevik victory in October, had begun to turn against the Bolshe-
viks. This was the beginning of a long road that was to lead to the 
sailors’ revolts in 1919 and Kronstadt in 1921.82
The story of the great Kronstadt revolt of 1921 has been told eloquently 
elsewhere.83 It was the culmination of mass peasant and workers’ move-
ments against Bolshevik policies. Orlando Figes documents the great 
peasant uprising against forced requisitioning, an uprising centred in 
Tambov, which began in August 1920 and was not finally suppressed until 
the summer of 1921. In Tambov and elsewhere, “much of the rural state 
infrastructure was swept aside by a huge tidal wave of peasant anger and 
destruction.”84 Jonathan Aves puts the uprising in Kronstadt in the context 
of a working-class uprising in Petrograd that was rooted in deep disaffec-
tion with Bolshevik rule. “By the end of 1920,” writes Aves, “a mood of 
extreme hostility amongst workers to the Communist Party dictatorship 
was developing.” This hostility was well-known to the leadership of the 
party. The Workers’ Opposition had proposed that a Congress of Produ-
cers should run the economy; Zinoviev, in March 1921, suggested that if 
such a plan went forward, “the Communist Party would receive only one 
per cent of the delegates.”85
The workers’ protests in Petrograd in the run-up to the Kronstadt 
rebellion have often been characterized as a “go slow,” or volynka, move-
ment. But Aves maintains that “the industrial unrest of February-March 
1921” needs to be seen as “a strike movement,” and that “the decision 
to abandon the policy of grain requisitioning was first made public” in 
response not to the Kronstadt rebellion but to this movement.86 However 
we evaluate these events, the fact of massive subaltern unrest against the 
Bolsheviks seems undeniable. The repression against the Kronstadt rebels 
was fierce. And while economic concessions were made (in particular, 
abandoning war communism and allowing free trade in grain), they were 
accompanied by a harsh political clampdown, “what Martov denounced as 
. . . ‘purely economic concessions without a change in the political order.’”87 
Israel Getzler’s judgment is harsh. The suppression of Kronstadt, he says, 
“marked a turning point, if not the terminal point, in the history of the 
Russian revolution. Lenin’s response blocked what was still left of the revo-




centralized and bureaucratized single-party dictatorship, and put Russia 
firmly on the road to Stalinism.”88 By 1921, the new state carved out of the 
old Russian empire bore no resemblance to that envisaged by any of the 
participants in the 1917 revolution. “Barbarous methods” had not proved 
fruitful in achieving any of the ends imagined by that generation.
Their Ethics and Ours
The question of ethics—of interrogating the relationship between ends 
and means—is deeply related to the tension between self-emancipation 
and substitutionism. Put another way, the constant evacuation of 
self-emancipation from the criteria by which political means are selected, 
and the resulting drift into substitutionist methods, has a clear ethical or 
moral dimension, on exactly the same plane as an “end justifies means” 
ethic. Self-emancipation is a means to an end—but for the Machiavellian, 
it is only one of many possible means. If that end can be achieved through 
other means, however unethical, so be it.
Unless of course, the ends we achieve are completely shaped by the 
means we employ. In fact, this is almost self-evident common sense. It 
takes a sophisticated theorist to make the opposite case. One who made the 
attempt was Leon Trotsky. His oft-cited Their Morals and Ours provides a 
coherent and digestible summary of what he saw as a historical-materialist 
approach to ethics. He accepts the charge, levelled at the Bolsheviks, that 
they saw the means employed as justified by the ends achieved. He denies, 
however, that this involved an expulsion of ethics from the question of 
political activity:
A means can be justified only by its end. But the end in turn needs 
to be justified. From the Marxist point of view, which expresses the 
historical interests of the proletariat, the end is justified if it leads to 
increasing the power of humanity over nature and to the abolition of 
the power of one person over another.89
Rather than being sophisticated, this is just sophistry. Specifically, it is not 
clear at what point we would identify the “historical interests of the pro-
letariat” as being served by the actions taken during the revolution. Their 




Gulag. They were also not served by the mass depopulation of Leningrad 
in 1934 and 1935, nor by the Great Terror of 1937 and 1938. The historical 
interests of the German proletariat in 1921 were ill-served by the instru-
ment created by the Russian Revolution, the Communist International. 
More generally, Trotsky’s claim that actions in the present can be ethically 
justified by results that make themselves visible only in the future perhaps 
provides a “rear-view mirror” standard for historians by which we can 
assess the justness of means employed, but it provides very little help for 
assessing actions in the present. But surely the very reason we have a field 
of study called “ethics” is because we realize that even if understanding 
is always retrospective, that is of little help when we peer into the future 
and try to assess what actions to take now. The Owl of Minerva and the 
rear-view mirror will do when we are writing our memoirs, but not when 
we are contemplating party or state policy.
Put it this way—we do not and cannot know the long-term, or even 
immediate term, consequences of our actions. The very nature of ethics 
is to provide guidance as to what actions to take in the present, pre-
cisely when we are not aware of how things will work out in the future. 
This dilemma can only be resolved by resorting to a deus ex machina—
displacing one’s own assessment of future possibilities to a far-seeing, 
omnipotent being. But whether this displacement is to an oracle, as in 
ancient times, or to a party or party leader in the modern era, it is a solu-
tion to the ethical dilemma in form only and is unsatisfying to any with 
an interest in self-determination and self-emancipation.
For the One Who Thinks Differently
In chapter 8, we saw that Souvarine and Trotsky assessed the evolution of 
the Russian Revolution within two key frameworks: the control of the sur-
plus and the dynamics essential to a hierarchical political party machine. 
In chapter 4, we saw Martov and Abramovitch introduce another, namely, 
the dynamics essential to the temporary new peasant-soldier class created 
from the horrors of the Great War. The essence of the politics within the 
industrial workers’ movement on which the socialist project had been 
based in Marx’s time was a battle for the extension of democracy—hence 
the name “social democracy.” In contrast, the politics within the move-




core, impatience with democracy and a tendency toward “direct action” 
through force of arms to settle disputes. This core aspect of the Martov/
Abramovitch thesis enriches our ability to understand the tragic degen-
eration of the revolution of 1917—the move from hope to horror.
Rosa Luxemburg, in 1918, wrote a piece specifically to criticize the 
Bolsheviks’ forcible suppression of the Constituent Assembly:
Freedom only for the supporters of the government, only for the 
members of one party—however numerous they may be—is no 
freedom at all. Freedom is always and exclusively freedom for the 
one who thinks differently. Not because of any fanatical concept of 
“justice” but because all that is instructive, wholesome and purifying 
in political freedom depends on this essential characteristic, and its 
effectiveness vanishes when “freedom” becomes a special privilege.90
Martov was one who was not afraid to “think differently”—opposing the 
governments of his day, opposing the leadership of his own party when it 
collapsed into pro-war social patriotism, opposing the Bolsheviks’ use of 
barbarous methods to try and achieve socialist ends. Luxemburg’s defence 
of “the one who thinks differently” and Martov’s historical-materialist 
exploration of the role of the temporary new class of peasants-in-uniform, 
along with the view they both shared, that ends cannot be separated from 
means—these can allow us to understand the big events we call the Rus-
sian Revolution.
The fact that Martov and Luxemburg are historical materialists in a 
classic sense is critically important. It means that we need not be restricted 
to “psychological factors” in explaining the Leninist distrust of self-activity 
and embrace of terror. It is helpful, in this regard, to return to the pre-
viously cited January 1919 program manifesto of the young German 
Communist Party and quote it at greater length.
During the bourgeois revolutions bloodshed, terror, and political 
murder were an indispensable weapon in the hands of the rising 
classes. 
The proletarian revolution requires no terror to realize its aims. 
It hates and despises killing. It does not need these weapons because 
it does not combat individuals but institutions, because it does not 




seek to revenge. It is not the desperate attempt of a minority to mold 
the world forcibly according to its ideal, but the action of the great 
massive millions of the people, destined to fulfill a historic mission 
and to transform historical necessity into reality.91
These were some of the last published words of Luxemburg, and they remain 
to this day one of the best short summaries of the key self-emancipation 
lessons from the Russian revolutionary era.
The very framing of this excerpt from Luxemburg takes us back to 
a theme touched on in part 2 of this book. The Russian revolutionaries 
aspired to straddle two revolutionary processes: the bourgeois (or, to use 
more contemporary language, “modernizing”) revolution against tsarism, 
and the working-class socialist revolution against capitalism. Oliver Crom-
well and Maximilien Robespierre both became agents of their respective 
country’s modernizing revolutions; both ended up being covered with the 
blood of victims from their own use of terror. Lenin, as a modernizing 
revolutionary, is in their company. We can make that historical parallel 
and in that sense understand what happened in the years following 1917. 
But doing so—putting Lenin and Trotsky at least to some extent in the 
same category as Cromwell and Robespierre—should serve as a warning 
sign should we attempt to look uncritically at these historical figures as 
models for contemporary, urban social movements. Clearly, the approach 
of Cromwell and Robespierre are of historical interest only. And this is 
how we should approach Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Clearly, their attempt 
to combine mass terror with a transition to socialism ended in abject 
failure—not to speak of moral degeneration on a colossal scale.
The Bolshevik Jacobins proved adept at constructing a weapon with 
which to raise money and build a party, and later, to overthrow the pro-
visional government and build a new state. But Luxemburg’s point in the 
manifesto quoted above is the theme of this concluding chapter—what is 
achieved from certain actions depends very much on how those actions 
are carried out.
It is not a matter of indifference that making a fetish of professional 
staff as the core of a party, with all that implies, created a belief in 
hierarchy inside the Bolshevik Party. That approach to party-building 
reflected a conspiratorial approach to politics and a distrust of openness 




Left. The distrust of the soviets in 1905 is a clear example of this. It was 
not the staff-driven Bolsheviks who were able to respond in a positive 
manner, but rather the scholar-activists (or journalist/scholar/organiz-
ers) in and around the Mensheviks. The “money question” that flowed 
from the staff model intersected with the emphasis on hierarchy to create 
the catastrophe of the period of expropriations, almost wrecking the 
party in the process. All of this generated a “bureaucratic type,” of which 
Stalin was the epitome. He could not consolidate his rule until the entire 
generation with which he had grown up had been eliminated. However, 
his political physiognomy was shaped by the particularly negative fea-
tures of that generation’s experience.
Part 1 of this book suggested that to get to the heart of that experience, 
we have to let ourselves listen to the experience of workers’ struggles that, 
at key moments, have defined the future of post-revolutionary Russia. 
Part 2 suggested that we have to put aside anti-Menshevik prejudices and 
read and study the great contributions of Martov and Abramovitch. Part 
3 suggested that, throughout this whole process, we cannot tolerate either 
a casual or a systematic anti-intellectualism that puts a wall of prejudice 
and shunning between ourselves and the subjects of our research—an 
anti-intellectualism into which Lenin descended after his divide from the 
Mensheviks in 1903. We have to let ourselves read Trotsky’s last book and 
try to let his intellectual journey speak to us on its own terms. We have 
to read Solzhenitsyn—perhaps disagree with him politically, but listen to 
his story of zek resistance to the hell of the Gulag. And we have to fully 
abandon a standpoint of reverence in our approach to Lenin—and for that 
matter, to all individuals associated with the Russian experience—and let 
history speak to us dispassionately and without filters of preconception. 
If we do so, we can see, for instance, the debates inside the Comintern 
as real debates reflecting real tensions between a substitutionist politics 
(which, if attempted in the twenty-first century, would end as badly as 
they did in the twentieth) and a politics of self-emancipation. In the end, 
it is the latter that is the only meaningful approach to social progress in 
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